The practices of happiness: political economy, religion and wellbeing by Steedman, Ian et al.

The Practices of Happiness
There is growing evidence that rising levels of prosperity in Western economies since 
1945 have not been matched by greater incidences of reported wellbeing and happiness. 
Indeed, material affluence is often accompanied instead by greater social and individual 
distress. A growing literature within the humanities and social sciences is increasingly 
concerned to chart not only the underlying trends in recorded levels of happiness, but to 
consider what factors, if any, contribute to positive and sustainable experiences of well­
being and quality of life. Increasingly, such research is focusing on the importance of 
values and beliefs in human satisfaction or quality of life; but the specific contribution of 
religion to these trends is relatively under­ examined. This unique collection of essays 
seeks to rectify that omission, by identifying the nature and role of the religious contribu­
tion to wellbeing.
 A unique collection of nineteen leading scholars from the field of economics, psychol­
ogy, public theology and social policy have been brought together in this volume to 
explore the religious contribution to the debate about happiness and wellbeing. These 
essays explore the religious dimensions to a number of key features of wellbeing, includ­
ing marriage, crime and rehabilitation, work, inequality, mental health, environment, par­
ticipation, institutional theory, business and trade. They engage particularly closely with 
current trends in economics in identifying alternative models of economic growth which 
focus on its qualitative as well as quantitative dimensions.
 This distinctive volume brings to public notice the nature and role of religion’s contri­
bution to wellbeing, including new ways of measurement and evaluation. As such, it repre­
sents a valuable and unprecedented resource for the development of a broad­ based 
religious contribution to the field. It will be of particular relevance for those who are con­
cerned about the continuing debate about personal and societal wellbeing, as well as those 
who are interested in the continuing significance of religion for the future of public policy.
John Atherton is Canon Theologian Emeritus of Manchester Cathedral and Honorary 
Research Fellow of the William Temple Foundation and of Manchester University, UK, 
with doctorates from Manchester and Uppsala Universities. His research and publishing 
interests have increasingly focused on the relationship between political economy and 
religion. Elaine Graham is Grosvenor Research Professor of Practical Theology at the 
University of Chester, UK, and was until October 2009 the Samuel Ferguson Professor of 
Social and Pastoral Theology at the University of Manchester, UK. Ian Steedman has 
been Professor of Economics at Manchester University and Manchester Metropolitan 
University, UK. He has a longstanding involvement in microeconomic theory, the history 
of economic thought and in the intersections among economics, ethics and social thought.
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Introductory essay
Developing an overview as context and 
future
John Atherton
Economics and religion: their relative jurisdictions
The long historic relationship between economics and religion is of high impor-
tance. For example, Judaism’s wisdom, prophetic and law traditions develop a 
strong constructive relationship with economic activities, located within the 
framework of God’s purposes and laws. The early Greek word for stewardship, 
oikonomia, plays a prominent part in the Greek New Testament in Christian tra-
dition in terms of illustrating moral and economic adequacy. It provides the root 
word for economics, as managing the household. In Muslim tradition, the Quran, 
reflecting the mercantile origins of the Prophet Mohammed, locates legitimate 
economic concerns within a deeply religious context.
 From these origins, the three Abrahamic Faiths developed a significant, if 
sometimes intermittent, involvement with economic priorities and theories, 
including in the Middle Ages with an emphasis on connecting justice to wages, 
prices and financial transactions (Wilson 1997). The early modern period wit-
nessed retreats from these positions of religious strength, with the emergence of 
commercial, financial and then industrial capitalism (Braudel 1981, 1982, 2002). 
The development of modern economics in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries witnessed, however, a revival of interest in the religious engage-
ment with economics. In Christian tradition, this evolved as Christian political 
economy in the early nineteenth century, through the works of Malthus, Sumner 
and Whately (Waterman 1991), and in the Islamic tradition the resurgence of 
Muslim interest free banking in the post 1945 period (Mills and Presley 1999; 
Hussain 2007). Significantly influencing these religious and economic under-
standings was a subtext relating moral concern to the promotion of human 
wellbeing.
 A majority of economists (and perhaps religious people to a lesser extent) 
would not see the need for or legitimacy of any such relationship. They would 
deny the value and relevance of a strong ethical dimension in economics, 
particularly as the twentieth century unravelled, from Robbins to Friedman and 
beyond (Sen 1992b: 7). Yet there is now a renewed interest to explore the con-
nections between economy, religion and ethics. In terms of religion, for example, 
the work of the Dalai Lama and the Abbot of Worth in Britain (Dalai Lama and 
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Cutler 1998; Jamison 2008) reinforces the importance of the development of 
wellbeing and happiness research.
 In seeking to clarify this re- emerging relationship there has been some con-
vergence around a model which suggests three dimensions in economics which 
can guide the nature of religious engagement with it. The first, basic or founda-
tional approach, relates to fundamental understandings of human nature and 
worth, including behaviour and beliefs, essentially an anthropology, which 
informs economic and religious understandings. The second dimension, as prac-
tice and policy, again reflects shared economic and religious interests. The third 
dimension, relating to the technical or scientific discipline of modern economics, 
is regarded by many if not most as the domain of economics alone. It is often 
argued, with some authority, that it is not the business of religion to interfere in 
this area of the autonomous nature of a discipline, such as economics as a social 
science. Support for this understanding is found in the work of the early Chris-
tian political economists, as elaborated by Waterman (Waterman 1991), with 
their distinction between what is essentially positive and normative economics. 
The former is the preserve of the technical or scientific field of economics, so for 
Whately: ‘Scripture is not the test by which the conclusions of Science are to be 
tried’ (Waterman 1991: 208). The latter is open, rightly, to the influence of ethics 
and religion, in terms of what kind of economics for what kind of society. 
However, these distinctions have been increasingly subject to critical scrutiny, 
particularly by developments in the philosophy of science which question the 
autonomy of scientific undertakings as value free (Sen 2009: chs 1/5; Putnam 
2002). They have also been challenged by the tradition of ethical economics, as 
a legitimate and a necessary dimension of economics, from the early recognition 
of normative as well as positive in early Christian political economy, through the 
work of Malthus (linking to Adam Smith’s earlier foundational work as moral 
philosopher), Marshall and Keynes to Sen, Stiglitz, Kahneman and Fogel today. 
The Swedish research project, ‘Ethical Reflections in Economic Theory and 
Practice’, 1996–2001 (Grenholm and Helgesson 1998, 2001) led by Carl- Henric 
Grenholm, one of the contributors to this book, particularly noted the critique of 
welfare economics by Sen and his wider scrutiny of the mainstream neoclassical 
economics’ understanding of economic behaviour and the human (Sen 1992b: 
31–32; Grenholm and Helgesson 2001: 11–14). None of these developments 
rejects the relative autonomy of the technical dimension of economics as a dis-
cipline in its own right, but they do question any attempt to promote economics 
as entirely value free or unduly autonomous, for example, as promoted by Fried-
man, that ‘Positive economics is independent of every value proposition or of 
every ethical position’ (Friedman 1953: 7).
 These distinctions and definitions may be usefully deployed in critical con-
versation with the findings from a conference on the influence of Christian prin-
ciples on economic thought, from a more biblically oriented perspective, held in 
the USA in 2002 (Henderson and Pisciotta 2005). This included examining the 
question ‘whether and to what extent the content of faith is relevant to the prac-
tices of academic disciplines’. The result suggested three roles of the Christian 
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economist: first, as ‘mainstream scholar’ to ‘excel in their discipline as it is 
understood among mainstream economists’, but then to inform such work by 
Christian convictions, for example, by technical research on ‘important issues 
that affect the world – issues that the Bible stresses, including the environment, 
debt forgiveness, healthcare and poverty’. Second, the Christian economist ‘as 
policy advocate’, recognizing that ‘policy making can never be completely value 
neutral’, and Christian values can be incorporated into economic policy. Again, 
as in the first role, contributions need to be ‘scholarly – historically based, empir-
ical and targeted for publication in top- quality, peer- reviewed journals’. Third, 
the Christian economist as ‘philosopher’, evaluating from a Christian perspec-
tive ‘the philosophical presuppositions underlying the foundations of eco-
nomics’, for example, critiquing the ‘neo- classical approach to understanding 
economic decision- making’ (Henderson and Pisciotta 2005: 4, 5, 7). Again, this 
contribution confirms the emerging judgement that recognizing the relative 
autonomy of economics does not preclude, but indeed increasingly confirms, the 
value of interdisciplinary engagements between economics and other disciplines. 
In this endeavour, religion and ethics have both a historic and a contemporary 
place.
Locating political economy, religion and wellbeing in context
The interest in happiness and wellbeing particularly emerges in the latter half of 
the twentieth century in a number of research fields including economics, psy-
chology and sociology. Although focused in particular disciplines, each includes 
developments which illuminate the subject of wellbeing and its wider dimen-
sions. The latter involves ethics and religion, including spiritual concerns, with 
findings crossing disciplines, and reinforcing the importance of ethics and 
religion.
 In economics, the pioneering work of Easterlin (Easterlin 1974, 2002) used 
national surveys of subjective wellbeing to question the supposed link between 
economic growth and welfare. He concluded that an increase in aggregate 
income does not buy greater popular happiness. Later work, by Inglehart et al. 
(2008), rather suggested that economic development, democratization, and 
acceptance of diversity were associated with an increase in feelings of free 
choice, linked to increased levels of happiness. Other research, for example, by 
Baker (Chapter 13, this volume), interestingly has linked these indices with reli-
gious participation. Easterlin’s work was corroborated by Scitovsky’s Joyless 
Economy (Scitovsky 1976), which argued that beyond a particular level of 
material comfort, further wealth does not add to wellbeing. Indeed, it could 
detract from it, unless accompanied by satisfying social and cultural activities. 
The later work of Oswald (1997), Easterlin (2002) and then Layard (2005) 
increased the profile of wellbeing research in economics, although it has always 
been contested (Johns and Ormerod 2007), not least because of its identity as 
subjective wellbeing – part of a long history of criticism, from Robbins (1938) 
who claimed it was impossible to say anything scientific about differences 
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between individuals’ feelings. In the related field of economic history, recent 
creative contributions by Fogel and Clark have added additional dimensions to 
these economic enquiries. Fogel, as a Nobel Prize winner in Economic Science, 
has deployed statistical analysis of demographic and health trends to illustrate 
the dramatic improvements in wellbeing since the later nineteenth century 
(2004). His earlier work, The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of Egalit-
arianism (2000) interacted technophysio evolution (the interaction of technolo-
gical and economic change with physiology), political realignments and religious 
Great Awakenings in the USA in the development of more egalitarian societies 
(a key feature of greater wellbeing). Clark’s more recent pioneering work, again 
heavily statistically oriented, suggests the movement into a post- Malthusian Trap 
economy and society. One of its key features is manifested in the emergence of 
the happiness hypothesis (Clark 2007: 374–377). Clark’s thesis, particularly his 
interpretation of culture as a cause of the Industrial Revolution in Britain, has 
become the focus of much critical attention, with an edition of the European 
Review of Economic History (2008) dedicated to its rigorous scrutiny.
 Developments in psychology reinforce the interdisciplinary achievements and 
potential of the work on wellbeing, particularly through the interaction between 
psychology and economics. For example, the work of the 2002 Nobel Prize 
winner in Economic Science, the psychologist Kahneman, indicates a large body 
of evidence that ‘the interpersonal comparisons of feelings are possible, and 
economists are recognising the importance of studying human behaviour’ 
(Diener et al. 2009: 16). His aptly titled contribution ‘Objective Happiness’ 
(1999) to Wellbeing: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology (Kahneman et al. 
1999) illustrated how the discipline of psychology has developed self- reporting 
subjective wellbeing to stand alongside objective measures as equally valid 
research tools in the social sciences. The work of Diener particularly reinforces 
these findings (Diener and Biswas- Diener 2008; Diener et al. 2009) in terms of a 
rigorous critical development of the definitions and measurement of subjective 
wellbeing/happiness. He has a clear recognition of the role of religion especially 
in the construction of such understandings. This conclusion is particularly high-
lighted by Haidt’s work, The Happiness Hypothesis: Putting Ancient Wisdom 
and Philosophy to the Test of Modern Science (2006). The work of psychologists 
has also developed wellbeing research into engagement with public policy 
(Diener et al. 2009) and a critique of economic structures. The latter features 
particularly prominently in James’s research, published as Affluenza (2007) and 
The Selfish Capitalist (2008), where he links increasing emotional distress with 
the emergence of more materialist selfish societies. The focus on the wellbeing 
of young children as a foundation of public policy, a particular feature of his 
work, is confirmed by other research, including Layard and Dunn’s A Good 
Childhood (2009) and particularly the epidemiologist Wilkinson’s (2005; 
Wilkinson and Pickett 2009).
 The discipline of sociology has developed research into social capital which 
also illustrates the potential of interdisciplinary work for enriching other disci-
plines, including economics and psychology. As defined by Putnam, it involves 
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‘Features of social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to 
act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives. . . . Social capital, in 
short, refers to social connections and the attendant norms and trust’ (Halpern 
2005: 2). Putnam, and others, present strong evidence that increased social 
capital of communities benefits personal and social wellbeing, with a reduction 
being linked to diminished wellbeing. A major decline in social capital from 
1960 to 2000, in terms of the severe erosion in volunteering and trust and the 
major increase in crime, family breakdowns and mental illness, warranted, for 
Fukuyama, its description as the Great Disruption (Fukuyama 2000). This mater-
ial feeds directly into policy making in terms of addressing such social deficits 
by increasing social capital through improving volunteering and trust, with clear 
benefits for personal and social wellbeing (Putnam 2000, 2004; Halpern 2005).
 This relationship between wellbeing research (including social capital) and 
public policy is of increasing importance, and is recognized in all the related dis-
ciplines. For example, in economics, Easterlin declares that ‘Appropriate public 
policies can increase the average level of subjective well- being’ (Easterlin 2003). 
So communities and individuals, once a modest level of economic wellbeing is 
achieved, need to focus more on relationships and public services or other non- 
economic, or more immaterial goods to improve the quality of life. In wellbeing 
surveys therefore, Scandinavian societies score significantly higher than the UK 
and the USA. Some economists involved in wellbeing studies also advocate a 
progressive consumption tax with household savings deductible from taxable 
income, to reward savings and discourage wasteful competitive consumption 
over status goods, while discouraging long hours of work to acquire unneeded 
goods (Frank 1999). Kasser (2002) and Offer (2006) suggest limiting advert-
ising, while Layard (2005) argues for, and indeed influenced the UK government 
to pursue, welfare- to-work programmes, better health services, and ethics teach-
ing in education. Psychologists have focused in particular on early childhood 
support (James 2007; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009), enhancing human rights, 
support (not disruption) of family and community networks, and improving 
employment rates and job security (Diener and Seligman 2004). Diener’s latest 
book, Wellbeing for Public Policy (Diener et al. 2009), reinforces this commit-
ment to link wellbeing and public policy. James (2007, 2008), with Wilkinson 
(2005; Wilkinson et al. 2009), and Fogel (2000) in economic history, argue 
strongly for reducing inequalities and promoting more egalitarian societies and 
relationships. This is firmly linked to improving wellbeing and reducing ill- 
being. In sociology, the proponents of social capital similarly argue for strong 
social wellbeing, including its clear benefits for personal wellbeing, through pol-
icies which focus on improving volunteering and trust, civic participation, and 
more egalitarian relationships. These objectives resonate strongly with Layard’s 
Big Seven for increased happiness, namely family, friends, work, income, health, 
participation and philosophy of life. The significance of this relationship between 
wellbeing studies in key disciplines and public policy reinforces one focus of 
this book, that on practice as an integral part of wellbeing studies, including the 
involvement of religion in them. Forrester, Graham and Atherton, for example, 
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have developed a new focus on practical and public theology as part of its recent 
re- engagement with the public sphere (Atherton 2000; Forrester 2000; Graham 
2004). The government has encouraged this involvement of faith- based organi-
zations in promoting greater social cohesion, an important feature in wellbeing 
research.
 The emerging socio- political context is also conducive to this renewed inter-
est in happiness wellbeing studies. For example, developments in economic 
history, particularly the works of Clark and Fogel, highlight the growing wealth 
of a post- Malthusian era, and its association with more egalitarian trends in 
society (Clark 2007; Fogel 2000). This movement into more immaterial or post- 
materialist needs and possibilities (Inglehart 1997) includes cultural, religious 
and spiritual aspects. Promoting personal and communal agendas is likely to 
become more positively inclined to the pursuit of greater wellbeing. This trend is 
confirmed by the rise of a new middle class in the last 15 years in emerging 
economies. For The Economist (2009: 17), they now constitute over half of the 
world’s population, creating not simply new markets, but also cultures that are 
more responsive to wellbeing agendas. A recent poll suggested that ‘such people 
are happier, more optimistic and more supportive of democracy than are the 
poor’. They are ‘more likely to invest in education and other sources of human 
capital’ – all features of the happiness hypothesis. Finally, all these trends are 
reflected in the growing awareness that traditional economic measurements of 
national wellbeing are increasingly insufficient. Even in 1968, Robert Kennedy 
was arguing that ‘the Gross National Product economic measurement does not 
allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education . . . or the 
strength of our marriages’ (New Economics Foundation 2009: 2). It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that governments, for example, France’s Commission on the 
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, and international 
organizations like the OECD are moving to develop broader definitions and 
measurements of human fulfilment (Stiglitz 2009). The National Accounts of 
Wellbeing, with an emphasis on personal and social wellbeing, have therefore 
been produced by the New Economics Foundation, and use the 2006 to 2007 
Cambridge survey of 40,000 people in 22 European countries (EU and non- EU). 
Clearly, these possibilities do not remove the central significance of economic 
measurements, but they do complement them with equally necessary informa-
tion for understanding and promoting greater human wellbeing. They are symp-
tomatic of a changing context, reinforced by research in various disciplines, 
which suggests the growing importance of happiness–wellbeing studies and 
related public policies in academia, society and religion. That agenda is in turn 
feeding back into measurements of economic growth.
Religion in wellbeing studies
The renewed interest of religion in wellbeing studies is multidimensional, 
reflecting its historic interests, the current resurgence of religion globally, its 
association with broader ethical concerns, and the limited, though growing 
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 recognition of religion’s role, nature and possibilities in wellbeing research in 
secular disciplines and literatures. It is the combination of these factors, with the 
clear glimpses of religion’s contributions to wellbeing in contextual trends, 
which confirms the significance of religion as a legitimate and necessary partner 
in the multidisciplinary endeavours of wellbeing research.
 Identifying religious concerns for wellbeing as a renewed project is but to 
illustrate its historic interests in, and major contributions to, our understanding 
of wellbeing. The pursuit of happiness is deeply embedded in human history, 
certainly from the ancient Greeks’ focus on eudaimonia or happiness as the good 
life, and the necessary virtues associated with its pursuit (McMahon 2006: 
19–65). The early and medieval Christian tradition of Augustine and Aquinas 
located that Greek tradition in a deeply Christian framework, interpreting the 
pursuit of wellbeing as conforming to God’s purposes, a telos which could only 
be fulfilled in the afterlife, as essentially ‘an ultimate goal of self- fulfilment’ 
(Kenny and Kenny 2006: 24). This long tradition was challenged and then com-
plemented by the fourteenth- century Duns Scotus who rightly argued that the 
pursuit of happiness as development of the self must be accompanied by the 
pursuit of justice as divine law. That tension between ‘independent and possibly 
competing ultimate goals’ (Kenny and Kenny 2006: 25) was played out in the 
late eighteenth century in the differences between the deontology of Kant and 
the teleology of Bentham with the dominance of the latter in classical and early 
neoclassical economics, and now promoted by Layard. This raises important 
arguments over the philosophical and ethical adequacy of modern economics 
(Grenholm and Helgesson 2001: 21). This reference to historic Christian under-
standings is intrinsically significant, not least because it helps clarify confusions 
in the current definitions of happiness and wellbeing. For example, the distinc-
tion between Aristotle and Aquinas, and then Scotus, leads usefully into the 
current definitional work of the Kennys, philosopher father and economist son 
(Kenny and Kenny 2006), since they work with the wider concept of wellbeing 
as inclusive of subjective wellbeing, welfare and dignity. Yet this definition, val-
uable as it is, is restrictive by comparison with Diener’s definition of subjective 
wellbeing, which includes: emotional wellbeing – how we feel; cognitive life 
satisfaction – how we judge we are doing in life; and psychological flourishing – 
to what extent we positively evaluate major domains or aspects of life, including 
health, work, relationships, leisure, religion or spirituality, and so on.(Diener and 
Biswas- Diener 2008: 4, 247–248). This more complex definition of subjective 
wellbeing or happiness certainly corresponds to Layard’s Big Seven features of 
happiness, and equally certainly includes key elements of the Kennys’ welfare 
and dignity concepts as well as their subjective wellbeing or contentment. The 
early work of Scotus, and to some extent that of the Kennys, also reminds us that 
the discipline of philosophy is an essential partner in the interdisciplinary work 
on wellbeing–happiness because, as Diener himself recognizes, the construction 
of subjective wellbeing, in terms of definition and measurement tools, has to be 
complemented by objective economic and social indicators of wellbeing, and 
because social as well as personal wellbeing has a strong ethical as well as 
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 religious dimension. Wellbeing is therefore also associated with an ability to 
connect to values external to oneself.
 The historic concern for wellbeing in Christianity and the other major faiths 
is now powerfully complemented by what is regarded in other literatures, for 
example, those of sociology, theology and political science, as the resurgence of 
religion in the later twentieth century. This resurgence is particularly illustrated 
by the rapid numerical growth of Islam but also Christianity, particularly in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. Out of a global population of 6.5 billion, over 
one billion are Roman Catholics, and over 500 million and still growing, Pente-
costals (Jenkins 2002: 2–6). These trends have also affected, but to a lesser 
extent, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism, including their greater political 
profile. In addition, this resurgence has taken a variety of forms, from Berger’s 
‘furious religion’ (Berger 1999: 2) including religious fundamentalisms, to a 
renewed interest, in Britain, the USA, Canada and Australia, in the reality and 
potential of faith- based contributions, including attention by governments. With 
regard to the latter, in 2001, UK Prime Minister Blair identified faith groups as:
playing a fundamental role in supporting and propagating values which bind 
us together as a nation . . . looking outwards to the needs of others, beyond 
your own immediate members, is a prime expression of . . . beliefs and 
values . . . [leading to] some of the most effective voluntary and community 
organisations in the country.
(Baker 2007a: 63)
All these developments could be seen as confirming the ‘exceptionalist’ argu-
ment in sociological, historical and anthropological literatures, that contempor-
ary secularization, as the relegation of religious belief to the periphery of 
personal consciousness and society, is an exception to all recorded history and, 
equally important, to contemporary experience (Davie 2002: 109; Huntington 
1998: 70; Macfarlane 2000: 256–257).
 The relevance of religion in and for wellbeing studies is both confirmed and 
advanced by the recognition of the nature and role of ethics in wellbeing 
research. This relationship between ethics and religion acknowledges their strong 
affinity without denying their clear distinction. The major world faiths all include 
strong commitments to ethical standards and ways of living, personally, socially 
and politically. Yet the importance and integrity of ethics, philosophically and 
practically, is a significant historic and contemporary reality, requiring distinc-
tive treatment without denying the interconnections between ethics and religion. 
For example, there is a strong tradition of ethical socialism in Britain, particu-
larly prevalent in the nineteenth century, and certainly evolving into the twenti-
eth century, as traced by Dennis and Halsey (1988). This is connected to, but 
should be treated as a distinctive strand from, English Christian socialism 
(Norman 1987). Steedman’s research, reflected in his contribution to this volume 
(Chapter 1), also identifies the presence of an equivalent ethical strand, including 
in the interpretation of wellbeing, in the development of neoclassical economics. 
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Both Halsey and Steedman, along with Keynes (1933), recognize the importance 
of Alfred Marshall in this tradition. The examination of contemporary and 
emerging trends, including the movement to post- materialist contexts, for 
example, in the work of Inglehart (Inglehart 1997), also includes the central 
importance of values in personal and social wellbeing. The wellbeing literatures 
are also beginning to acknowledge the importance of this ethical dimension for 
the development of human wellbeing (Griffin 1986; Sumner 1996). For example, 
the Kennys’ contribution includes a chapter, ‘Happiness and Morality’ (Kenny 
and Kenny 2006: 179–188), which carefully dissects this dimension, recognizing 
its varied and contested character historically and contemporarily. They usefully 
note three elements as essential for a moral system: ‘a moral community, a set of 
moral values, and a moral code’ (Kenny and Kenny 2006: 179). These confirm 
the interaction between personal and public morality, and its focus on ‘non- 
material values, such as justice, freedom and love’, the first being the subject of 
Sen’s latest book, The Idea of Justice (2009). Such valuable philosophical clari-
fications resonate with the contribution of Layard on happiness, with its focus on 
the common good, a philosophy of life and the promotion, in public policy con-
sequences, of the teaching of ethics in the educational syllabus (Layard 2005: 
95, 199–201).
 The emerging focus, in the study of religion in the academy, confirms its 
relevance in the analysis and promotion of wellbeing, including as the sociology 
of religion (the International Society for the Sociology of Religion) and the psy-
chology of religion (the International Association for the Psychology of Reli-
gion). In the USA, these have strong connections with parent bodies, including 
the American Psychological Association (Francis 2007: 39). Such relevant 
research in the academy is confirmed by the growing evidence of the strong 
association between religious participation and a ‘host of positive outcomes 
including lower crime rates and less delinquency’, but also with family life, vol-
unteering, health including mental wellbeing, and civic participation (Diener et 
al. 2009: 28). There is much overlap here with social capital literatures (Putnam 
2000: Halpern 2005).
 These constructive connections between religion and wellbeing are beginning 
to be clearly acknowledged in psychology, economics and sociology.
 In psychology, the Dieners’ basic introduction to happiness studies includes a 
useful chapter, ‘Religion, spirituality and happiness’, which acknowledges the 
historic and contemporary importance of religion for personal and communal 
wellbeing. It also recognizes the deep relationship between religion and spiritu-
ality, but also the latter’s distinctive character, including as secular spirituality 
(Baker and Miles- Watson 2008). These interpretations are developed more com-
prehensively by the psychologist Haidt (2006).
 In economics, the work of Layard particularly identifies and elaborates the 
nature and role of religion and spirituality in happiness, including in his founda-
tional Big Seven as ‘personal values (philosophy of life)’ (Layard 2005: 71). 
Both religion and spirituality, and their connections and distinctions, are 
acknowledged particularly in the promotion of wellbeing, including the use of 
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classic tools from the religious tradition of spiritual development or ‘mystical 
tradition’ (Layard 2005: 192), in Buddhism and the Dalai Lama, the Roman 
Catholic tradition exemplified by St Ignatius Loyola’s ‘spiritual exercises’, and 
Protestantism and the Quaker tradition. Layard also promotes its practical 
deployment as ‘education of the spirit’ through curriculum development (Layard 
2005: 199). They are also located by Layard in a related self- help group, Alco-
holics Anonymous, in psychological traditions, as positive psychology, and the 
development of philosophies of life, including as communally expressed (his 
chapter 7, ‘Can we pursue a common good?’). In terms of his understanding of 
the nature of religion, he particularly notes its foundational recognition of the 
importance of that which lies beyond ourselves, or, in the language of religious 
tradition, the experience of the transcendent, again, also located in secular tradi-
tions and experiences, including Maslow’s Religions, Values and Peak Experi-
ences (1964: 1976). This acknowledgement of religion’s core character is 
particularly evident in Layard’s emphasis on what some ‘call this source of 
comfort “divine” and . . . one of the most robust findings of happiness research: 
that people who believe in God are happier’ (Layard 2005: 72).
 In sociology, the detailed work of Putnam, as already noted, identifies the 
importance of religion as a very significant contribution to the development of 
strong social capital. This includes the robust performance of religious in com-
parison with non- religious contributions to the formation and nurturing of social 
capital, for example, as measured by their respective contributions to volunteer-
ing, charitable giving, altruism, trust and political participation. For Putnam, 
churchgoers were ‘substantially more likely to be involved in secular organisa-
tions, to vote and participate politically in other ways and to have deeper 
informed social connections’ (Putnam 2000: 66). This judgement also needs to 
acknowledge that certain forms of religion, including more hierarchical, intro-
verted and dogmatic forms, are likely to contribute less to wellbeing or, indeed, 
to incorporate negative characteristics and outputs (Halpern 2005: 178–179; 
Farnell et al. 2003: 33–34).
Religion’s nature, role and its measurement in relation to 
happiness–wellbeing
Current enquiries into religious capital are likely to be very productive for the 
field of religion and happiness research. For example, the Leverhulme Trust has 
funded a three- year research programme by the William Temple Foundation 
(WTF ), ‘Faith and traditional capitals: defining the scope of religious capital’ 
(2007–2010). Religious capital, though a contested concept, can also be 
developed as part of various capital notions. It is normally regarded as a subset 
of social capital, but could also be located in the religious field, as religious 
capital (Faithful Cities 2006; Atherton 2008). Earlier WTF research into a 
variety of churches in deprived areas of Manchester concluded that religious 
capital usefully describes the output of faith communities as a contribution to 
personal, social and community wellbeing (Baker and Skinner 2006). As such, it 
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can be described, quantified and costed, as we shall see below. The WTF 
research also concludes that religious capital is connected to spiritual capital, as 
the motivating or energizing force of such outputs, in terms of beliefs, public 
and private worship, the living of religious narratives, norms, practices and net-
works, including spirituality. The Leverhulme research programme extends this 
material to include churches, mosques, Hindu temples, Buddhist groups and 
postmodern spirituality groups. Government is traditionally interested in the 
functional character of religion, as religious capital or practical outputs. What 
the WTF research is also recognizing is the equally significant contribution to 
practical outputs of the energizing or motivating forces, as spiritual capital, and 
the value of developing adequate measurement systems for this, in conversation 
with other related disciplines, including psychology and economics.
 With regard to the latter, these developments or findings in religious research 
can be usefully interacted with what some secular literatures regard as the nature 
and role of religion in promoting greater human wellbeing. For example, what 
begins to emerge from these literatures can suggest a profile of the religious 
sources of wellbeing which has seven features, using the research of the British 
economist Layard (L), the American psychologist Diener (D) and the British 
practical theologian Swinton (S) (2001).
 Reflecting on this profile of the religious sources of wellbeing (see Table 1), 
it becomes possible to discern connections with other profiles. For example, it 
links robustly to the New Economics Foundation’s National Accounts of Well-
being, as the table indicates, and its use of personal and social wellbeing cat-
egories. This, in turn, connects to key features of the Christian tradition as tested 
in Sweden and Britain (the central part of the table), and to other chapters in this 
book. These convergences, both secular and religious, suggest an emerging con-
sensus on the shape of wellbeing. This is of particular importance for building 
partnerships to promote greater wellbeing in the twenty- first century. Yet it also 
reveals clearly where much of the particular religious added value lies; for 
example, note the clear gaps in the National Accounts of Wellbeing, when com-
pared to the secular profile of religion and the Christian traditions’ accounts – 
namely, connections to a reality greater than the self, as the transcendent, as 
God, leading to the importance of ritual, including as worship and meditation, 
and of the religious upbringing of the young. These three features are the particu-
larly powerful parts of the energizing force, as spiritual capital, of religion’s dis-
tinctive added value. In terms of their implications for public policy, both the 
shared and distinctive features can be connected to two main contemporary prac-
tical expressions of Christianity, including links with public policy: on the one 
hand, as working in partnership with others, including government, business, 
civil society and other faiths, as expressing the shared values noted in Table 1 (it 
is here that the major potential of religious contributions to public policy is 
located; see also Jones (Chapter 14, this volume), Gilbert (Chapter 12) and 
Atherton (Chapter 6); on the other hand, religious contributions can be critical 
of, and sometimes embody alternatives to, mainstream society including its 
dominant academic traditions (reflecting, in particular, distinctively different 
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religious values noted above, and in Table 1): for example, as fair trade (North-
cott, Chapter 7).
 Ways of identifying and then measuring such religious contributions to well-
being can be developed from these profiles of the religious contributions to 
society, particularly in terms of religion’s added value. As observed above, some 
secular research has already noted and estimated this religious added value. For 
example, Putnam’s research in the USA judged that faith communities, com-
pared to their secular equivalents, are ‘arguably the single most important depos-
itory of social capital in America’ (Putnam 2000: 66). Nearly 50 per cent of all 
associational memberships are church related, and half of all volunteering occurs 
in a religious setting. This research was confirmed by the North West Develop-
ment Agency’s two reports in 2003/2005, identifying and then costing the actual 
contributions of faith groups to society. It concluded that they contribute 
between £90.7 and 94.9 million- worth of voluntary action each year to the 
region, not including their major contributions to the education of children, stu-
dents and adults. Importantly, much of this work is self- funded: 73 per cent of 
respondents said they received no government funding (Faith in England’s 
Northwest 2005: 3).
 These findings are extended by the work, for example, of the Center for Spir-
ituality, Theology and Health at Duke University in the USA, which reports:
a series of clinical studies which suggest amongst other things: improved 
rates of recovery for cancer patients who report involvement in faith com-
munities; enhanced longevity amongst those who attend synagogues; slower 
rates of cognitive decline in those experiencing the onset of dementia and 
[a] marginal impact on aspects of coping strategies in relation to recovery 
from serious illness for religious people. 
(Center for Spirituality, Theology and Health 2008; Graham 2009: 11–12)
 It is the extension of the measuring of impacts beyond religious capital as the 
practical outcomes of religion, into spiritual capital as the energizing force of 
religious outcomes, which is also likely to be important for identifying ways of 
extending the contributions of religion to wellbeing in the area of public policy. 
Here the work of Leslie Francis (Chapter 8, this volume) is significant. His 
deployment of the secular Oxford Happiness Inventory, from the field of posit-
ive psychology, alongside his own scale of attitudes to religion, is particularly 
productive. The latter uses, in Christianity’s case, five key components of Chris-
tian faith: God, Jesus, Bible, prayer and church. His scale is usefully valid across 
age groups, Christian denominations and languages. It has also been tested, 
appropriately adapted, in Judaism, Islam and Hinduism. His work suggests posit-
ive associations between attitudes to religion and happiness scales, after taking 
into account gender and personality differences. In addition, the WTF is seeking 
to develop further ways of measuring such spiritual capital using the seven fea-
tures of secular understandings of the religious contribution to happiness (see 
Table 1), confirmed and extended by their correspondences to the major insights 
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and experiences of Christian tradition. This has been provisionally called a spir-
itual capital added value index (SCAVI). As such, it would sit alongside the 
work in psychology, economics and sociology, as a substantial profiling of the 
religious contribution to the promotion of greater wellbeing. This would there-
fore be located as an important part of these wider understandings, including as 
contributions to public policy.
Interpreting the range of religious or theological 
contributions to wellbeing–happiness
As an academic discipline, with historical and contemporary significance in the 
academy, Christian theology plays an important role in the development of reli-
gious contributions to wellbeing studies. The nature and role of other religions in 
relation to wellbeing can similarly be charted.
 The nature and role of religious beliefs and experiences, whether shared with 
other disciplines and practices or identified as distinctively and critically differ-
ent (or, indeed, elaborated as both shared and different), have featured promi-
nently in this introduction to happiness and religion studies. As in any social 
science or discipline, Christianity represents a range of theological views, lan-
guages and practices, varying from hard to soft theologies of God’s revelation to 
the human. These are often related to a spectrum of religious traditions within 
and between denominations. Added to this is a range of aspects of this study of 
‘the human experience of God, or systematized reflection on the human experi-
ence of God’ (Francis 2007: 36), varying from biblical studies of sacred writ-
ings, church history and systematic theology to Christian ethics and practical or 
pastoral theology. Most of these ranges of theological experiences, opinions, tra-
ditions and practices are represented in this collection.
 Since this project on happiness and religion is so strongly linked to other dis-
ciplines owing to the nature of the shared subject of study – human flourishing – 
and because of its connections to the work of other disciplines, it is appropriate 
to develop this understanding of the complex nature of the religious contribu-
tion, both in itself and in relation to the following chapters, in terms of the dif-
ferent ways in which theology engages with other disciplines. For Leslie Francis, 
in his ‘Empirical theology: defining the task and selecting the tools’ (2007), this 
can best be represented as a spectrum moving from theology as essentially 
intradisciplinary to theology as interdisciplinary. It is a mode of interpretation 
which applies as much to the social sciences as to theology.
 First, theology as intradisciplinary emphasizes the proper independence of 
theology from the social sciences. It therefore claims the relative independence 
of other social sciences, and generates greater focus on more robust traditional 
theological concepts as against deploying more modern concepts. It can there-
fore generate strong critiques of the findings and assumptions of secular disci-
plines, including in the political economy and happiness literatures. It can also 
possess a more idealistic view of faith groups in terms of their beliefs and prac-
tices, in contrast to its more critical views of secular beliefs and practices. For 
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example, the chapters criticizing capitalism, global trade and institutions reso-
nate with this perspective. This critical stance relating to happiness literatures 
emphasizes, for example, the Christian tradition of abstinence and ambivalence 
over materialism, and locates ultimate happiness in the afterlife. Here, note the 
emphasis, in Rodwell and Miles- Watson, from the disciplines of environmental 
science and anthropology respectively, on the importance of locating wellbeing 
in an exploration of past and future, as well as present in terms of indigenous 
understandings of community life, the communion of saints, and constructive 
engagement with the non- personal.
 The second way of working theologically relates to the interdisciplinary per-
spective, as theology’s constructive or positive engagement with the social sci-
ences essentially as a process of interaction or two- way traffic. The theologian in 
such a perspective can advance debate in social sciences in the same way that 
the social scientist would advance debate in theology, to their mutual benefit. 
The chapters by Atherton, Berry, Brown, Francis, Gilbert, Graham, Grenholm, 
Heslam, Jones, Reader, Riordan, Sedgwick, Steedman and Thatcher contain 
illustrations of this perspective.
 There is also an emerging recognition of the value of interacting these two 
ends of what is essentially a spectrum of interpreting theological studies and the 
nature of their relationships with other studies. For example, both ends of this 
spectrum acknowledge the growing importance of faith- based experiences and 
contributions to personal and social wellbeing, as a distinctive or authentic field 
of interest (Bourdieu 1992: 1–44). This includes a recognition of its added value, 
including its two operational forms as partnerships and as distinctively different, 
as noted above. Particular considerations of this religious intradisciplinary added 
value are included in Northcott (Chapter 7) on fair trade, representing the latter 
way of operationalizing religious engagement with society, while the former, 
more partnership- interdisciplinary oriented, will be found in the works of 
Thatcher (Chapter 11) on family, children and marriage; Baker (Chapter 13) on 
volunteering, membership of faith groups and happiness; Lorimer (Chapter 15 
on circles of support for the rehabilitation of paedophiles; and Gilbert (Chapter 
12 on mental health and spirituality.
 In addition, two contributions to knowledge are raised by this theological 
engagement with happiness, which are also of wider significance. First is the 
recognition of the growing importance in the academy and public policy of the 
nature and role of religion in the public square. This has become even more rele-
vant with the emergence of a post- secular or post- materialist age, which requires 
continuing engagement with the forces of secularization, and yet also recogni-
tion of the reappearance of religion’s significance. This involves acknowledging 
the historic identity, and the past and contemporary engagements of religion with 
society. In terms of the religious capital or practical contributions of religion to 
society, this also involves a proper recognition of the actual and potential role of 
religion in its contributions to personal and social wellbeing, without in any way 
discounting its manifest dangers. The task is to promote dialogue between the 
secular and religion in the academy and public policy. It certainly is not to 
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assume that the secular is right or wrong, but to pursue an open- ended commit-
ment to improving wellbeing, including the recognition of the nature and value 
of religion. It is encouraging that these wider contributions to wellbeing studies 
are both confirming the importance of such a religious offering to the theory and 
practice (including public policy) of wellbeing, and also helping to clarify the 
nature and role of religion in such a public square. Both Riordan’s contribution 
(Chapter 16), particularly its reference to the common good (also found in 
Layard), and Graham’s contribution (Chapter 18) noting the value of the liminal, 
between public street and religious sanctuary, are also creative contributions to 
this development of the constructive participation of religion in the public arena 
for the greater wellbeing of all.
 The second innovative contribution is to push the findings in wellbeing litera-
tures beyond the traditional though generally accepted anthropocentric interpre-
tation of personal and social wellbeing to include, and engage with, the 
non- personal (or beyond the human). This is elaborated in terms of a more ade-
quate environmental understanding, so central to the future of human wellbeing, 
and includes the inanimate as well as the animate world (Rodwell, Chapter 17). 
This is complemented by Miles- Watson’s anthropological study (Chapter 9, 
therefore also adding another discipline to the wellbeing studies), relating to 
understandings of indigenous peoples, and the wider religious traditions and 
experiences of encompassing the non- human as an intimate part of human 
experiences and wellbeing. Both go significantly beyond the traditional confines 
of sustainability in wellbeing understandings, for example, as found in the work 
of Nobel Economic Laureate Stiglitz’s valuable reflections on moral growth as 
‘growth that is sustainable, that increases living standards not just today but for 
future generations’ (Stiglitz 2005).
Outline of the book
The book includes the findings of a research network funded through the innov-
ative and highly creative ‘religion and society’ programme, reflecting the collab-
oration of two research councils, the AHRC and ESRC. The network represents 
the work of 18 academics and a reflective practitioner, Charlotte Lorimer. Most 
come from the UK, but two are from the wider EU, from Sweden and Estonia. 
All the contributions were developed and refined in two residential consultations 
but each essay remains the sole responsibility of its author. The division of the 
19 essays into three parts reflects the multidisciplinary nature of wellbeing 
research, encompassing political economy (Part I), and other social sciences 
(Part II), and more foundational, philosophical reflections (Part III). All come 
from religious traditions. They reflect the differences in theological traditions 
and experiences, including location on the continuum from intradisciplinary to 
interdisciplinary, as noted above.
 The essays can also be usefully located in relation to the emerging debate in 
economics, for example, through the work of Layard. In terms of his Big Seven 
constituents of happiness: family and marriage occupy the essays by Thatcher 
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and Brown, but particularly the former. Income is referred to in Atherton’s 
essay, and friendship in both Miles- Watson’s and Gilbert’s. Work engages the 
attention of both Sedgwick and Brown, and health, particularly mental health, of 
Gilbert’s essay. Participation is explored by Baker, and philosophy of life 
particularly by Riordan and Graham.
 Four other related features in wellbeing research, most prominently part of 
Layard and other economists’ work in this field, are also addressed. The first 
explores, from a faith- based perspective, the negative alternatives to wellbeing 
or good social capital (reflecting the other end of the spectrum, as ill- being, 
unhappiness, life dissatisfaction and bad social capital). These include the impact 
of crime on individuals, families and communities (perpetrators and victims), 
addressed by Christopher Jones, and as a case study of rehabilitation, in the 
related essay by Charlotte Lorimer. Adrian Thatcher’s essay explains the added 
value of marriage, particularly with regard to the development of children (a key 
aspect of wellbeing) recognizing the less effective, and in some cases damaging, 
other forms of relationship. This therefore relates to recognizing the problem of 
the high incidence of the breakdown of relationships in the post- 1960 period in 
the West. John Atherton’s essay on the pursuit of more egalitarian societies, not 
least given the increasingly recognized damaging consequences of inegalitarian 
societies for wellbeing, again explores resonances and differences in faith- based 
contributions to such ways of improving wellbeing. Finally, Tony Berry’s essay 
on institutional functioning and malfunctioning highlights the importance of 
another capital, institutional capital, for wellbeing, not least with reference to the 
deficiencies of the Church of England as an institution.
 Second, the place of ethics in relation to economic theory is examined in 
some detail by Ian Steedman, with reference to the neoclassical tradition in polit-
ical economy. Carl Henric- Grenholm, from Uppsala University, explores eco-
nomic theory from the particular perspective of theological ethics, in 
conversation with philosophy (Nussbaum) and economics (Sen).
 Third, the growing recognition of, and advances in, alternatives to main-
stream economic practice and theory is paralleled, in certain important respects, 
in Chapter 7 by Northcott on fair trade, representing the contribution of faith- 
based traditions exploring different ways of constructing economic theory and 
practice.
 Finally, recognition of the position and importance of developing adequate 
measurement systems in wellbeing studies is paralleled and complemented by 
the research by Leslie Francis with regard to its related potential for measuring 
the distinctive religious contribution to happiness.
Conclusion: future directions
The emerging recognition of the valued understandings of the nature and role of 
religion in wellbeing studies crosses key disciplines, including economics, psy-
chology and sociology. There is also an emerging acknowledgement of the value 
to be gained from a creative interaction between them which is of mutual benefit 
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for the disciplines involved, and, more importantly, for the pursuit of greater 
wellbeing. Building on these initial findings, the work of 19 contributors in and 
to this research network has both confirmed and developed these understandings. 
This is particularly, understandably, with reference to the nature and role of the 
discipline of religious studies, located in the historic but also contemporary sig-
nificance of religion in human development. The added value character of that 
religious contribution is especially relevant to the multidisciplinary endeavour. 
In the light of this general conclusion, the research project suggests three main 
findings which, in themselves, also contain implications for future research, 
including within the multidisciplinary engagement with wellbeing. Although 
each is of value in itself, they move logically from the more general to the par-
ticular, from the value of happiness–wellbeing studies, to that of the religious 
contribution, and to that of developing more adequate measurements of the 
latter.
 First, the research into religion and happiness was clearly, rightfully and crea-
tively, located in the wider wellbeing studies, their definitions, roles and meas-
urements. The contribution of each discipline, particularly economics, 
psychology and sociology, was both of significance and particularly enriched by 
interdisciplinary activity. This research project confirmed this and has also dem-
onstrated the value of incorporating the religious contribution, as theory and 
practice, into these studies. Compared with the other involved disciplines, this 
religious contribution needs far more work done on it, but we argue that the 
possibilities and feasibility of this have begun to be seriously demonstrated. A 
similar judgement relates to the value of interdisciplinary work on such a shared 
and vitally significant research subject as human wellbeing. All disciplines, 
while respecting, rightfully, the importance of pursuing their relative autonomy, 
will clearly benefit from these interactive processes. The value of behavioural 
studies in psychology, and increasingly in economics, illustrates this. Our 
research also suggests the high relevance to this multidisciplinary project of the 
disciplines of philosophy, anthropology and environmental science.
 Second, the research has begun to elaborate further the hints in the wider lit-
eratures of the nature and role of religion in wellbeing. This has been the 
project’s particular focus, enriched and provoked by location in these wider 
frameworks, as the reflection on theology as intra- and interdisciplinary revealed. 
Yet, equally, this spectrum also confirmed the importance of theology itself, as a 
discipline in the academy, for example, in wellbeing research. It is the develop-
ment of its self- understanding, including, though not exclusively, in critical con-
versation with other disciplines, that will reinforce and elaborate this contribution 
in itself and to wider studies. Engaging such a research area as wellbeing also 
has implications, as we have begun to see, for the discipline of theology, includ-
ing in its various subject disciplines, from the study of sacred literatures, church 
history and dogmatics, but particularly for Christian ethics and public or prac-
tical theology. The recognition of the importance of engaging the issue of the 
proper role of religion in the public square, in the academy, as well as public 
policy, will also necessarily benefit from these developments, including, for 
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example, constructing more adequate measurements of faith- based contributions 
to personal and social wellbeing. The extension of the study of human into non- 
human wellbeing will also become of increasing importance given the emerging 
environmental crisis.
 Finally, the development of more adequate measurement systems emerges as 
of particular though not exclusive importance, from the above general recogni-
tion of wellbeing studies, and then for the particular contribution of religion to 
them. Serious progress has already been made in other disciplines in valuing and 
measuring the practical contributions of religion to personal, social and national 
wellbeing. What is absent is an equally strong endeavour to clarify the nature, 
role and measurement of the motivating or energizing force behind that religious 
contribution. This research project has indicated how this is beginning to be 
refined and achieved, and how it can be developed further. Success in this task 
will complement the wider endeavours within the discipline itself and equally 
importantly, develop its contribution to wider interdisciplinary studies. Driving 
all this, is the shared commitment to promoting greater human wellbeing, now 
extended into non- human wellbeing, and even further, as Layard has recognized, 
in his reflections on personal values and philosophy of life. The latter has 
perhaps been more carefully elaborated by Beatrice Webb over 100 years ago, 
when she argued that, in terms of the pursuit of ends other than means, it was 
‘best to live “as if ” the soul of man were in communion with a superhuman force 
which makes for righteousness’ (Tawney 1953: 128). This represents, for many, 
the summation of the religious contribution to wellbeing. Yet some of its power 
arises from a shared understanding of wellbeing between morality and religion, 
integral to religion’s nature and role. It is to the comprehensive and plural char-
acter of the religious contribution that this research has pointed, clarified and 
acknowledged as a value in itself, but also of wider significance.

Part I
Political economy

1 Economic theory and happiness
Ian Steedman
The general diffusion of any interesting idea is liable to generate a penumbra of 
popular misunderstandings and false assumptions, no matter how careful are those 
who promulgate that idea. The claim that increases in national income per head, 
beyond a certain minimum level, will give rise to no increase in human happiness 
is no less subject to this risk than any other challenging claim. In particular, it may 
come to be associated in popular thought with the notion that economists are 
bound to be surprised by such a claim, or even to regard it as a direct refutation of 
their most fundamental ideas. Any such notion is, of course, nonsense and ought 
to be exposed as such, both because truth is better than falsehood and because 
intelligent policy discussion about wellbeing can only be hindered by mispercep-
tions of what economic theory does and does not have to say on this issue.
	 The	modest	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	thus,	first,	to	recall	what	has	been	said	
about	wellbeing	and	income	by	a	number	of	major	economists.	Specifically,	we	
shall consider some of the writings of Marshall, of Wicksteed, of Pigou, of Hicks 
and of de Van Graaff. Second, we shall turn to a brief consideration of some 
recent contributions to the literature on ‘the economics of happiness’.
Alfred Marshall (1842–1924)
Since Marshall’s Principles of Economics, which went through eight editions 
from 1890 to 1920, is unquestionably one of the founding works of modern 
mainstream economics, we begin by considering what Marshall had to say there 
about	 economics	 and	wellbeing;	 for	 our	 purposes	 it	will	 suffice	 to	 restrict	 our	
attention to the eighth edition (1920), without mentioning differences among the 
various editions.
 Marshall’s Principles, naturally enough, is not a treatise on the ethics of the 
good life but that does not inhibit Marshall from giving many indications of 
what he took to be components of such a life and of how he took them to be 
related	to	economic	matters.	On	the	very	first	page	of	the	text	we	read	that	the	
Principles is:
on the one side a study of wealth; and on the other, and more important side, 
a part of the study of man. For man’s character has been moulded by his 
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every- day work, and the material resources which he thereby procures, more 
than	by	any	other	influence	unless	it	be	that	of	his	religious	ideals;	and	the	
two great forming agencies of the world’s history have been the religious 
and the economic.
(1920: 1)
Character is not only shaped, Marshall claims, by the nature of one’s work: ‘very 
often	the	influence	exerted	on	a	person’s	character	by	the	amount	of	his	income	
is hardly less, if it is less, than that exerted by the way in which it is earned’ (2). 
Nevertheless, it ‘is true that in religion, in the family affections and in friend-
ship,	 even	 the	 poor	may	find	 scope	 for	many	 of	 those	 faculties	which	 are	 the	
source of the highest happiness’, even if the conditions of ‘extreme poverty . . . 
tend to deaden the higher faculties’ (2). We learn at once, then, that for Marshall 
‘character’ is of central importance (being related to both occupation and 
income) and that ‘the highest happiness’ relates to religion, family affections and 
friendship. It is thus unlikely that the remaining 850 pages of the Principles will 
teach any simple doctrine that happiness increases if and only if real income per 
head increases.
	 Leaving	the	question	of	character	aside	for	the	moment,	we	may	dwell	briefly	
on some of Marshall’s further hints as to the constituents of happiness. In the 
course of denying that economists are necessarily ‘adherents of the philosophical 
system of Hedonism or of Utilitarianism’ (17, n.1), Marshall hints (indirectly) 
that ‘true happiness is not to be had without self- respect, and that self- respect is 
to be had only on the condition of endeavouring so to live as to promote the 
progress of the human race’ (ibid.). Somewhat less grandly, he speaks of ‘the 
pursuit of science, literature and art for their own sake’ and of ‘the desire for 
excellence for its own sake’ (88–89; this in connection with ‘wants and activ-
ities’ – see below). Moreover, ‘a person’s happiness often depend[s] more on his 
own physical, mental and moral health than on his external conditions’ 
(133–134). Marshall can thus refer to ‘those habits of body, mind, and spirit in 
which alone there is true happiness’ (136, emphasis added). The constituents of 
happiness are to be found in a person’s dispositions, not in their possessions.
 What motivates people to act as they do? Marshall does not imagine that they 
always and everywhere pursue their true happiness! Yet their motivations are 
taken to be complex, even when they engage in economic activity. Thus:
What makes one course answer better than another, will not necessarily be a 
selfish	gain,	nor	any	material	gain;	and	it	will	often	have	been	argued	that	
‘though this or that plan saved a little trouble or a little money, yet it was 
not fair to others,’ and ‘it made one look mean,’ or ‘it made one feel mean’.
(21)
Considerations of trouble, money, fairness, reputation and self- respect can thus 
all function as motives. With respect to the earning of money, as a motive, it 
must be remembered that
Economic theory and happiness  25
Money is a means towards ends, and if the ends are noble, the desire for the 
means is not ignoble. [Money] is sought as a means to all kinds of ends, 
high as well as low, spiritual as well as material.
(22)
And if economics says much about earning money, ‘this is so, not because 
money . . . is regarded as the main aim of human effort [but because] it is the 
one convenient means of measuring human motive on a large scale’, pace 
Carlyle and Ruskin (ibid.). Earnings are, in any case, only one of various 
motives	 influencing	 a	 choice	 of	 occupation,	 others	 being	 the	 pleasure	 of	 the	
work itself, the delight in striving for achievement, social standing and class 
solidarity (23).
 If the economist cannot always give full weight to the powerful motives of 
family affection, charity, duty and love of one’s neighbour, this is ‘not because 
they are not based on self- interest’ but because their action is not law- like. Were 
they governed by discernible laws, economists could and would take fuller 
account of them (24). Economics is by no means restricted to the consideration 
of self- regarding motives, ‘in fact the variety of motives [is] among the chief 
subjects with which we shall be occupied in this treatise’, Marshall writes (25). 
It is thus no surprise that he will have no truck with the idea of ‘economic man’. 
For Marshall, economists:
deal with man as he is: not with an abstract or ‘economic’ man; but a man 
of	flesh	and	blood.	They	deal	with	a	man	who	is	largely	influenced	by	ego-
istic motives in his business life . . . but who is also neither above vanity and 
recklessness, nor below delight in doing his work well for its own sake, or 
in	 sacrificing	 himself	 for	 the	 good	 of	 his	 family,	 his	 neighbours,	 or	 his	
country; a man who is not below the love of a virtuous life for its own sake.
(26–27)
Marshall’s ‘man as he is’, we learn, ‘desires not merely larger quantities of the 
things he has been accustomed to consume, but better qualities of those things; 
he desires a greater choice of things, and things that will satisfy new wants 
growing up within him’. He comes to ‘desire change for the sake of change’ (86) 
and this leads Marshall ‘to remark with Senior that, “Strong as is the desire for 
variety, it is weak compared with the desire for distinction” ’ (87). While Mar-
shall tends to see such changing wants in a positive light (see below on ‘Wants 
and activities’), he is far from blind to their downside. He notes ‘the Buddhist 
doctrine that . . . real riches consist not in the abundance of goods but in the 
paucity of wants’ (136) and remarks on his own account that ‘the only direct 
effect of an increase in wants is to make people more miserable than before’ 
(690). He observes too that
after a time new riches often lose a great part of their charms. Partly this is 
the result of familiarity, which makes people cease to derive much pleasure 
26  I. Steedman
from accustomed comforts and luxuries, though they suffer greater pain 
from their loss.
(135)
(Even in a much earlier work of 1879, Pure Theory of Foreign Trade and 
Domestic Value, Marshall had stressed that custom and habit can introduce irre-
versibilities into consumption behaviour.) How, then, could Marshall have been 
shocked by the claim that time- series income growth need not be correlated with 
happiness?
 If Marshall was well aware that life is far from being exhausted by ‘eco-
nomic’ considerations, he did not, of course, belittle them. He saw them as being 
of	great	 importance,	 in	 that	 they	influence	the	 things	 that	do	ultimately	matter.	
The ‘question [whether all can have a fair chance of a cultured life] cannot be 
fully answered by economic science. For the answer depends partly on the moral 
and political capabilities of human nature’ (4); but economics is nevertheless of 
great	 relevance	 to	any	answer.	Any	reader	who	has	been	unduly	 influenced	by	
uncritical versions of the ‘economics and happiness’ thesis may then be sur-
prised	 to	find	 that	Marshall	goes	 straight	on	 to	assert	 that	 ‘the	bearing	of	eco-
nomics on the higher wellbeing of man has been overlooked’ (ibid.); that is 
perhaps not a statement that Marshall would retain in a hypothetical 2010 edition 
of his Principles!
 As	 Marshall	 draws	 closer	 to	 detailed,	 specific	 questions	 about	 the	 relation	
between measured economic magnitudes and wellbeing he seems to vacillate 
somewhat (the same is true of both Wicksteed and Pigou). On the one hand, he can 
write that ‘A shilling is the measure of less pleasure, or satisfaction of any kind, to 
a rich man than to a poor one’ (19) and, again, that ‘a pound’s worth of satisfaction 
to an ordinary poor man is a much greater thing than a pound’s worth of satisfac-
tion to an ordinary rich man’ (130). And he can ask quite explicitly ‘how far the 
exchange value of any element of wealth, whether in collective or individual use, 
represents accurately the addition which it makes to happiness and wellbeing’ (85). 
Indeed he opens Book III, chapter VI with the words, ‘We may now turn to con-
sider	how	far	the	price	which	is	actually	paid	for	a	thing	represents	the	benefit	that	
arises from its possession’ (124). At the same time, however, he can suppose that 
‘this is not important in comparing two [large] groups composed of rich and poor 
in like proportions’ (19, marginal summary and text) and that for large groups of 
people ‘there is even some primâ facie probability that equal additions to their 
material resources will make about equal additions to the fullness of life, and the 
true progress of the human race’ (20). This is no ill- considered chance remark on 
Marshall’s part, for he writes much later in the text (131):
On the whole however it happens that by far the greater number of the 
events with which economics deals, affect in about equal proportions all the 
different classes of society; so that if the money measures of the happiness 
caused by two events are equal, there is not in general any very great differ-
ence between the amounts of happiness in the two cases.
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It will be clear here that Marshall is both recognizing the theoretical problem of 
principle and hoping that in practice it will not matter too much.
 Even if two alternative ways of increasing income by the same amount will 
indeed change happiness by the same amount, questions remain as to the extent 
and permanence of that amount. We have already seen that Marshall was aware 
that familiarity can wear away an initial increase in happiness; he notes too that 
an increase in income can be misused, for example, through
that unwholesome desire for wealth as a means of display which has been 
the chief bane of the well- to-do classes in every civilized country . . . it 
would be a gain if the moral sentiment of the community could induce 
people to avoid all sorts of display of individual wealth.
(136–137)
And	he	later	refers	to	‘a	mere	increase	of	artificial	wants,	among	which	perhaps	
the grosser wants may predominate’ (690). For Marshall, it would seem, there 
are bad as well as good ways of deploying increased command over resources.
 Such considerations bring us back to Marshall’s concern with character and 
his related emphasis on activities or pursuits (as opposed to wants). These are 
rather delicate matters in that they are simultaneously of great importance to 
Marshall	and	yet	difficult	to	pin	down	and	to	render	at	all	precise.	Only	a	brief	
outline can be attempted here and the interested reader is referred to Whitaker 
(1987, section II) and to Raffaelli et al. (2006: entries by Bateman, Coats and 
Raffaelli) for further discussion.
	 We	noted	above	that	the	very	first	page	of	the Principles takes ‘man’s charac-
ter’	 to	 be	 of	 central	 importance	 and	 for	Marshall	 it	 is	 not	 something	 fixed;	 it	
evolves, and progress – real progress – is essentially concerned with the uplift-
ing of character. Wants (sometimes thought to lie at the heart of economic 
theory) are, for Marshall, only of secondary, albeit genuine importance. Thus:
even for the narrower uses of economic studies, it is important to know 
whether the desires which prevail are such as will help to build up a strong 
and righteous character. And in the broader uses of those studies . . . the 
economist . . . must concern himself with the ultimate aims of man, and take 
account	of	differences	in	real	value	between	gratifications	that	[have]	equal	
economic measures.
(17)
Since	‘human	nature	can	be	modified	[and	has	been]	very	much	even	in	a	few	
generations’ (752), one cannot assess economic events or policies while ignor-
ing their effects on character. While earlier economists had ignored this, 
according to Marshall, ‘modern economists keep constantly in mind the fact 
that [man’s character] is a product of the circumstances under which he has 
lived’ (764; this should surely have been made a prescriptive rather than a 
descriptive statement? I.S.).
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 What did Marshall regard as an improvement in character? Unsurprisingly, 
perhaps, he provides no neat, compact answer to this question but he certainly 
writes	with	approval	of	an	increased	willingness	to	postpone	immediate	gratifi-
cation	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 future	 benefits,	 of	 prudence	 and	 self-	control,	 of	 self-	
respect,	of	unselfishness	and	of	willingness	to	act	for	the	public	good	(680).	He	
is similarly positive about:
an increase of intelligence and energy and self respect; leading to more care 
and judgement in expenditure, and to an avoidance of food and drink that 
gratify the appetite but afford no strength, and of ways of living that are 
unwholesome physically and morally.
(689)
 Such qualities of character are linked not only to wants/desires but also to 
ways of acting, to activities and pursuits. While Marshall devotes Book III to 
‘Wants and their satisfaction’ (and no Book to activities), he insists that ‘while 
wants are the rulers of life among the lower animals, it is to changes in the forms 
of efforts and activities that we must turn when in search for the keynotes of the 
history of mankind’ (85). And he soon repeats and develops the point:
Speaking broadly therefore, although it is man’s wants in the earliest stages 
of his development that give rise to his activities, yet afterwards each new 
step upwards is to be regarded as the development of new activities giving 
rise to new wants, rather than of new wants giving rise to new activities.
(89)
The agents studied by Marshall, then, were poles apart from the caricature ‘eco-
nomic	man’	who	is	of	a	fixed	nature	and	selfishly	concerned	only	with	acquiring	
material	means	to	satisfy	his	given	wants.	His	difficulty	–	and	let	no	one	under-
estimate its genuine nature – was that it was (and is) easier to speak of outputs, 
purchases and consumption than of ultimate goals, evolving human character, 
and so on. Marshall took the former to be related to the latter and therefore 
worthy of discussion but he could never have suggested that measured national 
income	 per	 head	 is	 of	 ultimate	 significance,	 or	 is	 even	 guaranteed	 always	 to	
promote that which is.
Philip Henry Wicksteed (1844–1927)
Wicksteed would not normally be thought of as a ‘welfare economist’ and we 
shall	therefore	consider	him	more	briefly	than	either	Marshall	or	Pigou	(see	the	
following section). It is nevertheless highly relevant to refer to him here, since 
his Common Sense of Political Economy of 1910 provides a brilliant demonstra-
tion that economic theory has not the least need of any concept of the ‘economic 
man’, that the agents considered in economic theory are ‘whole persons’ with a 
wide range of motives – including the social, the altruistic, the cultural, the polit-
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ical	–	and	that	any	idea	that	human	flourishing	could	be	reduced	to	having	a	high	
income is merely laughable. (The same could be said of Adam Smith, of course 
– and has been; see e.g. Rothschild 2001). As Lionel (later Lord) Robbins put it 
in his 1933 Introduction to the Common Sense, with reference to ‘the belief that 
the whole structure of Economics depends upon the assumption of a world of 
economic men, each actuated by egocentric or hedonistic motives’, Wicksteed 
‘shattered this misconception once and for all’ (xxi).
 Right from the beginning, Wicksteed rejects outright any ‘attempt to establish 
any distinction whatever between the ultimate motives by which a man is actu-
ated in business and those by which he is actuated in his domestic or public life’ 
(4).	His	approach	‘does	away	at	a	stroke	with	the	hypothetically	simplified	psy-
chology of the Economic Man’ (ibid.). We must take the economic agent
as	we	find	him,	and	are	to	examine	the	nature	of	those	relations	into	which	
he enters, under the stress of all his complicated impulses and desires – 
whether	 selfish	or	unselfish,	material	 or	 spiritual	 –	 in	order	 to	 accomplish	
indirectly through the action of others what he cannot accomplish directly 
through his own.
(ibid.)
He soon moves on to illustrate his argument by considering a simple economic 
purchasing decision, which quickly proves to turn on considerations of social 
standing, respect for others, concern for the agent’s children and concern for suf-
fering in a distant country (21–23). Nor is this example to be regarded as 
somehow exceptional, for Wicksteed later states expressly that all motives are 
always to be taken account of in explaining any economic action (163–165; 
Wicksteed acknowledges but shows little interest in the only serious alternative, 
that of paying no attention to any motives at all).
 Wicksteed’s background assumption here is not that agents have other ulti-
mate goals, in addition to that of acquiring goods and services. To the contrary, 
such acquisition is never an ultimate goal in his view. These
things, of which money gives us command, are, strictly speaking, never the 
ultimate objects of deliberate desire at all . . . there is no ultimate object of 
desire which itself enters into the circle of exchange and can be directly 
drawn thence.
(152)
One can buy an aspirin but not the absence of a headache, a luxury yacht but not 
genuine self- respect or the sincere admiration of others. If goods and services 
are only means towards the more subtle constituents of wellbeing, why should 
any intelligent person suppose that more goods and services will always ensure 
greater welfare?
 If all motives bear on all actions, what does it mean to speak of ‘economic’ 
as opposed to other activity? For Wicksteed, the crucial point is that in a 
30  I. Steedman
straightforward sale and purchase, the seller is not seeking to further the interests 
of the purchaser, and the latter, likewise, is not aiming to further those of the 
former. Wicksteed characterizes such a situation as one of ‘non- tuism’ (180), 
part of his point being that neither the seller nor the purchaser is necessarily 
guided	by	egoistic	selfishness;	they	could	each	be	aiming	to	benefit	some	(differ-
ent) third party. The famous trio who provide your dinner (Adam Smith’s 
butcher,	brewer	and	baker)	need	not	be	pursuing	selfish	ends	just	because	they	
are not pursuing your ends.
 Wicksteed has been well described as ‘a purist’ of economic theory – and his 
response to being told that economic growth might not increase happiness, or 
that particular economic policies might fail to increase happiness even though 
they increase economic output, could only have been ‘Well, fancy that. Now tell 
me something interesting’.
Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877–1959)
While Wicksteed could be somewhat critical of Marshall’s economics, Pigou 
was among the foremost – perhaps was the foremost – of Marshall’s disciples. 
He was very open about this and, indeed, dedicated his Wealth and Welfare 
(1912) to ‘Dr. Alfred Marshall’. This work was later expanded into The Eco-
nomics of Welfare (1920), which Sir John Hicks took to be the ‘standard repre-
sentative’ of the earlier welfare economics. He went on to say:
It is such, not only in its own right, but as the culmination of a great line of 
economic thought. A whole series of economists, among whom Dupuit, 
Walras, Marshall and Edgeworth deserve particular mention, [contributed to 
this line] . . . the Economics of Welfare is essentially a systematisation of this 
tradition.
(1939: 697)
Medema, however, gives a slightly different emphasis, suggesting that, 
While Pigou claimed to build his welfare economics on Marshall, the line of 
descent runs more strongly from Sidgwick to Pigou . . . the most accurate 
characterisation of Pigou’s work here would be to say that he put Sidg-
wick’s ideas into a Marshallian theoretical framework.
(2006: 640)
 In this section we shall consider Wealth and Welfare (WW hereafter) and The 
Economics of Welfare (EW hereafter, citing the 4th edition of 1952), without 
attending to any delicate questions concerning changes over time in Pigou’s 
theory. We shall also touch on the late (1951) paper by Pigou.
 As Hicks (1975: 311) has observed, the central subject of EW, Parts I, II and 
IV, is the national income (the National Dividend in Pigou’s terminology) rather 
than welfare. The reason for this is clear – Pigou took it that national income 
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tended to be positively related to welfare. Indeed, Hicks suggests that Pigou was 
‘too optimistic’ concerning the relation between merely economic welfare and 
total welfare (318) and de Van Graaff has agreed (see below). But Medema goes 
too far in saying that Pigou was simply ‘tipping his hat to economic welfare in 
the broader sense’ (2006: 641) when he made his various qualifying remarks 
about any positive relationship between the national income and welfare. As we 
shall	see,	Pigou	drew	clear	and	explicit	attention	to	many	significant	doubts	and	
qualifications	about	any	such	relationship.	He	may	have	been	‘too	optimistic’	in	
his practical judgement of how matters would tend to work out on balance – but 
he was very clearsighted about potential pitfalls and himself considered, some 
90 years ago, several of the issues much bruited about by present- day critics of 
economic growth. Without in the least seeking to play down Pigou’s emphasis 
on the National Dividend and his ‘optimism’ concerning its positive relationship 
to wellbeing, we shall focus here on the more interesting matter of his awareness 
of the complexities surrounding these issues.
 Pigou states immediately that ‘Welfare can belong only to states of con-
sciousness’ and that ‘Welfare means the same thing as good. It . . . cannot be 
defined,	 in	 the	 sense	of	being	analysed.’	Thus	 ‘welfare	 includes	 states	of	 con-
sciousness only, and not material things or conditions’ (WW: 3). Nor does he 
reduce consciousness to ‘satisfaction’, for he writes explicitly that ‘Every con-
scious state is a complex of many elements, and includes not only satisfactions 
but also cognitions, emotions and desires’ (WW: 5; see also EW: 10, 14 for 
similar statements).
 Unsurprisingly, Pigou soon starts to narrow his focus. ‘Of welfare in general 
economic welfare is one part. It is welfare arising in connection with the earning 
and spending of the National Dividend’, or, in other words, ‘of those parts of the 
community’s net income that enter easily into relation with the measuring rod of 
money’ (WW: 3). In EW (11) he almost repeats this and then quotes with approval 
Cannan’s statement, in Wealth: 17, that ‘there is no precise line between economic 
and non- economic satisfactions’. (Wicksteed would perhaps have omitted the 
word	‘precise’.)	Pigou	then	faces	at	once	the	difficulty	that	economic	welfare	and	
welfare in general can change in different directions. Even more pointedly, some-
thing affecting economic welfare may also affect other aspects of welfare and 
hence the better policy with respect to the former may or may not be the better 
with respect to overall welfare. Pigou states that this is of practical importance, not 
just a logical possibility (WW: 4–5). He even says that ‘anything in the nature of 
rigid inference from effects on economic welfare to effects on total welfare is out 
of the question’ (WW: 11). The matter is of course taken up again in EW: ‘an eco-
nomic cause may affect non- economic welfare in ways that cancel its effect on 
economic welfare. This . . . requires careful consideration’ (EW: 12). Pigou even 
states that the divergence between the change in economic welfare and that in total 
welfare	‘will	be	very	wide’	in	some	fields	(EW:	20)	but	does	then	make	the	bold	
(hazardous?) judgement that they will ‘probably’ be of the same sign.
 Behind any economic aggregate such as the national income there lie, of 
course, innumerable individual decisions and choices. Pigou notes very clearly 
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that choices are based upon expected outcomes which need not always accu-
rately	reflect	actual satisfaction outcomes; choice can lead to disappointment (or 
favourable surprise). He suggests, in fact, that expectations of satisfaction ‘are 
frequently erroneous’ (WW: 9). In any case, desire is not necessarily proportion-
ate to the ‘good’, as Pigou illustrates through the examples of gambling, opium, 
basic food and clothing, the arts, and drinking (WW: 10–11). As he put it nearly 
40 years later, if ‘some sorts of satisfaction are in their nature better than others’ 
(shades of J.S. Mill?) then the maximization of satisfaction is not equivalent to 
that of goodness (1951, as partially reprinted in 1952: 846). The whole of Book 
I, chapter II in EW is devoted to these issues. After speculating that the possible 
disproportion between expected and achieved satisfaction is perhaps not a major 
problem in practice, he writes: ‘To this general conclusion, however, there is one 
very important exception. [It] has to do with people’s attitude toward the future’ 
(EW: 24). There is, he thinks, a general tendency to attach too great an impor-
tance to the present and the immediate future, relative to the more distant future; 
as he puts it, ‘our telescopic faculty is defective’ and this preference for the 
present is a ‘wholly irrational preference’ (EW: 24–25). Noting that some of the 
satisfactions resulting from our present actions may accrue not to us but to others 
(some of them not even known to us), Pigou deduces that the practical con-
sequence of ‘our [defective] telescopic faculty’ is that we shall both save too 
little and take inadequate care of ‘Nature’s gifts’ (EW: 26–28). (Only the igno-
rant can suppose that an awareness of environmental issues is a recent novelty 
for economists; see also WW: 7–8.)
 Like Marshall, Pigou makes it clear both that people learn and change and 
that such change can be related to economic events; he is interested too in 
character:
The core of feeling and purpose, which we call people’s character, is sus-
ceptible	 .	.	.	 of	 modification	 .	.	.	 The	 surroundings	 of	 work	 react	 upon	 the	
quality of life. Ethical quality is affect by the occupations . . . into which the 
desires of consumers impel the people who work to satisfy them.
(WW: 5–6)
Personal relations at work, Pigou suggests, affect welfare, whether for the better 
or for the worse (ibid.). EW has a lot more to say on the matter of hours of work; 
Pigou suggests, for example, that, ‘From a mistaken view of their own real inter-
est, work people may welcome an addition to the hours of labour of a sort which 
augments the dividend but damages economic welfare’ (EW: 85–86) and the 
point is strongly emphasized again later (467). More generally with respect to 
work, Pigou notes that people are both ends and means, and worries that society 
might	so	concentrate	on	people	as	the	second	(means)	that	it	sacrifices	‘the	non-	
economic	welfare	embodied	in	the	first’	(people	as	ends)	(EW:	13).	Even	more	
pointedly, ‘efforts devoted to the production of people who are good instruments 
[of production] may involve a failure to produce people who are good men’ 
(EW: 14).
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 Of course it is not only work and workplace relations that can change people. 
Thus	 ‘non-	economic	welfare	 is	 liable	 to	 be	modified	 by	 the	manner	 in	which	
income is spent’ and the ‘effect upon the quality of people produced by public 
museums	 .	.	.	 is	 very	different	 from	 the	 reflex	 effect	 of	 equal	 satisfactions	 in	 a	
public bar’. In Pigou’s judgement, such matters are ‘obviously of large practical 
importance’ (EW: 17). Moreover, easier provision of a good or service may 
increase the desire for it and Pigou cites libraries, savings banks, public houses, 
lotteries and concerts as possible examples (EW: 82–83; see also WW: 26). 
What matters most in this connection is the long- term response; when a group of 
people have fully adapted and themselves changed in desires, habits and expecta-
tions, ‘will they really derive more satisfaction from the last state of their envir-
onment	than	they	did	from	the	first?’	Pigou	continues:
The point is a very important one. If the per capita income of this country 
were, say, twenty times what it actually is, it may well be that a further 
increase in it would not ultimately – the population being supposed constant 
– add anything at all to economic welfare.
(EW: 84)
Can anyone seriously suppose that a Rip van Winkle Pigou would be in the least 
shocked by the ‘new’ economics- and-happiness literature?
 Some of Pigou’s examples quoted above make it clear enough that, like Mar-
shall, he was ready to give voice to his own values in the course of presenting 
his analysis. It is no great surprise, then, that Pigou can worry that higher wages 
could be spent on such worthless pleasures as drink (WW: 28–29). Essentially 
the same point is put more generally when Pigou claims that ‘a sudden and sharp 
rise of income is likely to be followed by a good deal of foolish expenditure 
which involves little or no addition to economic welfare’ (EW: 91). He is not 
entirely pessimistic here, however, and – returning to the theme of learning and 
adaptability – he suggests that the higher income can be adjusted to, with ‘capac-
ities and faculties adapted for the enjoyment of the enlarged income’ (ibid.). But 
Pigou is unlikely to forget that we can consume foolishly, for he has cited Sidg-
wick to the effect that while we give to others what is good for them, we give to 
ourselves what we like (EW: 18)!
 Pigou is more generally alive to the role of ‘others’ when he remarks that 
‘The satisfaction a man obtains from his economic environment is, in great part, 
derived, not from his absolute, but from the comparative, magnitude of his 
income’ (WW: 23). The point is put even more forcefully in EW by means of a 
quotation from J.S. Mill:
Men do not desire to be rich, but to be richer than other men. The avaricious 
or	covetous	man	would	find	little	or	no	satisfaction	in	the	possession	of	any	
amount of wealth, if he were the poorest amongst all his neighbours or 
fellow- countrymen.
(89–90)
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(At both WW: 28 and EW: 90, Pigou suggests that this phenomenon is more 
important at higher income levels.) It is to be hoped that no one takes the recent 
attention to income relativities and happiness to be an exciting innovation in 
welfare economics.
 From his earlier work until his late work Pigou was only too aware that maxi-
mizing per capita income is not equivalent to maximizing wellbeing. Thus in the 
‘Conclusion’ to WW we read:
Man does not live by bread alone; and, therefore, besides estimating the 
probable economic consequences of his action, a reformer needs always to 
beware	 lest,	 in	 his	 ardour	 to	 promote	 economic	 benefit,	 he	may	 sacrifice	
unwittingly some higher and more elusive goal.
And at the age of 74 Pigou could still write that:
Nobody supposes that economic welfare is coincident with the whole of 
welfare or that the State ought to pursue it relentlessly without regard for 
other goods – liberty, for instance, the amenities of the family, spiritual 
needs and so on.
(1951, as in 1952: 845)
John Hicks (1904–1989) and Jan de Van Graaff (1928–)
Since it would be entirely impracticable to attempt here a survey of welfare eco-
nomics since Pigou, we shall simply refer to a few further observations made by 
Hicks (who was already quoted in the previous section) and to the single, great-
est book on modern welfare economics, that by Van Graaff.
 According to Hicks (1975: 311), 
economics is not ethics, though it borders on ethics; the line between them 
is a place where it behoves one to walk very delicately. It is now quite clear 
that neither the [Pigovian nor the subsequent] Welfare Economics have been 
walking delicately enough.
Delicately or not, he goes on to suggest that
an increase in the Social Product . . . is clearly not always ‘good’ in an 
ethical sense . . . A richer society may be a more stupid society, or a more 
discontented	society	–	one	does	not	have	to	go	far	to	find	examples.
(318)
This is not to say that one can measure wellbeing: ‘We have indexes of produc-
tion; we do not have – it is clear we cannot have – an Index of Welfare’ (324). (Is 
Hicks wrong here, or are the much- cited happiness measures different from welfare 
measures?)	The	economic	theory	of	exchange,	or	catallactics,	will	never	suffice	as	
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the basis of an adequate welfare economics, Hicks suggests, for ‘there is more in 
life than there is in catallactics’ since ‘real human beings’ have multiple motiva-
tion (325). Even these very brief quotations from a leading mainstream economist 
of the later twentieth century will indicate that it can come as no shock to ‘ortho-
doxy’ to hear that rising income does not ensure rising wellbeing.
 Jan de Van Graaff ’s Theoretical Welfare Economics of 1957 is a brilliant 
exposition and discussion of the welfare economics which succeeded that of 
Pareto from the 1930s onwards. Here we need only draw attention to certain par-
ticular points bearing directly on the relation between conventional welfare eco-
nomics and the economics- and-happiness literature.
 After drawing attention to ‘the classical distinction between general welfare 
and economic welfare’ (5), Graaff (quoting Little, Oxford Economic Papers, 
1949) notes that one must avoid any suggestion that there are ‘segregable parts 
of states of mind’ which may be attributed to economic causes (ibid.). This both 
strongly recalls Wicksteed’s stance and completely explodes the fallacy that eco-
nomic theory supposes an ‘economic man’ somehow divorced from the real, 
flesh-	and-blood	individual.
 Turning to Pigou’s old worry about the distinction between (ex ante) expecta-
tions of satisfaction and (ex post) actual, realized satisfaction, Graaff notes that 
‘most people probably feel that the latter [welfare ex post]	is	the	more	significant	
concept’. Without demurring, he continues:
It	is,	however,	very	hard	to	think	of	a	way	of	defining	welfare	ex post. We 
could, of course, simply assume . . . that we had a lie- detector and could 
question	 people	 to	 find	 out	 if	 they	were	 better	 off	 yesterday	 than	 the	 day	
before,
but this is not a helpful assumption (33). While Graaff was obviously not com-
menting on today’s happiness studies, one may perhaps detect a latent scepti-
cism towards them. Do the respondents have any strong reason to care, or think 
hard, about how they answer the relevant questionnaires?
 Graaff devotes a whole section entitled ‘EXTERNAL EFFECTS’ (43–45) to 
what	he	sees,	rightly,	as	a	major	difficulty	for	conventional	welfare	economics,	
namely the fact that what a given individual wishes to consume at some given 
date may well depend on that individual’s history of consumption, on what 
others have been and are consuming, and on ‘the whole complex social process 
of taste formation . . . that mysterious complex of effects which operates through 
time’ (43). He notes Alfred Marshall’s awareness of these issues (Principles: 
67–70, 88–90) and emphasizes that they relate to the choice of an occupation no 
less than to the choice of consumption commodities (44). He later reiterates that 
‘external	effects	in	consumption	are	of	the	first	importance’	(154)	and	chooses	in	
his ‘Conclusion’ to stress very heavily both the fact that an individual’s con-
sumption	choices	are	influenced	‘very	markedly’	by	those	of	others	and	that	this	
is a central obstacle to the achievement of clarity and simplicity in welfare eco-
nomics (169–170).
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 Graaff is here giving very clear recognition to an issue often alleged to be 
something that economists never think about. The same is true of his acknowl-
edgement that ‘Social institutions may become ends in themselves, and may not 
just be means to the attainment of more outputs and fewer inputs’ – individuals 
may have preferences over the extent of the market, the role of state bureaucra-
cies and over degrees of monopoly or competitiveness per se (120–121). That a 
good economic theorist like Graaff recognizes these issues does not mean that he 
finds	them	easy	to	analyse;	he	does	not	(and	says	so).	But	then	who	does	manage	
to say anything very helpful about them?
	 Graaff	’s	reaction	to	difficulties	in	conventional	welfare	economics	–	difficult-
ies which he expounds far more effectively than 94.7 per cent of those who airily 
dismiss that theory – is to insist that the best input the economist can provide to 
policy discussion is ‘through contributing to our understanding of how the eco-
nomic system actually works in practice – rather than through normative welfare 
theory itself ’ (170). Is such a ‘modest’ approach to be looked down on? Is it 
always emulated in the happiness literature?
Richard Layard
Happiness. Lessons from a New Science (2005) was a bold intervention in the 
discussion of public policy, intended to have an effect on both public opinion 
and government policy. Its general spirit was captured in the Preface: ‘It is time 
to have a go – to rush in where angels fear to tread. So here is my effort. . . . It 
will	need	massive	refinement’	(ix).	Given	the	book’s	purpose	–	and	its	generally	
genial tone – one should not be overly pedantic in commenting on it. Many 
readers	will	indeed	find	it	easy	to	warm	to	Layard’s	obvious	goodwill,	his	insist-
ence that people’s feelings matter, that happiness is multidimensional and hugely 
dependent on interpersonal relationships, that rampant individualism is in danger 
of swamping any concept of the common good, that people value trust, stability 
and community, that much advertising is intrusive and harmful. Yet one can still 
be	surprised	at	the	brusque	confidence	with	which	he	sweeps	aside	the	concerns	
of noted philosophers who have criticized the philosophy of utilitarianism 
espoused by Layard. And one might feel cautious about the boldness of his ‘the 
only thing that matters is the feelings of everyone concerned’ (121), when he 
does not indicate whether all feelings are to be accorded equal respect. Do envy, 
malice	and	xenophobia	matter	as	much	as	compassion?	One	may	feel	confident	
that Layard would answer, ‘certainly not!’ but that leaves one unsure just how 
(and which) feelings matter. After mentioning various desires for status, Layard 
writes that ‘These are not ignoble sentiments of envy; the desire for status is 
basic to our human nature’ (150). How does the second part of this statement 
support	the	first	part?	Three	pages	later,	moreover,	Layard	returns	to	‘the	ignoble	
sentiment of envy’ (153) and appears not to deny that the desire for status is an 
ignoble sentiment but only to argue that it must just be accepted as a feature of 
human nature when public policy is being determined. Some readers might 
prefer greater conceptual clarity.
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 Our task here, however, must be limited to the consideration of what Layard 
has	 to	 say	 about	 economics	 and	 economists.	The	 task	 is	 not	 simplified	by	 the	
fact that Layard generally speaks simply of ‘economics’ tout court, or of ‘stand-
ard economics’ (127) or of ‘mainstream economists’ (231), or of ‘traditionally 
minded	economists’	(145),	without	naming	names	or	citing	specific	works.	This	
may be appropriate to the nature of his book but it makes it harder for the com-
mentator to be quite sure who or what Layard has in mind.
 While he has a number of criticisms to make of ‘economics’, Layard is an 
informed critic who can write, for example, that ‘Economists do not of course 
believe in “homo economicus” ’ and can note that altruism ‘is not inconsistent 
with sophisticated economics’ (141). Yet he spoils this by writing also of the 
benefits	 of	 voluntary	 exchange	 that	 ‘All	 this	 comes	 about	 through	 the	 naked	
pursuit of self- interest’ (129). This nonsense is ‘supported’ by the ‘famous words 
of Adam Smith [which] cannot be quoted too often’ about expecting our dinner 
from the butcher, the brewer and the baker having ‘regard to their own interest – 
to their self- love . . . their advantage’ (129). In fact, of course, the great Smith 
nodded at this point since, in Wicksteed’s terminology, it is only the ‘non- tuism’ 
of	the	butcher,	brewer	and	baker	that	is	relevant	here,	their	‘selfishness’	or	other-
wise being quite beside the point. (They may be seeking to maximize their gifts 
to a niece, to the Tories and to the kirk, respectively.) It is to be regretted that 
Layard should here provide encouragement for a crude – and popular – mis-
understanding of economics. He perhaps does the same thing in writing that 
‘economics	offers	 the	sophisticated	 tool	of	cost-	benefit	analysis	 to	 tell	us	what	
government should and should not do’ (127). No such analysis can ever ‘tell’ 
anyone what ought to be done, it need hardly be said, but the quoted statement 
could easily be (mis-)read by econophobes as ‘evidence’ that economists arro-
gate to themselves the right to determine policy. And whether many ‘mainstream 
economists’ need to be told that ‘many of the most important things that touch 
us do not reach us through voluntary exchange’ (231) may well be doubted – 
certainly such past economists as John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall and A.C. 
Pigou would simply raise an eyebrow and ask, ‘What’s new?’ (As we saw 
above, Wicksteed even insisted that no ultimately valued thing ever enters the 
circle of exchange!)
 A careless reader of Layard’s Happiness might be left both with the idea that 
the growth of per capita income (beyond a certain level) is irrelevant to happi-
ness and the belief that ‘economists’ take happiness to depend on nothing but 
per capita income. In fact the book contains material countering both that idea 
and that belief; unfortunately, it also gives them some encouragement!
 The claim that overall happiness has remained constant, as income per head 
has grown, has been challenged (see the following section) but, purely for the 
sake of the argument, suppose it to be a valid claim. Would it follow that income 
levels are irrelevant to happiness? Quite obviously not, since happiness could be 
both positively related to income and negatively related to ‘other things’, which 
have been increasing (and/or positively related to ‘other things’, which have 
been decreasing). Only the incredibly naive assumption that happiness must 
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depend on only one thing would allow its constancy to suggest anything at all 
about what does or does not produce happiness. Layard makes this perfectly 
clear at various points. Thus he writes, for example, that, ‘Since the Second 
World War, greater national income has indeed brought some increase in happi-
ness, even in rich countries. But this extra happiness has been cancelled out by 
greater misery coming from less harmonious social relationships’ (34–35). And:
In	 many	 ways	 life	 is	 better	 than	 fifty	 years	 ago:	 we	 have	 unprecedented	
wealth, better health and nicer jobs. Yet we are not happier. Is it because 
there are other new features of our experience that are bad and offset the 
new features that are good?
(75)
His answer is ‘Yes’ (78). Thus to say, even if truly, that ‘income has increased 
but happiness has not’ is not to say that income has no effect on happiness; that 
would be an elementary non sequitur. (To reinforce the point, it may be noted 
that Layard properly refers several times to rising health levels; if health is 
improving while happiness is constant, is anyone going to suggest that ‘there-
fore’ health is irrelevant to happiness?) Matters become yet more complex, of 
course, if rising income both tends, in itself, to increase happiness and provokes 
an increase in some ‘other thing’ tending to reduce happiness.
 Unfortunately, Layard’s book also contains such phrases as ‘if extra income 
has done so little to produce a happier society’ (155) and ‘So here we are as a 
society:	 no	 happier	 than	 fifty	 years	 ago.	Yet	 every	 group	 in	 society	 is	 richer’	
(223), which could too easily be (mis)read as encouraging the idea that income 
per head is irrelevant to happiness, despite Layard’s more measured statements 
to the contrary. Similarly unhelpful is the second sentence of the book – ‘eco-
nomics equates changes in the happiness of a society with changes in its pur-
chasing power – or roughly so’ (ix). That last phrase is no excuse for the 
preceding words, which provide econophobes with what they want to hear – will 
they all persevere as far as p.134 to read: ‘Let me hasten to add that most econo-
mists recognise some weaknesses in the GNP as a welfare measure’? (And even 
this recognition ought to refer to the ‘weakness’ of GNP as a measure of eco-
nomic welfare, never mind as a measure of total welfare.) It is perfectly proper 
to address a book to a wide audience but it is not proper to pander to popular 
prejudices. But let us end this paragraph on a happier note, with Layard’s claim 
that ‘we in the West are probably happier than any previous society’ (235).
 Layard’s book provides a clear, popular exposition of why economic policy 
making to increase happiness is not likely to be easy; indeed, ‘sensible policy 
development	 is	 quite	 difficult’	 (145).	 The	most	 general	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	
‘Almost every policy affects happiness through many channels’; thus policies 
designed to increase geographical mobility, for example, may both increase 
income per head and weaken family life and communal cohesion, leaving it 
unclear whether they promote overall happiness (ibid.). Hence the assessment of 
any one possible policy involves both keeping track of all its consequences and 
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weighing those (good and bad) consequences against each other; neither the 
‘keeping	track’	nor	the	‘weighing’	need	be	that	easy.	Two	more	specific	difficult-
ies in promoting happiness, to which Layard draws sharp attention, relate to 
income relativities and to our ability to adapt. Suppose that the happiness of a 
given individual at a given time depends (positively) on the individual’s income 
at that time and (negatively) on both the average income of others at that time – 
because the individual cares about status and relative social standing – and the 
individual’s own past income – because adaptation to past standards raises 
expectations about what is acceptable today. Under these circumstances, ‘it is 
quite	 difficult	 for	 economic	 growth	 to	 improve	 our	 happiness’	 (42).	 Layard	
stresses these points again in his concluding chapter. The race for (inherently 
relative) status is ‘a zero- sum game . . . That is one major reason why as a society 
we have not grown happier’ (228). And, ‘If things get better, we after a while 
take them for granted . . . This is another reason why growth has not increased 
welfare as much as we expected’ (229). Insofar as these claims are valid, any 
failure of happiness to increase over time can hardly be blamed on poor eco-
nomic policy (narrowly conceived) or on poor economic reasoning.
 (As noted above, Pigou had explained 90 years before Layard that a given 
policy could have opposite effects on economic welfare and overall welfare. 
Similarly, the claim that individuals care about their relative income was famil-
iar to both Pigou and John Stuart Mill, while the idea that people adapt to their 
circumstances was clearly set out by both Marshall and Pigou – and indeed by 
Jean Jacques Rousseau in the 1750s.)
 Nothing said above must be taken to imply that Layard makes no interesting 
criticisms	of	‘economics’.	Even	when	due	allowance	has	been	made	for	specific	
attempts by particular economists to grapple with the issues about to be mentioned, 
it is still fair to consider, with Layard, that inadequate attention is paid within con-
temporary economic theory to a number of matters. These include the possibility 
of considering the intensity of preferences and of diminishing marginal utility 
(51–52, 120–122, 133, 134); the fact that preferences may be partially endogenous 
(7, 138, 141, 231); the importance of income relativities and reference groups (42, 
44–46, 52); the adaptation of preferences to circumstances (48–49, 67, 143, 229); 
the importance of social relationships (67, 225–226, 228); and further issues in 
motivation and human nature (127–128, 135, 225–226). Such issues are fully 
worthy of greater attention than they often receive (and the implications of such 
increased attention would extend beyond the happiness discussion), so that it must 
be hoped that ‘economists’ will respond to Layard’s observations.
 With apologies to Easterlin, Frey, Oswald, Van Praag and other leading con-
tributors to the happiness debates (see e.g. Bruni and Porta 2005), we turn now 
to a critical discussion of such work.
Helen Johns and Paul Ormerod
Not all economists are entirely convinced by every claim made in the economics-
 and-happiness literature. We consider here some of the arguments put forward 
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by Johns and Ormerod in their Happiness, Economics and Public Policy (2007; 
Philip Booth and Samuel Brittan add a Foreword and a Comment, respectively).
 Many (but not all) studies of happiness levels work with a three- point scale 
for the measurement of those levels. As Johns and Ormerod point out (31–33, 
75–76), it therefore takes a large shift in the proportion of respondents who 
claim the highest level to bring about any great increase in the recorded average 
level	of	happiness.	Hence	no	great	significance	should	be	attributed	 to	 the	fact	
that the average level shows little or no tendency to increase. However, some 
studies do already – and all studies could – employ a more differentiated scale 
for happiness level recording, so that this criticism – while well taken – is 
perhaps less powerful than the following.
 Johns and Ormerod go on to show (34–40, 77–86) that, if per capita income 
is not well correlated with happiness measures, nor are leisure time, declining 
infant mortality, life expectation, unemployment, increasing gender equality, 
public spending, income distribution or crime levels! Yet who can seriously 
believe that not one of these magnitudes has any bearing on people’s happiness? 
And if we do not believe that, why should we believe any analogous claim that 
per capita income has no bearing on levels of happiness? The ‘evidence’ pre-
sented is, after all, of precisely the same nature in each case, so that one cannot 
casually take it to show the unimportance of one (or more) variable(s) but not to 
show the unimportance of other variables.
 It is not only the ‘evidence’ from happiness studies that Johns and Ormerod 
find	questionable;	 they	 are	 also	 concerned	 about	 the	policy	 lessons	 sometimes	
thought to follow from such studies. They note that
defining	 happiness	 is	 a	 question	 that	 has	 occupied	 some	 of	 the	 greatest	
minds in the Western world and yet it still remains open. So it is question-
able whether it can easily be resolved by the application of simple policy 
recommendations.
(20)
This general consideration is reinforced by the fact that if people adapt strongly 
to their circumstances and if they care more about relative incomes than about 
absolute income levels, then policy attempts to increase happiness are tightly cir-
cumscribed (passim). Johns and Ormerod object strongly to the idea that the 
proper goal of public policy making may be characterized as being ‘that of max-
imising measured happiness – and that all other values are subordinated to this 
end’ (71). Not the least of their reasons for so objecting is that the maximization 
of	measured	happiness	may	conflict	with	morality.
For example, ethnic cleansing might well increase the happiness of those 
who do not like sharing their neighbourhood with people who are ethnically 
different from themselves, but it is not a course of action that could conceiv-
ably be deemed moral.
(20)
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 It does not follow from the above that Johns and Ormerod have no time for 
any kind of happiness study; while sceptical about time- series studies, for the 
reasons	noted	above,	they	do	take	seriously	the	findings	of	panel,	or	longitudinal	
research,	‘which	tracks	specific	individuals	over	time’	(14).	And	they	take	such	
studies to ‘imply [the happiness increasing effects of] increased support for mar-
riage, reductions in incentives to single parents, and the promotion of religious 
faith in various ways. This is not’, they suggest, ‘a set of policy conclusions that 
most proponents of the happiness research tend to emphasise’ (48). Be that as it 
may, such conclusions may not be entirely uncongenial to some of the contribu-
tors to this volume.
Concluding remarks
It can only be perfectly proper to discuss the complex web of interrelationships 
connecting happiness, human wellbeing, the level and distribution of national 
income, economic and social policies and so on. Such discussions can only ever 
be hindered, however, by suggestions (explicit or implicit) that thoughtful econ-
omists are committed to naive ideas about ‘economic man’, to simple- minded 
views of human motivation, to the fallacy that it is easy to foresee all the effects 
of a given economic policy or, heaven help us, to the assumption that a growth 
in real income per head will ensure greater wellbeing. Economists of the calibre 
of Marshall, Wicksteed, Pigou, Hicks and Graaff (along, of course, with many 
others) have repeatedly given the lie to any such suggestions. They have taken it 
for granted that economic output is, at best, a support for the things of ultimate 
importance.
2 Happiness, welfare and 
capabilities
Carl- Henric Grenholm
In his book on Happiness Richard Layard has argued that increasing income and 
material wellbeing is not commensurate with increasing happiness, once a 
modest level of income has been achieved. His thesis is that in richer societies 
increasing prosperity and standards of living have not been accompanied by 
increasing happiness or wellbeing. Happiness should be a goal for public policy, 
which seems to be a challenge for economics and the conceptions of a good 
human life presupposed within mainstream economic theory.
 As an economist Layard obviously has a conception of what happiness and 
human wellbeing means. He accepts a utilitarian theory according to which our 
goal should be to promote happiness, which means to maximize the sum of 
human wellbeing. It is of great interest to compare this position with conceptions 
of welfare within welfare economics and neoclassical economic theory. Here 
welfare is often understood in terms of preference satisfaction. An interesting 
issue is whether happiness would be a more appropriate conception of a good 
human life.
 In this chapter I will deal with two basic problems within ethics and eco-
nomics. The first problem concerns the conception of a good human life within 
political economy and economic theory. What are the objects to value in eco-
nomic analysis? Should we understand the good in terms of welfare, happiness 
or preference satisfaction? The second problem concerns the conception of 
equality and the relationship between happiness and equality. What goods should 
be the objects for an equal distribution and why should such an equal distribu-
tion be promoted? Is the happiness hypothesis a reasonable argument in favour 
of equality?
 My starting point will be an analysis of the conceptions of wellbeing and 
welfare within mainstream economic theory. Welfare economics and neoclassi-
cal economic theory often presuppose an understanding of welfare in terms of 
preference satisfaction. There is a necessary connection between preference sat-
isfaction and welfare, according to several economists. I will argue that this is a 
conception of human wellbeing which can be criticized from several 
perspectives.
 I will then give a critical analysis of the conception of happiness presupposed 
in the work by Richard Layard. In his book happiness is related to a utilitarian 
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understanding of wellbeing, and a necessary condition for happiness seems to be 
good relationships to other human beings. I will discuss whether this is a reason-
able understanding of a good human life which is to be preferred to the concep-
tion of welfare within mainstream economic theory. I will also examine whether 
this is a conception of happiness which can be accepted from the perspective of 
Christian social ethics.
 Finally, I will give a critical analysis of another alternative to the conception 
of a good human life within traditional welfare economics. This is the neo- 
Aristotelian position developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum in their 
‘capabilities approach’. They share the idea that happiness may be understood in 
terms of human self- actualization, and they reject the utilitarian theory that 
welfare is pleasure or preference satisfaction. In dealing with the capabilities 
approach I will also discuss the meaning of equality and reasonable arguments in 
favour of an equal distribution.
Values in economic theory
What conceptions of a good human life are presupposed within economic 
theory? Several economists today would deny that there are any ethical assump-
tions at all in neoclassical economic theory. They argue that economic research 
and theory are free from moral values and normative implications. Milton Fried-
man, the main representative of the Chicago school, describes his field as ‘posit-
ive economics’, which is an objective science in the sense that it does not 
presuppose any moral values or norms. Its goal is not to tell us ‘what ought to be 
the case’ but to describe ‘what is the case’ (1953: 7).
 However, the position that economic theory does not imply any ethical 
assumptions seems to be difficult to defend. Neoclassical economics is often 
involved in a study of individual markets and a study of individual market 
decisions. In its models of consumer choice and the behaviour of producers neo-
classical economics assumes that we are rational individuals, seeking to promote 
our own preference satisfaction. These models often presuppose ideas on what is 
good or valuable, distributional values, and norms of equality (Helgesson 1998).
 In his doctoral dissertation, the philosopher Gert Helgesson has made a 
careful analysis of explicit and implicit values and norms in neoclassical eco-
nomic theory. His focus is on two concepts in neoclassical economics, namely 
stability and efficiency. The concept of stability plays a central role in various 
forms of equilibrium analyses, and it may sometimes be used evaluatively. 
However, it is more obvious that the understanding of efficiency in neoclassical 
economics presupposes assumptions of what is good and valuable.
 In mainstream economics, efficiency is most often interpreted as Pareto opti-
mality. This criterion for economic efficiency is described by Amartya Sen in 
the following way:
A social state is described as Pareto optimal if and only if no- one’s utility 
can be raised without reducing the utility of someone else. This is a very 
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limited kind of success, and in itself may or may not guarantee much. A 
state can be Pareto optimal with some people in extreme misery and others 
rolling in luxury, so long as the miserable cannot be made better off without 
cutting into the luxury of the rich.
(1992b: 31)
The Pareto principle may be interpreted and applied in different ways. However, it 
usually maintains that an alternative, x, is better than another alternative, y, if (a) x 
is better than y for at least one individual, and (b) x is at least as good as y for all 
individuals. An economy is Pareto optimal (efficient) if it is impossible to make 
someone better off without making someone else worse off. To make someone 
better off usually means to increase his or her welfare. This means that efficiency 
concerns welfare, and welfare is most often understood in terms of preferences. 
According to this preference interpretation of welfare, you are better off with 
outcome A than with outcome B if you prefer A to B. There is a necessary connec-
tion between preference satisfaction and welfare (Helgesson 2002: 169, 180, 201).
 According to most economists the Pareto principle is rather uncontroversial. 
No one would dispute that we exclude an alternative, if there is another altern-
ative that is better for some and not worse for anyone. However, the controver-
sial issue is what is regarded to be better for an individual. There are at least two 
different interpretations of the Pareto principle. One is the welfare interpretation, 
according to which an alternative is better for the individual if it promotes her 
welfare. This is the position within traditional welfare economics, where welfare 
is often understood in terms of utility or pleasure. Another is the choice interpre-
tation, according to which an alternative is better for an individual if she prefers 
this alternative. However, the distinction between these two interpretations is not 
always made in economics today, since welfare is often understood in terms of 
preference satisfaction (Granqvist 2000: 13).
 Many economists today would argue in favour of the choice interpretation of 
the Pareto principle. This is an interpretation which is related to a preference- 
satisfaction theory, according to which an alternative x is better for a person than 
an alternative y, if and only if the person prefers x to y. According to this posi-
tion, all preferences which are expressed by an individual on a market should be 
taken into account. The preference of an individual is simply what she would 
choose, if she would have to make a choice between two alternatives. It is not 
necessary that the preferences are well- informed and thoroughly considered 
(Granqvist 1993: 29).
 Is this a reasonable conception of a good human life and human wellbeing? 
Should we understand the good in terms of preference satisfaction? There are at 
least two serious objections against this position. One is that we sometimes have 
preferences which are based on bad information and therefore do not promote 
our own good. This means that what is good for us does not always coincide 
with our actual choices. A more reasonable preference theory should therefore 
understand preferences as choices we make when we have considered every 
alternative thoroughly (Broome 1998: 28).
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 Another objection against the idea that there is a necessary connection 
between preference satisfaction and welfare is that we sometimes have prefer-
ences the satisfaction of which does not increase our welfare. Some of our pref-
erences are welfare irrelevant, which means that they do not affect our welfare at 
all. There are also welfare- decreasing preferences, which means that getting 
what we want would be bad for us at least in the long run. This may of course 
depend on false beliefs or irrationality (Helgesson 2001: 60).
 It is of course possible to develop a more sophisticated preference- satisfaction 
theory, according to which the preferences to be satisfied are those which are 
well- informed and deeply considered. However, as Elizabeth Anderson has 
shown in her book Value in Ethics and Economics (1993), there are strong 
objections even against such a more sophisticated preference- satisfaction theory. 
She defends a pluralist theory of value, according to which there are different 
kinds of goods which are rationally valued in different ways. From this perspec-
tive she delivers a critique of rational desire theory, which maintains that what is 
good for a person is what she would desire if she were fully rational. One objec-
tion to this theory is that there are many valuable things besides the objects of 
rational desire. Another objection is that not all desires can signify values, 
because certain sources of motivation often incline us to seek things we find to 
be bad. The conclusion is that we cannot accept the idea that welfare is equiva-
lent to preference satisfaction (1993: 14, 129, 163).
The happiness hypothesis
We have seen that there are strong objections against the idea that a good 
human life should be understood in terms of preference satisfaction. What then 
would be the alternative? Should we understand the good in terms of happi-
ness instead of welfare and satisfaction of desires? This seems to be the posi-
tion of Richard Layard in his book Happiness. He argues in favour of an 
understanding of happiness which is an alternative to the conception of welfare 
within mainstream economic theory. Is this a reasonable conception of happi-
ness and a good human life?
 In his book Richard Layard argues that economic growth contributes to 
human wellbeing, but once a nation’s per capita income has achieved a certain 
level increasing national income has not been accompanied by increasing happi-
ness. Layard describes this paradox in the following way: ‘There is a paradox at 
the heart of our lives. Most people want more income and strive for it. Yet as 
Western societies have got richer, their people have become no happier’ (2006: 
3). The thesis of Richard Layard is that people in Western societies are no 
happier today than people were 50 years ago, even if the average living stand-
ards have more than doubled. When people become richer in comparison with 
other persons in their society, they become substantially happier. However, when 
whole societies have become richer, the overall happiness in these societies has 
not risen. On the contrary, when incomes have risen expressions of unhappiness, 
such as depression, alcoholism and crime, have increased. This demonstrates 
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that once subsistence income is guaranteed, national income is not the most 
important factor affecting happiness (2006: 29, 35).
 This position of Richard Layard may be called ‘the happiness hypothesis’. 
The terminology is used by the psychologist Jonathan Haidt in his book The 
Happiness Hypothesis (2006), where he argues against the Buddhist and Stoic 
idea that happiness comes from within and cannot be found by making the world 
conform to your desires. Haidt defends the hypothesis that happiness comes 
from within, and happiness comes from without. This means that external con-
ditions of life can make you lastingly happier, and one of these conditions is 
relatedness to other human beings (2006: 87, 105, 238).
 In his book Richard Layard defends a different kind of ‘happiness hypothe-
sis’. According to Layard, increasing income and material wellbeing are not 
commensurate with increasing happiness once a modest level of income has 
been achieved. Beyond a certain minimum level increases in national income per 
capita will not give rise to increases in human happiness in a society. Below that 
level there is an impact of income on happiness, but above this minimum level 
an increase in prosperity is unlikely to generate an equivalent increase in happi-
ness. When income rises, sociality factors for greater happiness become more 
significant than income (Atherton 2008: 108).
 Layard obviously presupposes a conception of happiness. He argues in favour 
of a utilitarian position, according to which the best public policy is one which 
produces the greatest possible happiness in a society. In social ethics, the prin-
ciple of utility means that an action is right if it produces the greatest overall 
happiness, and in individual ethics a right private action is one that promotes the 
greatest happiness of everyone affected. This is a utilitarian position inspired by 
that elaborated by Jeremy Bentham (Layard 2006: 111, 115).
 Happiness is, according to Layard, not equivalent to self- realization. He 
argues against such an Aristotelian understanding of happiness and in favour of 
a hedonistic position. This means that happiness is pleasure and a state of feeling 
good. Layard also argues against the idea of John Stuart Mill that some types of 
pleasure have a higher quality than others. Instead, he means that every good 
feeling is happiness, and feeling bad is misery. According to Layard happiness is 
an objective dimension of our experience, and it can be measured. At any 
moment we can find out if people are happy by asking them how they feel (2006: 
4, 13, 22, 224). Layard writes:
So by happiness I mean feeling good – enjoying life and wanting the feeling 
to be maintained. By unhappiness I mean feeling bad and wishing things 
were different. There are countless sources of pain and misery. But all our 
experience has in it a dimension that corresponds to how good and bad we 
feel.
(2006: 12)
What makes people happy? Layard argues that there are seven different factors 
which contribute to human happiness. The first is family relationships, and mar-
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riage seems to be the most effective form of family life in its association with 
happiness. The second is income, which is significant for wellbeing to a certain 
level. The third factor is work, as a provider of income, relationships outside the 
family, and an opportunity to contribute to the wider society. The fourth factor is 
community and friends, and a fifth contributor to happiness is health, particularly 
mental health. The sixth factor is personal freedom, which is related to the 
opportunity to participate in society. Seventh, personal values and philosophies 
of life are also important for happiness and wellbeing (Layard 2006: 65–72; 
Atherton 2008: 122).
 This means that sociality factors are of great importance for happiness, 
particularly in richer societies. Human beings are social beings, and human inter-
action is an end in itself. Therefore friendship and marriage make people 
happier, and unemployment causes misery, because it breaks a social tie. Layard 
argues that some of the factors that can explain the variation in happiness among 
countries are the divorce rate, unemployment rate, level of trust, membership in 
non- religious organizations, quality of government, and the fraction of the popu-
lation believing in God (2006: 70, 78, 225).
 Is this a reasonable understanding of a good human life? Layard’s position is 
an interesting alternative to traditional economic theory. In his critique of main-
stream economics he argues that human happiness is not only dependent upon 
increased national income and that we need an alternative vision of how wellbe-
ing is generated. Happiness is a more important goal of policy than increased 
gross national product. Layard also argues that human wellbeing is not equiva-
lent to preference satisfaction and choices in a market. Instead happiness should 
be understood in terms of pleasure and feeling good. This is a hedonistic altern-
ative to a preference- satisfaction theory (2006: 133, 147).
 There are at least two strong objections against this kind of hedonistic utili-
tarianism. The first concerns equality and the distribution of happiness. Accord-
ing to utilitarianism the social goal should be the greatest overall happiness in 
the society. It does not matter at all if there is an unequal distribution of happi-
ness among the persons living in the society. If some persons are feeling 
extremely bad while others enjoy a comparatively high level of pleasure, this 
can be accepted as long as the overall sum of happiness is high. Justice and an 
equal distribution of pleasure is not a goal in itself, which cannot be accepted 
from the perspective of a principle of human dignity. All humans have an equal 
worth, and therefore we should strive for not only increased happiness but also 
an equal distribution of happiness.
 The second objection concerns the hedonistic idea that happiness means 
feeling good. This is a limited understanding of a good human life, which can be 
criticized from both a philosophical and a theological perspective. In Aristotelian 
philosophy happiness is taken to be much more than pleasure. It is related to 
flourishing and integral human fulfilment, which means the realization of the 
potentials we have as humans. A similar understanding of happiness is elabo-
rated within the Christian tradition. Here happiness is understood not in terms of 
pleasure or preference satisfaction but in terms of human flourishing. Happiness 
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is the fulfilment of all human beings, which is possible in the love of God and in 
the love of another (Atherton 2007b).
 In order to achieve an adequate understanding of what happiness means it is 
necessary to elaborate an anthropological position. In Christian social ethics, 
happiness as human fulfilment is related to a Christian view of humans, which 
often understands human flourishing as something which is possible in a rela-
tionship with other human beings. A Christian view of humans can be related to 
a personalist position, according to which the person is interrelated to other 
persons, an interdependent social being living with others, and called to fulfil 
herself in a relationship with a transcendent reality. This means that happiness in 
Christian tradition is taken to be possible only in a relationship to other human 
beings and to God. From such a personalist perspective happiness is much more 
than feeling good and often independent of pleasure (Atherton 2008: 201, 218).
The capabilities approach
So far I have argued that welfare and a good human life should not be under-
stood in terms of preference satisfaction. We have also seen that an interesting 
alternative would be to understand the good in terms of happiness. However, 
Richard Layard does not give a convincing analysis of the meaning of happiness, 
and his utilitarian position can be criticized from several perspectives. Would it 
then be possible to elaborate a more reasonable understanding of happiness as a 
value within economic analysis?
 One interesting effort to elaborate such a position is made by Amartya Sen 
and Martha Nussbaum in their ‘capabilities approach’. This is a neo- Aristotelian 
alternative to the conception of a good human life within traditional welfare eco-
nomics. They argue that happiness may be understood in terms of human self- 
actualization, and they reject the utilitarian theory that welfare is pleasure or 
preference satisfaction. The objects to value are, according to Amartya Sen, not 
individual utilities defined in terms of pleasure or desire- fulfilment. Instead a 
good human life should be understood in terms of functionings and capabilities 
(1992a: 42).
 In his book Inequality Reexamined (1992a) Amartya Sen is mainly dealing 
with the conception of equality and the question of what goods should be the 
objects for an equal distribution. He maintains that most political philosophers 
seem to be egalitarians, in the sense that they demand equality of something. 
However, they have different conceptions of equality. The debate in contempor-
ary political philosophy deals primarily with the question ‘Equality of what?’ 
Most philosophers agree that justice is an equal distribution, but they have dif-
ferent opinions concerning what objects should be equally distributed. There are 
many different proposals, such as freedom, power, welfare, opportunities for 
welfare, resources, and capabilities (1992a: 1, 4, 12; Hansson 2000).
 Sen argues that justice should be understood as an equal distribution of cap-
abilities. A person’s cabability is according to him a kind of freedom, namely 
the freedom to achieve the various combinations of functionings that are import-
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ant for the person. Functionings are constitutive of a person’s wellbeing, and the 
relevant functionings can vary – from such elementary things as being ade-
quately nourished and being in good health, to more complex achievements such 
as being happy and having self- respect. Capability is primarily a reflection of the 
freedom to achieve valuable functionings. It reflects the person’s freedom to lead 
one type of life or another, and thereby it constitutes the person’s freedom to 
have wellbeing (Sen 1992a: 39, 49).
 This is an understanding of a good human life which is different from the 
positions within both traditional welfare economics and utilitarianism. Accord-
ing to welfare economics social welfare is the sum total of individual utilities, 
and the individual utility is often regarded to be a function of the income of that 
individual. Utilitarianism argues that the only intrinsic value is individual utility 
defined in terms of happiness or desire- fulfilment. Thereby these positions ignore 
the importance of freedom and concentrate only on achievements. Their focus is 
upon the actual achievements, not upon the freedom to achieve (Sen 1992a: 6, 
32, 88, 136).
 According to Sen, there are also important differences between the capabil-
ities approach and the theory of justice elaborated by John Rawls. In Rawls’s 
theory justice is taken to be an equal distribution of primary goods, including 
liberties, welfare, and the social bases of self- respect. These primary goods are 
not constitutive of freedom as such, but are rather understood as means to 
freedom. However, in the capability perspective on justice, individuals’ claims 
are to be assured in terms of the freedoms they actually enjoy to choose the lives 
they have reason to value. This perspective concentrates directly on freedom as 
such, rather than on the means to freedom. Thereby it takes into account that 
human beings are diverse and that there are variations in our ability to convert 
resources into actual freedoms (Sen 1992a: 8, 36, 42, 49, 79, 86, 148).
 In his book Development as Freedom (2001) Sen has elaborated a theory of 
global justice from the capabilities approach. Global justice is an equal distribu-
tion of capabilities, and capability is the substantive freedom to achieve altern-
ative combinations of functionings. Development is from this perspective to be 
understood as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy and 
increasing their possibilities to realize themselves as humans. Such a develop-
ment can be achieved by removing the most important causes of unfreedom, 
namely poverty as well as tyranny, bad economic conditions as well as social 
deprivation, and neglect of social welfare systems as well as intolerance of 
repressive states (Sen 2001: 3, 75).
 A similar approach to development and global justice is taken by the feminist 
philosopher Martha Nussbaum in her book Women and Human Development 
(2001). Her focus is also on human capabilities, that is, what people are actually 
able to do and to be. There are some functionings that appear to be of central 
importance in human life, and the important question is whether or not the 
person is capable of this. This means that justice is not a distribution of welfare, 
opportunities or resources. Instead, justice should be understood as an equal dis-
tribution of some capabilities for truly human functionings (2001: 34, 70).
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 According to Nussbaum, there are some central capabilities which should be 
secured to each and every person. She defends a universalism, according to 
which there are some universal values and norms for human capability. It is pos-
sible to achieve an agreement upon these universal values by cross- cultural dis-
cussions and comparisons. The common capabilities may be the object of an 
overlapping consensus, among people who otherwise have very different com-
prehensive ethical or religious conceptions. This means that Nussbaum defends 
a universalism which is rather sensitive to pluralism and cultural differences 
(2001: 41, 76).
 In her defence of universal values Nussbaum presents a list of central human 
capabilities. They include being able to live to the end of a human life of normal 
length, being able to have good health, being able to move freely from place to 
place, and being able to have attachments to things and people. They also 
include being able to live with others, being able to live with concern for other 
species, and being able to participate in political choices. This is a conception of 
minimum goods upon which we can agree in spite of different world views and 
different views of human nature (2001: 78).
 According to Nussbaum, there are different types of capabilities. Basic cap-
abilities, such as the capability for seeing and hearing, are the innate equipment 
of individuals necessary for developing more advanced capabilities. Internal cap-
abilities are developed states of the person herself that are sufficient conditions 
for the exercise of the requisite functionings. Combined capabilities are internal 
capabilities combined with suitable external conditions for the exercise of the 
functionings (2001: 84).
 Of great importance for the capabilities approach is, according to Nussbaum, 
the idea of human dignity, which means that each person should be treated as an 
end. A consequence of this idea of human worth is that all humans should have 
the capability for central functionings in human life. This is the principle of each 
person’s capability, which means that the capabilities are sought for each and 
every person (2001: 72). In respecting this principle the capabilities approach is 
closely related to a focus on human equality. It entails promoting for all citizens 
a greater measure of material equality than exists in most societies. However, 
Nussbaum also maintains that defenders of the capabilities approach might differ 
about the degree of material equality we should strive for. In contrast to Rawls, 
she argues that individuals vary greatly in their needs for resources and in their 
abilities to convert resources into valuable functionings (2001: 68, 86).
 The capabilities approach of Martha Nussbaum is an alternative not only to 
the theory of justice elaborated by Rawls but also to welfarism and traditional 
welfare economics. According to welfarism we should accept a preference- based 
approach, which means that all existing preferences are the bases for social 
policy. Nussbaum delivers several objections against this position. One is the 
argument from adaptation, according to which individuals adjust their desires to 
the way of life they know. Another is the institutional argument, which main-
tains that people’s preferences are in many ways constructed by the laws and 
institutions under which they live. A third argument is that there are some 
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objects which are good in themselves, even if we do not desire them (2001: 112, 
119, 136, 142).
Happiness and equality
We have seen that the capabilities approach is an interesting alternative to the 
conception of a good human life within traditional welfare economics. It is also 
a reasonable alternative to the conception of happiness as pleasure or feeling 
good. This is a neo- Aristotelian approach, which entails an adequate understand-
ing of a good human life as related to human flourishing. Human development is 
constituted by a freedom to achieve valuable functionings, not only by resources 
to satisfy human needs or preferences. The capabilities approach is also a theory 
of justice, according to which capabilities are social goods which should be dis-
tributed equally.
 Some objections may be raised against this theory. One is that freedom is not 
the only value to be distributed equally. In his theory of justice John Rawls 
argues that there are three primary goods which should be equally distributed, 
namely liberties, welfare and the social bases of self- respect. According to Rawls 
we should accept two principles for just distribution. The first is that each person 
should have an equal right to basic liberties such as political freedom and 
freedom from oppression. The second is that welfare should be equally distrib-
uted, unless an unequal distribution works to the advantage of all human beings, 
and that power should be equally distributed, unless it is bound to positions that 
are open to all (1976: 60).
 Amartya Sen argues convincingly that freedom is an important value and that 
it may be understood in terms of capabilities. However, welfare as satisfaction of 
needs is also an important value. In order to protect human dignity we should 
strive for an equal distribution not only of freedom but also of welfare in this 
sense. We might accept what Rawls calls the ‘difference principle’, according to 
which a just distribution of welfare means an equal distribution, unless an 
unequal distribution would be to the greatest benefit of those least advantaged 
(1976: 76). However, not only freedom but also welfare should be the object of 
an equal distribution.
 A second objection is that the capabilities approach presupposes an ethical 
universalism which is controversial. The defence of universalism given by 
Martha Nussbaum is not quite convincing. Even if there are some capabilities 
which are highly esteemed in some different cultures, this does not mean that 
there are universal values that are accepted in all cultural contexts. Nussbaum 
describes a dialogue with women in the USA and India, but this is not sufficient 
empirical evidence for the thesis that there is a universal overlapping consensus 
of common values. There are reasons to believe that our deeper understandings 
of functionings, capabilities and justice are influenced by our different social 
positions, cultural traditions and experiences.
 However, there are strong reasons to prefer the capabilities approach to the hap-
piness approach of Richard Layard. One argument in favour of the capabilities 
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approach is that it entails a reasonable understanding of what happiness means. 
There are good philosophical and theological arguments to maintain that happi-
ness is not limited to pleasure and feeling good. Happiness should be understood 
in terms of human fulfilment and human flourishing. Such an Aristotelian per-
spective on happiness can be expressed in terms of functionings and capabilities, 
which indicate what people actually are able to do and to be.
 A second argument in favour of the capabilities approach is that it entails a 
theory of justice as an equal distribution. The goal is not only to increase the 
overall happiness in a society, but also to promote an equal distribution of the 
capabilities. This means that the criterion of a right action is not only that it pro-
duces the greatest possible happiness in a society. In order to be right, the action 
should also contribute to an equal distribution of a good human life.
 Martha Nussbaum gives a strong argument in favour of such a principle of 
equal distribution. She argues that the capabilities approach relies on some deep 
moral intuitions and considered judgements about what respect for human 
dignity requires. According to Nussbaum, the central human capabilities are 
implicit in the idea of a life worthy of human dignity. The idea of human dignity 
indicates that the capabilities should be pursued for each and every person, treat-
ing each person as an end and none as only a means to achieve an end. A life 
without the capabilities is not a life that is worthy of human dignity (2007: 70, 
74, 76).
 The utilitarian theory of Richard Layard entails a different kind of argument 
in favour of equality. According to Layard inequality is bad because extra 
income brings less benefit to the rich than to the poor. Extra income increases 
happiness less and less as people get richer, but it means a lot for the happiness 
of poor people. In poor countries extra income increases happiness much more 
than in rich countries. To promote equality is thus a good means to produce the 
greatest possible happiness (2006: 52, 230).
 As John Atherton has described, the happiness hypothesis may be used in an 
argument in favour of equality in two ways. First, there is a connection between 
income and happiness for those who are worst off. Poverty reduction increases 
the happiness of poor people. Second, there is a positive relationship between 
more equal societies and greater happiness. For the overall happiness in a 
society, inequality seems to have damaging consequences (2008: 130).
 However, this utilitarian perspective gives a rather weak argument in favour 
of equality. From this perspective equality is a goal only if it increases happi-
ness. If it does not contribute to overall happiness, equality should not be pro-
moted. This is a position to be refuted. Equality is an important social goal in 
itself, independent of its consequences for the overall happiness in a society.
 A more convincing argument in favour of an equal distribution is the prin-
ciple of human dignity. Duncan Forrester has given a strong defence of this prin-
ciple in his book On Human Worth (2001). He argues that each person is of 
infinite, and hence equal, worth and should be treated as such, independently of 
their ability, contribution, success, work or desert. This principle is the main 
reason for an equal distribution of social goods (2001: 30).
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 There are different arguments in favour of such a principle of equal human 
worth. One is that human beings are equal by virtue of their common humanity. 
Another is that there is a quality which is common to all humans, such as a free 
and rational will (2001: 43, 44). According to Christian theology, God ascribes 
the infinite worth of each person, independently of the individual’s qualities and 
achievements. We are all created to be God’s image and likeness, and therefore 
we are equal (2001: 45, 82).
 If we accept such a principle of equal human worth, we have a strong argu-
ment in favour of an equal distribution of social goods. All humans are equal, 
and therefore justice means an equal distribution. We should strive for equality, 
even if it does not increase the pleasure in the world.
Conclusion
Two basic problems are dealt with in this chapter. One concerns the conception 
of a good human life within political economy and economic theory. What are 
the objects to value in economic analysis? The other problem concerns the rela-
tionship between equality and happiness. Is the happiness hypothesis a reasona-
ble argument in favour of equality?
 I have argued that welfare economics and neoclassical economic theory often 
presuppose an understanding of welfare in terms of preference satisfaction. This 
is a conception of human wellbeing which can be criticized from several per-
spectives. A good human life should not be understood as satisfaction of desires.
 From this perspective I have given a critical analysis of the conception of 
happiness presupposed in the work of Richard Layard. According to him happi-
ness should be understood in terms of pleasure and feeling good. I have argued 
that there are strong objections against this kind of hedonistic utilitarianism. 
Happiness should rather be understood in terms of human flourishing.
 Finally, I have analysed another alternative to the conception of a good 
human life within traditional welfare economics. This is the neo- Aristotelian 
position developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum in their ‘capabilities 
approach’. I have argued that this is a rather reasonable understanding of a good 
human life and the meaning of happiness. I have also argued that the capabilities 
approach gives an important perspective on the relationship between happiness 
and equality. We should strive for equality, even if it does not increase the 
overall happiness in the world. The reason is that all humans have an equal 
worth.
3 Happiness through thrift
The contribution of business to human 
wellbeing
Peter Heslam
Introduction
Commercial enterprise faces unprecedented opportunities to be an agent of posit­
ive social, material and spiritual wellbeing – of human happiness – in the con­
temporary world. This is partly because under the impact of globalization, 
business is becoming the predominant form of global culture as people all over 
the world belong to the same community of work. It is also because global busi­
ness enterprise demonstrates an ability to lift people out of poverty. Although 
recognition of this is growing, many people concerned about poverty remain to 
be convinced. During 2005, the plight of the world’s poor reached the top of the 
international agenda, due largely to the mobilization of a large conglomeration 
of NGOs, campaign groups, trade unions, celebrities and faith groups under the 
banner ‘Make Poverty History’. The emphasis was on aid, debt relief and 
the reform of global trade rules. While the last of these gave tacit recognition to 
the importance of commerce, the campaign as a whole largely ignored the posi­
tive potential of business.
 Obfuscating the contribution of business to human wellbeing is a major over­
sight, not least because foreign direct investment has now overtaken aid as the 
primary source of funding in the developing world. This shift promises greater 
effectiveness in delivering positive outcomes in terms of human happiness, in 
the rounded sense of wellbeing, because it gives people hope for the future and a 
vision of dignity, freedom and wellbeing that can be achieved through their own 
honest endeavour. This moral and spiritual vision is embodied in the habit of 
thrift, central to which is the delay of gratification that psychologists have long 
maintained is fundamental to human happiness. Without this vision, people 
perish as they resign themselves to a life sentence of poverty once aid fails to 
materialize or to deliver real change. There is no conceivable way to banish the 
poverty that prevents human wellbeing in the long term, therefore, other than 
through the vigorous growth of enterprise. This has been true for every rich 
country and it is true for every poor one now.
 Business alone is not enough, of course. To really prosper, a nation requires 
the social institutions that characterize free societies, such as property rights and 
the rule of law. It also needs the cultivation of norms and the exercise of virtues 
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beyond the requirements of the law. These norms and virtues are instilled, nur­
tured, shaped, inspired and sustained through strong relationships, and through 
social institutions and networks (including religious ones) that are built on trust. 
As they do so, they form the kinds of mindsets and patterns of behaviour that 
characterize thrift. Business thrives on this habit – thrift derives from the verb 
‘to thrive’ – and as it does so it mounts an assault on poverty.
 Norms, virtues, relationships, trust, social institutions, networks and habits – 
these are all aspects of what social scientists increasingly call ‘social capital’. 
Consequently, the wealth creation that is needed for human wellbeing cannot be 
regarded along narrowly economic lines that ignore the role of social capital. 
This chapter will therefore explore the development potential of the contribution 
business is able to make to social capital as it pursues its commercial objectives. 
But as social capital is a broad category it will be broken down into four of its 
key elements, even though they interact and overlap with each other: institu­
tional capital, relational capital, moral capital and spiritual capital. Together they 
constitute a fresh research agenda that helps to throw light on the question ‘What 
causes wealth?’ Contrary to popular perception, this question is generally a 
greater preoccupation of the poor than of the rich.
Institutional capital
When a company, of whatever size, contemplates the possibility of beginning 
operations in a particular low­ income country, it generally looks for certain insti­
tutional features such as private property, the rule of law, an independent judici­
ary, an effective and impartial police force, a free press, and a limited, 
functioning state. Without them, firms lack the assurance they need that their 
property rights will be upheld, the honouring of contracts can be enforced, the 
government can be held to account and that their freedom to operate will not be 
unduly hampered through poor or excessive regulation that gives opportunity for 
corruption.
 This holds out the promise that foreign direct investment in developing coun­
tries will drive the development of institutional capital, which in turn will spur 
economic growth – a ‘virtuous circle’ of ever increasing institutional develop­
ment and economic prosperity. The problem, however, is how to get this circle 
turning and opinions are divided as to whether economic growth leads to institu­
tional growth, or vice versa. There is no space here to engage with this debate 
but the evidence does seem to suggest that making investment conditional on too 
many institutional reforms may not help economic development. It appears, in 
fact, that most significant institutional development occurs only when societies 
grow richer, partly because such development becomes more attractive to people 
whose income is rising and partly because it is less likely to be reversed once a 
country has passed a level of economic development amounting to around $6000 
per capita GDP (Przeworski and Limongi 2000). This emphasis on the impor­
tance of economic growth does not suggest that economic growth is sufficient to 
create the institutional conditions favourable to growth, only that it appears to be 
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necessary. Over the long term, economic and institutional growth are nearly 
always co­ developments.
 The symbiosis of this relationship calls attention to the fact that other sectors 
of society, besides business, have a role to play in institutional development. 
Indeed, it is often when business works in partnership with government and civil 
society that each side of the partnership finds it can maximize leverage. And lev­
erage is all important, as the people who are in the best position to tackle corrup­
tion and other failures of governance are generally the very people who benefit 
from it the most. Efforts to stimulate institutional development therefore have to 
strive towards conditions in which public and private agents consider it to be in 
their own interests to shun bad governance. But while it is well established that 
institutional development facilitates economic development, more research is 
needed into how business can stimulate institutional development. The fact that 
Transparency International’s corruption scale (www.transparency.org) indicates 
that the freer and more open the market, the less corruption there is, should serve 
as a spur to this research.
Relational capital
Previously considered a marginal issue, relationships have come to be regarded 
as a key component of business success due to their impact on morale, motiva­
tion and productivity. Although their economic value defies precise measure­
ment, staff retention and career development provide a rudimentary indication of 
a company’s relational health (Tomorrow’s Company 1995: 11). A ‘relational 
health audit’ has, however, been devised as a measurement and management tool 
(www.relationshipsfoundation.org) and many of the Most Admired Companies 
drawn up by Fortune magazine calibrate these kinds of measurements. The best 
companies to work for, it seems, are those that excel in the management of 
internal and external relationships. A champion in this area is Starbucks, which 
has actively sought to develop strong relationships with its key constituencies, 
including producers (Gulati et al. 2002: 3–6). Stimulated in part by Starbucks’ 
success, ‘relationships management’ has risen to a place of prominence in expa­
triate executive training, the key emphasis in which is developing trust. A recent 
study by McKinsey of 231 global companies identified three management prac­
tices as essential for business performance, all of which have important rela­
tional implications: clear roles, an inspiring vision, and an open and trusting 
culture (Leslie et al. 2006).
 But the development significance of strong relationships of trust extends well 
beyond competitive advantage and includes the role of business in peace­ 
building. Conflict, warfare, violence and terrorism represent the most extreme 
forms of relational breakdown and they thwart economic growth. Indeed, such 
conflict represents the greatest deterrent to commercial investment. In the 1990s 
the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman captured the link between 
peace and business in his well- known ‘Golden Arches Theory’ of conflict 
 prevention, according to which no two countries with at least one McDonald’s 
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restaurant have ever gone to war with each other. While this observation over­
simplifies the role of business in peace building, and may indeed no longer be 
true, the contribution of commercial enterprise to peace and security has to be 
part of any investigation into the role of enterprise in alleviating poverty.
 Endorsement of this suggestion appears to come from Pope John Paul II, who 
established a clear link not only between poverty and violence but also between 
development and peace. Indeed, he calls for economic development as the key to 
peace (Centesimus Annus #52). A similar vision appears to have inspired the 
2009 New Year message of Pope Benedict XVI (www.vatican.va). But it also 
features in the work of the thirteenth­ century theologian Thomas Aquinas, and in 
the loftier impulses of the seventeenth­ century Dutch seaborne empire. These 
were expressed in the ideal of Commercium et pax, commerce and peace, the 
proud motto of Amsterdam that was reflected in its harbour crowded with 
foreign ships. Without meaning to simplify a complex issue, when people are at 
peace they tend to trade; and when they trade they tend to promote peace. Trade 
appears to help forge the strong relationships it demands, converting them into 
the relational capital that builds and sustains prosperity. But the dynamics here 
are little understood and require detailed investigation, partly in the search for 
business models that are effective in breaking the conflict trap that has locked so 
many countries and regions into poverty (Collier 2007).
Moral capital
The banking crisis of 2007/2009 confirms the suspicion of many that the market 
is unable to act as a moral agent because, based on greed, it is inevitably indif­
ferent or hostile to virtue. It is, therefore, the duty of the state to impose ethical 
behaviour on business by means of regulation. The state does indeed have a reg­
ulatory role – libertarianism is only alive in textbooks. As the economist John 
Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) is famous for having argued, the invisible hand of 
the market needs assistance from the visible hand of the state. The state must, for 
instance, try to prevent certain markets from emerging (such as those in danger­
ous drugs or slavery), and to keep business away from those areas of human life 
in which it has neither a legitimate role nor competence. Regulation is necessary 
for human beings to be able to exercise freedom, including the freedom the 
market brings. There are three key reasons, however, why regulation is unable to 
secure an ethical market economy and why it is possible to look to business as a 
valid agent of the moral capital required to achieve and sustain prosperity. The 
first is that profit, on which society turns, is business’s primary moral obligation, 
not least because it is only if this obligation is fulfilled that business can make 
any further contribution to moral capital, or to any other kind of capital. Profit is 
a means of serving what is the end of all economic activity, which is the human 
person. Within a competitive context, it can serve as a measure of how well this 
end has been served.
 Second, enterprise is capable of inculcating and promoting ethical behaviour. 
Although the market economy is often regarded as the driver of rampant 
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 consumerism, environmental destruction and family breakdown, such things 
merely reflect the fact that market freedom, like any other freedom, gives people 
opportunities both for virtue and for vice. Because freedom contains this inbuilt 
challenge, so too, by extension, does the ‘free market’. Business faces this chal­
lenge on a daily basis, and its leaders need to be inspired, incentivized and 
resourced in order to meet it. Substituting legal coercion for this is misguided 
not because it imposes too much on business, but too little.
 Third, the moral role of business is revealed in the fact that as Benjamin 
Friedman has demonstrated, economic growth can correlate positively with 
moral development (Friedman 2005). More detailed research is needed in this 
area, not least to establish causality, but Friedman’s finding may find support, 
as did that of his namesake at the New York Times, in the encyclicals of John 
Paul II. The pontiff wrote: ‘The advancement of the poor constitutes a great 
opportunity for the moral, cultural and even economic growth of all humanity’ 
(Centesimus Annus, #28). The Pope’s departure from zero­ sum economics rec­
ognizes that economic and moral growth can and should coincide. For him, ‘the 
training of competent business leaders who are conscious of their responsibil­
ities’ is a way in which rich countries can help poor ones (Centesimus Annus, 
#35).
Spiritual capital
Capitalism is as much about the human spirit as it is about material wellbeing. 
That is why spiritual capital, which is primarily about meaning and purpose, is 
an integral, though often overlooked aspect of business. It is aligned to, and 
dependent on, a broad definition of wealth that encompasses the enrichment not 
only of the body and mind but also of the spirit – a notion of wealth that inspires 
people to give of their best in creating it because it is about ultimate concerns. In 
business, spiritual capital is generally expressed in the overall aim of an entre­
preneur or a company – their vision, motivation, values and how business objec­
tives are worked out in relation to broader and deeper goals to which most 
humans aspire. It is about what is sometimes referred to as the ‘spirit’, or even 
the ‘soul’ of a company (Pollard 1996; Batstone 2003; Ressler and Mitchell 
Ressler 2007). As more people seek meaning and purpose in their lives through 
their work, giving attention to this matter is increasingly seen as important to the 
recruitment and retention of a motivated and productive workforce. Much work 
still needs to be done in this area. Indeed, the study of spiritual capital, like that 
of ‘happiness’, to which it closely relates, is a science in its infancy (Layard 
2005). Further scientific analysis is also needed, for instance, into the nature of 
‘spiritual intelligence’, that aspect of human intelligence which is often referred 
to as SQ, to correlate with IQ, the ‘Intelligence Quotient’, and EQ, ‘Emotional 
Intelligence’ (Goleman 1995). This would bring greater rigour and clarity to an 
area in which the findings of neurology, neuroscience, neuro- econonomics and 
positive psychology may offer promising insights into the role of business in 
spiritual development.
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 This field of investigation is not, therefore, one in which theology or religious 
studies has a monopoly of insight, reflecting the fact that a person may be high 
in SQ but have no religious faith, just as a religious person may have little SQ. 
SQ is about the innate human capacity to form meanings, outlooks, ideals and 
beliefs, and is, therefore, precultural, more primary than religion. It is a form of 
intelligence that allows humans to recontextualize problems by seeing them from 
a wider point of view and to draw on the best of their impulses in finding solu­
tions (Marshall and Zohar 2004: 31–51).
 It is true, of course, that the spirituality of most human beings takes religious 
form and preliminary research into religious capital is getting underway (Baker 
and Skinner 2006; Furbey et al. 2006). This is able to build on the insights of 
earlier studies which suggest that religious teaching, inspiration, motivation and 
support can play a significant role in stimulating and maintaining spiritual capital 
(Paloutzian 1981; Zika and Chamberlain 1987; Seligman 1988; Schwartz and 
Huismans 1995). Rabbi Harold Kushner (1987) echoed these findings in propos­
ing that religion satisfies ‘the most fundamental human need of all. That is the 
need to know that somehow we matter, that our lives mean something.’ His 
words reflect the observation made by Viktor Frankl (1959) that, among inmates 
in Nazi concentration camps, greater stamina and resilience were generally 
shown by those who retained a sense of meaning and purpose that was often 
grounded in their (largely Jewish) faith. They also reflect the findings of a 
leading social capital researcher, Robert Putnam (2000), which suggest that reli­
gion contributes over half of the social capital of the USA.
Thrift
Despite a century of controversy following Max Weber’s seminal essays that 
came to be published as The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, rec­
ognition is growing that immaterial factors such as worldviews, mindsets, atti­
tudes, beliefs, virtues and values can have considerable impact on economic 
development.1 Thrift is one of the most important of these factors, as it gives rise 
to behaviour that is fundamental to the kind of commercial enterprise that 
embodies, exemplifies and helps build the institutional, relational, moral and 
spiritual forms of social capital. As the credit crunch of 2007–2009 stemmed 
from a deeper institutional, relational, moral and spiritual crunch, this behaviour 
needs to be reinvigorated as part of any serious attempt to recover long­ term 
economic stability and its associated benefits for the poor.
 For most of the twentieth century, nearly everyone in advanced economies 
had access to grassroots saving and investment institutions, including building 
societies, mutual funds, savings book accounts and credit unions. While most of 
these pro­ thrift institutions provided loans, they demanded evidence of credit­ 
worthiness and required a substantial deposit before granting a loan. Lotteries, 
casinos, predatory interest rates (usury) and other forms of thriftlessness were 
outlawed, and although pawnbrokers, bookmakers and loan sharks existed, their 
operations were generally considered disreputable.
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 Today the institutional landscape looks very different. While a pro­ thrift 
sector still exists, it fails to serve ordinary citizens. Indeed, many commercial 
banks and investment funds have abandoned small savers and investors in favour 
of ‘high net worth individuals’ to whom they supply an ever increasing variety 
of tax- efficient investment opportunities. Simultaneously, financial institutions 
targeting low­ income (‘sub­ prime’) consumers have proliferated, along with 
credit card, hire purchase and student loan companies, cheque­ cashing outlets, 
loan brokers, lotteries and online gambling facilities. The growth of this anti­ 
thrift sector is partly responsible for the high levels of debt that have become an 
accepted feature of advanced economies but now threaten to undermine them.
 The emerging two­ tier institutional framework serving rich investors and poor 
debtors not only raises questions about the morality of debt, about which today’s 
moral and religious leaders are generally outspoken, but also about the impor­
tance of thrift, about which such leaders are generally silent. Despite this silence, 
Hebrew and Christian scriptures provide solid foundations for a theology of 
thrift. Indeed, the word probably derives from an Old Norse word meaning, as 
noted earlier in passing, ‘to thrive’. Literally it means ‘prosperity’ or ‘wellbeing’ 
– meanings encompassed in the Hebrew notion of shalom, which is broader than 
material prosperity and is central to the scriptural theme of redemption. The con­
notation thrift has with redemption is made clearer still when consideration is 
given to that aspect of thrift that has specifically to do with saving (from waste), 
in view of the scriptural notion that God saves human beings from the destruc­
tive waste of human waywardness. Thrift is able, therefore, to work redemp­
tively, not least in preserving resources so that they can meet human needs and 
in saving the environment from the destructive wastefulness of carelessness and 
over­ consumption. Not to be confused with ‘stingy’, thrift is an amalgam of atti­
tudes and habits that helps people thrive because it involves the wise and grate­
ful stewardship of the natural resources with which human beings are entrusted. 
It is a form of wellbeing that leads to the human flourishing that is reflected in, 
while not being limited to, the eudaemonistic kind of happiness that is character­
ized by fulfilment, rather than by hedonic pleasure.
 Jesus’s well­ known warning against laying up treasure on Earth (Mt 6:19–21) 
cannot be understood, therefore, as an admonition against thrift but rather against 
greed and miserliness, which undermine thrift. In fact, the fear that generally 
accompanies these vices is evident in the words and actions of the third servant 
in Jesus’s Parable of the Talents (Mt 25:14–30). This servant’s fear, based on a 
harsh picture of God, led to actions that were unimaginative, unproductive and 
risk­ averse. The fearless words and actions of the two servants who ‘put their 
money to work’, in contrast, reflect a God who inspires the kinds of imagination, 
productivity and responsible risk­ taking that characterize the thrift needed to 
convert the barrenness of money into the fruitfulness of capital.
 Having made this conversion, which underlies all investment and entrepre­
neurship, these two servants are welcomed into God’s shalom economy: ‘I will 
put you in charge of many things. Come and share your master’s happiness’ (Mt 
25:21, 23). Their thrift is rewarded with greater stewardship responsibility and 
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happiness. This resonates with two further meanings and dimensions of thrift: 
‘prudence’ and ‘providence’, words that appear in the names of two large invest­
ment companies that began as explicitly pro­ thrift institutions: the Prudential and 
Friends Provident.
 All this seems a long way from the situation today, in which debt levels have 
increased disproportionately to income. While easy access to credit can open 
the door to greater opportunity and freedom, it can, in the absence of thrift, 
close that door. Indeed, the repossessions associated with the sub­ prime lending 
that preceded the credit crunch slammed shut many doors, not all of them meta­
phorical. While it is common to attribute all this to individual greed and reck­
lessness, institutions also play a role in shaping human choices. They have the 
potential either to build or undermine the norms, values, habits, trust and sense 
of purpose – the social capital – that augment individual decisions with wider 
social considerations and commitments. Because such capital reduces the need 
for litigation and monitoring, it is ‘efficient’ and promotes economic growth. 
Anti­ thrift institutions, in contrast, promote a culture of debt in which people 
find it almost impossible to delay gratification and fulfil goals that go beyond 
material concerns. They instil a psychology that predisposes people towards the 
hedonic rather than the productive use of money. 
 This psychology is alien to the creative, future­ orientated and purposive 
mindset that is commended in Jesus’s parable and which encourages invest­
ment. Grounded in hope, this mindset has been stimulated and sustained by the 
eschatological dimensions of Christian faith. This is reflected in research by 
Barro and McCleary (2003, 2006, 2007), which shows that belief in Heaven, 
Hell and the afterlife is particularly conductive to behavioural patterns that 
encourage economic growth. Their findings are supported by Ferguson (2004), 
who argues that the decline of Protestantism has been accompanied by a decline 
in Europe’s work ethic, leading to the continent’s economic stagnation. 
However true this is, the lottery presents itself to poor debtors as a means to 
future redemption. Decoupled from hard work, reward is attached to chance and 
fate. Would- be habitual savers and investors prepared to delay gratification are 
being made habitual bettors content only with instant gratification. If, as many 
psychologists have argued, the delay of gratification is fundamental to happi­
ness, it is perhaps unsurprising that increasing levels of debt have been accom­
panied by the declining levels of happiness to which a growing number of 
researchers in economics, sociology and psychology attest.
 Those who argue that nothing can be done about this, either because the 
obstacles are too high or because the market needs to be left entirely to its own 
devices, are like those who argued that nothing could be done about the wearing 
of seat belts or smoking in public places. There are, moreover, precedents for 
taking decisive action. The British government introduced a new threepence coin 
in 1937 depicting the thrift plant on one side, thereby promoting thrift by way of 
a pun made visual on a means of spending that was tangible and commonplace. 
Soon afterwards, during wartime, the British and US governments actively 
encouraged their citizens to exercise thrift by issuing war savings.
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 The contrast with the overriding response of the UK government in the wake 
of the economic crisis of 2007–2009 could not be sharper, the emphasis being on 
measures to encourage high street spending, such as lowering VAT and the cost 
of borrowing. The extent to which the shift from ‘thrift is good’ to ‘spending is 
good’ reflects Keynes’s influence is a moot point but brief attention does need to 
be given to the ‘paradox of thrift’, with which his name is associated, because it 
is a widely held economic standpoint that resists the promotion of thrift. Should 
saving habits increase, this doctrine maintains, falling demand for goods and 
services results in lower economic growth and hence lower savings overall. 
Prodigality, therefore, rather than thrift, ensures a country’s wealth. Economists 
holding this view, sometimes called ‘stagnationists’, argue that measures should 
be taken to reduce savings, such as reducing the investment opportunities of the 
rich by increasing their taxes. While many economists are critical of the paradox 
of thrift, it has found fertile soil among today’s moral and religious leaders, 
where it finds expression in a closely related paradox: while consumption, and 
the advertising that fuels it, is good for the economy it is bad for society because 
it corrodes its moral and relational fabric (Charry 2004). In basic theological 
terms this is the idea that, in a fallen world, sin holds out greater material 
rewards than does redemption. Or, in moral terms that are often associated with 
Adam Smith, vice is better for the economy than virtue.
 Smith does indeed give ground to the stagnationists and not only in the 
passage containing the famous quote: ‘It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard 
to their own interest’ (Smith 1776: I.ii.22). Elsewhere he argues that the illusory 
appeal of wealth deceives us into hard work and productivity (Smith 1759: 
IV.i.10) and he conceded that there was some truth in Bernard Mandeville’s 
well­ known analogy of the beehive in his Fable of the Bees, according to which 
‘every part was full of vice, yet the whole mass a paradise’. Yet Smith was 
sharply critical of Mandeville’s notion that economic growth is an unintended 
consequence of sins such as vanity, gluttony and greed, condemning it as ‘ingen­
ious sophistry’, ‘great fallacy’ and ‘wholly pernicious’ (Smith 1759: VII.
ii.98–106).
 The value of Smith’s critique of Mandeville lies partly in the challenge it 
makes to the assumption that the benefits of the market economy are contingent 
on vice. Although, from the perspective of redemption, private vice can lead to 
public virtue, there is no reason to downplay or dismiss the role of private 
virtue in promoting this outcome. Insofar as the current shaking up of the 
market economy is due to the impact of vices such as greed, it appears to indi­
cate that a flourishing market economy owes more to virtue than to vice. Were 
capitalism to be based on material accumulation, as many critics contend, it 
would be logical to expect the aristocracy and peasantry largely to have been 
responsible for its rise, for while there is plenty of evidence that these classes 
generally prized accumulation – the former for vainglory, the latter for survival 
– there is little to suggest that this was characteristic of the more market­ 
orientated middle classes, which rose on the tide of free trade. For them, the 
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Calvinistic Netherlands of the seventeenth century often served as a model of 
commercially based bourgeois culture. Under a Dutch king (William III) and 
Queen Mary II, they adopted Dutch institutions such as a central bank, a stock 
market and forms of commercial organization that gave birth to the modern 
company. They also adopted the habits of thrift required to make these institu­
tions work, so that, by the end of the eighteenth century, England had in many 
ways become a commercial society (Langford 1992; Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge 2003; Gregg 2007; McCloskey 2007). The king no longer believed 
he had the right to seize money from the City of London, and the state of the 
economy, as Montesquieu observed, had begun to play a more significant role 
in politics (Montesquieu 1748). The change was far less radical than it had been 
in the Netherlands – the British upper classes exhibited anti­ trade snobbery 
right up until the middle of the twentieth century (Heslam 2008: 170–172) – but 
the shift towards thrift­ based wealth creation from heredity­ based or 
deprivation­ based wealth accumulation was crucial to the legendary social, 
moral and technological accomplishments, entrepreneurial spirit and commer­
cial acumen of the Victorian era.
 The transformative potential when moral fibre converges with commercial 
entrepreneurship is reflected in the demise of absolute poverty in the West and 
in an increasing number of countries elsewhere. Yet many of the countries that 
have become wealthy, at least in part, through this convergence have jeopard­
ized livelihoods by spending far more than they have been earning and build­
ing up huge trading deficits. Meanwhile, several Asian cultures are excelling in 
the habits of thrift, in the case of China inspired in part by Confucian values, 
and it is to these countries that the West has been turning to meet its expanding 
borrowing requirements. There is no space here to discuss how thrift can be 
recovered and promoted within the debt­ based culture of the West. But opinion 
formers and policy makers, who are increasingly emphasizing the importance 
of ‘happiness’, can perhaps draw inspiration from the way in which happiness 
is obtained in the Parable of the Talents and consider the following four sug­
gestions: a public education campaign on thrift linked to government­ backed 
bonds; the creation of a range of innovative thrift- based financial institutions 
that are relational and community­ based; the development of national lottery 
ticket outlets as places where savings tickets may also be sold; and the priori­
tizing of entrepreneurship in education and in international development 
policy.
 The second of these suggestions could draw from the experience of micro­ 
finance organizations in developing countries, such as the Grameen Bank, 
whose operations have strong relational dimensions – the pressure to repay is 
mediated through a group of fellow borrowers. With regard to the third sugges­
tion, adverts could use a slogan such as ‘Every ticket wins’. Millions of con­
sumers, currently bombarded with gambling and credit options, would be 
offered a rare opportunity – the opportunity to invest. This would be no more, 
and no less, than the freedom and opportunity of the market economy – an 
economy built on thrift.
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Conclusion
The core activities of wellbeing­ enhancing commercial enterprise, dependent as 
they are on the exercise of thrift, are crucial to the exercise of soft power in the 
world today. The hard power of military might is, regrettably, sometimes neces­
sary to secure human development. But soft power is chiefly about the positive 
potential of the institutional, relational, moral and spiritual dimensions of human 
culture that are as much part of the commercial sphere as they are of any other 
sphere of human society. The human wellbeing that is supported by social 
capital is increased when thrift­ based business furthers these dimensions. It is 
partly due to insufficient regard for soft power that Western countries have 
sometimes relied too heavily on military solutions in furthering the cause of 
freedom, democracy, peace and security around the world. Much of the social 
capital that these countries enjoy has been built through economic activity, the 
commercial societies of the Netherlands, Britain and the United States having 
served as models for the rest. The resulting economic growth has raised prosper­
ity to unprecedented levels for most human beings. In the process, business 
around the world has accumulated vast amounts of knowledge and experience 
about the conditions for growth, sometimes as a result of its own failings, such 
as those associated with the economic crisis of 2007–2009.
 Globalization, which is not unidirectional (from West to East) but multidirec­
tional, and increasingly so, holds the promise that this expertise can be dissemi­
nated to those areas of the world that are most in need of it. As key agents of soft 
power, entrepreneurial companies are the primary means through which this can 
be achieved. Business leaders need therefore to avoid all types of behaviour that 
encourage irresponsible risk taking and excessive debt, but they should also 
ignore the condescending attitudes that are often expressed towards them. These 
are reflected, for instance, in the fact that, whereas in many countries a career in 
the military often enjoys immense prestige, business is barely recognized as a 
profession. These attitudes are ironic in a global situation in which commercial 
power has overtaken military power as the chief means of human development. 
Business is the institution to which the world is becoming increasingly commit­
ted. It is the social form distinctive of an increasing amount of cooperative activ­
ity outside the family, government and personal friendships. While nation­ states 
have been on the defensive, and voluntary associations, political parties and 
trade unions have been in decline, business has been gaining in strength, despite 
all kinds of setbacks. As a result, its potential to act on the world stage as an 
ambassador and agent of social good has never been greater.
 This chapter has been written out of a desire to see that potential realized. 
Given the size of the challenge, however, it has been able to do little more than 
call attention to some of the key research fields that need to be explored. But 
hopefully this will help stimulate not only those who conduct academic research 
but also those who lead and advise companies, or who help shape perceptions of 
business within other spheres of society, to think creatively about the role of 
business in today’s world. While the development case for business has been the 
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main theme of this chapter, the business case for development has been a sub­ 
theme and one that is of no less importance in the search for effective solutions 
to poverty. Attempts to improve living standards and quality­ of­life issues 
without the involvement of the private sector are bound to fail, just as business 
ventures without concern for such aspects of wellbeing will be disappointing in 
the long run. In this sense, although the relational, institutional, spiritual and 
moral aspects of business may be referred to collectively as soft power, they are 
no longer the soft issues they have often been thought to be. In a fragile and 
divided world they are becoming the hard issues, essential not only for reducing 
poverty and increasing wellbeing but also for successful business.
Note
The need for this growth is reflected in the suggestion by Rodney Stark (1996: 209) that 
‘historians today are more than willing to discuss how social factors shaped religious doc­
trines . . . [but] have become somewhat reluctant to discuss how doctrines may have 
shaped social factors’.
4 Happiness, work and Christian 
theology
Peter Sedgwick
Theology and the meaning of work
The question of why people work is not the same as the meaning men and 
women find in it. People work for all sorts of reasons: because they have to, to 
earn money, to ‘keep the wolf from the door’, and perhaps, if they are lucky, 
also to find meaning and fulfilment when they turn up to work in the morning. 
Almost 70 years ago William Temple in Christianity and Social Order spoke of 
service as the great meaning of work. However, such a meaning was hard to find 
when work was brutalizing and the only work available. The Church of England 
Mission and Public Affairs Council General Synod motion on Faith, Work and 
Economic Life (GS Misc 890B 2008: para 1) at their session in July 2008 quoted 
William Temple’s Christianity and Social Order (1942) in its briefing paper: 
‘Nine- tenths of the work of the Church in the world is done by Christian people 
fulfilling responsibilities and performing tasks which in themselves are not part 
of the official system of the Church at all.’ The Synod document goes on to 
speak of all economic activity, and all work, as relational:
From the entrepreneur whose activity creates work for others, to the worker 
in manufacturing or the public sector, to the mother with children, the vol-
unteer or the solitary who prays alone – all their work is, or can be, at an 
important level, directed to the good of others. The ends to which work is 
directed are therefore a reflection of the many ways, seen and unseen, in 
which the Spirit’s life finds expression in people’s relationships with one 
another.
(2008: para 3:2)
Further reflections from the Synod paper are the opportunity for discipleship, 
and offering the ‘potential for enabling us to participate in the creative activity 
of God’ (2008: para 3.2). Temple wrote consistently about vocation. Service was 
vocation, and vice versa, and Temple’s condemnation of the brutalizing effects 
of industrial work was that it made the expression of vocation so difficult. God’s 
vocation may be to self- sacrifice, but only a saint could follow this road as a 
contribution to human welfare, as Temple notes (1942: 70–71). Most employees 
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find this very difficult (Suggate 1987: 89). Certainly Simone Weil, the French 
social activist, left wing in her politics, and mystical in her theology, sought this 
road in the 1940s. She eventually died of her lifestyle, as she identified with 
those suffering in the world, but this was a very unusual and costly expression of 
vocation. Neverthless, the call to holiness and sanctity may be found through the 
self- sacrifice of the self in boring and demeaning work, as Weil showed, and it is 
important that this aspect of Christian spirituality is not lost in the search for the 
contemporary feel- good factor in popular spirituality. For millions of people 
across the globe who do still work in terrible conditions it is their faith which 
makes of their work something which is offered to God. This is not to deny that 
such work needs to be improved (this is not an argument against campaigning 
against sweated labour) but it is to say that people can and do make of their work 
a way of serving others and offering their lives to God. Temple himself wrestled 
with whether a Christian idea of vocation and self- realization would involve the 
dimension of self- sacrifice. He was, after all, from a privileged and wealthy 
family – the only Archbishop of Canterbury to be the son of an Archbishop of 
Canterbury, in the days when they had large numbers of servants. What was, 
however, clear for Temple was that service and vocation for a Christian were 
intrinsically related. It was certainly true that self- realization can be part of a 
Christian’s call to a particular vocation. ‘Inclination is often a true guide to voca-
tion’, said Temple, but whatever the inclination the ultimate determinant is 
‘because in that field he can give his own best service’. Service is possible in 
commerce and industry as much as in teaching or medicine, claimed Temple, but 
it is much harder the less rewarding work is (Temple 1942: 70–71).
 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s theologians, and the General Synod, have 
struggled to find the meaning of work in an increasingly globalized capitalism 
(CCBI 1997; Brown and Sedgwick 1998). However, this is not an easy task. 
Indeed, it would be much easier to find many attacks on the destructive effects 
of employment. Companies were once run by CEOs who had fought in the 
Second World War. Companies were like armies. They were hierarchical, slow 
moving, and what mattered was their manufacturing capacity. In the past 25 
years all this has collapsed. Companies are very light, fast, interested in intellec-
tual data and finance, and hire and fire at will. It is a familiar story. In the past, 
business ethics was rather like military ethics. If you instilled the right spirit into 
the company it would not rape or pillage, just as an army should not. Today who 
knows what deals are struck, what financial data manipulated, what spin put on 
intellectual data? The opportunities for malpractice are very high. Predictably, 
then, the past decade was one of the most corrupt in American business history, 
despite courses in business ethics in most business schools. Enron, WorldCom, 
and many other famous business names express the ‘new corporate culture’ 
(Byron 2006: 25).
 It is, for example, very easy to find references to the brutalizing effects of 
modern capitalism on human dignity, and indeed family life, in contemporary 
theological writings. One example may stand for many. Cullen (2007) speaks of 
traditional Catholic beliefs of the family as vindicating ‘an entire capitalist 
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 economic system’. This leads to unjust, abusive pillorying in the service of an 
opaque political ideology. Another example may be cited from the same collec-
tion of essays. Manion (2007) writes: ‘We are willingly duped into conspiring to 
keep ourselves chained to the forces of dehumanising capitalism which moves 
us ever further from a life with meaning, purpose, direction and fulfilment.’ For 
both authors, and for many others, capitalism is the great evil, sin incarnate, to 
be overcome by either feminist socialism or an appeal to Pope John Paul II. The 
stringent criticism by the Papacy of modern employment is graphically shown in 
Laborens exercens (1984) and Centesimus Annus (1991). Centesimus Annus 
(1991: para 42) writes:
Alienation is found in work when it is organised so as to ensure maximum 
returns and profits with no concern whether the worker grows or diminishes 
as a person . . . through increased isolation in a maze of relationships marked 
by destructive relationships.
John Paul II grew increasingly critical of modern capitalism and consumerism in 
the modern world. There is much that could be echoed here by Archbishop 
Rowan Williams. Writing of the liking by young people for clubbing and dancing, 
Williams (2000: 69) speaks of the egalitarian innocence of going clubbing:
You appear equal, but behind this is the ‘Byzantine politics of the fashion 
industry. The very clothes you wear to go clubbing are mired by capitalism. 
How does all this work? What makes it possible? Whose labour, in what 
conditions, whose investment, whose profit?
The dance industry is put alongside the export of live animals in barbarous con-
ditions in the succeeding lines of the paragraph. It is clear that there is a sea 
change from the optimism of Temple – that somehow service could be possible 
in modern employment, if only industry were reformed (hence Temple’s prefer-
ence for nationalization of industry) – to the distaste of modern Catholic theolo-
gians in both Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism for the world of work.
Meaningful work and the search for inwardness
Nevertheless, it is within work that many people find a context in which they can 
ask questions about their identity. It is not clear whether this interest about 
meaning at work is driven by concern about identity, or whether it is rather that 
the world of work offers a location in which people can ask such questions. It is 
probably a bit of both. The rise of highly educated workforces (Cardiff has 31 
per cent of its workforce with an NVQ 4 or above, which is a diploma or degree, 
far more than the UK figure of 24 per cent, and in great contrast to the overall 
Welsh figure of 21 per cent) doing highly skilled work does not make work more 
meaningful. Yet it is this rise in the skilled workforce which makes such ques-
tions possible. The new report by The Work Foundation (2008: 6) says:
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It seems impossible to imagine that in times of deep hardship, industrial 
strife, hunger and war, ideas so superficially felt as meaningful work might 
have some appeal. For much of the twentieth century, many young people 
sought meaning through a stance of opposition to ‘the capitalist order’ and 
by extension, the world of work. Has that period now passed?
The report goes on to examine the belief that the question of ‘meaningful work’ 
is a new phenomenon in human history. If there is reasonable economic and 
physical security in the majority of the industrialized West, if there is no realistic 
alternative to contemporary Western capitalism, and if risk is now seen as pri-
marily about personal, health and relational issues (which could be combined, as 
with the rise of AIDS), then the question of meaning becomes more an internal 
one. The Work Foundation report quotes a 2006 survey which found that 51 per 
cent of workers said that their work was a means to an end, and yet also that 78 
per cent found their work to be stimulating; 69 per cent said that work was a 
source of personal fulfilment; and 86 per cent denied that their work was mean-
ingless. Other surveys have also found that work came second only to the family 
as the most important role in people’s lives, while it has often been noted that a 
vast majority of people would seek to work even if they had an income to allow 
them to live comfortably without working. Work offers ‘a sense of purpose or 
redemption, a source of challenge or enjoyment, (an) ability . . . to confer or rein-
force social identity or identities’ (Baldry et al. 2007: 40).
 It is clear that companies can attempt to maximize the contentment found by 
employees, and that this may be seen as part of the Human Resources culture of 
belonging, commitment and engagement. There is much to admire in a company 
that celebrates achievement, nourishes talent and recognizes the desire of 
employees to develop their potential. Such an argument is predicated on the 
belief that employers and employees have shared interests. Over the past three 
decades management training has emphasized the need to create a culture of 
excellence, which will lead to commercial success for the company. Peters and 
Waterman’s In Search of Excellence (1982: 323) defined a business generation.
 How can you attach a meaning to work? You can take a questionnaire and ask 
a worker what they feel about their work, on a spectrum from meaningless to 
meaningful. You can also, for yourself, find meaning in what you are doing, irre-
spective of how satisfied you are with how the conditions of employment are. 
Experiencing work as meaningful or finding that the work which you do gives 
purpose, meaning and value to the rest of one’s life is to move into the edges of 
philosophy or theology. It becomes lived experience, expressive, and leads into 
spiritual and ethical enquiry. Ultimately this may be seen as a search for the tran-
scendent, or the ways of God with the world. Meaningful work is not however 
necessarily the same as vocation. Vocation involves the service of others, 
whereas meaningful work need not involve this element of service. The Work 
Foundation report argues that ‘vocation plus self realization becomes meaning-
ful work’ but in fact it is not clear why meaningful work need involve the service 
of others. The report (2008: 42) struggles with this concept, which it calls a 
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 ‘tentative double negative’. ‘Proper concern for one’s happiness and wellbeing 
is not incompatible with a moral point of view about the work that one does.’
 Meaningful work does unite three things. First there is the craft ethic, well 
explored by Richard Sennett (2008) in his book The Craftsman. Sennett believes 
that Ruskin’s ideal of the craftsman is able to be resurrected today, including the 
lamps of beauty, truth and life. Craftsmanship is doing things well for the pleas-
ure of achieving this ideal. However, it should be noted that Sennett writes from 
the perspective of someone without any expressed belief in God. This means that 
the ethic of the craftsman fills the void left by the abandonment of belief. A 
Christian understanding of work as vocation has to go further than this, and 
explore the offering of work to God and the expression of love as service to 
others. Second, there are moral motives, such as trust, caring and perhaps voca-
tion. I have already said how the report from The Work Foundation (2008: 38) 
struggles with this concept. Third, there are compensation motives, which 
include but go far further than pay. They can include leadership, authority, 
power and recognition. All three can create a feeling of intrinsic satisfaction.
 The concluding section of the report by The Work Foundation acknowledges 
that unemployment remains a problem in Western Europe, especially in France 
among young people, as it was throughout Europe in the last century. There is 
also a question of the work–life balance, and an issue of the power of the state. 
Yet none of these have the hold that the new culture of inwardness has, espe-
cially on the young. It is interesting that the report ends up quoting Charles 
Taylor, but without the clear religious message of his latest work, A Secular Age 
(2007). The report ends by challenging organizations to recognize the aspirations 
of workers.
 A Christian idea of work as vocation will want to stress that work is some-
thing that can be offered in prayer to the Creator, and the spirituality found in the 
activity of earning a living. This has always been part of the work of religious 
orders. At least one industrial chaplain, Peter Stubley (2002: 23), found inspira-
tion from the Franciscans which was world affirming, ascetical and recognized 
the importance of human work. When the Franciscans were revived following 
the Reformation in 1921 in Dorset, their initial ministry was to the unemployed 
tramping the roads. The importance of a theology of vocation is that it finds a 
purpose in the valuing of work, as an offering by the created order to their 
Creator in love and adoration, with the sacrifice of self to serve others (altruism 
in happiness and social capital literatures). This goes beyond, although it 
includes, the idea of work as self- actualization in The Work Foundation.
Layard on happiness and work
We are now in a position to see the significance of Layard’s study of happiness, 
especially as it relates to employment and work–life balance. Layard strongly 
emphasizes the importance of work for happiness. In this he follows earlier 
writers such as Robert Lane’s The Market Experience (1991). The insights from 
social psychology are crucial to the engagement with economics, especially as it 
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engages with the literature on happiness. Lane is a distinguished social psychol-
ogist at Yale who has long established a bridge between economics and psychol-
ogy. Neither Lane nor Layard (2005: 233), however, accepts that just any form 
of employment will produce happiness. It must be family friendly, with more 
flexible hours, more parental leave, and easier access to child care. He notes that 
family breakups can occur owing to shortage of time. This creates internal strain, 
which then breaks up the relationship, causing yet further unhappiness. Work 
becomes the enemy of the person seeking happiness. Flexible working practices 
are one of the main challenges of the modern workplace, as is entitlement to 
parental leave. In this, as in so much of his book, Layard looks to the Scandin-
avian societies as those that have moved closer to this ideal. Child care must be 
high quality, and there should be no social pressure on parents to work, unless 
they are living on benefits. Each family should decide for themselves if they 
want both parents to work, or not, unless they are on state benefit. Here Layard 
(2005: 178) argues that they should be willing to work at least part- time, once 
the children are of school age. He recognizes the delicacy of the situation, but 
nevertheless he feels that there are limits to the generosity of the state.
 Layard discusses how low unemployment can be achieved, and also how the 
unemployed should be treated. Layard argues for the welfare to work approach, 
because he fears that the demoralization of the worker in long- term unemploy-
ment will lead to the inability to change the situation, and also the refusal to 
accept responsibilities to wider society. However, Layard does not accept that 
the United States and British model of hire- and-fire does anything positive to 
contribute to labour productivity. What would be far more rewarding would be 
to improve the apprentice system, which does not work well in Britain. The 
lowest paid tenth of workers in Britain and the United States earn only half the 
level of their counterparts in western Germany. This suggests to Layard (2005: 
176) the existence of a pool of unskilled, disengaged workers.
 Layard (2005: 67) talks of work providing not only an income but also an 
‘extra meaning of life’. It is not clear if this is the same as what The Work Foun-
dation calls ‘meaningful work’. It seems that Layard goes part of the way to The 
Work Foundation’s report, but not the whole way. He speaks of the self- respect 
and relationships created by work. He also says it is important that work should 
be fulfilling, so that we have control over what we do, and if the creative spark 
among us is denied we feel half dead. However, he does not elaborate much 
more on this point. Layard is rather mainly concerned with enforced unemploy-
ment, for he says that there is much less change in happiness between work and 
being ‘out of the labour force’ compared with work and unemployment. Unem-
ployment is not something that one habituates to, even after two years, although 
it hurts less if other people are out of work in one’s locality as well. Even when 
one is back in work there is a psychological scar. Kenny and Kenny (2006: 119) 
also refer to the social stigma of unemployment, and argue that employment is 
important because of the nature of human dignity. Human dignity echoes the 
Aristotelian idea that the happy life is one of reason expressed through action. 
Yet a third thinker, alongside Charles Kenny and Richard Layard, would be the 
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economist Amartya Sen. Sen, however, feels that being out of the labour market 
is more of a problem than perhaps Layard allows. Kenny and Kenny (2006: 119) 
show that Sen is certainly concerned that many legitimate welfare claimants do 
not claim because of concerns with dignity. Losing employment for Sen leads to 
social exclusion, fewer opportunities either to make decisions or to express your-
self through action, and a weakening of social values. This may also include 
cynicism about social relationships. Kenny and Kenny (2006: 126) note as well 
that low- paid work does not always add to dignity. Adam Smith argued for a 
minimum wage, but this was not adopted, to the great detriment of the dignity of 
the working poor.
 There is one area where Lane goes far beyond Layard. Lane argued as a psy-
chologist (he calls himself a psychosocial economist) that there is a direct corre-
lation between the cognitive complexity of job content, and the cognitive 
complexity of those who work at such jobs. It is a symbiotic relationship. 
Complex jobs attract people with more flexible minds, which in turn are 
developed further by the jobs themselves. Equally, jobs that are self- directed 
both attract certain sorts of people and develop that sense of inner direction to a 
much greater degree than would more hierarchical employment. Lane (1991: 
246) writes:
Prior work history is one of the most powerful predictors of recovery from 
schizophrenia, from drug addiction, and from alcoholism . . . At least statisti-
cally, if not in every case, capacity to work correlates highly with both 
mental health and capacity to love.
However, alienating work can only do so much. It can teach perseverance and a 
belief that one can overcome problems. For people to be stretched further, work 
needs both cognitive complexity, a sense of personal control, and some ability to 
make decisions at work. There is a close correlation between what Lane was 
writing in 1991, and where The Work Foundation is today.
 This is also taken up by John Atherton (2008: 277) in his recent book Trans-
figuring Capitalism. Again he mentions the work–life balance; the importance of 
using taxation to promote shared public goods; and the idea of extending 
employee share ownership to increase cooperative working, with greater partici-
pation in economic decisions. Temple (1942: 97; Atherton 2008: 143) made a 
similar plea, calling for everyone to have ‘a voice in the conduct of business or 
industry which is carried on by means of his labour’.
Identity and faithfulness
The final part of this chapter will look at the particular theological contribution 
made by Vernon White (2002) in his book Identity. Partly because White is pri-
marily a philosopher of religion, who writes on the nature of God, and on divine 
impassability, his book on human identity has not received as much attention 
from social ethicists as it deserves. White (2002: 43) argues carefully in his book 
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that the nature of divine identity is shown in covenant loyalty, or divine faithful-
ness through time and change. More theologically, 
When faced with sin and evil, faithfulness takes the shape of the divine 
acts(s) of grace, mercy and wrath, which constitute ‘justification’ within the 
overall process of salvation . . . it expresses the divine identity, therefore, as 
a purposive, dynamic, goal- seeking activity.
Divine faithfulness is related to divine power to achieve these purposes, and so 
divine omnipotence is given a moral framework which sets the context for the 
shape of human living.
 Human beings have to express their identity through change and continuity 
by persisting with accountable actions and reactions. Despite radical change, the 
same person continues to be present, and for White this identity is best lived out 
in love and faithfulness. White (2002: 95) spends much time considering the bib-
lical narratives as indicating what sort of faithfulness a Christian might be called 
to, but my interest is in his understanding of responsibility. It is not enough for 
an agent to express herself through particular actions. These actions must fulfil:
[S]ocial roles by persons bound in the social practices of a community. The 
moral focus of human identity then becomes the character of people formed 
within and fitting such social practices and roles over time – and particular 
actions are only considered secondarily in so far as they flow from that char-
acter and its social formation.
White (2002: 95) recognizes the danger of this approach. It could lead – indeed, 
it has in the past most certainly led – to reducing ‘the meaning of responsibility 
wholly to the performance of a social role within community beyond criticism’. 
He thinks of the trenchant criticism that was made by Bonhoeffer of the Lutheran 
idea of fixed orders of creation to which God’s word calls individuals, and in 
which they lead their ordered lives. Such orders could certainly include work, 
but they were open to the misuse of power without it being challenged. So White 
sketches out a much more open understanding of how roles and responsibilities 
relate. There are limits to what we should do, especially if another person acts in 
a particular way. Roles can come to an end, and our responsibility with them, 
says White (2002: 95). It is sometimes causally impossible to exercise a role of 
commitment unilaterally if role circumstances have changed. In employment, 
one of the great dilemmas of the past 20 years has been the change in the nature 
of work in the public sector. There are many public servants who felt that the 
changes in role being carried out by employers – such as a far more explicit 
measurement of outcomes, emphasis on value for money and enforced flexibility 
– meant that the profession or career to which they had committed themselves 
no longer existed. That is certainly the burden of David Faulkner’s fine study of 
the criminal justice system, Crime, State and Citizens: A Field Full of Folk 
(2001), where a distinguished civil servant at the Home Office expressed the 
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 dis- ease felt by many professionals at the new regime that now defined roles in 
the prison service, probation service, and much else. It was now impossible to 
live out the commitment, or vocation, that had defined the character of many 
civil servants. Meaningful work went into reverse and human identity was 
affected, in this case for the worst.
 It is time to relate this back to the main argument of this chapter. White 
(2002: 137) argues that the Christian theologian should be aware that contempor-
ary society will often provide a semblance of participation, faithfulness and 
loyalty that is deceiving. At least the older world which William Temple wrote 
about in 1942 knew where the buck stopped. This world was bureaucratic, hier-
archical, using instrumental reason, in a ruthless way. It separated out values at 
work, such as efficiency, specialization, division of labour and the like from 
wider moral values, such as personal identity, love and wellbeing. The new 
culture of work is seductive. It can, as White (2002: 137) says, generate the 
experience of intimacy, normally only found in human friendships and families. 
What matters is how this culture is evaluated. One of the key criteria for evaluat-
ing this new work culture is that of faithfulness. If there is a divine–human con-
tinuum of faithfulness, then it is surely the case that ‘an overall presumption of 
faithfulness will push the company to provide an overall narrative of meaning at 
work, rather than discrete bundles of meaning’. There should be some sense of 
connection between individual work projects, not merely though the ‘product’ of 
the project, but through the knowledge, skills and personality of the worker. The 
older order was hierarchical, and often oppressive. Yet sometimes this organiza-
tion, paternal though it was, could provide a stability and framework to people’s 
lives. Working for the company was not entirely a myth sold by capitalists to the 
workers. The difficulty is how this order can be replicated in today’s world? 
(White 2002: 145).
 Perhaps this is to ask too much of a company. Perhaps this stability is found 
only by belonging to unions, guild affiliations and professional bodies. But if the 
concept of faithfulness has any meaning at all, then the religious (or at least 
Christian) contribution to Layard’s writings on happiness will be to talk not only 
of happiness at work, not only of meaningful work which serves others, but of 
faithfulness in working identity. This working identity will of course evolve, but 
the exploration of how human identity is voiced through self- expression over 
time via ‘social roles by persons bound in the social practices of a community’ 
will continue to need the evaluation of the theologian. The dynamics of faithful-
ness are not exclusive of change, but there has to be continuity over time. Sedg-
wick (2007: 217) has explored how the vocation of the Christian in the world of 
work could be difficult to discern, and used the phrase ‘polyphonic living’. 
Something of the same wrestling with continuity and change is also being hinted 
at here, but with much more emphasis on faithfulness and continuity. But what 
is clear is that Layard’s emphasis on happiness through meaningful work will 
continue to challenge the social policy maker, as much as the theologian, in the 
years to come.
5 Happiness isn’t working, but it 
should be
Malcolm Brown
In his famous essay on Charles Dickens, written in 1939, George Orwell 
described the kind of happy ending which Dickens, and his Victorian readership, 
cherished:
The ideal to be striven after, then, appears to be something like this: a 
hundred thousand pounds, a quaint old house with plenty of ivy on it, a 
sweet womanly wife, a horde of children, and no work . . . nothing ever 
happens except the yearly childbirth. The curious thing is that it is a genu-
inely happy picture, or so Dickens is able to make it appear. The thought of 
that kind of existence is satisfying to him. . . . No modern man could combine 
such purposelessness with so much vitality.
(Orwell 1970: 491)
But is Orwell’s final judgement quite correct? The aspirations of early twenty- 
first-century English people are perhaps more easily and more accurately 
deduced from a close reading of advertisements than of novels and, naturally, 
some of the detail will differ. But with a few colour supplements by the chair, 
and the television on in the corner, a parallel account of a ‘happy ending’ today 
is quite easy to construct. Similarly described from the male protagonist’s per-
spective, it might be something like this: a hundred thousand pounds a year, a 
large, modern house with a smart car in the drive, a sweet, womanly wife, two 
children – a boy and a slightly younger girl – and no work. Nothing ever happens 
apart from numerous holidays and leisure activities. This too is a genuinely 
happy picture, or so the advertising designers are able to make it appear. The 
thought of this kind of existence is satisfying to most of us. (Post?)modern man 
seems well able to combine such purposelessness with such obvious images of 
vitality.
 Orwell’s point was that Dickens both reflected and helped to mould mid- 
Victorian notions of happiness. Today’s advertisers similarly claim to be reflect-
ing, even as they help shape, the aspirations of contemporary society. Scoffers 
like me should not lightly dismiss the power of such images of happiness, even 
as our minds and hearts rebelliously inform us that such purposeless lives must 
surely be lacking something of significance.
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 One characteristic of the happiness proffered by Dickens and the advertisers 
alike is the absence of any hint of commitment to a cause greater than the self 
and the immediate family circle. Earlier in the essay, Orwell had noted how 
Dickens’s often angry social commentary was not accompanied by the slightest 
notion of any political programme. It was once said that Orwell could not blow 
his nose without commenting on the oppressive conditions in the handkerchief 
industry, but his criticism of Dickens is not unfair. The question, for the Chris-
tian as much as for the political activist, is whether there are viable models of 
happiness which can sit alongside the notion of commitment to change.
 Indeed, it is worth asking how Christians are supposed even to contemplate 
happiness this side of the eschaton. The Kingdom has come in Christ but remains 
uncompleted in a world still living with the persistence of sin. Even those con-
vinced of their own salvation cannot ease up from the work of helping the 
Kingdom to come, and the contemplation of the gulf between how things are and 
how they might be in God’s own dispensation. The Dickensian happy ending in 
which nothing of significance happens is hard to square with Christian disciple-
ship. For anyone committed to some kind of eschatological vision of how things 
are meant to be (and not only for Christians) some very different notion of hap-
piness seems called for.
 If the world is understood as incomplete, fallen but redeemable, then to be 
happy with things as they are is to risk detaching oneself from God’s project. 
And, insofar as the Kingdom comes in God’s good time and not by our own 
efforts (although, without our efforts, its coming can be frustrated), a theological 
understanding of human happiness will need to embrace some notion of contin-
ual struggle rather than being posited on the completion of a discrete process of 
change. As Ronald Preston put it, the challenge of Christian living is ‘how to 
maintain a parousia radicalism when a parousia is not expected’ (Preston 1991: 
170).
 Being happy, then, within a Christian understanding of salvation history is 
likely to be discovered in the pursuit of happiness rather than in the illusion of 
its achievement. This is where the Dickensian, and the advertisers’, images of 
happiness are so obviously deficient. It is as if human lives are conceived of in 
novelistic terms, whereby struggle, uncertainty and change resolve themselves 
into a present and future where it is normal for nothing further to change. An 
interesting contrast here is between the staple American cop- shows like Ironside 
or Starsky and Hutch, where despite violence, fear and numerous on- screen 
deaths, each episode invariably closed with the central characters bonding with 
each other in laughter, and the Sherlock Holmes stories of Arthur Conan Doyle. 
When there is no disruption of the everyday by some intriguing case, Holmes 
reaches for the cocaine bottle to stave off ennui. Normality for Holmes is when 
the veneer of order is constantly subverted by the bizarre and the deviant. Only 
when Doyle tried to bring the stories to closure by introducing the ‘Napoleon of 
Crime’ did he betray himself into an inconsistent worldview in which the final 
defeat of Moriarty through the sacrificial death of Holmes (who thus became a 
debased saviour figure, later – and reluctantly – resurrected) restores the certain-
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ties of an unchanging and unchangeable social order. But this is far from the 
mental atmosphere of the early, or indeed the subsequent, stories where the 
normal state of things is understood to be a perplexing mix of good and bad 
motives, cupidity, rage, deception and abuse of power, as well as virtue, decency, 
truth and honour. The struggle for the better against the worse is continuous and 
an inevitable consequence of human nature. In contrast, American TV adven-
tures have maintained a decades- long pattern of crude Manichaeism in which a 
static social order is preserved through innumerable skirmishes at its boundaries, 
each of which is brought to an explicitly happy ending (at least for the key char-
acters) ready for a new battle to begin the following week. Struggle is, literally, 
episodic and abnormal: happiness is for the closing scene when a static normalcy 
has been restored. Strange that Kojak should be, in this respect, more Dickensian 
than Holmes.
 The idea that happiness is to be found in the struggle for change, within a 
world of complexity, echoes an Aristotelian teleology in which a life properly 
lived is concerned with discovering and pursuing distinct ends, and the ‘good 
life’ is not just a desired end but is discovered in the pursuit of the telos.
 Commitment to a teleology brings with it some sense of what it is to be virtu-
ous. Virtues are those aspects of character which promote the good and give 
content to the idea of obligation and what we ought to do. Without some com-
mitment to ends outside ourselves, the concept of virtue is vacuous. Being good 
matters because it is measured against some notion of ‘the good’ which is 
formed in relationship with others and against some canon of virtue: in contrast, 
being happy seems merely solipsistic.
 But should it not be the case that being good makes one happy? To the extent 
that our lives fully integrate ideas, values, actions and reflections, perhaps good-
ness is indeed its own reward and the reward is happiness. But most people live 
in the middle of a complex battlefield of rival beliefs and differing accounts of 
the good life. Christian ethics has rarely escaped this mêlée. To the extent that 
the Christian faith is a holiness movement, it calls its adherents into a closed 
account of virtue and acknowledges happiness only in terms of the internal life 
of the people of faith insofar as their lives conform to the demands of faithful 
discipleship. Other accounts of happiness are snares and delusions. But insofar 
as Christianity is a missionary faith, its members are called to ‘mix it’ with the 
cultures around them and to make their own account of virtue intelligible to 
other stories about what it is to be good or happy. If this is done seriously, it 
cannot but give some consideration to whether happy atheists, humanists or, say, 
Muslims are in fact happy because, however dimly, they have already grasped 
an aspect of God’s truth. It all depends on the extent to which one accepts the 
possibility of a natural theology accessible outside the revealed truths of scrip-
ture and tradition. The problems of resolving this tension underlie the great con-
troversies in Christian ethics today, as the strongly communitarian strands 
epitomized by Stanley Hauerwas, Radical Orthodoxy or some forms of evangeli-
calism (currently in the ascendant) clash with the enduring liberal tradition of 
Reinhold Niebuhr and his present- day heirs such as Ian Markham who has 
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attempted the revitalization of natural theology (Markham 1998). And this unre-
solved tension is not only a feature of the academy but is introducing some para-
doxical alignments in practical church polity. Anyone who has become used to 
classifying British evangelicals as part of a holiness culture within the church 
has to reckon with the unashamed collusion with consumer culture which under-
pins the arguments of the best- selling report Mission- Shaped Church. Acknowl-
edging, of course, that evangelicalism is far from being a united or monolithic 
movement, the rekindling of the mission imperative in the Church of England, 
largely but not entirely an evangelical phenomenon, reopens the perennial 
problem of how far a missionary church must compromise with the fundamental 
ideology of the surrounding culture – and how far any such compromise 
damages the church’s calling to holiness.
 There is much more one could say about the shifting patterns of liberal and 
communitarian theology within the practical witness of today’s church, not least 
about the correlations between right- and left- wing political agendas and theo-
logical stances on church life. But the key point is that the simple, fully integ-
rated, Christian community, in which all values and virtues coalesce to make 
good people happy, is likely to be deficient in its outworking of the Christian 
vocation to mission. People form their notions of happiness from many sources 
and numerous competing narratives, and the extent to which these narratives 
overlap with the Christian tradition is strongly contested within that tradition 
itself. Being happy may, for most Christians, have a very strong component of 
being good, as goodness is understood in the churches. But one glance at the 
lifestyles of many churchgoers, and an ear cocked to their conversations over 
coffee after the service, suggests that their hopes and aspirations, values, and 
concepts of goodness, differ but little from those of the communities and cul-
tures they inhabit most of the week. This is, emphatically, not an accusation of 
hypocrisy. Rather it is the inevitable consequence of living as a missionary 
church in a post- Christian world where the interweaving of Christian faith within 
the fabric of society is rapidly changing and extraordinarily hard to map. The 
implications for Christian understandings of happiness are interesting.
 Take marriage.1 After all, it is the bedrock of the family, in turn the central 
component of the Dickensian happy ending. Should the partners in an unhappy 
marriage separate? And, if they do, have they for ever drawn a line under the 
possibility of seeking happiness in matrimony ever again? The marriage service 
speaks of matrimony as reflecting the faithfulness of Christ to His Church and, 
thus, as a vehicle for living out the Christian virtue of fidelity. Similarly, Jesus’ 
own teachings on marriage appear to focus on the virtue of faithfulness and say 
little of happiness as the object of marriage. But the Prayer Book also speaks of 
marriage as ‘for the mutual society, help and comfort that the one ought to have 
of the other’, and this end is hardly achievable in a relationship marked by 
misery. Indeed, the relative emphasis given to the different objects of marriage, 
as the Prayer Book crept towards its definitive form, was strongly contested 
(MacCulloch 1996: 421f.; Martin 2003: 4–15). No wonder, since the continual 
dilemma of so much practical theology – whether and when ethics should trump 
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compassion, and vice versa – is at stake in the Christian understanding of mar-
riage as elsewhere. Adrian Thatcher hints that a deeply unhappy marriage should 
not be prolonged for what are essentially doctrinal reasons (Thatcher 2002). But 
that only raises the question of how unhappiness is to be evaluated socially – for 
the Christian, that is, in the context of the church which forms his or her notions 
of virtue, and simultaneously in the surrounding and inescapable society and 
culture. The church of Christendom could, perhaps, get away with conflating 
Christian virtue and good citizenship in a way which led to a broadly consistent 
picture of where the boundary of endurable unhappiness might lie. No such 
clarity is on offer for a missionary church in a complex, plural and essentially 
emotivist culture.
 It remains that the church of today has colluded massively with a notion of 
happiness in marriage which, because ill- defined, draws promiscuously (as it 
were) on strands of culture within and beyond the church. The equation between 
Christian marriage and a ‘happy’ marriage has been promoted in the context of 
predominantly pastoral church life which mostly subordinates ethics to ‘caring’, 
with the result that the church has become pastorally incapable of preaching 
virtue with consistency. A Christian in a difficult marriage is perfectly entitled to 
ask whether he or she should strive to be faithful against whatever provocation, 
or should strive to be happy, since the concept of an unhappy Christian marriage 
seems to be beyond the church’s pastoral vocabulary. The possible retort that 
fidelity and happiness are inseparable and that no one can be happy who breaks 
their marriage vows neglects the obvious point that all marriages (like all rela-
tionships) involve more than one moral agent, each having the power to subvert 
the happiness of the other, however hard they pursue the virtue of faithfulness. 
As the Church of England’s compromises with remarriage following divorce 
show, the imperative of fidelity, despite its gospel warrant, has been almost com-
pletely eclipsed by pastoral concerns (although the continuing ban on remarried 
clergy becoming bishops demonstrates the token moue of distaste that so often 
accompanies necessary moral compromise). Nor has the trite rhetorical claim 
that Christian marriage and happy marriage are coterminous dropped out of the 
church’s pastoral lexicon.
 Both in the Dickensian and the contemporary context, the marriage ideal is 
one of cosy sameness and inaction. As John Milbank points out in another 
context, most sexual attraction in the modern West is essentially homoerotic 
because it is predicated on finding a partner sufficiently like us to reflect us back 
to our selves (Milbank 2002). What has been lost is an understanding of marriage 
as an encounter with an ultimately ineffable other. The insipid ideal ‘happy mar-
riage’, with which the churches appear to collude with enthusiasm, cannot be the 
foundation of any viable social ethic or the breeding ground of virtues, despite 
the rhetoric of marriage as the bedrock of society, since it explicitly keeps the 
complexity of multiple ‘othernesses’ outside its purview. The moral focus on 
marriage has, indeed, become almost neurotic – perhaps because, by investing 
marriage with supreme moral significance, one is left free to act amorally in com-
mercial, political and other spheres where otherness is truly inescapable. As 
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MacIntyre puts it, ‘ “immoral” ’ and “vice” become associated in the nineteenth 
century with whatever threatens the sanctity of the Victorian marriage – that last 
refuge of those who, outside the domestic sphere, were quite prepared to be 
scoundrels’ (MacIntyre 1985: 233).
 There is much more that could be said about happiness and virtue in the 
context of marriage and family life. But having attempted to disturb one feature 
of the complacent Dickensian happy ending – the happy and fecund marriage – 
let us consider another aspect of the picture he paints and which today’s advert-
ising imagery perpetuates. This time, it is not what is in the picture which needs 
upsetting, but what is explicitly absent from it which needs affirming – purpo-
sive work.
 It is telling that, of all activities, work should be essentially absent from both 
the Dickensian and the contemporary ‘happy ending’. It would be foolish to 
deny that, for very many people in all strata of the labour market, the experience 
of work in its modern forms can be profoundly disintegrative and hard to connect 
with the virtues. But the consciousness of this is itself testimony to the enduring 
belief that work should be a very different sort of moral experience. Many voices 
today draw attention to the character- forming nature of human work and, at the 
same time, to the potential of economic structures to frustrate the formation of 
virtuous characteristics among workers. Richard Sennett makes just this point, 
arguing that an emphasis on competition, and a fixation on ‘winners’ and 
‘losers’, has helped destroy the ability of workers to make their work meaningful 
(Sennett 1998). He cites the example of a janitor who developed a strong sense 
of what it meant to be a ‘good janitor’ – and the janitor’s son, a Wall Street 
broker, who lamented his inability to convey virtues such as truth- telling, loyalty 
and honesty to his own children because they could see how his working life 
undermined and belittled those values.
 Sennett’s (true) story of the janitor who understood what it meant to be a 
good janitor to some extent takes us beyond MacIntyre’s rather arbitrary defini-
tions of what kinds of work are, and are not, to be construed as practices. He 
says, in After Virtue, that:
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially defini-
tive of, that activity, . . . Bricklaying is not a practice; architecture is. Plant-
ing turnips is not a practice; farming is.
(MacIntyre 1985: 187)
It seems that the bricklayer and the turnip planter are not destined to enjoy the 
happiness of being good bricklayers or turnip planters, since MacIntyre does not 
recognize the possibility of internal goods attaching to their work. Without 
denying the existence of much work that is mindless and purely mechanical, 
MacIntyre’s examples must be questioned, for if it is possible to conceive of bad 
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turnip planting or bricklaying (and it is),2 then it must be possible to speak of the 
internal goods of these activities and, thus, to regard them as practices. MacIn-
tyre goes on to characterize the internal and external goods of a practice through 
the example of teaching a reluctant child to play chess by offering the child 
sweets for every game the child wins. As long as only the external goods are in 
view, the child has no incentive not to cheat if he can get away with it. But the 
hope of the teacher is that, in time, the child will come to understand that chess, 
being in MacIntyre’s sense a practice, has internal goods and that winning is not 
the sole characteristic of a good chess player or of a game of chess well played 
(MacIntyre 1985: 188).
 Work, then, if understood as a practice through which it is possible to pursue 
internal goods, becomes a likely vehicle for happiness because it is active, 
directed to external goals and yet, by being capable of being done well or badly, 
is also about virtue.
 Another reason for looking to purposive work as a vehicle for the pursuit of 
happiness is that the location of most work within the marketplace means that it 
almost inevitably involves a negotiated encounter with others who may not share 
one’s own moral structures. Like MacIntyre’s definition of a practice, it is a 
cooperative human activity, but one in which cooperation must almost always 
cross the boundaries of discrete moral communities. In this, it is the opposite of 
the Dickensian cosiness of family and the epitome of what, according to 
Milbank, marriage should be but, in contemporary culture, is not. At work, the 
encounter with profound otherness and difference is almost inescapable.3
 My point here is that, as I suggested earlier, understandings of being happy 
may be formed in a variety of moral contexts. Christians do not live out their 
whole lives among fellow believers – if they did, it would be a dereliction of 
their missionary calling. Participation in purposive work, organized within a 
market model which treats plurality as a given, is one very significant location 
where virtues, and ideas of happiness, may be shaped. Because work typically 
requires cooperative effort with people who have not been selected on the basis 
of a shared moral formation, a Christian account of virtuous work, and how work 
can become part of the pursuit of happiness, must be capable of dialogue with 
other versions of what it is to be good or happy. The relational aspect of most 
work, the fact that few labour markets allow Christians, or any other mono-
chrome ethical group, to work in isolation from others, and the extent to which 
people still gain self- knowledge and self- worth from their working lives, make 
purposive work a natural location for exploring the meaning of happiness from 
different ethical perspectives. Inevitably, since happiness is hard to pursue when 
deeply at odds with those around one, Christian understandings of happiness can 
be moderated, modified or qualified in the shared endeavours of working life. On 
the other hand, happiness is, as we have seen, discovered in the pursuit of it, and 
the trajectory of the pursuit is informed by commitment to a vision for change. 
This is certainly the case for the Christian who, in the ethical melting- pot of 
working life, has to seek common understandings with others while maintaining 
integrity with the tradition of faith, and the community which embodies it. 
82  M. Brown
 Happiness, for the Christian, is, like so much of the life of discipleship, a matter 
of engaging with the worldviews of others while calibrating them against a theo-
logical yardstick. It is a dialogic process in which what it means to be ‘happy’ is 
understood as both of the world and beyond the world. This is to be expected 
within the Christian dispensation because we know ourselves to inhabit the theo-
logical interim in which the glory and grace of God is known through the Spirit, 
yet sin persists and the Kingdom, already inaugurated, is not yet fulfilled. And so 
we come back to the tension between holiness and mission.
 It would be wrong to make too much of the gap between Christian and other 
notions of happiness. As Nigel Biggar has powerfully argued, what matters is 
not Christian distinctiveness so much as Christian authenticity (Biggar 2006: 
9–19). Christians and others may occupy similar ground but get there from dif-
ferent premises and via differing chains of reasoning. So the pursuit of happiness 
for the faithful may lead them, for authentically theological reasons, to combine 
their efforts with those of others in some common cause that is not explicitly 
‘Christian’ but is none the less perceived to further the aims of the Kingdom. 
Good work may very well come into this category. Nevertheless, precisely 
because the Christian’s rationale for joining the collective project is specific to 
that faith tradition, the possibility of a parting of the ways remains always open. 
Limited agreement about how to be happy, rather than the complete assimilation 
of one tradition into some unspecific melting- pot of rationales, is what is meant 
here. But limited agreements need not be negligible.
 Given the potential of purposive work to generate a context for the pursuit of 
happiness in which differing ethical traditions may cooperate together for limited 
ends, how might work be structured to make this aim both feasible and coherent 
within the Christian theological tradition? If we can offer some tentative answers 
to this question, we may be able to construct a model of work which, while 
explicitly theological, could still be recognized for its virtuous orientation by 
others who do not share the theological starting points. If work is highly signific-
ant in the formation of virtue and the pursuit of happiness, then a way of order-
ing and understanding work which simultaneously coheres with Christian belief 
is recognizably good even without its explicit theological framework, and which 
is thereby communicable beyond the household of faith, is not to be sniffed at. 
One possible outline of such a theology of work was proposed as long ago as 
1941 by the novelist and theologian Dorothy L. Sayers.4
 Revisiting Sayers’ theology of work is not intended to suggest that this is, in 
some way, a definitive understanding or one on which a considerable edifice 
might be constructed. Rather, it is intended as an example of how an unasham-
edly theological approach to purposive work might not only satisfy the Christian 
desire for belief and practice to be integrated but may also be recognized as vir-
tuous even when the specifically Christian content is omitted. In addition, this is 
not to imply that the theological element is a mere add- on or appendix. It is an 
example of Biggar’s argument that Christians may authentically occupy the 
same territory as people of other faiths and none without retracting from their 
specifically theological rationale for being there. If purposive work is one arena 
Happiness isn’t working, but it should be  83
in which happiness is pursued, and if, as I have suggested, the possibility of 
engaging with others to pursue happiness collectively is important, then an 
approach such as Sayers’ is an indication of how Christian ethics can help create 
a framework within which a profound and shared notion of happiness becomes 
possible.
 Sayers developed a Trinitarian theology of work as she reflected upon her 
own craft as a writer, but her thinking is not confined to the work of artists as 
such. The creative worker, in whatever field, is driven by an Idea – a glimpse of 
the whole work that is to be made or performed. This can apply as much to 
service industries, engineering, homemaking, childcare or leading worship as it 
does to the craft of the writer. The Idea is realized through the application of 
Energy; mental, physical or spiritual. When the work is done and the Idea is 
embodied in the activity, or Energy, it creates a reaction in the creator and in 
those who receive the work – this response demonstrates the Power of the work 
and confirms the importance of relationships in making work good, whether the 
recipient is the customer, the client, the public or the colleague. Idea–Energy–
Power: Sayers sees these as analogous to Father, Son and Holy Spirit. In other 
words, the reflective worker is participating in the activity of the Trinity and mir-
roring to the world the way in which God, as Trinity, engages with the created 
order.5
 When Sayers published The Mind of the Maker, it was suggested by critics 
that she had discovered a Trinitarian pattern in human work because, in effect, 
her own faith had planted the idea within her argument. In other words, her 
understanding of Christian doctrine shaped her conception of work, rather than 
her analysis of work shedding light on the nature of God. Sayers accepted the 
likelihood of this but, rightly in my view, argued that it made little difference. It 
is a perfectly legitimate exercise to argue deductively that, because God is like 
this, our understanding of the world should be like that. The point is that Sayers 
offers us an analysis of good human work which makes sense to the Christian 
because the pattern of the life of the Godhead may be discerned within it. But a 
non- Christian or a non- theist can, in principle, recognize the progression from 
the Idea to the Energy to the Power, and attach to it as much or as little wider 
significance as they wish. It remains, perceived from almost any angle, a worth-
while account of how good work might be distinguished from bad, since it 
simultaneously emphasizes the integrity of activity and conception, the expendi-
ture of the worker’s personal efforts, and the fundamentally relational nature of 
work which, even if it is performed in solitude, impacts upon a wide constitu-
ency of others. In that work of this nature harnesses personal commitment to the 
pursuit of meaningful change, it fulfils to a great extent the conditions for being 
a vehicle for happiness. In that work usually brings the ethical agent into contact, 
indeed into cooperative activity, with other agents who may not share the same 
ethic, it brings the pursuit of happiness out of the ethical ghetto (Christian or 
otherwise) and allows a teleology of happiness to be negotiated rather than 
imposed. In all of this, the Christian worker is reinforced in discipleship by the 
knowledge that, insofar as work can be ordered to allow energy to be applied to 
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ideas for the purpose of power, the image of the Triune God can be identified, 
behind the scenes, as it were, and the possibility of the work being considered as 
participation in the divine action is kept open.
 To reiterate, I am not claiming that Sayers’ Trinitarian theology of work is 
definitive, or a model for all to follow. I use it as an example of how a theologi-
cal perspective on a facet of human activity can, first, allow the Christian to 
share territory with others without compromising an authentically theological 
worldview and, second, to show how happiness can be pursued, with others 
beyond the community of faith, in ways which are, none the less, coherent with 
a profoundly theological understanding of how the world works. In other words, 
it is not necessary to Christian versions of happiness to be cloistered with like 
minds and doctrinal uniformity, nor is it necessary to abandon the authentically 
Christian commitment to divinity and transcendence in order to pursue happi-
ness in a plural world. The missionary and the holiness strands in the life of the 
church can be reconciled without making it impossible for Christians to pursue 
happiness in a wide range of social relationships.
 To bring this argument to a close, it is worth noting that, during a parish course 
on ‘Theology in Film’, the scenes from well- known movies which were consist-
ently regarded as the most appealing were those that depicted purposive work by 
groups of people. The barn- raising sequence with the Amish community in the 
Peter Weir film Witness, starring Harrison Ford, is a good example. So is the cre-
ation of the Jesuit mission community in Roland Joffe’s The Mission with Robert 
de Niro and Jeremy Irons. In Witness, the work of barn- raising becomes, explic-
itly, the point at which the community ethic of the Amish and the ‘outsider’ ethic 
of the Harrison Ford character are reconciled in mutual labour. The example from 
The Mission is designed to illustrate the collaborative work of the Jesuits and the 
indigenous people and is, perhaps, a more obviously contrived image of happi-
ness given the utter devastation of the community with which the film concludes. 
The moral ambiguity of the mission project is explored sensitively throughout the 
film, but the creation of the community is still one of the most optimistic and 
affirming images which most viewers seem to draw from it.6
 These are the scenes which prompt ordinary Christian people to identify 
something attractive and uplifting in selected Hollywood movies. Not so much 
‘happy endings’ as ‘happy middles’. It is the getting there, not the arriving, that 
speaks most eloquently of happiness, and even more so when the work involved 
in getting there reconciles, even temporarily, conflicting outlooks. Happy 
endings of the Dickensian sort give us nowhere to go next. Construing happy 
endings in terms of marriage and family is too constricting, too insulated from 
the surprising, perplexing and sometimes disorienting plurality of a world full of 
other people. But if, instead of writing work out of the happiness script, it was 
taken as a rich and promise- filled place for pursuing happiness, the possibilities 
are manifold. Christian theology becomes a way of interpreting the world which 
enables work to cohere with faith without retreating into a closed, communitar-
ian ethic. Dickens, as have so many who have come after him, has been looking 
in the wrong place for happiness, and has sold us all short in consequence.
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Notes
1 Some of my argument here about marriage is similar in tone to much of what Stanley 
Hauerwas has to say on the subject (Hauerwas 1981). However, I go on to develop the 
argument in a significantly un- Hauerwasian direction in the context of purposive work 
and the encounter with others.
2 It was said that the National Vocational Qualification in bricklaying, when first intro-
duced, was awarded for the ability to build straight walls but did not require students to 
build walls that turned corners, which is more difficult than it may sound. True or not, 
the story illustrates very clearly the possibility of there being good, and bad, 
bricklaying.
3 I do not mean by this that only activities taking place within an explicit market count 
as ‘work’. Even on a very broad definition of ‘work’ which embraces activities such as 
childrearing, homemaking, volunteering and so on, there is, first, a quasi- market for 
that work, characterized by the notion of opportunity cost – the things that are not done 
so that the particular activity can take place – and, more importantly, a negotiated set 
of relationships with others whose moral formation cannot be assumed to cohere with 
that of the worker. The exception to this might be, precisely, that aspect of the Chris-
tian tradition which understands prayer and worship to be part of humanity’s proper 
work, and if this is so, it is at this point that Christian ideas of work most explicitly 
challenge the market model of social relationships. But that point is not at the heart of 
my arguments here.
4 I am indebted to Dr Christine Fletcher for introducing me to Sayers’ theology of work 
(Fletcher 2006). My use of Sayers’ work here differs somewhat from Fletcher’s 
approach.
5 Sayers (1941). It has been claimed that the same theological analogy appears clandes-
tinely within the plot of Sayers’ detective novel, Murder Must Advertise (Sayers 1933).
6 I am indebted to The Revd Carol Wardman for sharing her experience of running this 
course on Theology and Film.
6 Challenging inequality in a post- 
scarcity era
Christian contributions to egalitarian 
trends
John Atherton
Concern over inequalities within and between nations has been an important 
focus of attention within happiness and wider wellbeing literatures. In such a 
context, inequalities refer to income and wealth, but also to other major features 
of wellbeing recognized in the UN’s Human Development Index (HDI) (which 
includes health and education), and in the New Economic Foundation’s National 
Accounts of Well- being (2009) and, using Kennys’ wider definition of wellbeing, 
which includes human dignity as political arrangements in terms of achieving 
basic human rights (Kenny and Kenny 2006). Although these issues remain 
central to adequate consideration of wellbeing in the contemporary context, I 
wish to move the focus of interest further, to locate it in an emerging new 
context of post- scarcity, a provocative but challenging concept, which features 
across a variety of literatures and disciplines, and includes reference to postmod-
ern and post- industrial societies.1 It is particularly linked with the happiness 
hypothesis as emblematic of new challenges to human wellbeing given dramatic 
breakthroughs relating to income and increasing life expectancy. This has also 
been associated with long- term trends to more egalitarian societies. I wish there-
fore to explore actual and potential connections between the happiness hypothe-
sis’s identification of inequality as damaging to wellbeing, and these new 
agendas associated with the post- scarcity thesis and its recognition of emerging 
egalitarian trends. I will then consider three Christian contributions to the ine-
quality–equality debate, examining their connections to key features of the hap-
piness hypothesis in a new post- scarcity era. The cumulative effects of such an 
exploration could form a religious contribution to engaging inequalities in order 
to promote greater human wellbeing, including its additionality and measurabil-
ity potential.
The nature and function of inequality in the happiness 
hypothesis
I will briefly consider this in relation to the happiness and wellbeing literatures, 
acknowledging that the debate over the nature and role of inequality in con-
temporary societies is still contested, despite new evidence supporting the argu-
ments against inequality (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009).
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 Inequality inevitably features prominently in happiness and wellbeing litera-
tures given their use of continuums from happiness to unhappiness, wellbeing to 
illbeing, and life satisfaction to life dissatisfaction, and their recognition that the 
negative end of the spectrum is much more likely to include the poor and disad-
vantaged within and between nations and the positive end to include the more 
prosperous. Both ends are related to levels of income and wealth, education, 
health, life expectancy, and crime in a community. Poverty reduction within and 
between nations, including as measured through the wider HDI, is therefore a 
key strategy in the literatures. The significance of social comparison and habitu-
ation to increasing prosperity in the happiness hypothesis reinforces this socio- 
economic relationality dimension, and its involvement with the debate over 
inequality. For Layard, income inequality is therefore a factor both in diagnosing 
unhappiness and in his reformulating economic behaviour to generate greater 
human wellbeing. Thus, on the one hand, he notes that modern surveys confirm 
the belief that ‘extra dollars make less difference if you are rich than if you’re 
poor’ (Layard 2005: 51). Extra income also makes more difference to happiness 
in poor than in in rich countries. This is confirmed by Kenny and Kenny, who 
argue the moral consequences of this in terms of modest redistribution from rich 
to poor countries:
We know that the marginal impact of a dollar in terms of life, liberty or 
utility in wealthy countries is close to zero. We know that the impact of that 
dollar spent on delivering a measles vaccination or research into a vaccine 
for malaria may be considerably higher. It is difficult to understand the 
moral case against moving that dollar.
(Kenny and Kenny 2006: 204)
On the other hand, Layard then proceeds to argue that addressing inequality is 
one of the ‘five main features of human nature’ that must be included in a ‘new 
vision of how our wellbeing is generated’ – recognizing that redistribution of 
income to the poor generates more happiness for them than for the rich, but also 
acknowledging that the extent of redistribution should not unduly blunt incen-
tives to rich and poor (Layard 2005: 135f .).
 It is these arguments which are supplemented and enriched by findings in 
other literatures, including epidemiology, psychology and sociology.
 In epidemiology, Wilkinson argues convincingly that inequalities are related, 
including causally, to ill- health, including lower life expectancy (health is one of 
Layard’s Big Seven constituents of happiness).As importantly, he also recog-
nizes that this correlation between ill- health and inequality crosses the class 
spectrum, including the middle classes, and is not restricted to the ends of the 
spectrum, the richest and the poorest. He refers therefore to the study of 17,000 
men in government offices in London which ‘found that death rates from heart 
disease were four times as high among the most junior office workers as among 
the most senior administrators; intermediate levels in the office hierarchy had 
intermediate death rates’. These huge disparities occurred among office workers 
88  J. Atherton
calling themselves middle class. Inequality is therefore a society pervading phe-
nomenon, even if more pronounced at the ends of a spectrum (Wilkinson 2005: 
15–16).
 In psychology, James links the increasing incidence of mental and emotional 
illbeing to the rise of more affluent societies and groups characterized by the 
disease of what he terms affluenza; it is therefore a feature of the happiness 
hypothesis as increasing prosperity but not happiness. Importantly, he connects 
this to socio- political-economic arrangements, what he calls the rise of selfish 
capitalism in the late twentieth century (James 2007: 11). He works with a spec-
trum from selfish to unselfish capitalism, and from more inegalitarian to egalit-
arian societies, the former epitomized by the profoundly unequal USA, but 
increasingly affecting the Far East and Russia, and the latter by the more egalit-
arian Denmark (as representative of Scandinavian societies).
 In sociology, there is a significant overlap between features of social capital 
and the happiness hypothesis in the respective literatures. These illuminate the 
issue of inequalities and wellbeing in two particular areas. On the one hand, ine-
qualities in societies are identified by Halpern, and by Putnam, as related to lower 
social capital and vice versa (Putnam 2000: 294; Halpern 2005: 194). On the 
other hand, the erosion of social capital from the 1960s to 2000 is associated with 
factors which strongly overlap with features on the happiness–unhappiness con-
tinuum, including family breakdown, declining trust, volunteering and churchgo-
ing, and rising crime and mental ill- health. There is an interesting conversation to 
be had between Fukuyama’s description of this breakdown in social capital as the 
Great Disruption (Fukuyama 2000), and the description of the rupture between 
the most prosperous and most deprived nations in the twentieth century, by 
 economic historians such as Pomeranz and Clark, as the Great Divergence 
(Pomeranz 2000; Clark 2007: 12–15). Both reflect growing unease over the com-
plementarity of increasing prosperity, disadvantage and social breakdown as 
classic marks of inequality. Measures to correct these imbalances are intrinsic to 
the promotion of greater human wellbeing and focus on poverty reduction strat-
egies, including policies for more egalitarian societies, and strategies to encour-
age the renewal of social capital in nations, communities and personal 
relationships (Putnam et al. 2003; Halpern 2005). Interestingly, the contribution 
of faith- based organizations to the decline and then refurbishment of social capital 
is clearly recognized, acknowledging that they contain the potential for recon-
struction, but also the ability to erode social capital and equality. Here note 
Putnam’s observations on Italy’s regions and US states, that more hierarchical 
and authoritarian understandings of faith and religious organizations were associ-
ated with lower social capital (Halpern 2005: 178–179, 270; Putnam 1993).
Contextualizing the debate in arguments for an emerging 
post- scarcity era, and the trend to more egalitarian societies
There is growing recognition of the transition from the absolute scarcity associ-
ated with the Malthusian trap (that ‘short- term gains in income through techno-
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logical advances were inevitably lost through population growth’) (Clark 2007: 
1) to a post- scarcity era initiated by industrialization in the mid- nineteenth 
century, and increasingly confirmed by trends in industrial (Clark) or postmod-
ern (Fogel) societies. It is a development with profound implications for under-
standings of human wellbeing, political economy and culture, including religion. 
Much of this material is developed in new research in a variety of disciplines.
 I first encountered the concept of post- scarcity in Wilkinson’s The Impact of 
Inequality: How to Make Sick Societies Healthier (Wilkinson 2005: 248). This 
may be linked to economic historian Offer’s basic human needs transition, that 
when ‘basic deprivations are remedied and basic needs are satisfied’ then other 
challenges emerge for human wellbeing relating centrally to the happiness 
hypothesis (Offer 2006: 36). This was then confirmed by Gregory Clark’s A 
Farewell to Alms. A Brief Economic History of the World (2007), and his refer-
ence to the increasing wealth of post- Malthusian trap industrial societies, but 
particularly by the work of the Nobel Economic Laureate Robert Fogel and his 
The Escape from Hunger and Premature Death, 1700–2100. Europe, America 
and the Third World (2004), and The Fourth Great Awakening and the Future of 
Egalitarianism (2000), focusing on post- scarcity through technophysio evolu-
tion. Their argument, empirically based, is that given all human history as 
encounter with scarcity, only in the past 150 years has this Malthusian trap been 
broken for an increasing number of people, as a historic post- scarcity era begins 
to emerge. It is recognition that rapid growth of income per person, when associ-
ated with the demographic transition to smaller families, ensured that the effi-
ciency advances of the Industrial Revolution were not translated into endless 
supplies of impoverished people, but into the rise of income per person and dra-
matically increased life expectancy, education and health care. It is what Fogel 
calls ‘the escape from hunger and premature death’, and Clark ‘A farewell to 
alms’. Implications of these historic trends need to be firmly located on the 
agendas of the happiness hypothesis and Christian social ethics.
 For example, a central element in this movement to post- scarcity is observed 
by Wilkinson, Fogel and Clark as a trend from more inegalitarian to more egalit-
arian societies. For Wilkinson, this marks the movement from ‘dominance’ socio- 
political arrangements associated with the powerful commanding the allocation 
of scarce resources, to a more cooperative or affiliative strategy (Wilkinson 2005: 
169–214). This modern transition is linked to his observation that the absolute 
scarcity characteristic of the long history of the Malthusian trap (at least from 
13,000 years ago) was deeply associated with profoundly inegalitarian societies:
[T]he most fundamental rationale for inequality is always scarcity. Ranking 
systems among animals and humans alike are systems by which the strong 
gain prior access to resources, and the only point of competing for access to 
resources is the threat of scarcity. What marks a fundamental change consti-
tuted by the emergence of post- scarcity is that you do not need to compete 
for resources that are freely available and abundant.
(Wilkinson 2005: 244)
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(I am reminded here of Marx’s vision of a needs–satisfied communist utopia). 
Despite the contested nature of Wilkinson’s latter judgement, it is a transition 
with implications for religious thought and practice given the historic signifi-
cance of religious hierarchies and social control systems, and the impact of scar-
city on theological understandings of God and Christ.
 Wilkinson then fills out further the consequences of this transition to a post- 
scarcity world by noting the corresponding emergence of more egalitarian socie-
ties in the past 150 years with reference to political economy, leisure, 
relationships and culture. This is particularly elaborated in the economic history 
of Fogel. He observes that the movement from the Malthusian trap to industrial 
and now post- industrial economies has been associated with increasing gains in 
income, health and life expectancy, particularly for unskilled workers – con-
firmed by Clark – that is, that benefits of increasing wealth and wellbeing fall 
particularly to ‘the unskilled workers’ (the redistribution of income towards 
unskilled labour from owners of land and capital) (Clark 2007: 11). In Fogel’s 
work:
In every measure that we have bearing on the standard of living . . . the gains 
of the lower classes have been far greater than those experienced by the 
population as a whole . . . that increasing equality in real consumption 
mirrors ‘a dramatic narrowing of other inequalities between rich and poor, 
such as inequalities in height, life expectancy and leisure. Normal measures 
of economic wellbeing often miss such major changes in life condition.
(The Economist 2007: 122)
This judgement is confirmed and elaborated by Fogel’s The Fourth Great Awak-
ening and the Future of Egalitarianism, with particular relevance for this chapter 
and research project, because he links this technophysio evolution (as the inter-
action of technological change and health improvements) in the USA to cycles 
of political realignments and to four religious Great Awakenings. He identifies 
the last, the fourth such Great Awakening, as an emerging phenomenon in the 
late twentieth and early twenty- first centuries.
 Linked to this judgement is Fogel’s observation that this transition to a more 
post- scarcity-oriented era is also associated with the changing ethics and culture 
of society, to a major focus on health and health care and its financing, but also 
to a movement from the more materially focused living of the immediate post 
Malthusian trap era to a rediscovery or re- emphasizing of a lifestyle that places 
greater emphasis on such values as family life, shared time, spiritual values and 
good health (Fogel 2000: 13–14, 2004: 77–78). This greater prominence of the 
values and ethical dimension of human living becomes central to wellbeing 
development, as the happiness hypothesis has confirmed. It is to this agenda that 
religion has a particular contribution to make.
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Christian contributions to the inequality–equality agenda
The task now is to examine three Christian perspectives on the inequality– 
equality debate and its formative contribution to the happiness- wellbeing 
hypothesis but now in the light of the emerging post- scarcity era. All the reli-
gious contributions – from Forrester, Hicks and Tawney – precede the 
happiness–post- scarcity debates, yet they have played important roles in the 
 formation of contemporary Christian tradition, particularly as the theory and 
practice of the discipline of Christian social ethics.
 The three contributors have produced substantial and influential works on ine-
quality–equality. What can we learn from them which could engage constructively 
with the happiness–post- scarcity literatures? This is particularly with reference to 
the literatures’ recognition, on the one hand, of the obstacles presented to wellbe-
ing by grave inequalities, and, on the other hand, of the potential for greater well-
being suggested by more egalitarian societies. Such an exercise reflects the value 
of a correspondence methodology, as used by the theologian Tanner’s Economy of 
Grace, the sociologist Bourdieu’s The Structures of the Social Economy, and by 
the theologian Mudge’s parallel hermeneutics in Beyond Idealism. A Way Ahead 
for Ecumenical Social Ethics (Atherton 2008: 95–96, 233, 271). This involves 
setting alongside each other accounts, from different traditions or disciplines, of 
an agreed problem – say, the market economy or mechanism, but in our case 
 inequality–equality. The actual and potential correspondences between them may 
then be identified and elaborated. Because the happiness and post- scarcity litera-
tures have emerged principally since 2000, and the three contributions preceded 
them, I will use key findings from the happiness–post- scarcity literatures on ine-
quality and equality, and identify and elaborate resonances in these earlier Chris-
tian sources. The objective will be to test the feasibility of constructing religious 
features of a view of inequality–equality, which could include adding value to 
secular findings. That additionality will be confirmed by the ability of the religious 
contributions to be located in the Christian narratives of creation, redemption and 
eschatology. As Browning observes,
Neither Finnis nor Nussbaum [for whom he has a high regard], devoid as 
they are of narratives of the cross and forgiveness, say anything about how 
just love for the good of the other and self is to be sustained and renewed in 
the light of sin and brokenness.
(Browning 2006: 316)
Given the psychologist Haidt’s The Happiness Hypothesis: Putting Ancient 
Wisdom to the Test of Modern Science (Haidt 2006), and its secular elaboration 
of the classic religious themes of the divided self, changing one’s mind, the 
faults of others, uses of adversity, the felicity of virtue and a philosophy of life, 
Browning’s case for ‘the ways that the Christian narrative informs and searches 
the more directly ethical dimension of human existence’ should be taken seri-
ously (Browning 2006: 316).
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 The selection of religious contributions is made in the light of my knowledge 
of theological tradition in Christian social ethics. They have been chosen because 
they have produced important works on the themes of inequality–equality. They 
include, first, Duncan Forrester, the most experienced and accomplished Chris-
tian social ethicist in Britain, and representing the Scottish and Reformed tradi-
tions, and his On Human Worth (2001). His work resonates with de Gruchy’s 
South African reformulation of Reformed tradition as the promotion of justice 
and reconciliation in a post- apartheid South Africa. Second, Douglas Hicks from 
the US, through his Inequality and Christian Ethics (2000), represents a power-
ful engagement with Amartya Sen’s capability theory and practice, including in 
dialogue with the UN’s HDI and economic measurement systems, but also 
through his reflections on the nature of the universality of God’s love, including 
therefore as a bias to the marginalized, and therefore as a contribution to egalit-
arianism. Finally, R.H. Tawney was an English Anglican, economic historian 
and social philosopher. His Equality (1931) was republished in 1964 with a new 
Introduction by Richard Titmuss, major theorist and policy influence on the 
Welfare State, including his seminal study, The Gift Relationship (Titmuss 
1973), of the British blood donation system as demonstrating the efficiency of 
altruism. Tawney’s work on equality as a way of life, restructured social rela-
tionships and fraternity again offers strong opportunities for a constructive dia-
logue with the happiness and post- scarcity hypotheses (Tawney 1964; Forrester 
2000; Hicks 2000; Sen 2001; de Gruchy 2002).
 The three contributions offer opportunities for dialogue with the happiness 
literatures. They emphasize the importance of interdisciplinary work as theory, 
and of partnerships in practice, including in policy formation. Significantly, they 
recognize the importance of beginning with inequality, with the problem itself, 
and only then with developing alternative, more egalitarian understandings and 
practices. For American feminist Christian ethicist Karen Lebacqz it is to accept 
that ‘in order to understand the meaning of justice we need to listen to the 
experiences of those who are suffering injustice’ (Jarl 2003: 89). This approach 
resonates strongly with that adopted by Sen in his The Idea of Justice (2009).
 Importantly, I have chosen to move from Forrester’s explicitly theological 
reflections on the body of Christ as model for egalitarian inclusion, through 
Hicks on measuring inequality and promoting a bias for inclusion through an 
understanding of the nature of God, to Tawney’s more ethically rooted under-
standing of equality as a way of life through the formation of character and 
virtue, as the egalitarian reconstitution of socio- political arrangements, and as 
fraternity. It would be equally valid to move from ethical to religious, from 
Tawney to Forrester, given the basic continuum of ethical to religious, as a 
cascade of grace.
Duncan Forrester
Out of his practical encounter with the marginalized, Forrester develops a power-
ful interpretation of church as the body of Christ which he uses as a paradigm of 
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the equality of relationships and of the worth of contributions. At first sight, the 
seminal image of church as the body of Christ appears to make the rather com-
monplace assertion that an effectively functioning whole relies on the contribu-
tions of its different parts. Yet, as Forrester observes, St Paul may be seen to 
take ‘an idea common in the culture of his day and [reshape] it radically to make 
it serve a new purpose’, despite his retention of other contemporary cultural 
biases and his writing for an internal church audience. For the image was com-
monly used ‘to suggest that some parts are superior to others, that some were 
made to rule and others to obey’. The ancient Greek understanding of political 
cohesion excluded women, slaves and migrants, and was profoundly hierarchi-
cal. Yet for Paul, as for members of the body of Christ, ‘Diversity of gifts and 
functions does not lead to diversity of worth, esteem or status’ (Forrester 2001: 
99). (Compare the key problem of interpersonal comparison eroding contempor-
ary happiness for Wilkinson, Offer and Layard.) He rather affirms difference in 
terms of individual gifts and needs, including capabilities, but all are equally and 
fully members of one body. It is a model of the Church ‘as sacrament, sign and 
instrument of equality’ also found in the Roman Catholic tradition. So the 
Second Vatican Council declared, ‘By her relationship with Christ, the Church is 
a kind of sacrament or sign of intimate union with God, and of the unity of all 
mankind. She is also an instrument for the achievement of such union and unity.’ 
For Forrester these careful words are none the less:
unambiguous in suggesting that the church is, or is called to be, an exempli-
fication of a kind of egalitarian community which is intended to encompass 
all mankind, and of which the church is also to be an instrument, helping to 
bring such an inclusive community into existence as well as providing a pre-
liminary manifestation of it.
(Forrester 2001: 195)
Douglas Hicks 
Hicks’ work should be interpreted as developing further Forrester’s thesis on a 
religious corporate model for more egalitarian social orders through particular 
focus on an interpretation of the nature of God’s universal love as inclusive of a 
bias to the marginalized. This is a strategic development for expanding the 
understanding of the body of Christ as engineered to engage inequalities with 
reference to the most marginalized. He particularly substantiates this with a tech-
nical measurement system of inequality as a key factor in its more effective 
engagement, and as thus indispensable for developing a more egalitarian society 
and world. It therefore reinforces the performative character of Christian social 
ethics as public theology.
 First, Hicks’ reflections on the theologies of Gutierrez’s liberationism, so 
seminal for engaging national and global inequalities, and Richard Niebuhr’s 
foundational Western social ethics, generate ‘the regulative idea of human equal-
ity (which) bears directly and dynamically on political and socioeconomic 
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 relations – in individual actions as well as wider social structures’ (Hicks 2000: 
115). He develops an understanding of the nature of God’s equal love for each 
person as therefore requiring a particular love for the most marginalized and 
vulnerable – essentially what I have described as a bias for inclusivity (as recon-
ciling universal and particular) (Atherton 2003: 117–122). It is, importantly, a 
particular development of Forrester’s body of Christ paradigm. It indicates that 
Paul’s commitment to each part of the body, as all fully and equally members of 
one body, means that the vulnerable are therefore particularly acknowledged, 
because ‘those parts of the body that seem weaker are indispensable’ (1 
Cor.12.23). As bias for inclusivity, it therefore underlines the contemporary 
importance of the UN Development Programme’s commitment to the bias of 
pro- poor economic growth policies for national and international poverty reduc-
tion as essential for overcoming profound inequalities and generating more egal-
itarian societies. Its 1996 study indicated that
since 1960, no country has been able to follow a course of lopsided devel-
opment – where economic growth is not matched by human development or 
vice versa – for more than a decade without falling into crisis. During the 
past three decades, every country that was able to combine and sustain rapid 
growth did so by investing, first in schools, skills and health while keeping 
the income gap from growing too wide.
(Hicks 2000: 62)
For Hicks, using Skocpol, it is ‘targeting within universalism’ (Hicks 2000: 
237). It is such poverty reduction strategies that are confirmed by wellbeing–
happiness literatures with reference to the work of economists Layard, Kenny 
and Collier. The latter focuses on targeting The Bottom Billion as against the 
routine focus on the other four billion in developing economies (Collier 2007).
 Second, Hicks’ contribution incorporates a sophisticated inequality measure-
ment system which bends the national aggregative information of the UN’s HDI 
to include ‘distributional measures as well’, using the economists’ Gini coeffi-
cient tool to identify inequality of performance within and therefore between 
nations, including with reference to racial and gender- based groups (Atherton 
2003: 165). He particularly links this to Sen’s work on human capabilities (pro-
foundly related to the development of the UN’s HDI). This goes beyond Rawls’ 
equal distribution of primary goods, to include a differential principle relating to 
the individual’s needs and capabilities. It is a crucial recognition of the need to 
hold together difference and universality, in terms, for example, of Iris Young’s 
differentiated solidarity as a necessary reworking of the common good (Young 
2000: 9). This acknowledgement, too, of the importance of measurement systems 
in more effectively engaging the inequality–equality problematic relates equally 
to the importance of measuring the added value of the contribution of faith- based 
organizations to greater social cohesion. It also thereby suggests the value of 
enlarging the bias- for-inclusivity argument beyond pro- poor economic growth to 
also incorporate tools for measuring pro- happiness economic growth (deploying 
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Diener’s work, for example) (Diener and Biswas- Diener 2008: 234–243), and, in 
terms of the ethical dimension, as pro- moral wellbeing policies. Here, I refer to 
the historian Himmelfarb’s examination of late Victorian British values, where 
she observes how social policies addressing the poverty question linked the 
delivery of material and moral wellbeing (Himmelfarb 1995: 164). Ways of 
assessing this moral impact of policies should therefore have a high priority in 
the promotion of happiness. The economic impact assessment of faiths’ contri-
bution to society by the government’s NWRDA now needs to be complemented 
by a moral impact assessment of government’s contributions to society (North-
west Regional Development Agency 2005). This links directly into the literat-
ure’s recognition of the centrality of the ethical dimension in a multidimensional 
wellbeing, for example, in the work of Layard, Kenny, Offer, Haidt and Fogel.
R.H. Tawney
Tawney’s highly influential tract for the times, Equality (1964, first published 
1931), is an essential follow- up to his critique of inequality, again in another 
important tract for the times, The Acquisitive Society (Tawney 1920). Three par-
ticular features of his work connect strongly with the happiness and wellbeing 
literatures in a post- scarcity era. These relate to ethics, a way of life and socio- 
political arrangements.
 First, Tawney is significantly a moralist, including in conversation with a reli-
gious dimension. He is therefore a reminder of the importance of an ethical– 
religious continuum, and the value of engaging each end of the spectrum. This is 
particularly relevant to the wellbeing and post- scarcity literatures, as noted in 
Hicks, and in the works of Layard, Haidt, the Kennys, James and Fogel. All 
recognize the growing importance of the ethical dimension in promoting greater 
wellbeing, particularly in a post- scarcity era. For Tawney, it also includes 
engagement with the spiritual dimension, in its personal but also social format 
(as we will note in his work on socio- political arrangements, say, in his The 
Acquisitive Society, and its strong resonances with James’ Selfish Capitalist 
today). The tradition of ethical socialism as expounded by Halsey includes a 
useful section on Tawney (Dennis and Halsey 1988). My own Ph.D. also 
addressed Tawney as a social moralist (Atherton 1979).
 Second, Tawney’s commitment to democracy and socialism was embedded 
in socio- political arrangements but equally in a way of living. The two were 
inextricably bound together. The latter resonates with the happiness literatures’ 
recognition of a philosophy of life as central to wellbeing (Layard, Kenny and 
Haidt), but also with the increasing and related significance of traditioning com-
munities and the formation of character, and thereby of virtues. Haidt certainly 
notes this, but it is also seriously present in the work of Offer, Layard and Him-
melfarb. In this connection, Tawney was particularly engaged in such civil 
society bodies as trade unions, universities and churches, and would have identi-
fied with their recognition in social capital literatures as central to promoting 
wellbeing. Equally, his emphasis on fraternity or fellowship was a recognition 
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that closeness of relationships was either facilitated or diminished by the extent 
of equality or inequality. Adam Smith reached a similar conclusion in relation to 
encouraging human sympathy or empathy, particularly in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759) as a crucial balance to the self- interest of his Wealth of 
Nations (1776). For Tawney, in his Equality, ‘Clever men, it has been remarked, 
are impressed by their difference from their fellows; wise men are conscious of 
their resemblance to them’ (Tawney 1964: 83). Preston interprets this as point-
ing to a profoundly Christian humanism, which again is embodied also in appro-
priate (and more egalitarian) social relationships and structures. Personalist 
ethics as moral anthropology or view of the human and its dignity are inextrica-
bly complemented by a common good. So equality is not advocated ‘merely in 
order that everyone should be free to “get on” according to his abilities [the 
disease of affluenza for James today], but that they should be free to share in the 
“good life” in solidarity with their fellows’. For Preston, ‘We cannot regard men 
as brothers unless in some sense we share their lives’ (Preston 1979: 99).
 Third, it is that sharing ethic (as sharing in and with others) which so power-
fully resonates with the reciprocity and other- regarding ethic of the happiness 
and social capital literatures. This, for Tawney, has to be embedded in socio- 
political arrangements. It is therefore expressed as a comprehensive critique of 
the acquisitive society, epitomized today by James’ selfish capitalism, and by 
seeking to operationalize different ways of developing more common good soci-
eties – what James calls unselfish capitalism. The first is epitomized by the USA, 
the second by Denmark and the Scandinavian economies. The latter also links 
with the current wellbeing literatures, for example, with Offer’s economy of 
regard, and Wilkinson’s extending employee share ownership into cooperatives 
(Wilkinson 2005: 304; Offer 2006: 75–99). Tawney was strongly involved in 
early experiments in the latter, including through his involvement in Christian 
socialist societies in the first decades of the twentieth century and their promo-
tion of guild socialism and cooperatives. Importantly, both Tawney and current 
literatures recognize that more egalitarian social arrangements necessarily 
involve high levels of participation – central for Wilkinson, and for Layard’s Big 
Seven, and a key measure of high social capital for Putnam. Dunn’s work on 
democracy similarly recognizes the obstacles to participatory, as against repre-
sentative democracy, as fundamentally an economic problem, of what he calls 
the order of egoism (Dunn 2005: 126–127). Tawney would have welcomed this 
linking of a way of life and socio- economic arrangements, including as 
expressed by James’ suggestion that the ratio between highest and average level 
incomes should be no more than 5:1 (James 2007: 330). The unwillingness of 
New Labour to address both ends of the spectrum, through its concentration on 
raising up the lowest, avoids the hard questions generated by increasing inequal-
ities between richest and poorest in and between societies. For Tawney, ‘what 
thoughtful rich people call the problem of poverty, thoughtful poor people call 
with equal justice the problem of riches’ (Tawney 1979: 112).
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Conclusion
The value of these Christian contributions to the current happiness–wellbeing lit-
eratures in a post- scarcity era lies significantly in their individual context. They 
clearly and usefully resonate with key factors of such wellbeing in such a 
context. That conversation is worth furthering. Yet it is also their cumulative 
impact, whether moving from Forrester’s theological work to Tawney’s more 
ethical- inclined contribution, or vice versa, that is of equal value for current 
debates. Essentially, it constitutes a coherent, balanced and elegant philosophy 
of life, tested over centuries, and drawing on rationality and emotional and imag-
inative reason. And it is here, as much as in individual contributions, that the 
additionality and measurability value of religious contributions may be found, a 
judgement reinforced when located in and richly confirmed by Christian 
narratives.
Note
1 Post- scarcity relates to economies breaking through the Malthusian trap of absolute 
poverty into growing abundance for increasing numbers of the world’s population. Rel-
ative scarcity of course continues to remain, but increasing prosperity brings major 
changes in behaviour and problems, including the happiness hypothesis and the 
paradox of prosperity.
7 Fair Trade and human wellbeing
Michael Northcott
For thou shalt eat the labour of thine hands: happy shalt thou be, and it shall be 
well with thee.
(Psalm 128.2)
At the heart of most classical and modern debates on the nature of ethical life is 
the claim that humans desire happiness and wellbeing above all things. From 
Epicurus to John Stewart Mill individuals are said to act rationally when they 
use things and relate to others in such a way as to promote their own sense of 
wellbeing. They may not always choose actions that actually have the effect of 
promoting their own wellbeing, but this is not because they do not seek it. It is 
rather because they misconstrue the kinds of actions that will promote it (Spae-
mann 2000: 30).
	 The	 eudaimonistic	 claim	 of	 the	 philosopher	 finds	 analogy	 in	 what	 modern	
economists call rational choice theory according to which individual consumers 
and	firms	act	rationally	when	they	put	their	own	interests	–	in	purchasing	a	good	
for the lowest price or in procuring and marketing a good in such a way as to 
maximize	profits	–	above	consideration	for	the	interests	of	others	involved	in	the	
transaction. Self- interested choices of this kind may involve externalities or costs 
to others that diminish their wellbeing. Such costs might take the form of a low 
wage	 that	 does	 not	 compensate	 the	 producer	 of	 a	 particular	 product	 sufficient	
that he or she can decently clothe, educate, feed and house his or her family. Or 
they might take the form of environmental pollution from an industrial process 
which, due to lack of government regulation or proper enforcement, is permitted 
to toxify the environment of residents or workers in the vicinity of a production 
facility or of those who are affected by polluted air, land or water. Such dimin-
ishments of others’ welfare consequent upon the rational choices of individual 
consumers	or	firms	are	said	by	some	advocates	of	 rational	choice	 theory	 to	be	
illustrative	 of	 the	 intrinsic	 conflict	 and	 competition	 between	 rational	 choosers	
that, since Thomas Malthus and Charles Darwin, economists have argued is 
‘natural’ to the evolution of life and the progress of human society.
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The uncivil economy
Not all practitioners of the dismal science of economics present things quite so 
darkly. Adam Smith argued that the butcher and the baker do better in their 
capacity to provide for their family, and for others, when they act not from 
benevolence	but	from	self-	interest	in	maximizing	their	profit	from	their	respec-
tive butchering, brewing and baking activities. As Smith puts it in a well- known 
passage:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that 
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address 
ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self- love, and never talk to them 
of our own necessities but of their advantages.
(Smith 1776: I. 2.2)
When they devote themselves to their own business, the principle of the division 
of labour, operating in tandem with the market, ensures that butcher, brewer and 
baker provide a better- quality product to others, and enhance their own family’s 
wealth and wellbeing and that of others. But crucial to this enhancement of well-
being is the existence of a shared and civil place for exchange and a shared moral 
realm in which each exchanges goods in a way that has the outcome of recogniz-
ing the appropriate value of the raw materials and skill utilized by the other.
	 Once	 removed	 from	 the	 confines	 of	 a	 particular	 city	 the	 operation	 of	 the	
market can be anything but civil. In a global economy where supply chains can 
extend from Edinburgh to Ecuador it is possible for exchanges of labour and 
land through the medium of money to be unfair and unjust. Comparative advant-
age	between	nations	is	a	principle	first	clearly	enunciated	in	classical	economics	
by David Ricardo. Ricardo argued that free trade advances the collective sum of 
economic welfare because it allows regions and towns within nation- states to 
specialize in things they are good at or climatically best situated to produce 
(Ricardo 1817). They trade these things at a comparative advantage with the 
things they are less suited to make and which others can make more cheaply. 
But the classical dogma of comparative advantage was conceived on the model 
of trade between traders and local communities within one political entity or 
between European nations and their colonies. The doctrine is reductionist since 
it	assumes	that	a	simple	procedural	rule	–	free	movement	of	goods	–	can	promote	
wellbeing more widely regardless of the institutions or practices of those who 
engage in trade. Ricardo neglects the role of good laws, of customs and institu-
tions in promoting and sustaining virtues such as trust and honour without which 
business exchanges outside what Spaemann calls the ‘boundaries of the normal’ 
run the risk of being debased into expropriation and theft, and of promoting eco-
logical destruction or slavery (Spaemann 2000: 55).
 At this point it will be helpful to consider another objection to the classical, 
and neoliberal, economic proposition that growth in trade, by increasing wealth, 
increases	 human	 wellbeing.	 In	 a	 tradition	 of	 moral	 reflection	 going	 back	 to	
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Christ and Saint Paul in the Christian tradition, and to the Stoics and Plotinus in 
the classical, the case is made that far from enhancing human happiness wealth 
may act as an obstacle to the realization of the blessed or happy life. Christ 
instructs his disciples:
And seek not ye what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, neither be ye of 
doubtful mind. For all these things do the nations of the world seek after: 
and your Father knoweth that ye have need of these things. But rather seek 
ye the kingdom of God; and all these things shall be added unto you.
(Luke	12.27–31)
To make wealth the goal of life is the cause and nature of the wordliness of 
nations but not a goal that Christians should adopt, for two reasons. To do so 
would manifest a distrust in the providential provision of God, and to do so 
would not serve that particular vision of beatitude and wellbeing associated with 
the pursuit of the Kingdom of God.
On the happy life
In	the	first	extended	reflection	on	the	blessed	or	happy	life	in	the	Christian	tradi-
tion Augustine may be said to take his cue from Christ, albeit with a neoplatonic 
twist, when he argues that the condition of blessedness is not constituted by 
material goods or worldly power and success but is rather a quality of the soul: 
‘As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man’s life of happiness, of whom it 
is written: “Happy is the people whose God is the Lord” ’ Psalm 143. 15 (Augus-
tine: xix, 26). In similar vein Thomas Aquinas, in an essay on happiness in the 
Summa, argues that people do not seek money or power as ends in themselves 
but rather because they believe that possessing them will make them happy. 
Therefore happiness ‘does not consist in external goods or in goods of the body’ 
but rather ‘in goods of the soul’ (Aquinas: 1.2, Q2, A7). In the most extensive 
Christian treatment of the theme of happiness, Boethius suggests that suffering 
and not success is the surest means for the soul to be enlightened to the true 
wisdom which is the source of a happy life: ‘for of all suffering from Fortune, 
the unhappiest misfortune is to have known a happy fortune’ (Boethius 1902: 
34). For Boethius suffering imposed by the wicked on the just has the potential 
in the providence of God to provoke the soul to a more virtuous life:
Wherefore high Providence has thus often shewn her strange wonder, 
namely,	 that	 bad	 men	 should	 make	 other	 bad	 men	 good.	 For	 some	 find	
themselves suffering injustice at the hands of evil men, and, burning with 
hatred of those who have injured them, they have returned to cultivate the 
fruits of virtue, because their aim is to be unlike those whom they hate. To 
divine power, and to that alone, are evil things good, when it uses them suit-
ably so as to draw good results therefrom.
(Boethius 1902: 134)
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In this vein the suffering imposed on poor farmers or factory workers in devel-
oping countries as a consequence of unfair terms of trade may actually be bene-
ficial	for	their	ultimate	happiness.	At	any	rate	it	might	be	said	that	relief	of	such	
suffering in the form of terms of trade that enhance the wealth of the poorest 
may not necessarily result in an increase in the blessed life since wealth and not 
bodily privation is the more likely cause of temptation and distraction from the 
love and worship of God which is the source of true happiness and virtue.
	 There	is	a	growing	body	of	empirical	research	which	seems	to	confirm	some	
aspects of the theological claim that happiness and wealth are not intrinsically 
related. This research shows that increases in wealth beyond modest levels in 
developed societies do not necessarily increase wellbeing and may in fact 
reduce it (Diener and Biswas- Diener 2002). Rising incomes since the 1970s 
have not correlated with higher reported states of happiness (Easterlin 1974), 
and they are at the same time associated with rising levels of divorce and other 
forms of social breakdown and stress (Clydesdale 1997). Part of the reason for 
this may be that in high- income societies people mistake the source of happi-
ness for increases in wealth whereas those who place greater emphasis on 
loving relationships report higher states of life satisfaction (Diener and Oishi 
2000). At the same time other research clearly shows that reported wellbeing is 
higher in rich developed countries than in poor developing ones (Diener and 
Diener: 1995).
 Clearly the relationship between wealth and wellbeing is complex and con-
tested. In this chapter we might hope to clarify just one aspect of this relation-
ship and this is in relation to the attempts by people in wealthy countries to 
ameliorate poverty in developing countries through the medium of fair trade. Do 
these attempts result in greater human wellbeing? If so, is it an increase in well-
being	that	is	confined	to	the	developing	countries	or	do	we	find	increases	in	well-
being among fair trade consumers as well?
The righteous kingdom
Christ’s instruction to his disciples not to place concern for material welfare at 
the forefront of their intentions does not suggest that he believes that material 
wellbeing	is	not	a	necessary	condition	of	a	good	life:	‘seek	ye	first	the	kingdom	
of God and all these things will be added unto you’ (Matthew 6. 33). It is not 
that Christ objects to his disciples being well clothed and fed. On the contrary, 
Christ observes that he is criticized by his opponents for the quality of food and 
wine that he and his disciples enjoy when they sit down to dinner: ‘The Son of 
man came eating and drinking, and they say, Behold a man gluttonous, and a 
winebibber,	a	friend	of	publicans	and	sinners.	But	wisdom	is	justified	of	her	chil-
dren’ (Matthew 11. 19). The instruction not to worry about food and drink does 
not mean that the disciples are actively to seek hunger or privation, as Boethius 
seems to suggest might be appropriate for the begetter of wisdom. The life of 
wisdom is neither to have more nor less of such things but instead primarily to 
seek the Kingdom of God. Providence will add those things that are needful to 
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those who seek after the Kingdom, though they do not set getting them as their 
primary goal.
 It is often said that Christ came preaching the Kingdom of God and that the 
disciples founded the Church instead. But when we examine the teaching of 
Jesus about the social and political character of the Kingdom of God, and the 
social	and	political	practices	of	the	early	Christians,	we	do	in	fact	find	remark-
able continuity. Christ’s teaching about the Kingdom begins with him reading a 
messianic vision of wellbeing in the synagogue at Capernaum taken from Isaiah: 
‘he hath sent me to heal the broken- hearted, to preach deliverance to the cap-
tives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised, 
to	preach	the	acceptable	year	of	the	Lord’	(Luke	4.	18–19).	The	acceptable	year	
of the Lord is a reference to the Jubilee year in which every 50 years according 
to Leviticus intergenerational debts of land and money were to be redeemed and 
those in debt bondage. Christ’s announcement of the Kingdom is clearly eco-
nomic and political in its implications and a radical challenge to the Roman 
authorities, and their Jewish collaborators who collected taxes that were driving 
Israelites into debt and landlessness in the time of Christ. Hence in another 
saying Christ tells his disciples ‘except your righteousness shall exceed the right-
eousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom 
of heaven’ (Matthew 5. 20). Now, by righteousness, Christ does not mean ritual 
purity but right relationships with other people, and in particular relationships 
characterized	by	 justice.	 Justice	emerges	 from	 the	earliest	 sermons	of	Christ	–	
particularly	in	the	Gospels	of	Matthew	and	Luke	–	as	a	central	consequence	of	
the pursuit of the Kingdom as the ultimate goal.
	 It	 should	not	 surprise	us	 therefore	 that	 the	first	 economic	action	of	 the	first	
Church in Jerusalem is to enact economic justice among the people of God. Dis-
ciples sell lands and houses, and give all the proceeds to the Church to be dis-
tributed to any who have need and it is said that ‘no one counted their 
possessions as their own’ and ‘they had all things in common’ (Acts 4. 32). 
Clearly there is continuity here between the teaching of the Kingdom and the 
first	 social	 performances	 of	 the	Church.	 The	Gentile	 churches	 do	 not	 seem	 to	
have taken up this same approach with such alacrity, and indeed Saint Paul has 
to chide and encourage them to give of their wealth to those who are in need, 
and in particular to his own needs and the needs of other preachers among them, 
and to the suffering Christians in Judea (2 Corinthians 8). However, the early 
churches, both Jewish and Gentile, soon developed practices of almsgiving, and 
of care for the poor and homeless. And in later centuries a distinctive set of eco-
nomic practices emerged which in the Middle Ages included communal deliber-
ation on just wages and just prices. Such deliberation is in strong contrast to the 
presumption of Smith and his heirs that wellbeing will be best advanced when, 
instead of collective deliberation, aggregates of market decisions by consumers 
and producers are left to maximize the wealth of nations.
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The efficiency of market relationships
There are two crucial claims in Smith’s Wealth of Nations that we need to notice. 
The	 first,	 and	 most	 widely	 acknowledged,	 is	 that	 he	 sets	 market	 aggregation	
through the laws of supply and demand above collective deliberation on just 
wages and prices. The second is that much of the comparative increase in the 
wealth	of	nations	such	as	Britain	on	which	he	reflects	was	based	not	on	market	
aggregation but on coercive mercantilism, backed by military power, on the 
lawless frontier of empire. To this day, many forms of market engagement in 
developing countries are still subject to what Albion Barrera calls economic 
compulsion; they are not conducted in the manner of exchanges between butch-
ers and bakers in the civil sphere of eighteenth- century Glasgow. While indi-
vidual	producers	–	small	farmers	in	Tanzania	or	Kenya,	textile	workers	in	free	
trade	 zones	 in	 Mexico	 or	 Vietnam	 –	 may	 volunteer	 to	 participate	 in	 market	
exchanges, such as the sale of a cash crop for a low price grown with their 
labour, their volunteering may not be entirely voluntary (Barrera 2005). They 
may through force of circumstance be compelled to participate in market 
exchanges for the goods that they grow or make which offer inadequate recom-
pense because they have no other choices available to them. Either they sell their 
labour or the product of their land at an unjust wage or price or they and their 
families go hungry, or more hungry. It is this element of compulsion that Christ 
clearly	refers	to	in	his	first	sermon	in	Capernaum.	Liberty	from	oppressive	com-
pulsion, redemption from bondage to debt, are the marks of the Kingdom of God 
and the ‘acceptable year of the Lord’. The Kingdom produces wellbeing because 
it sets justice and liberty above production and wealth. And by implication where 
there is compulsion and injustice, even in societies where wealth is increasing, 
wellbeing is diminished.
The pathology of inequality
Against the now widely held economic proposition that ‘a rising tide lifts all 
boats’ empirical evidence reveals the harmful effects of economic compulsion 
and the reduction in wellbeing produced by the compulsion and injustice associ-
ated with extremes of inequality. Medical epidemiologist Richard Wilkinson’s 
research shows that even in rich societies where inequality is great, social solid-
arity	 between	 rich	 and	 poor	 is	 significantly	 undermined,	 and	 all	 parties	 suffer	
from this loss, both rich and poor. Hence the rich have poorer mortality out-
comes in highly unequal societies, and the poor of course have outcomes that are 
even worse (Wilkinson 1997). According to Wilkinson the reason is the 
increased personal and social stress that results from the decline in social solid-
arity and trust in highly unequal societies, and the rising tide of the pathologies 
of	extreme	inequality	which	 include	not	only	 ill-	health	–	which	 is	ultimately	a	
cost	 to	society	as	a	whole	–	but	crime,	drug	addiction	and	violence.	These	are	
behaviours	from	which	the	rich	must	find	ever	more	complex	forms	of	protec-
tion (Wilkinson 1996). In addition to Wilkinson’s psychosocial theory of health 
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inequality we might also add that another reason for the lower outcomes in terms 
of wellbeing for the rich in highly unequal societies is the psycho- spiritual stress 
arising from the refusal to acknowledge that they have any moral responsibility 
for the pathologies of the poor in their own society. According to Saint Paul in 
Romans where guilt is real, and denied, it affects the inner life and sense of well-
being of the one who incurs it.
	 In	the	light	of	Wilkinson’s	findings	Christ’s	teaching	about	the	nature	of	the	
good life may be rephrased as follows: ‘deepening compassionate connections’ 
with others is crucial to a life that turns out well (Dalai Lama and Cutler 1998: 
68–71).	Hence,	 in	Christ’s	parable	of	 the	Last	 Judgment	 in	Matthew	25,	what	
separates the sheep from the goats and determines the worth of a life is the 
manner in which the individual manages such connections. The sheep are those 
who have compassionately acknowledged their connection with the sick, the 
prisoner, the hungry and ill- clothed act in such a way as to alleviate their suffer-
ing. In so doing they have, according to this parable, not only found connection 
with	those	who	suffer	but	connection	with	ultimate	reality	–	with	God	in	Christ	
who is present among the suffering. The negotiation of inner desires and outward 
actions by the individual on this view is constrained by the reality of the world 
in a metaphysics of compassion that cannot be reduced to the inner life. Com-
passion	is	the	bridge	between	the	inner	and	outer	worlds	–	between	the	psycho-	
spiritual life of the individual and the outer realms of the social and the divine.
	 The	 Epicurean	 view	 of	 this	 inner–outer	 negotiation,	 as	 reformulated	 by	
modern advocates of rational choice theory, is that each individual is a perfect 
whole and behaves rationally when she puts the satisfaction of her inner desires 
before the interests of others in the outer world (Spaemann 2000: 54). To the 
extent that individual choices are affected by external reality it is suggested that 
this	inner–outer	interaction,	which	is	conceived	of	as	successive	but	unconnected	
interactions	between	individuals,	is	best	governed	by	impersonal	forces	–	market	
forces, supply and demand, and anonymous exchanges. By this means social 
forces	function	to	maximize	the	preference	satisfaction	of	market	actors	–	both	
individuals	and	firms	–	and	thus	achieve	a	degree	of	efficiency	greater	than	that	
presented by collective deliberation over such interactions in trading relation-
ships where parties are fully known to each other. If as a consequence of the 
spread of such kinds of anonymous exchanges individuals increasingly come to 
distrust other individuals, and friendship between different social groups and 
classes	diminishes,	this	does	not	provide	grounds	for	falsification	of	the	modern	
Epicurean theory on its terms. Wellbeing in this approach is about the inner state 
of the individual and, provided that individuals are maximizing their preferences, 
it may be said that the practice of this theory grows wellbeing.
 As Robert Spaemann argues, this focus on the felt experience of the atomistic 
individual neglects many features of what most reasonable people would recog-
nize as a life worth living, including friendship and love, and the shared customs 
and procedures, institutions and laws that sustain peaceable and rich social inter-
actions between individuals. It also neglects the sense in which a life may be 
said to ‘come out well’ (Spaemann 2000). The coming out well of life cannot be 
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assessed purely on the basis of reported states at particular moments, not least 
because	 the	coming	out	well	of	 life	 is	 related	 to	 the	fit	between	 the	 life	of	 the	
individual and the larger structure of truth that constitutes reality. This is why 
Christ suggests in the parable of the sheep and the goats that the worth of a life 
can only be assessed after death, and that that assessment will include an estim-
ate of how the life lived deepened, or refused, the claims of compassion on those 
among whom the individual lived. The truth of being subsists in the created con-
nections between people. Reality has a given moral structure and only when a 
person’s	inner	life	finds	some	accord	with	this	can	it	be	said	that	it	is	a	good	life.	
As Augustine puts it, the one who ‘wants to become blessed here on earth 
through themselves’ manifests ‘an astonishing blindness’, for:
what kind of friend would a person be, if they were indifferent about the 
betrayal or faithfulness of friends? And indifferent about the troubles of 
the city, the civil war, the injustice and distress which comes from it, about 
the scourge of humanity, war, unjust as well as just? Whoever tolerates 
these or thinks about them without a troubled soul, if they consider them-
selves happy, is actually all the more miserable since they have lost their 
human sensibility.
(Augustine: XIX, 8)
Many	 today	 in	 European	 and	 North	 American	 cities	 have	 no	 direct	 firsthand	
experience of civil unrest or war, and are inured to the kinds of injustices that 
cause real hunger in other parts of the world. But materially they are connected 
to such injustices and wars when they buy tropical agricultural goods such as 
tea, coffee and bananas, tropical hardwood products such as mahogany or rose-
wood household or garden furniture, and when they buy oil and gas from trou-
bled regions of the world such as the Caucasus, Iraq and Nigeria. The individual 
who is able to remain content in her own pursuit of happiness when materially 
connected	and	sustained	by	goods	sourced	from	regions	of	the	world	afflicted	by	
injustice and war is, in Augustine’s terms, endangering her own humanity. For 
Augustine,	 friendship	 is	 the	 practice	 that	 prevents	 selfish	 isolation	 from	 the	
needs of others, and it was in global friendships that the practices of Fair Trade 
originated.
The inefficiency of friendship
In the UK, two Christian students at St John’s College Durham who had vol-
unteered in South Asia set out to help the farmers and rural labourers who had 
become their friends through trade from their college rooms. They began to 
source craft products from producer groups in South Asia and to sell them 
from a loft in the college, and then, as the work expanded, through local con-
gregations after worship on Sundays. After graduating they took their emergent 
fair trade cooperative to a vicarage in Houghton- le-Spring and from that vicar-
age	 sprang	first	 one	 and	 then	 two	 of	Britain’s	 first	 Fair	 Trade	 organizations,	
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Traidcraft and Tearcraft. Traidcraft is now a PLC as well as a trust and a chari-
table foundation, and this threefold organization guarantees that the original 
identity of Traidcraft as a ‘Christian response to poverty’ could not be under-
mined in the unlikely event of a takeover (Traidcraft 2008: 2). Many of the 
producer groups with whom Traidcraft works are from a faith background, and 
more than 80 per cent of Traidcraft’s volunteer Fair Traders, who sell Fair 
Trade goods in church and village halls, in small high street cooperatives or 
from their homes or car boots, are regular churchgoers.
 In the Netherlands one of the most successful Fair Trade projects came from 
the initiative of the Dutch liberation theologian Fransico van der Hoff Boersma. 
Frans had lived for much of his life among coffee farmers in Oaxaca, Mexico, 
and he saw how the farmers were being made destitute by the falling price of 
coffee on world markets in the 1980s (Lamb 2008: 123). On a visit to the Neth-
erlands in 1987 he met with the director of Solidaridad, the Dutch Christian 
development organization, and proposed a new approach to trading coffee in 
which ‘the power of the strongest does not determine the rules of the game’. As 
a result of his visit to the Netherlands Solidaridad worked with other church 
organizations, charities and the Max Havellar Foundation, one of the earliest 
Fair Trade organizations, to launch a new Fair Trade coffee label in Holland that 
captured 1.7 per cent of the Dutch coffee market within a year of its launch in 
1988, selling coffee sourced on the Fair Trade model from Mexico (Lamb 2008: 
124–125).
 Boersma argues that fair trade does not necessarily have to disrupt the normal 
workings of economic markets:
It	doesn’t	create	artificial	commercial	conditions,	but	rather	new	ones	based	
on justice. To pay the producer the real price for producing a product is not 
only economically rational but is grounded in the most elementary of ethical 
principles.
(Boersma 2006)
His friends are Mexican farmers whose lives have been made miserable by 
unfair and distorted terms of trade between rich developed and poor developing 
countries. Through Fair Trade, sales and supply chains are established across 
thousands of miles which honour that friendship by ensuring that every link in 
the chain is guaranteed as fair and just, and the farmers receive a proper recom-
pense for their product. Because of this recompense they are able to afford to 
pay teachers to teach their children, to provide drinking water and electricity to 
their homes and to improve their cramped living conditions.
Wellbeing from Fair Trade
Five	million	people	in	more	than	50	developing	countries	now	benefit	from	Fair	
Trade terms (Becchetti 2006). A number of qualitative studies of the effects of 
Fair	Trade	on	producer	groups	indicate	that	the	measures	of	wellbeing	identified	
Fair Trade and human wellbeing  107
by these Fair Trade users are indeed enhanced by the increased income and the 
guaranteed price that Fair Trade offers. Parents are able to send their children to 
school	 and	 so	 enable	 their	 children	 to	find	 a	 route	 out	 of	 poverty	 that	was	 not	
available to them as parents. Householders are able to improve the quality of the 
roofing	 and	 drainage	materials	 around	 their	 huts	 or	 homes.	The	 steady	 income	
also	enables	some	to	invest	in	diversification	so	that	they	can	supplement	income	
from cash crops with crafts. There is evidence too that Fair Trade enhances com-
munity life, since involvement in Fair Trade requires participation in cooperative 
marketing practices. Fair Trade, because it encourages best environmental prac-
tices, also helps reduce the environmental impacts of farming and enhances 
farmer health as compared to plantation workers, who are required to use large 
quantities of pesticides and who frequently suffer health effects as a consequence. 
Because of the ongoing dismal prices for coffee in world markets, Fair Trade pro-
vides ‘the difference between survival and bankruptcy’ for many small farming 
communities (Reynolds et al. 2004). In addition, the economic security which 
long- term Fair Trade contracts provide enables participating farming communit-
ies to ‘fortify the cultural, social and economic assets of their communities’ (Rey-
nolds et al. 2004: 1120). On the sense of wellbeing among Fair Trade farmers, a 
study of Kenyan farmers reveals a greater income satisfaction than that expressed 
by farmers not participating in Fair Trade networks but receiving similar income 
levels. This is likely because participation in Fair Trade cooperatives brings other 
non- monetary rewards including long- term security, technical assistance and 
improved dietary intake from cooperative food purchasing (Bechetti 2006: 23).
Benevolence and wellbeing
While there have been a number of academic papers and reports indicating an 
increase in farmer wellbeing as a consequence of Fair Trade practices, there are 
fewer studies on the impact of participation in Fair Trade among consumers in 
the North. But those that are available also point to wellbeing enhancement 
among Northern consumers. The discussants in a German focus group express a 
consciousness of guilt and historic responsibility for the exploitation of agricul-
tural producers in the South and that being involved in Fair Trade makes pos-
sible an ethical responsibility for these farmers that was not possible before 
(Farnworth and Rabe 2004: 6). It should not surprise us in the light of the fore-
going	that	we	find	this	expressive	effect	among	those	engaged	in	the	Fair	Trade	
networks in the North as well as in the South. Many who visit modern supermar-
kets are aware of the burdens that discount selling imposes on farmers, in Europe 
as	well	as	in	the	developing	world.	Indeed,	there	is	evidence	that	consumers	find	
the experience of visiting such supermarkets depressing, and this element of sup-
pressed guilt could be implicated in that depression.
 Harriet Lamb of the Fair Trade Foundation describes Fair Trade as a ‘people 
to people’ trade. It is a movement that has begun to challenge the ‘the brutal 
logic of the global marketplace’ through the power of thousands of people living 
across the globe who decide that they want to make a difference:
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for me, Fairtrade is a way of taking up Gandhi’s challenge I absorbed 
working	in	India	as	a	young	woman	–	to	‘be	the	change	you	wish	to	see	in	
the	world’	.	.	.	Everyone	can	so	very	easily	buy	and	support	Fairtrade	–	and	
so connect with farmers and workers across the world. With each purchase, 
we are helping build that living, more human alternative. And, at the end of 
the day, I am a mother who wants mothers the world over to realise the 
same dreams for their children as I do for mine.
(Lamb 2008: 178)
Like Boersma and the founders of Traidcraft, Lamb has known farmers in the 
developing	world	 as	 friends,	 and	 she	finds	 that	 her	 actions	 in	 connecting	with	
them through Fair Trade enhance the moral quality of her life as well as their 
material wellbeing. A focus group study of Fair Trade users in Germany revealed 
a similar link. The principal elements of Southern farmer wellbeing that the 
study revealed were of most interest were the ability of farmers to educate their 
children, improvement in the social status of women farmers, improvements in 
the local environment and in community life, and securing a guaranteed income 
for farmers from their produce (Farnworth and Rabe 2003: 15).
 Fair Trade represents a mobilization of a range of actors in North and South 
and the evidence from other studies of wellbeing, such as the Swiss canton 
finding	(Frey	and	Stutzer	2000),	indicates	that	participation	in	such	networks	is	a	
crucial element in reported quality of life. Through Fair Trade, consumers and 
producers	alike	are	recovering	an	element	of	self-	sufficiency	and	participation	in	
their acts of production and consumption instead of leaving the coordination of 
these acts to the ‘invisible hand’. This enhances individual moral agency and 
responsibility for the social and the natural world.
 According to Augustine and Aquinas, wellbeing is not so much something to 
be experienced in this life as the outcome of a life well lived, the beatitude 
received by the saints after a life directed to the supreme good which is the love 
of God and the service of God’s creatures. But in the practice of Fair Trade such 
service is not only a duty performed in the pursuit of the ultimate end but an 
experience that enhances a sense of personal wellbeing. Is there not something 
rather life- denying about the Augustinian vision of beatitude that Aquinas and 
Boethius	also	affirm?	Aiming	for	the	good	is	not	about	feeling good. Is this the 
import	 of	Christ’s	 teaching	 ‘seek	ye	first	 the	Kingdom	of	 heaven’?	Well,	Fair	
Traders are putting the kingdom of justice ahead of cost in their own purchasing 
decisions.	And	they	are	finding	that	not	only	does	this	just	act	provide	material	
sufficiency	 for	 those	who	 formerly	 lacked	 it	 but	 the	 connections	 of	 friendship	
across the globe that the social networks of Fair Trade produce enhance their 
experience of coffee drinking or tropical fruit consumption. A pecuniary sacri-
fice	–	for	most	Fair	Trade	products	do	cost	more	than	the	conventionally	traded	
alternative	 –	 produces	 a	 non-	monetary	 but	 real	 reward.	 It	 is	 precisely	 this	
element of reward of which philosophers and theologians are often suspicious. 
The presumption shared by the Stoics, Augustine and more recently, Immanuel 
Kant	 is	 that	 if	 virtue	 finds	 reward	 in	 this	 life	 then	 it	 is	 ‘mendacious’,	 to	 use	
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Augustine’s description, or not as excellent as it would be were no reward in the 
offing	 (Augustine:	XIX,	 4).	 Duty	 because	 it	 is	 duty	 is	 preferable	 to	 duty	 that	
offers any sense of reward. But if human happiness and active concern and care 
for others are intrinsically connected, then doing good does indeed promote 
doing well (Borgonovi 2008).
Festal fairness and Eucharistic eating
At the time of writing, the complex procedures that certify a product as fairly 
traded have only been undertaken for agricultural products which, apart from 
cotton, are for eating and drinking. While coffee and tea are sometimes utilized in 
individuated acts of imbibing, food and drink are more often taken in the company 
of others. In many cultures tea and coffee drinking are essential lubricants of social 
life, from meetings between scholars and traders to familial and workplace gather-
ings. Christ’s most frequent enactment of the Kingdom of God took the form of 
feasting. He courted the accusation that he was a glutton and a wine bibber because 
the meal was the performance par excellence of the Kingdom whose coming he 
announced. But the meals of Christ gave offence not so much for what he ate as 
with whom he ate. He often dined with Jewish rabbis and theologians, as he 
himself was both of these, but he also dined with tax collectors and sinners, peas-
ants and prostitutes. At one such dinner a woman of dubious reputation has the 
temerity to anoint his feet and his hair with perfume, and in permitting such an act 
of sensual devotion Christ gives offence even to the disciples.
 For all that Christ instructs his disciples to ‘take up the cross and follow me’, 
he also enacts with his disciples a festal way of living which they are charged to 
carry on after his death. The command to take up the cross is a teleological con-
dition of discipleship. The goal of the disciple is not eating and drinking but 
laying down one’s life for one’s friends. This preparedness arises not from duty 
but	from	love.	Because	they	learned	to	love	one	another	as	Christ	loved	them	–	
regardless	 of	 class,	 condition	 or	 race	 –	 the	 early	Christians	were	 said	 to	 have	
‘turned the world upside down’, a world, that is, in which dinners were meant to 
be hierarchically ordered with slaves preparing the food, women standing by and 
the noblemen lying around the low table positioned according to rank.
 Fair traders do not set as their primary goal to drink better- tasting coffee. 
Indeed, one of the criticisms of Fair Trade is that it rewards farmers with a 
higher	price	 for	 a	 product	 that	 tastes	 no	better	 –	 and	 in	 the	 early	days	of	Fair	
Trade	sometimes	tasted	worse	–	than	ordinary	coffee,	though	Fair	Trade	coffee	
marketing has focused much more on a taste premium in recent years (Linton et 
al. 2004). The purpose of Fair Trade is not eating and drinking but justice. When 
child mortality goes down among farmers belonging to democratically managed 
cooperatives supported by long- term contracts, advance payments and guaran-
teed fair prices the end of justice produces a real improvement in wellbeing in 
farming communities. But when the fair trader enjoys a cup of coffee with 
friends in a café knowing that it is Fair Trade coffee and that it has this effect, 
the experience of sharing in the coffee has a new festal element. This element 
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arises from the knowledge that this coffee has not been bought at the price of 
another’s suffering in contrast to coffee that relies upon unfair and coerced 
exchanges between poor developing country farmers, the big four transnational 
coffee companies and New York coffee futures traders. That a coffee transaction 
involving moral discernment turns out well for the producer does not mean that 
it may not also enhance the sense of wellbeing for the consumer. For 2000 years 
Christians have known the power of festal and just eating and drinking. They 
experience this weekly in the Eucharistic feast in which the fruits of Christ’s 
redemption are made known in the transformation of the constituent elements of 
daily	food	and	drink	–	bread	and	wine.	Eucharistic	eating	is	the	regular	perform-
ance in the lives of Christians of their belief that the way of the world, and of the 
nations, can be changed and that in the performance of its changing there is hope 
of a better life of justice and love in the present as well as in a future beatitude 
(Northcott 2007). It therefore should not surprise us that in many places Fair 
Trade	coffee	was	first	drunk	and	sold	after	the	Eucharist	in	churches.
Part II
Contributions to other 
social sciences

8 Religion and happiness
Perspectives from the psychology of 
religion, positive psychology and 
empirical theology
Leslie Francis
The intention of this chapter is to assess available empirical evidence concerned 
with the association between religion and happiness. The evidence is organized 
and the argument progressed in four stages. Stage one marshalls the historic 
literature accessed within the broad field of the psychology of religion, concen-
trating particularly on the second half of the twentieth century. The lack of 
clarity emerging from this literature is attributed in part to problems associated 
with conceptualizing and operationalizing the notion of happiness and in part to 
the problems associated with conceptualizing and operationalizing the notion of 
religion. Stage two clarifies the problems associated with conceptualizing and 
operationalizing happiness by drawing on the emerging field of positive psychol-
ogy in general and the theories of Michael Argyle and his associates in particular 
in the development of the Oxford Happiness Inventory. Stage three clarifies the 
problems associated with conceptualizing and operationalizing religion by 
drawing on the emerging field of empirical theology in general and the theories 
of Leslie Francis and his associates in particular in the development of a family 
of measures concerned with the attitudinal dimension of religion. Stage four 
describes and discusses a series of empirical studies that have explored the asso-
ciation between scores recorded on the Oxford Happiness Inventory and the 
Francis Scale of Attitude towards Christianity, the Katz–Francis Scale of Atti-
tude towards Judaism, and the Santosh–Francis Scale of Attitude towards Hin-
duism. The conclusion is drawn that, within the terms of reference proposed by 
positive psychology and by empirical theology, a clear and consistent positive 
association exists between religion and happiness.
Psychology of religion
Conflicting traditions within the theoretical approach to the psychology of reli-
gion have advanced very different views regarding the relationship between reli-
gion and psychological wellbeing in its broadest sense (Wulff 1991). While 
some strands see religion as promoting psychological wellbeing, other strands 
see religion as detracting from it.
 Within the empirical approach to the psychology of religion, evidence on the 
observed association between religion and happiness has been impaired by the 
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lack of a reliable and valid index of happiness properly grounded in psychologi-
cal theory. In the absence of adequate instrumentation to assess happiness, early 
empirical studies concerned with the relationship between religiosity and happi-
ness followed five main routes. The following review of the literature sets out to 
provide a thorough map of studies concerned specifically with the relationship 
between religiosity and happiness conducted between the late 1950s and the 
mid- 1990s. Studies concerned with constructs like wellbeing and life satisfac-
tion, which may or may not be clearly related to happiness, are not included.
 One strand of research has simply invited subjects to assess their level of happi-
ness on a single continuum. For example, in an early study conducted among 108 
men and 102 women over the age of 65 in America, O’Reilly (1957) assessed hap-
piness on a three- point continuum (very happy, moderately happy and less happy) 
alongside reported church attendance. He found that 55 per cent of the very happy 
respondents were active in the practice of their religion, compared with 47 per cent 
of the moderately happy and 44 per cent of the less happy.
 Wilson (1965) assessed happiness on a ten- point scale, from 1 (completely 
and utterly unhappy; terrible depression and gloom all of the time) to 10 (com-
pletely and supremely happy; tremendous joy and elation all of the time). He 
found a positive correlation of 0.33 between happiness and religious commit-
ment when both were measured on ten- point scales. Reanalysing data from the 
1974 and 1975 National Opinion Research Centre Survey, Cutler (1976) 
assessed the relationship between happiness measured on a three- point contin-
uum (very happy, pretty happy and not too happy) and church affiliation. He 
found church affiliation to be a significant, but weak, predictor of happiness.
 Reanalysing data from the Quality of American Life Survey (Campbell et al. 
1976), McNamara and St George (1978) assessed happiness on a three- point 
scale (very happy, pretty happy and not too happy) alongside two measures of 
religiosity: frequency of church attendance and an attitudinal index combining 
three items concerned with self- assessment of religious- mindedness, importance 
of religious faith, and satisfaction derived from religion. From these data the 
authors concluded that religion and happiness are positively related among the 
more ‘fortunate’ sectors of society. They remain uncorrelated, however, among 
the more ‘deprived’ sectors of society, among whom are included the single, the 
widowed and the divorced.
 Shaver and colleagues (1980), in a study among 2500 women in America 
between the ages of 15 and 91, assessed happiness on a seven- point scale (very 
happy, moderately happy, slightly happy, neither happy nor unhappy, slightly 
unhappy, moderately unhappy and very unhappy). One of the problems with this 
study was that only 8.7 per cent of the respondents selected one of the three 
unhappy responses. When religiosity was assessed on a five- point scale (very, 
moderately, slightly, not at all and anti- religious) a curvilinear relationship was 
found with happiness. The slightly religious respondents were less happy than 
either the very religious or the anti- religious respondents.
 In a sample of 71 patients with advanced cancer, Yates and colleagues (1981) 
assessed happiness on a three- point scale (very happy, pretty happy and not too 
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happy), alongside a ten- item index of religious belief and four questions con-
cerned with religious activity and connections. While no significant relationship 
was found between happiness and scores on the index of religious belief or 
importance ascribed to church, significant positive correlations were found 
between happiness and affiliation with a church, frequency of church attendance, 
and feeling ‘especially close to God or nature in the past four weeks.’
 In a telephone interview survey conducted among 560 adults in Akron, 
Poloma and Pendleton (1989) assessed happiness on a three- point scale (very 
happy, pretty happy and not too happy), alongside a range of questions con-
cerned with frequency and style of prayer. Bivariate correlations showed no rela-
tionship between frequency of prayer and happiness. Multivariate correlations 
demonstrated a significant positive relationship between religious experiences in 
prayer and happiness. In further analyses of these data, Poloma and Pendleton 
(1990, 1991) found significant positive correlations between happiness and 
reported closeness to God, personal satisfaction with religion, church attendance, 
and personal satisfaction with church activities. No significant relationships were 
found between happiness and orthodoxy of religious belief or claiming the 
descriptor ‘born again’.
 Reanalysing data from the 1984 National Opinion Research Centre Survey, 
Reed (1991) explored the relationship between happiness and strength of reli-
gious affiliation among 1473 respondents. Religious affiliation was divided into 
two categories (strong and weak), while happiness was assessed in three categor-
ies (very happy, pretty happy and not too happy). The data demonstrated a signi-
ficant positive relationship between self- reported strength of religious affiliation 
and happiness.
 Reanalysing data from the National Opinion Research Centre Survey (Davis 
and Smith 1989), Ellison (1991) assessed happiness on a three- point continuum 
(not too happy, pretty happy and very happy) alongside a range of religious vari-
ables. He reported a significant positive relationship between firm religious 
beliefs and happiness.
 A second strand of research has inferred happiness from scores recorded on 
indices of related psychological measures. For example, Graney (1975) modified 
the Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn 1969) to enhance its usefulness among older 
people and interpreted this instrument as a measure of happiness. In a four- year 
longitudinal study of 60 elderly women, he found a significant positive associ-
ation between happiness and attending religious services.
 Blazer and Palmore (1976) employed the happiness subscale of the Chicago 
Inventory of Activities and Attitudes (Burgess et al. 1948) alongside the religion 
subscale from the same inventory. In a sample of 272 Americans aged between 
60 and 94 they found a significant positive correlation between happiness and 
religious activities, but no significant correlation between happiness and reli-
gious attitudes.
 McClure and Lodden (1982) argued that happiness can be inferred from 
scores on the depression scale of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inven-
tory (Hathaway and McKinley 1967). In a study conducted among 233 subjects 
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in America, they found a positive relationship between ‘happiness’ and time 
spent in religious activities.
 Bergin and colleagues (1987), following Alker and Gawin (1978), employed 
the sense of wellbeing scale of the California Psychological Inventory (Gough 
1975) as a measure of happiness. In a study among 78 students in America, they 
found that happiness was positively associated with scores on the intrinsic 
dimension of the Religious Orientation Scale (Allport and Ross 1967).
 Frankel and Hewitt (1994) inferred happiness from scores recorded on the 
Bradburn Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn 1969). In a study of 299 students in 
Canada, they compared the scores of students affiliated to on- campus Christian 
groups with the scores of students not affiliated to such groups. They found that 
the affiliated group recorded higher scores of positive affect and lower scores of 
negative affect. From these data they concluded that ‘those affiliated with on- 
campus religious groups appear happier than their unaffiliated counterparts’.
 In two separate studies, Lewis and colleagues (1997) inferred happiness from 
scores recorded on the Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al. 1985) and the 
Purpose in Life Test (Crumbaugh 1968). Among a sample of 154 undergraduate 
students they found no relationship between scores on the Satisfaction with Life 
Scale and the Francis Scale of Attitude towards Christianity (Francis and Stubbs 
1987). Among a sample of 67 undergraduate students they found no relationship 
between scores on the Purpose in Life Test and the same measure of attitude 
towards Christianity.
 In a third strand of research the happiness of the respondent has been assessed 
by the interviewer. For example, in a study conducted among 225 elderly people 
in America, reported by Zuckerman et al. (1984), the interviewers assess the 
respondents on a five- point scale, which was subsequently collapsed into two 
categories (happy and not happy). This study reported a positive correlation 
between happiness and religiosity, assessed by summing three questions con-
cerned with frequency of church attendance, self- assessed degree of religious-
ness, and degree of comfort derived from religion.
 A fourth strand of research has attempted to develop rudimentary scales of hap-
piness. For example, Balswick and Balkwell (1978) assessed happiness on a four- 
item scale. The items were in the form ‘I feel happiness’, ‘I feel delight’, ‘I feel joy’ 
and ‘I feel elation’, rated on a four- point scale: very often, often, seldom and never. 
Among a sample of 1244 high school students in America, they found a positive 
correlation between happiness and scores on their scale of religious orthodoxy.
 A fifth strand of research provides no clues about how precisely happiness 
was assessed. For example, Tellis- Nayak (1982) reported on a study among 259 
persons aged 60 or over in America, in which religiosity was assessed by com-
bining scores on four items, one exploring each of the dimensions of religious 
ideology, ritual, experience and consequence. On the basis of this study the 
author concluded that happiness was neither ‘meaningfully or significantly 
related to the religious factor’.
 Heisel and Faulkner (1982) reported on a study among 122 black Americans 
between the ages of 51 and 90, in which religiosity was assessed by combining 
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an unspecified number of items concerned with the three dimensions of experi-
ential, ritual and consequential religion. On the basis of this study the authors 
concluded that ‘those who scored high on happiness also tended to score high on 
religiosity’, in spite of the fact that the chi square test of association did not 
reach the 5 per cent level of significance.
 Delbridge and colleagues (1994) equated happiness with life satisfaction and 
wellbeing. On the basis of 555 interviews they concluded that ‘church attend-
ance was not particularly important for well- being’. No clues are given, however, 
regarding how these constructs are assessed or how the relationship was tested.
Measuring happiness
During the late 1980s, within the broader streams of developing interest in posit-
ive psychology, major advances were made in the conceptualization and meas-
urement of happiness by Michael Argyle and his associates in the development 
of the Oxford Happiness Inventory (Argyle et al. 1989). Argyle and Crossland 
(1987) suggested that happiness comprises three components: the frequency and 
degree of positive affect or joy; the average level of satisfaction over a period; 
and the absence of negative feelings, such as depression and anxiety. Working 
from this definition, they developed the Oxford Happiness Inventory by revers-
ing the 21 items of the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al. 1961) and adding 
11 further items to cover aspects of subjective wellbeing not so far included. 
Three items were subsequently dropped, leading to a 29-item scale.
 Argyle and colleagues (1989) reported an internal reliability of 0.90 using alpha 
(Cronbach 1951), and a seven- week test- retest reliability of 0.78. The concurrent 
validity of 0.43 was established against happiness ratings by friends. Construct 
validity was established against recognized measures of the three hypothesized 
components of happiness showing correlations of +0.32 with the positive affect 
scale of the Bradburn Balanced Affect measure (Bradburn 1969), –0.52 with the 
Beck Depression Inventory, and +0.57 with Argyle’s life satisfaction index.
 A series of studies employing the Oxford Happiness Inventory in a range of 
different ways has confirmed the basic reliability and validity of the instrument 
and begun to map the correlates of this operational definition of happiness. For 
example, Argyle and Lu (1990a) found that social competence was a strong 
significant predictor of happiness among 63 adults. In a study among 114 adults, 
Lu and Argyle (1991) found that happiness was correlated positively with self- 
esteem, social skills, and cooperation. In a study conducted among 65 adults, Lu 
and Argyle (1992) found that happiness was predicted by satisfaction with rela-
tionships with people from whom support had been received. Rim (1993) found 
a significant relationship between happiness and coping styles among 88 under-
graduates in Israel. In a study conducted among 36 adults between the ages of 17 
and 61 over a period of six weeks, Valiant (1993) found that happiness was more 
stable than depression. While depressive mood was significantly related to negat-
ive events and to a negative evaluation of these events, happiness was independ-
ent of life events and of the cognitive evaluation of these events. Lu and Argyle 
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(1993) found an inverse relationship between happiness and the total time spent 
watching television among 114 adults. Noor (1993) found that locus of control 
was a strong significant predictor of happiness among 145 adult women. Lu and 
Argyle (1994) found that happiness was positively correlated with engagement 
in a serious leisure activity among 114 adults. Noor (1995, 1997) found a strong 
association between happiness and an index of general health among two 
samples of 231 and 145 adult women. Hills and Argyle (1998a) found that hap-
piness was positively correlated with intensity of musical experience among 231 
residents of South Oxfordshire. Hills and Argyle (1998b) found that happiness 
was positively correlated with participation in sports among 275 residents of 
Oxfordshire.
 Chan and Joseph (2000) found that happiness was correlated positively with 
self- actualization, self- esteem, likelihood of affiliation, community feeling and 
self- acceptance. Neto (2001) found that happiness was correlated positively with 
satisfaction with life, self- esteem, sociability and self- rated attractiveness, and 
correlated negatively with embarrassability, loneliness, shyness and social 
anxiety. Hills and Argyle (2001a) found that happiness correlated positively with 
life regard, self- esteem, life orientation and affiliative tendency. Pannels and 
Claxton (2008) found that happiness was positively correlated with creative ide-
ation in a sample of 171 university students.
 The most securely established finding regarding the psychological correlates 
of happiness as operationalized by the Oxford Happiness Inventory concerns the 
location of this construct within the dimensional model of personality proposed 
by Hans Eysenck and his associates (Eysenck and Eysenck 1991). In an early 
study examining the relationship between Eysenck’s dimensional model of 
personality and the Oxford Happiness Inventory, Argyle and Lu (1990b) found a 
significant positive correlation between happiness and extraversion among 131 
undergraduates. Furnham and Brewin (1990) found that happiness was corre-
lated positively with extraversion, correlated negatively with neuroticism and 
uncorrelated with either psychoticism or the lie scale among 101 students. These 
findings regarding the relationship between happiness and extraversion, neuroti-
cism and psychoticism were confirmed by Lu and Argyle (1991) among 114 
adults, by Brebner and colleagues (1995) among 95 student volunteers, by 
Francis and colleagues (1998) in a cross- cultural study among a total of 1076 
students in the UK, USA, Canada and Australia, by Francis (1999) among 456 
undergraduates in Wales, by Furnham and Cheng (1999) among 120 students in 
the UK, by Lu (1995) among 581 Chinese adults living in Taiwan, by Noor 
(1996) among 145 women from Oxford, by Furnham and Cheng (2000) among 
233 English- speaking young people mainly recruited from the final year at 
school, by Chan and Joseph (2000) among 107 students in England, by Cheng 
and Furnham (2001) among two samples of 83 and 121 students in the UK, by 
Hills and Argyle (2001b) among 244 residents of Oxfordshire, and by Robbins 
and colleagues (in press) among 131 undergraduate students in Wales. Cheng 
and Furnham (2003) reported on a study conducted among 234 participants, 
ranging in age from 15 to 35 attending various schools and colleges, which 
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found that happiness was correlated positively with extraversion, correlated neg-
atively with neuroticism, correlated negatively with psychoticism, and uncorre-
lated with lie scale scores.
 Basic research employing the Oxford Happiness Inventory has been extended 
beyond the English- speaking community by a series of studies developing forms 
of the instrument in Arabic (Abdel- Khalek 2005), Chinese (Lu and Shih 1997; 
Lu et al. 1997, 2001; Lu and Lin 1998), Japanese (Furnham and Cheng 1999), 
Hebrew (Francis and Katz 2000), Persian (Bayani 2008; Liaghatdar et al. 2008), 
Portugese (Neto 2001) and German (Lewis et al. 2002).
 As with all good psychometric instruments, the strengths of the Oxford Hap-
piness Inventory reside in the clarity of the definition of the construct being 
operationalized, in the precision with which the individual items have been for-
mulated, and in the evidence regarding the performance of the construct within a 
researched network of theoretically- grounded associations (construct validity). 
As with all good psychometric instruments, the Oxford Happiness Inventory 
remains vulnerable to the critique that there are multiple alternative definitions 
of happiness that remain uncaptured by the measure.
Measuring religion
The social scientific study of religion has long recognized that religiosity itself is 
a multidimensional concept and that specific aspects of this concept need to be 
operationalized separately to form the basis for empirical enquiry. Attempts to 
map the dimensionality of religiosity have resulted in a number of conflicting 
models and the development of a wide range of instruments, as clearly evidenced 
by the thorough review and critique offered by Hill and Hood (1999) and 
updated by Cutting and Walsh (2008). Francis (1978a, 1978b) advanced the 
view that the attitudinal dimension of religion offered a particularly fruitful basis 
for coordinating empirical enquiry into the correlates, antecedents and con-
sequences of religiosity across the life span. The attitudinal dimension appears 
particularly attractive, for four reasons.
 First, at a conceptual level, social psychologists have developed a sophistic-
ated and well- established understanding of attitude as a deep- seated and rela-
tively stable and enduring covert predisposition, in contrast with more volatile 
surface behaviours and opinions. To access attitude towards religion is to get 
close to the heart of religion in an individual’s life.
 Second, following the pioneering analysis of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), 
Francis (1978a, 1978b) argued that attitudes are concerned primarily with 
accessing the affective dimension of religiosity. The affective dimension is dis-
tinguished from the cognitive dimension (concerned with beliefs) and from the 
behavioural dimension (concerned with practice). The affective dimension is 
able to transcend the divisions between denominational perspectives, while 
beliefs tend to polarize such divisions. In a Christian context, for example, Cath-
olics may believe one thing about the nature of God and Protestants may believe 
another, but both Catholics and Protestants may agree on the assessment of the 
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extent to which their faith exercises a positive or negative influence on their 
lives. The affective dimension is less likely to be distorted by personal and con-
textual factors, while practice tends to be subject to all kinds of personal or 
social constraints. Whether an individual attends a place of worship may be 
influenced by personal factors (like state of health) or social factors (like pres-
sure from parents), but negative and positive feelings about faith are much less 
likely to be contaminated by such factors.
 Third, the affective dimension of religiosity may be accessed by instruments 
which can function in a comparatively stable manner over a wide age range. 
While the sophistication with which beliefs are formulated and tested clearly 
develops over the life span (Fowler 1981), attitudinal statements concerned with 
positive and negative affect can be formulated in ways that are equally accepta-
ble during childhood, adolescence and adulthood (Francis and Stubbs 1987; 
Francis 1989).
 Fourth, at an operational level, social psychologists have developed a range 
of sophisticated and well- established techniques for assessing and scaling atti-
tudes, including the pioneering work of Thurstone (1928), Likert (1932), 
Guttman (1944), Edwards (1957) and Osgood et al. (1957). By testing the per-
formance of these various methods among different age groups, Francis (1978a, 
1978b) identified the Likert technique as providing the most reliable and consist-
ent scaling properties from the age of 8 upwards through childhood and adoles-
cence into adulthood.
 As well as being multidimensional in the sense of embracing many dimen-
sions (like belief, practice and attitude), religiosity is also multifaceted in the 
sense of embracing many traditions (e.g. Christianity, Islam and Hinduism). 
Francis (1978a, 1978b) argued that the attitudinal dimension of religion can best 
be accessed through the specific traditions by which it is expressed. Working 
within a Christian context, therefore, Francis proposed a scale of attitude towards 
Christianity which was found to function reliably and validly among children 
from the age of 8, among adolescents and among adults.
 The 24-item Likert scale, originally published by Francis (1978a), contains 
both negative and positive items concerned with an affective response to five 
components of the Christian faith accessible to and recognized by both children 
and adults, namely God, Jesus, the Bible, prayer and church. Each item is 
assessed on a five- point scale (agree strongly, agree, not certain, disagree, disa-
gree strongly), producing a range of scores from 24 to 120. The reliability and 
validity of the scale have been supported by studies among school pupils in 
England (Francis 1987, 1989; Lewis et al. 2006a, 2007), Kenya (Fulljames and 
Francis 1987), Nigeria (Francis and McCarron 1989), Northern Ireland (Francis 
and Greer 1990; Greer and Francis 1991) and Scotland (Gibson 1989; Gibson 
and Francis 1989). Another series of studies have supported the reliability and 
validity of the scale among adults in Australia and Canada (Francis 1995a), 
England (Francis and Stubbs 1987; Francis 1992a), the Republic of Ireland 
(Maltby 1994), Northern Ireland (Lewis and Maltby 1997), South Africa 
(Francis et al. 2005) and the USA (Lewis and Maltby 1995). In addition to the 
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full 24-item form of the Francis Scale of Attitude towards Christianity, a seven- 
item short form has been developed and tested among primary school pupils 
(Francis 1992b), secondary school pupils (Francis et al. 1991) and adults 
(Francis 1993; Francis et al. 1995b).
 The Francis scale of Attitude towards Christianity has also been translated 
into other languages, recognizing that integration of cross- cultural quantitative 
studies in the psychology of religion has been hampered by the lack of common 
instrumentation. Examples are provided by editions in Arabic (Munayer 2000), 
Czech (Francis et al. in press), Chinese (Francis et al. 2002), Dutch (Francis and 
Hermans 2000), French (Lewis and Francis 2003), German (Francis and Kwiran 
1999; Francis et al. 2002), Greek (Youtika et al. 1999), Norwegian (Francis and 
Enger 2002), Portugese (Ferreira and Neto 2002), Romanian (Francis et al. 
2009), Slovenian (Flere et al. 2008), Spanish (Campo- Arias et al. 2006), 
Swedish (Eek 2001) and Welsh (Evans and Francis 1996; Francis and Thomas 
2003).
 By the mid- 1990s over 100 independent studies had employed this scale to 
examine a wide range of correlates of religiosity during childhood, adolescence 
and adulthood (Kay and Francis 1996), and the wide range of issues explored 
has continued to expand.
 In order to test whether the growing body of evidence regarding the corre-
lates, antecedents and consequences of attitudes towards religion (established in 
a Christian context by means of the Francis Scale of Attitude towards Christian-
ity) also held true in a Jewish context, Francis and Katz (2007) developed a com-
parable instrument, the Katz–Francis Scale of Attitude towards Judaism. In order 
to achieve a proper comparability between the two instruments the attempt was 
made to translate each of the original 24 items in a way appropriate for a 
Hebrew- speaking Jew living in Israel. The psychometric properties of the instru-
ment were assessed on a sample of 618 Hebrew- speaking undergraduate students 
attending Bar- Ilan University.
 The second development was the Sahin–Francis Scale of Attitude towards 
Islam (Sahin and Francis 2002). The items of the Francis Scale of Attitude 
towards Christianity were carefully scrutinized and debated by several Muslim 
scholars of Islam until agreement was reached on 23 Islam- related items which 
mapped closely on to the area assessed by the parent instrument. The psycho-
metric properties of the instrument were assessed on 381 Muslim adolescents in 
England. Subsequently the instrument was tested among a sample of 1199 
Muslim adolescents in Kuwait (Francis et al. 2006, 2008a).
 The third development was the Santosh–Francis Scale of Attitude towards 
Hinduism (Francis et al. 2008b). Scholars familiar with the study of Hinduism 
debated the items presented in the Francis Scale of Attitude towards Christianity 
and suggested 19 equivalent translations into a Hindu context. The psychometric 
properties of the instrument were assessed on a sample of 330 individuals 
between the ages of 12 and 35 attending a Hindu youth festival in England. Sub-
sequently the instrument was tested among a sample of 100 Hindu affiliates from 
the Bunt caste in the South India state of Karnataka (Tiliopoulos et al. 2010).
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Religion and happiness revisited
In the first of a series of studies, Robbins and Francis (1996) examined the asso-
ciation between scores recorded on the Oxford Happiness Inventory and on the 
Francis Scale of Attitude towards Christianity, after taking into account indi-
vidual differences in personality as measured by the short- form Revised Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck et al. 1985). Data provided by a sample of 
360 first- year undergraduate students in Wales demonstrated a significant posit-
ive correlation between attitude towards Christianity and happiness scores 
(r = 0.26, p < 0.001). This association remained positive after controlling for 
individual differences in sex, extraversion, neuroticism, psychoticism and scores 
recorded on the Eysenckian lie scale.
 In a second study, Francis and Lester (1997) replicated the first study in a dif-
ferent cultural context. This time the Oxford Happiness Inventory, the Francis 
Scale of Attitude towards Christianity and the short- form Revised Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire were completed by a sample of 212 undergraduate 
students in the USA. This time a very similar correlation was reported between 
attitude towards Christianity and happiness scores (r = 0.28, p < 0.001) and once 
again the association persisted after controlling for sex differences and for dif-
ferences in personality.
 Recognizing that the first two studies had been conducted among undergradu-
ate students, the third study reported by Francis and Robbins (2000) drew on a 
sample of 295 individuals, ranging in age from late teens to late seventies, 
recruited from participants attending a variety of courses and workshops on the 
psychology of religion. The same three instruments were included in the study: 
the Francis Scale of Attitude towards Christianity, the Oxford Happiness Inven-
tory and the short- form Revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. The associ-
ation between attitude towards Christianity and happiness scores was positive 
(r = 0.30, p < 0.001) and remained after controlling for sex differences and for 
differences in personality.
 The next three studies were drawn together and published in one paper by 
Francis et al. (2000). The three samples reported in this paper covered adoles-
cence, young adulthood and later life. The adolescent sample comprised 994 sec-
ondary school pupils during the final year of compulsory schooling (15- to 
16-year- olds). The young adult sample comprised 456 first- year undergraduate 
students in Wales. The third sample comprised 496 members of the University 
of the Third Age, a relatively informal educational network for senior citizens 
(10 per cent were in their fifties, 50 per cent in their sixties, 34 per cent in their 
seventies, and 6 per cent were aged 80 or over; 66 per cent were female and 34 
per cent were male). All participants completed the Francis Scale of Attitude 
towards Christianity, the Oxford Happiness Inventory and the short- form 
Revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. The partial correlations between 
attitude towards Christianity and happiness scores, after controlling for sex and 
for personality, were as follows: adolescence, r = 0.10, p < 0.01; young adult-
hood, r = 0.20, p < 0.001; later life, r = 0.16, p < 0.01.
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 The next study reported by Francis and colleagues (2003) among 89 students 
in Wales did not include the personality measure. However, after controlling for 
age and for sex, there was a significant correlation between attitude towards 
Christianity and happiness scores (r = 0.38, p < 0.001).
 Alongside these seven samples (N = 360, 212, 295, 995, 456, 496, 89) that all 
found a positive association between attitude towards Christianity and happiness 
scores, an eighth study found no association between the two variables. This 
eighth study was reported by Francis et al. (2003) among a sample of 331 stu-
dents attending the University of Würzburg in Germany. Further research is 
needed to test whether this aberrant finding truly reflects a cultural difference.
 In order to test whether the association between the attitudinal dimension of 
religion and happiness reported by the majority of the preceding studies was 
peculiar to the Christian tradition, further studies were established using the 
Katz–Francis Scale of Attitude towards Judaism, the Santosh–Francis Scale of 
Attitude towards Hinduism, and the Sahin–Francis Scale of Attitude towards 
Islam. In Phase one, Hebrew- speaking students in Israel completed Hebrew edi-
tions of the Katz–Francis Scale of Attitude towards Judaism, the Oxford Happi-
ness Inventory and the short- form Revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. 
In the first study, Francis and Katz (2002) reported on a sample of 298 female 
students. In the second study, Francis et al. (2004) reported on a sample of 203 
male students. Both studies found a positive association between attitude towards 
Judaism and happiness scores, after taking into account sex differences and dif-
ferences in personality.
 In Phase two, a sample of 100 Hindu affiliates from the Bunt Caste in the 
South India state of Karnataka completed the Santosh–Francis Scale of Attitude 
towards Hinduism and the Oxford Happiness Inventory. Once again a positive 
association was found between attitude towards Hinduism and happiness scores, 
after taking into account sex differences (Tiliopoulus et al. in press). Further 
studies are currently awaiting analysis using the Sahin–Francis Scale of Attitude 
towards Islam.
Conclusion
This chapter set out to examine the association between religion and happiness, 
drawing on perspectives, conceptualizations and methodologies proposed by the 
psychology of religion, positive psychology and empirical theology. The key 
conclusion that may be drawn is that a clear association exists between these two 
variables across a range of age groups and across a range of religious traditions. 
The empirical evidence demonstrates that overall religious people are happier.
 This conclusion rests on three key assumptions. Assumption one is that the 
Oxford Happiness Inventory conceptualizes, captures and measures a viable 
understanding of happiness. Assumption two is that the attitudinal dimension of 
religiosity captures the core of what it means to be religious in the contemporary 
world and that the family of measures proposed by Francis and his associates 
provides appropriate operationalizations of this dimension. Assumption three is 
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that correlational studies (including appropriate control variables) are sufficient 
to test and establish the association between religion and happiness and that 
employing this technique in a series of replication studies provides an appropri-
ate strategy for developing a sound basis of scientific knowledge. At the same 
time, it remains important not to overclaim what can be established by correla-
tional studies: establishing association is not the same as demonstrating causal 
directionality.
 Accepting the robustness of these assumptions, the research team welcomes 
opportunities to falsify these conclusions by pursuing the pattern of replication 
studies across novel situations and fresh contexts.
9 Ethnographic insights into 
happiness
Jonathan Miles- Watson
At the beginning of Happiness the economist Richard Layard (whose work is 
explored in detail elsewhere in this volume) lists the range of disciplines he will 
draw upon in his discussion. This list is impressively interdisciplinary and along­
side economics he lists the disciplines of psychology, sociology and philosophy as 
being formative (Layard 2006: 4). It is notable, however, that anthropology is 
absent from Layard’s list. In choosing not to engage with the work of anthropolo­
gists, Layard’s book is fairly typical of the happiness literatures which have been 
far more rooted in the disciplines of economics (discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 of 
this volume), political philosophy (Chapter 7) and psychology (Chapter 8). In this 
chapter, following a brief discussion of key concepts and a short survey of relevant 
literature, I will show that anthropology can contribute to the debate by refocusing 
it on the importance of ‘dwelling’ (Ingold 2000: 5). The outcome of this refocus­
ing is an understanding of happiness that is grounded in lived experience and 
allows for a nuanced understanding of sacred spatial capital.
Anthropological approaches to the study of happiness
It is not surprising that the work of anthropologists is largely absent from main­
stream happiness literatures, since, until recently, anthropologists have tended to 
avoid explicitly engaging with the concepts of happiness and wellbeing. Thin 
has recently discussed a wide range of historical factors that he believes have 
come together to distance anthropologists from the happiness debate (2008: 
135–150, 2009: 27–30). One of the key issues raised by Thin is the trend for 
anthropologists to use cultural relativism as a shield against ethnocentricism. A 
second is the tendency to fight the idealization of non- Western societies by 
focusing on pathologies. A third reason is added by Mathews and Izquierdo, who 
have suggested that anthropologists have avoided discussing happiness because 
of the way that a lack of interest at the ground level has combined with a wide­
spread failure to distinguish between levels of data and analysis (2009a: 9). 
Despite the lack of anthropological discussion of happiness there is a growing 
realization that anthropologists have the ability to significantly add to the con­
ceptualization of happiness, whether it is by confronting the abstract with 
the concrete (Lambek 2008: 130), by taking seriously alternatives to human 
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flourishing (Laidlaw 2008: 157), or through highlighting alternative conceptions 
of the good life (Mathews and Izquierdo 2009a: 1). In a sense this task is simply 
a question of reinterpreting the existing ethnographic record, since although 
anthropologists have tended to avoid explicit theorization of the abstract concept 
of happiness they have had a lot to say about aspects of happiness. The problem 
then is not so much that anthropologists have nothing to contribute to the discus­
sion as that, for varying reasons, they have not significantly engaged with the 
construct of a universal, objective and abstract category of happiness.
 This picture is in the process of dramatically changing as the discipline of 
anthropology undergoes a significant shift that has resulted in an explosion of 
interest in the topic of happiness. Indeed, after years of silence, two collected 
volumes of essays that deal explicitly with the anthropology of happiness/well­
being have been published while this essay has been in development.1 In these 
recent publications anthropologists have adopted differing strategies for engag­
ing with the concept of happiness that fall along a spectrum. At one end of the 
spectrum are anthropologists who have placed their emphasis on generating an 
anthropology of happiness through engaging with insights from other disciplines 
(Colby 2009; Lambek 2008; Thin 2009). At the other end of the spectrum are 
those who place their emphasis on presenting ethnographic detail that deepens 
understanding of an aspect of happiness (Adelson 2009; Clark 2009; Laidlaw 
2008). This chapter is more orientated towards the latter end of the spectrum and 
will add to the discussion of happiness by combining material drawn from the 
ethnographic record with insights from my own fieldwork in order to explore 
one aspect of the related concept of wellbeing.
 In this chapter I follow Mathews and Izquierdo’s suggestion that anthropolo­
gists can best explore happiness through a system of ‘comparison . . . [involving] 
ethnographic portraits placed in juxtaposition’ (2009b: 250). I also follow them 
in believing that this system of analysis would operate best as a collaborative 
project with different anthropologists, at different times, drawing on the ethno­
graphic record to deepen our understanding of one of four experiential dimen­
sions of wellbeing (2009b: 258–262). These are the physical (or bodily) 
dimension, the interpersonal dimension, the existential dimension and the insti­
tutional dimension (2009b: 261). This chapter will focus on deepening under­
standing of the interpersonal dimension of experiential wellbeing; however, 
through theorization of the concept of personhood, I develop the second dimen­
sion in rather a different way from their understanding.
 Already in this chapter, a shift has steadily occurred from happiness to the 
related concept of wellbeing. Many of the chapters in this volume make such a 
movement, as does most of the recent anthropological discussion. In Pursuits of 
Happiness Mathews and Izquierdo explicitly lay out their reasoning for making 
such a movement, arguing that happiness is a composite of the wider concept of 
wellbeing (2009a: 3). Furthermore, they suggest that the latter term’s more flexi­
ble and encompassing nature makes it more suitable for an exploration through 
the presentation of diverse ethnographic data (2009a: 3). Mathews and Izquierdo 
define wellbeing as
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an optimal state [which is] conceived and experienced in different human 
ways by different individuals and within the cultural contexts of different 
societies [yet] bears a degree of commonality due to our common humanity 
and interrelatedness over time and space.
(2009a: 5)
This is a useful and workable definition of wellbeing for an ethnographic explo­
ration of the topic that will be adopted for the purpose of this chapter.2
Understanding religion’s role in happiness
Many of the contributors to this volume argue in explicit terms, using both quantita­
tive and qualitative data, for the value of belonging to a religious community and/or 
subscribing to a set of beliefs. I intend to take rather a different approach and define 
religion in such a way that it is inevitably positioned at the heart of the set of pro­
cesses that form our ability to reckon with the environment. I am not here interested 
in attempting to catalogue all definitions of religion; it is not a suitable place for 
such an attempt and the task is largely redundant, having been admirably attempted 
elsewhere (Kunin 2003; Kunin and Miles- Watson 2006; Thrower 1999). Instead, I 
intend to briefly define what the term religion will signify in the context of this 
chapter and outline the influential writings that have led to this definition.
 Rather than drawing on an essentialist, or substantialist definition of religion, 
my understanding draws from functionalist and symbolic discourse (Kunin and 
Miles- Watson 2006: 4–8). In particular I find Geertz’s suggestion, that religion 
is a symbolic system which both guides outward life and orders inward life, 
useful (Geertz 1968: 95). From this perspective it is possible to see religion oper­
ating as a kind of habitus (Bourdieu 1992: 53–54, 2005: 211), or a way of 
becoming enskilled in reckoning with the world and the relations we forge 
within it (Pálsson 1994). By this I do not mean to limit religion, rather I would 
suggest that it is possible within the world to forge relations of all kinds, with the 
seen and the unseen, the human and the non­ human.
 Despite the obvious similarities between Geertz and Berger, I find in Geertz’s 
definition more room to manoeuvre. This is primarily because of Berger’s stress 
on religion as a process of the objectification of internal structures (Berger 1969: 
4). This means that in essence the cultural and religious world is a reflection of 
the internal world of man and therefore markedly different to the world of nature 
(Berger 1969: 6). It is possible to read Geertz in a similar way, but I also find in 
Geertz’s suggestion of a two- way movement, from world to mind and back 
again, the seed of an ecological model of religion, by which I mean to suggest 
that the religious process is not so much one of world formation as world discov­
ery. It provides us with a framework for engaging with that which flows from 
existence. Religion enskills us in ways of being attentive to certain aspects of 
life and has the ability to show how both man and grace are situated within 
nature. This enskilment is crucial for our ability to weave meaningful relation­
ships, which are essential for our wellbeing.
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 The question of religion’s role in wellbeing is therefore not one of opposi­
tions between religious and secular, or superstition and religion; instead it is a 
question of the way in which different religious practices generate differing rela­
tionships of differing qualities. In order to explore this further, the remainder of 
this chapter will turn to demonstrate both how the previous argument arises from 
ethnographic data and how through ethnographic data we can come to know 
more about these differing relationships and their importance in human well­
being. The ethnographic accounts chosen may be seen as traditionally anthropo­
logical, in that they deal largely with localized religions (or with locally distinct 
variations of global traditions) and are largely drawn from societies that have a 
comparatively low level of tool development. I do not however believe that 
anthropology is only valid as a study of these sorts of communities, or that the 
value of these accounts lies in their ability to act as colourful traveller’s tales. 
Moreover, I am not suggesting that these accounts document practices that are 
somehow stuck in time, and I acknowledge that many of the insights this mater­
ial offers have resonances with the theological insights found elsewhere in this 
volume. Yet, these accounts of specific communities, at specific times, contain 
within them insights of wider significance that are as valuable for the under­
standing of human wellbeing as other material. Furthermore, perhaps there is, as 
Ingold (2007) has argued, something in the way that tool use has developed in 
certain communities that erases the trace of our action in the world, hence 
making it harder to engage meaningfully with our environments.
The importance of non- human people
The happiness literatures consistently suggest that interpersonal relationships are 
a key factor in human wellbeing (Heil 2009; Lambek 2008; Layard 2006). This 
section will also highlight the importance of interpersonal relationships; 
however, it will develop the argument in two ways. First, it will show that reli­
gion has an important role to play in fostering and maintaining those relation­
ships. Second, through an increased theorization of personhood, it will highlight 
the importance of developing relationships with non­ human persons. This leads 
to recognition of the importance of the emerging concept of spatial capital as a 
key tool for urban planning.
 In the evocatively titled ‘Having your house and eating it’, Gibson outlines 
the religious practices that he came to know in Ara (1995: 132–148). From his 
account emerges an understanding of the way in which the Muslim population of 
this region engage in a series of rituals designed to form relations, which solve a 
logical problem through allowing both unity and divergence (1995: 134–145). In 
order to understand the logic of this religious practice it is first necessary to 
know something of the way in which humanity and personhood are understood 
locally. Gibson recounts in detail key life cycle rituals that show how a human is 
understood to be the embodiment of several distinct forces (1995: 133–136). 
These forces are bound together (through the shared experience of embodiment) 
in the human person, but separate again after death (1995: 137–139). This means 
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that the life cycle may be viewed as a movement from diversity, to unity, to 
diversity. Yet, it is simultaneously possible to view the life cycle as a movement 
from the unity of pre­ human life, to the diversity that is human life, before 
returning to unity again after the end of a human life (ibid.). This process is 
excellently highlighted by Gibson’s account of how after death the self some­
what untangles, while some aspects drift away, like mist, others dwell on for a 
time (1995: 137–138). The anja, the element of personhood that may remain, 
will make demands of a peculiar kind for a period of time, such as offerings of 
its favourite food; however, over time, it returns to the collective unity of the 
ancestors, whose needs can be met through generalized offering and ritual 
(Gibson 1995: 138).
 In Ara, the awareness of the need for diversity within unity not only operates 
diachronically but also operates spatially. An excellent example of the spatial 
reinforcing of the chronological play may be found in the domestic house. For 
the domestic house is itself a binding together of several persons into one meta­ 
entity, or person. Gibson suggests that the people of Ara were attentive to the 
construction of their living space from the beginning (1995: 139–140). As is 
generally the case everywhere, this process is done in conjunction with a special­
ist; however, the specialist in Ara, called the Oragi, draws his authority from his 
ability to communicate with the trees in their raw state (ibid.). It is through these 
first communications that a meaningful relation is developed which continues 
throughout the life of the house. The spirits of the trees are said to communicate 
to the Oragi through the whorls in the grain which reveal to him how the indi­
vidual elements should be brought together in the creation of a house (ibid.). It is 
necessary to blend male and female elements in the house and this is particularly 
noticeable in the vertical poles, which are arranged in male and female pairings 
(Gibson 1995: 141). Although there is some confusion over whether these are 
brother and sister, or man and wife, both of these conceptions develop com­
plementary aspects of the same understanding (ibid.). For brother and sister are 
diverse genders drawn from the same source, whereas man and wife are diverse 
genders drawn together into unity through the sacrament of marriage. The house 
then is no mere backdrop but a living entity of which the humans also form a 
part. Through the development of various relationships, humans play a part in 
generating the meta­ person of the house, which in turn plays a part in generating 
the various elements.
 The awareness of being part of a series of interrelated things that the people 
of Ara demonstrate resonates with Gregory and Mary Bateson’s notion of grace 
as an awareness of being part of a series of nested minds (Bateson and Bateson 
1998). Yet, this awareness is far from universal and is particularly lacking in my 
own fieldwork site, an urban area of Himachal Pradesh, India. In contrast to Ara 
the focus here is all too often on dominating the landscape to rapidly create 
unsympathetic concrete structures. There is a pervasive oppositional model in 
which mankind is viewed as distinct from an environment that must be subju­
gated. The result of this is an environment in which scavengers (such as 
monkeys) flourish, yet humans suffer, due to poor health, sadness of spirit and 
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paucity of beauty. There is then perhaps something lacking in the dominant reli­
gious systems of this region, which perhaps relates to the way that colonialism, 
urbanization and mobility have conspired to obliterate the received tradition of 
the Puranas and elevate the more dislocated, partial, Vedanta literature (Mehta 
2009). Of course this is not universally the case in this region and, even if they 
are not aware of it, people are building relationships with their environments, yet 
the quality of those relationships is often poor, as is the skill of people to reckon 
meaningfully with their environments.
 Ingold has noted that the dislocation of the human from the environment is 
often connected with a view of the human as an organism plus (2000: 88). In 
contrast to the understanding of personhood developed by Gibson’s ethnogra­
phy, this view is predicated on the belief that the only fully developed people are 
humans. This leads to the suggestion that humans are the only things that can be 
meaningfully engaged with. Globally many are under the influence of a Carte­
sian model that does not do justice to the subtlety of Descartes’ own thought 
(Derrida 2008: 70), which views the person as something trapped inside the 
body, where it functions as a processor of the chaotic sense data with which the 
world bombards the person (Ingold 2000: 159). This understanding of the person 
as something uniquely human and detached from its environment is in contrast 
to the complex notion of personhood that Gibson presents. For his ethnography 
suggests that personhood is a complex of different forces that are forged through 
engagement with other elements, or persons (human and non­ human, living and 
dead), who together form the meta­ person of the household. From this perspec­
tive it is only sensible to heed the arguments of the architect Farouk Y. Seif, who 
has suggested that homes should reflect identity and be constructed under the 
principles of patience and love, rather than desperation (2008).
 Hallowell’s famous account of Ojibwa ontology also adds an important 
dimension to our notion of personhood and this consequently leads to a nuancing 
of our understanding of happiness (1960). Hallowell noted that, in the myths of 
the Ojibwa, persons were not always human, nor were they humans in disguise, 
such as the animals of Western fables (1960: 30). What is more, there is no sense 
that the experiences taught through myth, or learnt through dreams, are any more 
real or useful than those of waking life (1960: 30–43). Therefore, there is no 
sense that non­ human persons are somehow allegorical or unreal. Indeed, the 
Ojibwa are said to exist in a web of personal relations with both human and non­ 
people (Hallowell 1960: 48). This is because personhood for the Ojibwa, in con­
trast to the Cartesian concept of the person, is an expression or action (Ingold 
2000: 159). Therefore it is perfectly logical from the Ojibwa perspective that 
thunder can be a person, because it communicates its personhood through an 
identifiable action in the world (Hallowell 1960: 31–34). Ingold has stressed that 
a hidden narrative running throughout Hallowell’s and other similar accounts, 
such as Nelson’s account of the Koyukon (1983), is the need to be enskilled in 
interpreting a real phenomenon, in this case that of thunder, in a meaningful way 
(Ingold 2000: 159). As with the people of Ara in these other ethnographies we 
see humanity existing at the centre of a web of relations with the human and the 
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non­ human; for these relations to promote human wellbeing it is necessary for 
humans to become enskilled in relating with these elements in meaningful ways.
 This model fits with recent anthropological theorization on the importance of 
the landscape for our identity, happiness and wellbeing, in which it is argued 
that people are not separate from their landscapes, existing in a sort of taskscape, 
or world of action, which unfolds against the backdrop of the landscape (Ingold 
2000: 198–208). Instead, it is argued that humans do not so much act on (or in) a 
landscape as move along with it (Bauer 2004; Ingold 2000, 2007; Tilley 1994). 
From this perspective the landscape becomes a polyrhythmic composition of 
processes, within which the divisions between the landscape and taskscape, the 
natural and the built environment, and the animate and the inanimate become 
dissolved (Ingold 2000: 201). This understanding of the landscape, which is 
becoming prevalent in the fields of cultural geography and socio/cultural anthro­
pology, meshes well with the data I have drawn from the ethnographic record, 
and serves to highlight how different people profit from being more attentive to 
the relations they develop.
 In a world of heightened mobility and economic migration, humans often 
struggle to develop quality relations with other human and non- human persons 
(Izquierdo 2009: 67–87). Without the time to become enskilled in interpersonal 
relations people often fall back upon the crux of domination, which stands in 
contrast to the harmonious relations of trust found in various places around the 
world (Ingold 1980). Layard argues that trust is essential to happiness (2005: 7) 
and the ethnographies I have drawn upon would support this suggestion; 
however, they call for a nuancing of Layard’s insight expanding his idea to 
include non- human persons. For Gibson’s account demonstrates how in Ara the 
household consists of what Milton has termed an ecology of relations (2005).3
 In the household of Ara, as Gibson describes it, human and non- human 
persons engage reciprocally, generating a series of nested minds, an awareness 
of which is captured in the term grace (Bateson and Bateson 1998). The quality 
of these relations is based, in part, upon the skill of the human to engage mean­
ingfully with other elements of the environment; a skill that is often gained 
through received religion, which is passed from a caregiver to a youth. Gibson’s 
ethnography implicitly suggests that this received tradition teaches humans how 
to be attentive to elements of their environment so that they might engage with 
the world in a more meaningful way. Religion in large areas of Himachal 
Pradesh once operated in a very similar manner (Thakur 1997); however, the 
received tradition has recently declined and this may be tied to a dislocation of 
morality and religion from the environment, which has led to a widespread lack 
of ability to engage in a meaningful way with the environment. Here, as else­
where, it is not that man has removed himself from his environment so much as 
that large numbers of the population are experiencing a dwindling ability to 
build relations with their environment that enhance their wellbeing.
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Sacred space, capital and wellbeing
Basso’s ethnographic accounts of the Apache (1990, 2001) presents an excellent 
example of both how meaningful relations with the environment can be con­
structed and how large­ scale population movement can disrupt those relations, 
resulting in a spiritually and physically impoverished life.4 He records how 
Apache mythology is tied to the landscape and how relations formed during an 
individual’s life mesh with those formed both in the historical past and in mythic 
time (Basso 1990: 128).5 As a human moves through the landscape they build 
relationships, therefore, when they encounter something in the landscape, (a 
place, a tree, a building) they encounter it in the context of past encounters, 
which means that the encounter evokes past memories, sounds, sights, smells 
and emotions (Ingold 2000: 237–40). Similarly, when they think of a place they 
do not think of the place as an abstract geographical point so much as the experi­
ences they have had in that place (ibid.). Because humans exist in a long, 
ongoing conversation, when they think of the place they may also think of 
encounters others have had there and told them about, and when they encounter 
a place through others’ encounters they become enskilled in interacting with it in 
certain ways. What is more, by interacting with the landscape they become part 
of the landscape, their presence in it both instantly and historically observable 
through signs of engagement (Tilley 1994).
 The trace of human and non­ human action in the world communicates 
meaning to the person who is enskilled enough to interpret it. It opens possibil­
ities for meaningful engagement, provided that the person is skilled enough to 
respond sensitively. Basso records that when the Apache were moved to reserva­
tions, they found themselves in an alien landscape, which they lacked the skill of 
accumulated generations’ wisdom to engage with (1990). The result was an 
increase in alcoholism, moral listlessness and a decrease in quality of life (ibid.). 
I have elsewhere suggested (Miles- Watson 2008) that population movement in 
itself is not necessarily harmful to happiness and that rooted religious systems of 
understanding can be robust enough to not only survive this transformation but 
to act as shock absorbers for the change, in much the same way that Lévi­Strauss 
suggests that the myths of South America operate (1969: 33).
 Returning to the region of my own fieldwork it is possible to see that in 
Shimla, the capital of Himachal Pradesh, despite a dramatic post­ colonial popu­
lation shift, areas of the city are pregnant with meaning in the same way that 
Basso records the landscape was for the Apache. Central to the generation of this 
connection are the Christian religious institutions, which enskill people of all 
faiths to be attentive to signs of the past that can help forge understanding in the 
future. Upon approach to the centre of Shimla, dusty roads, lined with cement 
buildings, give way to wide, pedestrianized avenues lined with buildings that are 
deliberately designed to evoke certain mythic histories (Bhasin 2009: 83–95). 
The church buildings, especially Christ Church Cathedral, dominate this space 
and inside Christ Church (as in Ara) the signs of the ancestors of the place may 
be perceived. Such spaces transcend relations of blood and generate connections 
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with the ancestors of the space, the trace of whose action is easily observable. 
By doing so, the space becomes an important source of wellbeing for the humans 
that worship, visit and pass daily. What is more, because the space is constantly 
being generated, these various groups of people become part of the space itself 
through their worship, reverence and more general engagement.
 The language of capitals has emerged powerfully in the discourse of the 
social sciences over the past decade. Alongside social capital, religious capital 
and human capital there is now an emerging concept of spatial (or landscape) 
capital, which is discussed in Chapter 19 of this volume. This chapter’s explora­
tion of the ethnographic record began with the objective of deepening under­
standing of the interpersonal realm of wellbeing. However, the ethnographic data 
have led towards an appreciation of spatial capital, through a certain collapsing 
of the person/environment dichotomy. If, as Ingold has recently suggested 
(2007), we require a greater level of skill than ever before to be aware of how 
we exist as part of a greater household, or system of nested minds, then the 
ability of religion and sacred spaces to generate that awareness is more import­
ant than ever. The grace that is the realization of the ecology of relations within 
which a person exists can come through living religious traditions, which teach 
us how to be attentive to our own actions and the relations they generate with 
others. This stands in contrast to Cartesian (and other similar) teachings that 
emphasize the separateness of man from his actions and the uniqueness of man 
in relation to personhood. The ethnographic record provides examples of ways 
of engaging with the world that reflect back upon our own lives, resulting in the 
realization that wellbeing everywhere is contingent upon interpersonal relations. 
These are forged within space and across time; they are relationships with human 
and non­ human, animate and inanimate people.
Notes
1 The first of these, Culture and Wellbeing, edited by Jimnez, contains contributions 
from anthropologists working primarily with the British tradition. The second of these, 
Pursuits of Happiness, edited by Mathews and Izquierdo, has contributions from 
anthropologists working primarily within the American tradition.
2 This definition is not universally accepted and other anthropologists have recently 
developed different approaches to the topic of wellbeing. These include James (2008), 
highlighting the distinction between wellbeing and welfare, Jimnez’s (2008) suggestion 
that studying wellbeing always involves awareness of the lack of something, and 
Thin’s (2009) empirical approach to wellbeing.
3 I would not however deny that it is possible to conceive of skilful domination, or that, 
as James (2008) and Laidlaw (2008) have recently highlighted, alternative models to 
the ecological approach function in such a way as to successfully promote the wellbe­
ing of some, even if it is at the expense of others.
4 Naomi Adelson has recently explored similar issues in relation to the Cree (2009: 
109–126).
5 This process resonates strikingly with Bakhtin’s notion of chronotopes (1981: 7).
10 Institutions, organizations and 
wellbeing
Anthony Berry
Introduction
Much has been made of the contribution of a variety of capitals to wellbeing and 
happiness. These capitals include human, social, knowledge and religious. I seek 
to argue that there has been too little attention paid to the role of institutions and 
organizations in the development of wellbeing and human happiness. Further, I 
seek to argue that institutions and organizations (public, private and third sector) 
are central to human wellbeing. In this sense the configuration of institutions and 
organizations, while mutable, does mean that there is a category of capitals, 
institutional and organizational.
 While high levels of wealth do not necessarily lead to higher levels of happi-
ness, moving away from poverty does. Much of the debate on the economic 
development of second and third world countries has focused upon the limita-
tions imposed by a lack of developed institutions (central banks, open markets, 
regulatory capabilities, access to legal redress).
 The common image of organizations (in the media) is of somewhat oppres-
sive places which exploit persons, and in a naive market view seek to extract 
labour surplus; which of course some do. Further, organizations are often viewed 
as antithetical to that apparently most desired state – individual autonomy. Indi-
viduals report the negatives that institutions appear to provoke. As an example, 
an academic, when asked what your university does for you, replied, ‘Nothing! 
And what is more it inhibits my work.’ He went on to explain that he was largely 
judged by his individual research, so all other demands were irrelevant to his 
future expectations. Similarly a clergy person, incumbent in a Church of England 
parish, legally a member of a deanery synod, a primary element of church (syn-
odical) government, said that he did not attend because it was boring and gave 
him nothing. Here we have an individual selectively disobedient to the law, with 
added optional contempt and disparagement of the institution. The deanery 
synod exists as a collaborative organization, while for this person the ‘fantasy’ 
of clerical autonomy within the institution and organizations of the Church was 
held in preference to the requirements of engaged collaboration.
 This chapter is developed by a very brief review of institutional and organiza-
tional literature, some reports of research into the factors that lead to (un)happi-
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ness in organizations, followed by some consideration of organizational fields as 
expressions of institutional conflicts where higher order values and beliefs may 
be of greater importance to happiness than the factors found in the research 
considered.
Institutions and organizations
Scott (1995) provides a lucid exposition of the development and use of institu-
tional theory in economics, politics and sociology. He noted that economists 
were interested in richer explanations of human behaviour than the (dominant) 
individual rational choice models and attended to the context within which indi-
viduals acted. There were critiques in relation to uncertainty and the indetermi-
nacy of decision outcomes, the significance of external factors, the need for 
behavioural realism and for an understanding of change. Van de Ven (1993) saw 
institutions ‘as imperfect and pragmatic solutions to problems’. Scott argued that 
the institutional political theorists focused upon formal structures and legal 
systems providing many rich descriptions of governance. In social theory Dur-
kheim and Weber in attending to institutions as symbolic systems of knowledge, 
belief and moral authority complemented formal structures with arguments for 
the significance of values and norms. Weber (1947) developed a famous three-
fold typology of modes of authority in institutions (and organizations); the tradi-
tional, the charismatic and the rational- legal as cultural systems that legitimate 
the exercise of authority (and perhaps power).
 In the explorations of organizations from the viewpoint of social institutional 
theory there was a move from a view of an organization as a kind of structure or 
machine to enact rational decisions to a view of organizations as adaptive, 
organic systems shaped by institutional states and processes. Merton (1957) 
pointed to the institutional explanations for the behaviour of officers and organi-
zations that were supposed to be rational bureaucracies. Selznick 1957) noted 
that to institutionalize is to infuse with value beyond the technical requirements 
of the task. Simon (1957) approached these matters from a critique of rational 
action which concluded that man could only be boundedly rational, that is with a 
very constrained space, that individuals had limited search capabilities and 
patience, and were more likely to avoid uncertainty than engage with it. (This 
finds an echo in the current global financial crisis where it appears that assess-
ment of risk was feeble.) Further, Simon noted that actions were infused with 
value systems, so organizations’ frames (bounds), rules and routines were pro-
duced such that any individual was an institutionalized individual and not an 
autonomous rational actor. Indeed, the rational actor like the organization could 
no longer be seen as a stimulus- response process but had to include an interpre-
tive (cognitive) process between stimulus and response. The new institutional 
theorists in economics were influenced by Coase (1937) and marked by William-
son’s (1975, 1981) attention to transactions that could explain the differing 
forms of economic collaboration: via market, hierarchy or by emerging hybrid 
forms of alliances, joint ventures and networks.
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 Underneath this shift in conception of institutions and organizations lay a 
substantial debate about both ontology and epistemology. Early theorists were 
more rooted in realism and positive functionalism. There was also a difference 
of view as to the role of the theorist, to provide historical descriptions and trace 
development or to seek to build more general explanations. The new or, to use 
Scott’s term, neo- institutionalists were to stress phenomenology (Silverman 
1971) and the social construction of reality (Berger and Luckman 1967). ‘Organ-
isations were not simply the product of increasing technical sophistication but 
also the result of the increasing rationalisation of cultural rules’ (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977; Scott 1995: 30).
 Scott’s own definition of institution (1995: 33) was as follows: ‘Institutions 
consist of cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are transported by 
various carriers – cultures, structures and routines – and they operate at multiple 
levels of jurisdiction.’ They are evident in the shaping and reshaping of organi-
zations; also the actors in organizations are shaping and reshaping institutions. 
Here is stability of a kind but it is a fluid, contestable and contested stability. 
And of course some organizations will be infused with collective values while 
others will be more individualistic. (I shall return to what I term the institutions 
of autonomy via a discussion of a change in the Church of England.) Scott con-
ceived of institutions as constructs or theories but not as observable or legal enti-
ties. He suggested that there were three pillars to his conception: values, 
cognitions and modes of regulation. Interestingly Scott argued that organiza-
tions, which are social and legal entities and are observable, are the places where 
institutional conceptions of values, cognitions and modes of order may be 
observed as shapers of organizational behaviour. But he also recognized that in 
organizations, values, cognitions and modes of order were not fixed, were con-
tested and were changing. But Scott’s conclusions are also of interest, since he 
claims that ‘organisations are creatures of their institutional environments but 
most modern organisations are constituted as active players, not passive pawns’ 
(1995: 132).
Organizations
Organizations (with varied legal forms) exist in the public, private and third 
sector of the society and economy. The boundaries of these organizations may 
also be within or transcend the borders of the states in which they have their 
legal home. Organizations take many forms, from bus companies to restaurants, 
from dance clubs to social services and from air forces to sailing clubs. Organi-
zations have been much studied, largely around themes of efficiency of struc-
tures and operation in relation to task complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty, 
and social, cultural and economic contexts.
 Organizations do differ in structural configuration. There is evidence that 
some organizational forms may be better suited to the tasks required in the 
context than others. We can note four kinds of organization. The machine 
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bureaucracy: excellent for routine work, the pursuit of efficiency, governed by 
hierarchy; these can be designed. The organism: good for turbulence and change; 
governed by internal/external dialogue; tend to emerge. Networks: good for han-
dling high- complexity, multiple and shifting connections internally and exter-
nally (not the same as autonomous persons in voluntary social networks); tend to 
be a mixture of negotiated design and emergence. Alliances: good for collabora-
tion and competition and for not reinventing wheels, for not incurring high costs 
of learning; need to be negotiated.
 The relation of the idea of organization to the idea of institutions has been a 
central question. It was observed earlier that neo- institutionalists consider that 
organizations are infused with institutional issues, values, beliefs and cognitions 
and modes of order. For example, it has been persuasively argued that from a 
study of Western and Asian arrangements for economic functioning (mostly 
banks and commercial corporations) organizational forms created for economic 
activity are more shaped by their institutional context than by the quest for 
efficiency.
 Amatai Etzioni (1964) added a characterization of organization around con-
ceptions of authority, in some sense derived from Weber (1947) but with a dif-
ferent slant. His three ideal forms were: normative (authority comes from the 
‘shared’ values; e.g. a church or charity; in some ways reminiscent of Weber’s 
charisma); instrumental (authority comes from the inducements offered and con-
tributions elicited, e.g. a car manufacturer, a retail shop, in some ways like 
Weber’s rational- legal form); and coercive (where authority is imposed by 
power, e.g. armies, prisons, in some ways like Weber’s traditional forms). Of 
course individuals can experience the same organization as being all three of 
these ideal types; there can be little more coercive experience than the ‘black-
mail’ to follow the norms as one group might define them, little more normative 
than the indoctrination into common values and little more instrumental than 
being told that you must go along with organizational or company ‘values’. In 
short all organizations are contestable and contested spaces. And all organiza-
tions are subject to external pressures and sometimes to external control. Public 
organizations are subject to Parliament and its agencies, so inevitably take on the 
form of rational bureaucracies, normative organizations such as churches and 
charities are subject to the requirements of law, and commercial organizations 
(instrumental) are subject to both law and to the behaviour of competitors.
Person and role in organization
One familiar concept which mediates the relationship between the person and 
the organization is that of role and, by extension, the coordination of roles which 
is sometimes referred to as organization structure and procedures. There are 
three (simple) conceptions of role: that which the organization via its organizing 
processes signals as the role to be performed (a job description); the role as inter-
preted by the individual appointed; and the role as other connected actors (both 
internally and externally) expect and come to expect the role to be performed. It 
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is apparent that in normative organizations individuals give greater preference to 
their own interpretation of role than they do to that of the organization or to that 
of others; in coercive organizations the organization preference dominates; in 
instrumental organizations there is a greater interplay of the three elements. But 
of course in all ‘real’ organizations there is space for small to substantial vari-
ation at least some of the time.
 Now these three conceptions of role lie at the heart of a variety of problems that 
persons experience in organizations. Role conflict occurs when the three concep-
tions are substantively different or when a superior insists on a role performance 
which is at variance with the organizations’ nominal definition. Of course such 
conflict is most marked around ethical issues. Role overload occurs when more is 
expected of a person than can normally be done in the expected time boundaries; 
underload is the opposite, leading to a sense of being undervalued; role complexity 
occurs during times of change and when other internal and external expectations 
multiply; role ambiguity occurs when the organizations’ expectation is out of date 
with the actual flow of work, or when the three conceptions produce ambiguous 
guides to action; role uncertainty occurs when the superior is unclear about prior-
ities. All these role issues may produce role stress. The match of personality to role 
may also be problematic, for should a person with high autonomy needs find 
herself in a tightly defined role or vice versa, then additional role stress occurs. 
However, this is not to assert that role stress necessarily contributes to illbeing; in 
fact persons have different capacities for coping with stress and some stress is 
beneficial in providing healthy stimulation for thought, understanding and action, 
but note that high levels of stress do exact consequences for wellbeing.
Some recent evidence of the contribution of organizations to 
happiness
There was a tradition in organizational studies of exploring how organizations 
might be both economically efficient and beneficial for human beings. This led 
to studies of explanations of reported job satisfaction and expanded into trans-
national research on the quality of working life, providing a further impetus to 
examining the effects of ‘culture’ and gender on human requirements for job 
satisfaction.
 Before considering happiness in organizations, let me first note some findings 
from a recent study of individual happiness. The Slough Studies (2005) of per-
sonal happiness (in the south of England) reported ten steps which individuals 
can make or take to attain a good level of happiness: plant something and nurture 
it, count your blessings every day (and find five of them to count), take time to 
talk to a friend for an hour a week, phone a friend and arrange to meet, give 
yourself a new treat every day, have a good laugh, exercise for half an hour three 
times a week, smile at a stranger, cut TV viewing by half and spread some kind-
ness. While these are outcomes from surveys they do include some aspects of 
basic needs and affiliation needs as well as the importance of reaching out in 
relationships. Of course, life events might well make these ideas appear some-
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what Panglossian, and they make no contact with basic needs for food, shelter 
and so on; nor the higher level needs of identity, of useful work, personal or col-
lective achievement and what Maslow (1968) called self- actualization. But the 
affiliation issues could be viewed as including some aspects of practical spiritu-
ality and placing others before and alongside oneself.
 In contrast to the personal focus of the Slough project the Ciumenta study 
(2007) was about workplace happiness. This study reported that some 80 per 
cent of employees are either very happy (0.25) or fairly happy (0.56) at work 
with about 20 per cent unhappy or very unhappy. Almost three- quarters of 
respondents cited relationships with colleagues as being a key factor in happi-
ness at work with lack of communication from the top as being the biggest cause 
of unhappiness. Senior staff were more likely to be happy than junior staff; 
public and third sector organizations had both the highest proportion of very 
happy people (0.26) and somewhat or very unhappy people (0.24). People in 
small organizations are slightly more likely to be happy than those in larger 
organizations (0.86 to 0.81); and the longer persons have been with an employer 
the less happy they become (by about 0.10); however, the younger (25 or less) 
and the older (55 or more) they were, the happier they were.
 The top ten factors that ‘made people happy at work’ were friendly, support-
ive colleagues, enjoyable work, good line manager, varied work, belief that we 
are doing something worthwhile, and what we do makes a difference, being part 
of a successful team, recognition of our achievements and competitive salary. As 
the great majority of people are happy at work, we may assume that institutions 
and organizations provide work and work roles that are meaningful and valued 
in the context of meeting basic monetary, affiliation and identity needs. Con-
versely the top ten factors that ‘make us unhappy at work’ were found to be lack 
of communication from the top, uncompetitive salary, no recognition of achieve-
ments, poor line manager, little personal development, ideas being ignored, lack 
of opportunity for good performance, lack of benefits, work not enjoyable, not 
feeling that I make a difference. In short these are almost the reverse of the hap-
piness factors; there was a lack of basic needs via money or recognition, a lack 
of affiliation needs and little sense of a valued identity. This creates a construc-
tive agenda for development for both organizations and individuals.
 However, it should be noted that 90 per cent of people agreed with the idea 
that happiness means being able to develop my full potential at work; and the 
same proportion agreed that happiness includes the sense that the organization 
values me and is committed to me as an employee. But in contrast to these 
affirming statements about organizations four- fifths of respondents agreed that 
they were happy at work as long as it does not intrude on personal life. Further, 
of the very happy people, some 80 per cent agreed that they needed to have a 
sense of autonomy in their job in order to be happy in it, a figure that rose to 90 
per cent for the very unhappy. A picture emerges of respondents who were able 
to make a reasonably clear distinction between the person and the person in role 
in an organization, and presumably adjusted their expectations and psychologi-
cal stance accordingly.
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 These observations fit with the idea that individuals place a value on work, 
working and the context of work which is of greater importance than the remu-
neration, provided it is seen as fair and equitable with others (Frey and Stutzer 
2000), or that as income rises above that required for meeting needs it becomes 
of less importance. The absence of work when desired or the loss of employment 
is a considerable contributor to unhappiness, as is significant change in organiza-
tions which disturbs the familiar institutional patterns. Interestingly these find-
ings have an echo in the Brown and Thornborrow (1996) studies of followers in 
organizations. From their study of three organizations they classified followers 
using a typology of different followers. These were:
1 Effective and exemplary: think for themselves, conduct work with energy, 
self- starters, problem solvers, rated highly by superiors.
2 Survivors: are organization fence sitters, go along with leaders and adapt to 
any new circumstance.
3 ‘Yes’ people: are not enterprising and are a little servile.
4 Sheep: are passive and unengaged, lack initiative and a sense of respons-
ibility, and just do what is asked of them.
5 Alienated: are independent in thinking but passive in their working, and 
perhaps become cynical and disgruntled.
From a questionnaire, Brown and Thornborrow were able to measure the follow-
ership stances of staff in three UK organizations in the sectors of finance, power 
and confectionery. Their findings surprisingly were similar in each organization: 
exemplary (0.15), alienated (0.15), the rest (0.70). In effect the critically intelli-
gent split into the exemplary and the alienated, with 70 per cent covering the 
rest. Perhaps one in six of the staff at any one time is ready for promotion, but 
this was a static picture. It is possible that staff become conditioned to a follower 
role but then get frustrated and leave to seek a more congenial workplace. The 
researchers sought to examine the preferences of leaders and followers about the 
leadership styles in use. Their findings were that, almost uniformly, organiza-
tions seem to discourage the exemplary followers. This might explain the high 
numbers of the alienated.
 Following a review of the rich literature on the work–health relationships, 
based upon considerations of the traits of healthy organizations, the character-
istics of high- performing work, and the organizational marks that give low- stress 
and healthy environments, Wilson et al. (2004) developed and tested a model of 
healthy work organizations. They defined the healthy organization as follows:
a healthy organization is one characterised by intentional, systematic and 
collaborative efforts to maximise employee well being and productivity by 
providing well designed and meaningful jobs, a supportive social- 
organizational environment and accessible and equitable opportunities for 
career and work- life enhancement.
(2004: 567)
Institutions, organizations and wellbeing  141
In this these authors pull together the results of many piecemeal studies. The 
model links organizational attributes, organizational climate, job design, job 
future, psychological work adjustment and characteristics of a healthy worker. 
(Research instruments were designed; psychological work adjustment were job 
satisfaction, organizational commitment, efficacy and job stress; the employee 
health and wellbeing indicators were perceived general health, psychological 
health, attendance, likelihood of leaving and engagement in health risk behav-
iours.) Data were collected from 1130 employees from nine stores in one US 
retail company. The analysis was rigorous, using structural equation modelling, 
and supported the model. While the authors acknowledge the limitations of 
employee perceptions as the basis of the data and of the cross- sectional and syn-
chronic nature of the study it does suggest that wellbeing can be a product of 
appropriate organizational design, the creation of appropriate climate, job design 
and job futures. Wellbeing (job satisfaction and happiness) is not just a local 
characteristic of individuals and their unique adjustment to their work demands 
and context.
 Most of these studies were conducted upon employees in general. The Char-
tered Management Institute in the UK has conducted annual surveys of manag-
ers’ reported quality of working life from 1997 (Worral et al. 2008). The 2008 
survey, including a direct comparison with Australian managers, showed some 
heightening of the reported concern with the detrimental effects of work pressure 
and longer hours. The survey included attention to leadership style (Australians 
were less authoritarian); positive job satisfaction (which declines with manage-
rial level from 80 per cent to 52 per cent for UK managers (86–64 for the Aus-
tralians); nature and effects of organizational change (where 9 per cent of UK 
and 20 per cent of Australian managers reported an improvement in wellbeing); 
workload (30 per cent worked longer than 48 hours per week) and its effects; 
experience of health symptoms; incidence of ill- health (about 30 per cent report 
stress, about 15 per cent report depression); sick leave and absenteeism (at four 
to five days per year which seems low compared to average UK figures of about 
ten days which appear in the UK press); organizational policies on health and 
wellbeing (where about 40 per cent of both samples reported good organiza-
tional coverage of these issues). As there was, understandably, no comparison 
with population data it is difficult to conclude that these observations are differ-
ent from the population and therefore solely related to managerial work, and 
they must be influenced by other life experiences. However, the substantial pro-
portion reporting the existence of organizational policies on wellbeing does 
suggest either a widespread concern with health and wellbeing and/or a wide-
spread desire to have organizations that sustain a good quality of working life 
with a good work/life balance for the managers.
 These four studies are rooted in positive realism and appear to produce social 
facts but without exploring how such social facts are constructed, either socially 
or personally. Nor do they pay much attention to the sometimes quite dreadful 
sorrows that we all experience from time to time. They are also apparently con-
ducted on an average population and thus miss most of the stages- of-life issues, 
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but with these quite substantial criticisms it does appear that there is good evid-
ence that life in organizations for most employees (but it is never clear about 
seniority) is conducive to (self- reported) happiness. However, it is true that the 
notion of happiness in these studies seems to be far removed from the concep-
tion that Plato ascribed to Socrates of happiness being a matter of contemplating 
the good or the sublime.
Darkness in the dynamics of organizations
Of course it would be a mistake to see the above studies as more than indicative 
of happiness in organizations, as organizations are open to considerable change, 
indeed usually must change in order to survive. And while these studies suggest 
many reasonably acceptable organizations, there are organizations where various 
tyrannies operate. Mischa Popper (2004) considered that it was important to try 
to understand extreme cases of dependence between leaders and followers such 
as the mass suicide of the followers of Jim Jones and the relations of a high 
moral quality such as Ghandi or Mandela provided. Mischa Popper suggested 
three kinds of leader- and-follower relationships: regressive relations, symbolic 
relations and developmental relations. To some extent Popper derived his three 
types of relationship from Weber’s distinction between authorities.
 Regressive relations are rooted in the psychological process of projection, an 
unconscious process. Here the leader is not a person but a construction of the fol-
lowers’ wishes and yearning, where the narcissistically deprived personality may 
seek compensation in the process of leadership and where the love and regard of 
the followers fills the otherwise unmet needs. Popper argues that as not everyone 
has the resources to lead, some people with narcissistic deprivation may become 
obsessive seekers of figures to ‘admire’, as ‘ideal hungry’ personalities. ‘The 
meeting of mirror hungry personalities with ideal hungry personalities may create 
a dynamic in which desires and fantasies feed the needs, perhaps pathological, of 
both parties.’ The argument of Mischa Popper is that regressive relations are not 
formed on ideas but are rooted in primary urges, anxieties and distress. This is not 
to claim that all charismatic relations are so pathological but that the concept of 
regressive relations does give an explanation of the interpenetration of followers 
and leaders (indeed deep collusion) that can lead to destructiveness. There are 
other examples of equally destructive deep collusions between leaders and fol-
lowers where various defences interlock such as projection and introjection, 
mutual denial of reality and joint scapegoating of another group.
 Duncan (2003) argued that if we can understand why people follow leaders of 
repressive social movements, we may be helped to find means of limiting their 
access to power and the damage they can do. The relations of leaders and fol-
lowers in some cults can be intense and sometimes overpowering. This may 
arise from a need of the followers to have certainty, a need which the leader only 
too readily supplies (Brothers 2003), through such processes as the denial of dif-
ference, the inflammation of passion and faith- keeping fantasies. This is indeed 
the dark side of charisma.
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 Symbolic relations grow out of content- based meanings, messages, ideologies 
and values which a leader either represents or is expected to represent. These can 
be deeply significant figures such as Jesus, transitory figures such as pop stars or 
political figures such as the liberation leader, Nelson Mandela. Of course these 
figures are only too available for projections to make them more unreal than real, 
larger than life. People need self- expression to protect and promote their self- 
esteem and self- worth, to preserve and increase self- consistency. By identifying 
with a symbolic leader, followers have a means of enhancing their self- worth. 
Not only is the follower–leader relationship of importance and value but so is 
the wide array of follower relations who can now share a greater sense of 
belonging and communal identity. Such leaders can create symbols for identifi-
cation, market them, and compete with other leaders for the social prizes of 
power, influence, adulation and wealth.
 Developmental relations are an idea based in good parenting (Popper and 
Mayseless 2003) where the development stages of childhood to adulthood are 
understood and nurtured. This appears in versions of transformational leadership 
where individual attention and inspiration are designed to build up followers’ 
capability, identity and autonomy. But developmental leaders also provide the 
space for followers to work by holding boundaries of meaning, of policy and of 
anxiety, thus giving sufficient security for the risky business of working. This is 
at both a conscious and an unconscious level. A developmental relationship may 
include the leader holding the projections of the followers (and those of others) 
without fighting them or colluding with them, but when and where appropriate 
inviting those others to take back their projections and move to a position of 
mature dependence.
 There is some evidence that difficult situations where identity and meaning 
are under threat are the very conditions that see the emergence of ‘strong’ 
leaders as a product of regressive relations. Schein (1992) has argued that sym-
bolic leaders are important actors in changes such as liberation or of national 
emergence where identity has to be established and nurtured. Churchill did this 
for the UK, and Lech Walensa did it for Poland after 1989. In both of these cases 
the ‘secret’ of their success was the relationship, not just their own leadership. 
The evidence for this is the abandonment of them by many followers when a 
new situation existed.
 The regressive relationship, as well as being an aspect of an institution of 
dependence, may also be an aspect of an institution of autonomy, where auton-
omy is the preferred and sought state of individuals or the state into which they 
are institutionalized. But it is possible that institutions of autonomy may have 
organizations that can enable individuals to seek a more mature dependent 
culture. However, it is arguable that academic organizations which give stress to 
individual performance, like any organization that does the same, will not 
develop mature dependence but may become locked in a regressive state. This 
will impact upon an individual’s happiness, probably becoming negative in rela-
tion to the organization and more positive in relation to member academic 
groups (i.e. a professional role) and personal worlds. In this way a somewhat 
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pathological work–life balance might be maintained. In the Church of England 
parish clergy are caught in an institutional tradition of autonomy, which many 
may resolve in a similar way, regressive and unhappy in organizational terms, 
happy in professional and personal terms.
Institutions and organizational fields
One of the key insights of the neo- institutionalists was the focus on the intercon-
nection of organizations both in an institutional sense and in organizational fields. 
The following brief consideration of a change process in the Church of England, 
although developed elsewhere (Berry 2006), represents something of the puzzle 
of happiness issues when the issues at stake are those of deeply help values and 
beliefs. At the risk of appearing trite it is important to note that the Church of 
England is not one organization, rather it is an institution which has emerged 
over many hundreds of years as a result of considerable conflicts in values, 
beliefs and modes of order. Its primary organizations include the Archbishops of 
Canterbury and York with their staffs and jurisdictions, the 44 Dioceses with 
Bishops and staff with statutorily established governance structures, and 14,000 
parishes with legal identity. In addition, there existed a Central Board of Finance, 
a Pensions Board, the Church Commissioners as holders of historic assets (one- 
third of the UK Cabinet were such commissioners) and the General Synod which 
governed the Church (with powers delegated from the Queen in Parliament) 
made up of Bishops, elected clergy and laity. The then Standing Committee of 
the General Synod might be viewed in a rough- and-ready way as the Church’s 
cabinet. The General Synod staff at Westminster numbered over 100 people with 
expertise in various aspects of church life. All this also stood beside church 
schools, theological colleges, university departments of theology, monastic 
orders, and an enormous range of organized interest groups, as well as other 
Christian and faith bodies. This was a pluralist and polyarchic organizational 
field, reflecting the turbulent manner in which the three institutional strands of 
Anglo- catholicism, evangelicalism and central liberalism had, over the centuries, 
accommodated to each other. It was also the product of considerable tension 
between the traditional and charismatic modes of authority of episcopacy and the 
rational democratic form of participative governance; the formula to hold this 
was to claim that the Church was episcopally led and synodically governed.
 In 1994 the two Archbishops commissioned a group, chaired by the then 
Bishop of Durham (Michael Turnbull), to consider the policy making and 
resource direction machinery of the national Church, a kind of fitness- for-
purpose brief. The membership of the commission consisted mainly of very 
senior men from the commercial and financial world largely drawn from the 
kinds of financial institutions which had been active in the processes of the 
demutualization of UK building societies and insurance societies, and of priva-
tizing UK utilities. They were also almost all from the evangelical wing of the 
Church, a wing that was steadily growing in power and influence in the institu-
tion. They described, with disparaging intent, the organizational field of the 
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Church’s central bodies as a cat’s cradle of autonomous and semi- autonomous 
bodies (in neo- institutional terms this was a rather good metaphor, as it sug-
gested multiple layered connections, some unobserved and probably unobserv-
able). The commission recommended in a report entitled Working as One Body 
(1995) a unitary solution where the central bodies be subsumed into a new 
legally separate body to be called the National Council, with the General Synod 
(described as merely reactive) continuing but with the removal of members’ 
rights to introduce legislation for church governance. This new Council was to 
have a membership appointed by the Archbishops together with a small minority 
element elected from the three sections of the General Synod. It had an execu-
tive focus, rooted in a kind of strategic choice theory. Of greater surprise was the 
fact that the recommendations were almost entirely structural and did not explore 
how strategic choice or policy was made or how it was to be made. Here we 
observe the migration of corporate commercial models of authority for strategic 
choice resting with those at the top as though they were the legitimate agents of 
the passive shareholders, working as a self- perpetuating oligarchy. This may 
have reflected a mode of order desired by some bishops and the then Archbishop 
of Canterbury. There was little sense of ‘democratic’ involvement, or in church 
language of any conciliar processes.
 The argument was offered that a new structure for policy and coherence 
would enable new vision. In one sense this was an insight into a new social con-
struction of meaning. But it was also a truncation of the analytic processes 
because the external world was as much ignored as the internal world of the 
Church as institution or as a field of organizations. This regression was a famil-
iar approach to turbulence and difficulty by pulling things together and hoping 
that integration would ensure effective adaptation or clearer pursuit of goals 
whatever the environment. The Turnbull Report ignored the way in which the 
institution, in subtle ways, created policy and strategy through its complex theol-
ogies, languages, ideas, values and beliefs acting in the organizational field.
 There was an analysis of goals for the clients who were the Archbishops of 
Canterbury and York but it bypassed the issues of norms and values (the variety 
of theological stances in the institution). Via its conclusions about power and 
mistrust, it did not attend to the issues of how the extant organizations worked, 
the connection of the normative, affective and dynamic processes within the 
wider institution to those in the organizations, and did not examine, with ade-
quate care, the issues of power and authority of the General Synod or of the gifts 
of the whole church, locating, as it did, leadership only in the ordained. It did 
consider the issue of accountability in the sense of a covenant or common fel-
lowship which should be based upon trust, but it rather created an autonomous 
and hence unaccountable National Council and appealed for acceptance on the 
basis of an impatience for change. Finally it did not discuss or deal with the 
issues or problems of implementation. The Turnbull Report and process gener-
ated a very considerable degree of unhappiness in many people in the organiza-
tions, especially in the members of the General Synod, and also in those parts of 
the Church which were antithetical to the evangelical project.
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 After some years of debate in and around the General Synod a new body, 
now called the ‘Archbishop’s Council’, was created, absorbing the Central 
Board of Finance, but with an elected majority and becoming effectively the suc-
cessor to the Synod Standing Committee. The Church Commissioners remained 
independent, as Parliament would not turn back the reformation of the sixteenth 
century. The General Synod retained its powers. This substantial defeat of the 
project for evangelical control via an autonomous ‘new head for the body’ was 
because the managerialist model of organization and control being infused into 
the Church of England sought a new monarchical form of governance and a 
return to traditional forms of episcopal control which ignored the evolution of 
the Church from those models to the loosely coupled, multiple organizational 
field which had emerged to contain (included in mutually evolved spaces) com-
peting theological (value and belief ) stances. The defeat was possible largely 
because the organizations had constitutional status within the state and so could 
not be altered without due process in Parliament, a due process that included 
some strong backstage representations and some very substantial confrontation 
with the proponents.
 Here the mode of order in the institutional and its organizational field had 
emerged as needing to be embedded in Acts of Parliament in order both to con-
strain power and the powerful and to maintain space for the differing values and 
beliefs. These constitutional modes of order were guarantees, not of happiness, 
but of an acknowledgement that it was acceptable to hold to different value posi-
tions and that there was institutional and organizational security. But it may be 
argued that a necessary and more constructive reconfiguring of the organiza-
tional field was hindered and evolution inhibited, issues went unexamined and 
problems were denied by the failure of a well- intended project which foundered 
through the search for power and control rather than a search for constructive 
processes of change. If that is correct then the general unhappiness may well 
increase, as the organizational field oscillates between regressive and symbolic 
relations. In its new state it does seem to be a neat example of Van de Ven’s 
interpretation of Commons: ‘institutions existing at a certain point in time repre-
sent nothing more than imperfect and pragmatic solutions to reconcile past con-
flicts’ (Scott 1995: 3).
 The material of this case does suggest that the capacity of multiple organiza-
tional fields to resist control being exercised from one point in them may have a 
wider application when considering the consequences of the shift from central-
ized to network forms of organization. Like Humpty- Dumpty they may never be 
put back together again, but in the field approach there is always the possibility 
of shifting to new and unpredictable forms. In the Church of England at the time 
of writing there is considerable conflict and unhappiness about issues of gender 
and sexuality. It is not clear how the new configuration will be or whether it will 
have an expanded organizational field as groups leave one and form others. What 
is the case is that happiness is disturbed by perceived threat and resolved by cre-
ating places of ‘happiness’ where happiness of the actors is a function of their 
ability to claim and have space for their values and beliefs.
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Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to relate some of the burgeoning literature on 
happiness to the experience of individuals in institutions and organizations, 
noting some current research, mostly in the positive realist tradition, on happi-
ness, the quality of working life and wellbeing in organizations. The focus 
moves, perhaps uneasily, between institutions and organizations, although I have 
followed the path of the neo- institutionalists as charted by Scott (1995). The 
exploration of the change process in the Church of England widened the scope 
to include institutions and organizational fields where happiness of the actors 
was a function of their ability to claim and have space for their values and beliefs 
and their preferred mode of order. It is the case that there needs to be more atten-
tion given to the role of institutions and organizations (public, private and third 
sector) in the development of wellbeing and human happiness. Further, as insti-
tutions and organizations are so central, it may not be a mistake to speak of insti-
tutional capital, acknowledging that such institutions are not stable and 
unchanging.
 The implication of this argument is to turn some of our approach to wellbeing 
and happiness away from individuals and primary relationships towards a 
broader framing of institutions and organizations as places where humans engage 
in collaborative activity, common (enough) purposes that are socially useful and 
ethically good (and dubious), and where on the evidence so far most humans are 
happy with their work and its environment.
11 Religion, family form and the 
question of happiness
Adrian Thatcher
There is much empirical evidence to support the hypotheses that children are 
more likely to thrive when brought up by their biological parents; and that mar-
riage produces greater happiness, not just for children, but for their parents, and 
for societies, than comparable family forms. In the first section, this evidence is 
analysed. In the second, the problematic character of happiness within Christian 
thought and practice is allowed to disrupt all appeals to it as a goal of human 
life. The third section identifies six prior issues which need to be resolved if the 
claim that Christian teaching about marriage and family form produces happi-
ness is to be vindicated. The fourth section contributes theologically to the dis-
cussion about what families are. The argument concludes that a form of Christian 
teaching about families is to be embraced primarily because of its intrinsic 
attractiveness, and only secondarily because empirical study currently supports 
its felicific consequences.
Happy families?
When, between 2002 and 2006 I wrote Theology and Families (Thatcher 2007),1 
I was obliged to take seriously a report by 13 renowned family scholars, pre-
pared for the Institute for American Values (IAV), Why Marriage Matters: 
Twenty- One Conclusions from the Social Sciences (IAV 2002: 1–28).2 (It has a 
British counterpart, Does Marriage Matter?)3 (CIVITAS n.d.). The report deals 
with four areas. With regard, first, to family relationships it concludes that ‘Mar-
riage increases the likelihood that fathers have good relationships with their chil-
dren;’ that ‘Cohabitation is not the functional equivalent of marriage;’4 and that 
‘Growing up outside an intact marriage increases the likelihood that children 
will themselves divorce or become unwed- parents.’ ‘Divorce is twice as likely 
among children whose parents have divorced’ (IAV 2002: 7–9). Second, with 
regard to family economics, the team concludes that ‘Divorce and unmarried 
childbearing increase poverty for both children and mothers’ (IAV 2002: 9–11). 
Third, with regard to physical health, the team concludes that ‘Children who live 
with their own two married parents enjoy better physical health, on average, than 
do children in other family forms’ and that ‘Parental marriage is associated with 
a sharply lower risk of infant mortality’, around 50 per cent in the case of 
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 children of unmarried mothers (IAV 2002: 11–14). Fourth, there are similar 
benefits with regard to the mental health and emotional wellbeing of members of 
intact families (IAV 2002: 15–16).5
 The conclusion is that lifelong marriage has huge benefits for children, 
parents and societies. There is, therefore, a particular family form that is more 
happiness- producing than comparable family forms. The conclusion also pro-
vides a strong and positive account of what, in relation to families, happiness is. 
It isn’t necessary to research the standard treatments of philosophical thought 
and language for an appropriate stipulative definition. The evidence is in every 
case comparative. Outcomes are measured against alternatives in all four areas, 
and happiness is the state that results from particular, prescribed family 
practices.
 This conclusion, of course, confirms standard Christian teaching. John Witte 
calls this ‘the health paradigm of marriage’ which, he says, is ‘both very new 
and very old’ (2002: 86); new because it is validated by empirical secular 
research, old because ‘the West has had a long and thick overlapping consensus 
that marriage is good, does good, and has goods both for the couple and for the 
children’ (2002: 88). It is now being claimed, on empirical grounds, that mar-
riage is more likely to be better than alternatives to marriage, both for spouses 
and for children. Marriage need no longer be favoured on grounds of social con-
vention, religious teaching or ideological proclamation alone. It may be shown 
independently to provide positive benefits for couples, and especially for their 
children, irrespective of faith or political commitments. Our concern is not 
whether these findings are reliable (though I think they are).6 Practical theolo-
gians must be attentive to the social scientists but have no wish to adjudicate 
their competing claims. (In any case, theologians have their own procedures for 
dealing with empirical reality (Graham et al: 2005), and for interacting with the 
social sciences (Gill 1996).) The question is, rather, assuming the truth of the 
report: What does that tell us about the contribution of religion to familial happi-
ness? Conversely, is the neglect of religious teachings about marriage and famil-
ies a source of misery?
Happiness as a problem for theological thought
Serious problems, axiological and aetiological, cloud any attempt to calculate 
the influence or impact of any set of beliefs upon actions or behaviour. But for 
religious people, not just Christians, the greater problem is how, or even 
whether, happiness finds its way into the practice of discipleship. Of course hap-
piness is a human value, central to human flourishing. Cicero assumed beati 
certe omnes esse volumus (‘Obviously everyone wants to be happy.’).7 But that 
is Roman thought. The Christian tradition, following Augustine, is deeply wary 
of happiness, requiring instead renunciation. Virtue and felicity, taught Augus-
tine, are not credible deities in the Roman pantheon: rather, ‘they are gifts of the 
true God’, and their connectedness to each other and to God is demonstrated by 
Augustine’s rhetorical question:
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Furthermore, where there is virtue and felicity, what need is there to seek 
anything else? If men are not satisfied with these, what will suffice them? 
For surely, virtue includes all that ought to be done, felicity all that ought to 
be desired.
(1984: 159)
Augustine inveighed against the elevation of happiness over other values and its 
separation from ‘true religion’ (1984: 163). Rather, self- denial is a requirement 
of any Christian disciple.
 There is little doubt that a similar polemic against the elevation of happiness, 
and its separation from virtue and from God in late modern societies, can derive 
much from Augustine’s analyses. The word does not appear in the King James 
version of the Bible. Contemporary theologians are increasingly suspicious of 
what is variously called The Enlightenment, the enlightenment project, moder-
nity, and so on. The pursuit of happiness is embedded in it. Happiness is, and 
has to be, measurable. The felicific calculus provided a means (Bentham 1789: 
ch. 4). When John Stuart Mill announced the Greatest Happiness Principle, he 
deliberately called it a ‘creed’, a ‘theory of life’ which renders superfluous 
without further argument any morality based on religious or theological principle 
(1861: ch. 2).
 For Christians, happiness is emphatically not the goal of life; nor is their 
account of right and wrong determined by the fallible calculation of felicific con-
sequences. The meaning of life is rather to be found in the love of God, of one’s 
neighbour, of one’s self, and even of one’s enemy. Theology shares with many 
social critics a deep misgiving about the value accorded to happiness. Philip 
Rieff warned, in 1966, that whole capitalist societies were even then being 
organized as therapeutic cultures, that is, as places where ‘a sense of well- being 
has become the end, rather than a by- product of striving after some superior 
communal end’ (Rieff 1966: 261). Richard Stivers warns that ‘when religion is 
associated with happiness it is reduced to the status of a means to the end of hap-
piness’ (1994: 64). He accuses liberal Protestantism of having achieved this 
transformation by ‘inverting New Testament teachings about the suffering and 
rejection that a witness to Christ would necessarily encounter’. Alasdair MacIn-
tyre famously and trenchantly showed why happiness ‘is indeed a pseudo- 
concept available for a variety of ideological uses, but no more than that’. All 
contributors to this present project may need to heed his warning that ‘the use of 
a conceptual fiction in a good cause does not make it any less of a fiction’ (1981: 
62). Terry Eagleton locates the pursuit of happiness within the movement away 
from objective morality to subjective preference, and presses the epistemological 
question how we know we are happy when we think we are, warning ‘You can 
. . . be mistaken about whether you are flourishing, and someone else may be 
more wisely perceptive about the matter than you yourself. This is one important 
sense in which morality is objective’ (2003: 129). And so on. One might wonder 
why, given the avalanche of literally hundreds of stolid criticisms of happiness 
such as these, it refuses to be buried.
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 So how does religion and theology cope with this dilemma? The ‘happiness 
literature’ is, of course, its own testimony to its usefulness. Happiness is now a 
‘new science’ (Layard 2005). Layard believes that ‘Many arguments have been 
brought against this philosophy, but none of them stand up’ (2005: 225). Like Mill 
before him, there are no transcendent sources of happiness worth looking for. Reli-
gious instrumentalities may offer some possible help – ‘there is a range of spiritual 
practices that help to bring peace of mind, from Buddhist meditation to positive 
psychology’ (2005: 230). Are religious people supposed to connive with their own 
marginalization? All this is enough to alienate much of the theological constitu-
ency. Yet the new science of happiness is very family- and child- centred. Layard 
is also the co- author of A Good Childhood, a report in the United Kingdom for 
The Children’s Society, a former Church of England charity. Children, the report 
says, most want and need love and respect (Layard and Dunn 2009: 151), while:
The greatest responsibility is on parents. The most important act which two 
people ever perform is to bring another being into the world. This is an 
awesome responsibility and, when they have a child, the parents should have 
a long- term commitment to each other as well as to the welfare of the child.
(2009: 155)
But now for a volte- face! While it might be argued that religious people have 
different religious values which may be preferred to happiness (just as they have 
different accounts of the human being which may be preferred to the language of 
human rights), there are several good reasons for not accentuating the differ-
ences between Christian and ‘secular’ ethics, the strongest of which has been 
magisterially put by Charles Taylor in A Secular Age: ‘the general understanding 
of the human predicament before modernity placed us in an order where we were 
not at the top’ (2007: 18). Nowadays ‘secularity is a condition in which our 
experience of and search for fullness occurs’. Prior to secularization believers 
were ‘called on . . . to detach themselves from their own flourishing’. Nowadays 
‘new conditions of belief ’ exist. Within them, Taylor believes, there remains ‘the 
sense that there is some good higher than, beyond human flourishing’. Christians 
can still ‘think of this as agape, the love which God has for us, and which we can 
partake of through his power’ (Taylor 2007: 18–19).
 These considerations are crucial to any religious or theological evaluation of 
family forms. The dilemma is this: Should Christians pursue what they take to 
be the will of God whether or not it leads to human flourishing? Or should they 
pursue human flourishing because they take it to be the will of God? The 
dilemma is noticeably similar to that stated by Plato in the dialogue Euthyphro.8 
In relation to family form, the first position takes God’s will to be understood 
independently of any calculation of happiness. God makes God’s will known in, 
for instance, the Bible and tradition, in divine commands, the teachings of 
the Church about marriage as a sacrament or holy ordinance; about the evils of 
pre- marital sex, cohabitation, homosexuality, adultery, divorce, and so on. 
Human lives must accommodate themselves to God’s revealed will, whatever 
152  A. Thatcher
the foreseen or unforeseen consequences. But the second position poses no 
necessary disjunction between God’s will and human flourishing, since human 
flourishing is what God wills. But if that is what God wills, how independent can 
humans be in pursuing what they take their flourishing to be?
Whether empirical results validate religious truth claims
There is then a ‘health paradigm’ of marriage. Marriage is generally good for 
everyone; this remarkable result is empirically verified; the churches are entitled 
to feel pleased (and perhaps vindicated?) that their teachings about marriage and 
families have social- scientific confirmation. This is a seductive combination of 
religion and social science; but does it withstand scrutiny? Perhaps, but first it 
needs to survive several types of objection.
 First, Christians have been slow to endorse the emerging style of companion-
ate, personalistic, romantic and egalitarian marriage. This phenomenon embeds 
itself in the second half of the twentieth century. The Reformation may have 
given marriage a new respect, yet as historian Stephanie Coontz remarks (about 
the marriage vows in the 1662 Prayer Book Solemnization of Matrimony):
The wife was legally required to worship her husband with her body. He 
could force sex upon her, beat her, and imprison her in the family home, 
while it was she who endowed him with all her worldly goods. The minute 
he placed that ring upon her finger he controlled any land she brought to the 
marriage and he owned outright all her movable property as well as any 
income she later earned. Prior to the late eighteenth century, few voices 
challenged these inequities.
(2005: 142)
Marriage is undoubtedly a developing tradition in itself (the argument whether 
same- sex couples may benefit from it is obvious confirmation of its evolving 
nature). But any general endorsement of marriage requires attention to which 
particular temporal and cultural version of it is endorsed.
 Second, appeals to traditional marriage, or to traditional teaching about it 
generally, pretend to ignorance regarding the marital dynamics of power and 
gender within that ancient institution. The New Testament locus classicus for 
marital theology is Ephesians 5: 21–33. Three times that author innovatively 
enjoins husbands to love their wives. The uxorial role however is not a mutual 
one. Three times wives are to submit themselves to their husbands (at v. 24 ‘in 
everything’). The doctrine of male ‘headship’9 (based in part on this passage) 
remains established in contemporary conservative evangelicalism and funda-
mentalism, where euphuistic talk of male ‘servant leadership’ of families may 
sometimes be an oxymoron disguising more overt assertions of dominance.
 Third, the possibility of exit from marriage is almost a necessary precondition 
for marrying couples today. Who wants to remain married to a monster? This 
too is primarily an issue of power. While it is banally obvious that divorcing 
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couples provide evidence that some marriages are unhappy, it is less obvious 
(but still certain) that the provision of easy marital escape- routes has altered the 
institution of marriage fundamentally. Marriage is still ‘till death us do part’ 
except that it now isn’t: spouses may part without attributing fault at all. The 
promissory character of the wedding vows has now become aspirational only. 
But the churches’ teachings about these matters – separation, divorce, annul-
ment, further marriage – have undergone evolution even while interchurch disa-
greements have remained sharp. Both ‘indissolubilists’ and ‘dissolubilists’ can 
appeal to a Happiness Principle (should they want to). The former can argue that 
a permanent union provides the best context for conflicts to be resolved;10 the 
latter that an indissoluble marriage may function coercively and may threaten 
personal freedom and safety.
 Fourth, there are internal inconsistencies in the religious commendation of mar-
riage. Is it primarily a defence against fornication (‘better to marry than to burn’ – 
1 Cor. 7:9), or can we do better? Is it a sacrament or not? Is celibacy better or not? 
Do the Gospels commend it or not?11 Is procreation a requirement or not?12 Do the 
churches smother alternatives to marriage by a gross overemphasis on it? Eliza-
beth Stuart speaks of a sad development within Western Christianity – ‘the col-
lapse of Christian discipleship into heterosexual marriage. . . . In public discourse 
on sexuality the Western churches currently give every impression of wanting to 
produce heterosexual desire rather than desire for God’ (Stuart 2007: 70–71).
 Fifth, the Church’s beliefs about the permanence of marriage do not seem to 
be very effective in holding the marriages of Christian believers together. While 
it is true that rates of marital dissolution can be lower among couples where both 
attend church regularly (Wuthnow 2005: 88), it is also true that ‘During the 
1970s, when most observers believe the family was weakened by rising divorce 
rates, religious involvement in the United States held steady’ (Wuthnow 2005: 
89). A study of over 500 couples showed that ‘increases in religious involvement 
only slightly decreased the probability of the couples considering divorce, and 
neither enhanced marital happiness nor decreased marital conflict’ (Booth et al. 
1995).13 Since the influence of beliefs on behaviour is in any case problematic, 
little should perhaps be made of the evident lack of causality between religious 
beliefs in the permanence of marriage, and the actual durability of marriage 
among believers. Equally little can be gauged of the reconciling impact of reli-
gious belief on troubled couples.
 And sixth, there is a prima facie case based squarely on the teaching of Jesus 
that the Kingdom or Reign of God is to be valued far beyond kin, so the Christian 
endorsement of any particular family form requires ingenuity. (The crucial pas-
sages in the Gospels are Mk. 3: 31–35; Lk. 8: 20–21, 11: 27–28 and 18: 28–30.)
Jesus said to them, ‘Truly I tell you: there is no one who has given up home, 
or wife, brothers, parents, or children, for the sake of the kingdom of God, 
who will not be repaid many times over in this age, and in the age to come 
eternal life’.
(Lk. 18: 29–30)
154  A. Thatcher
It could hardly be clearer that Christian discipleship is at odds with comfortable 
family life: rather, renunciation of family ties is a requirement that brings its 
ample rewards both in this life and the next. Sacrifice, not fulfilment, is the 
expectation of the followers of Jesus. It is arguable that, by a combination of 
natural law and kin altruism, ‘the Reign or Kingdom of God can be located 
within families as well as far beyond them’ (Thatcher 2007: 66–71). But that 
takes argument. It is far from obvious that relations of kin are, or ought to be, 
means of happiness. Indeed, the Gospels assume the contrary.
A theological framework for families
Limited space here requires a selection of just two considerations from many 
that could be put forward. First, the flourishing of children is one of the clearest, 
unmistakable imperatives of the teaching of Jesus in the Gospels. (The key pas-
sages are Mt. 18: 1–6, 19: 13–15, 21: 14–16; Mk. 9: 36–37, 10: 13–16; Lk. 18: 
15–17.)14 Jesus Christ had an intense love of children. He identified completely 
with them, especially with their vulnerability, and held them as an example for 
adults to follow. An effective theological endorsement of particular family forms 
may be made by an appeal to the teaching of Jesus about children (and that is 
very different from any attempt to find nuclear families in early Genesis or in the 
Household Codes of the New Testament). But there are good reasons for believ-
ing that the evidence about the flourishing of children (see above, pp. 148–149) 
is compelling. What remains to be done is to link the teaching of Jesus about 
children with the ‘health paradigm’ of marriage. A simple theological argument 
is avail able which consists of two uncluttered premises and a simple conclusion. 
It goes like this:
Premise 1 Jesus Christ wills the flourishing of all children.
Premise 2 Children are more likely to flourish within marriage.
Therefore: Jesus Christ wills marriage for bringing up children.
(Thatcher 2007: 127)
A second powerful consideration derives from what almost all Christians believe 
about God. God is a Trinity, a Network of Relations, or as Pope John Paul II 
taught, a Communion of Persons (1981: section 11; 1994: section 7; Catechism 
1994: section 2205), or communio personarum. God is also love (1 Jn. 4: 8, 17), 
and ubi caritas, deus ibi est. Christian families are invited to see themselves also 
as communions of human persons, and the relations between members as par-
tially analogous to the relations between the Persons who are God. Indeed, since 
human love within Christianity is always touched by divine love there is at least 
the possibility of an analogy of participation between human families and the 
divine Persons of the Trinity. (Such an analogy need not be confined, of course, 
to families.) Such analogies assume an ever- widening ‘circle of love’ which 
reaches out beyond their centres or nuclei.15 Mystical traditions within Christian-
ity speak unashamedly of participation in the life of God. This is no less true for 
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families than it is for monks or hermits. That promise for families is seductively 
attractive. It represents an irresistible summons, one in the face of which the cal-
culation of consequences is rendered irrelevant.
Conclusion
In the first section the truth of the claim that children are more likely to thrive 
when brought up by their biological parents was assumed. The second section 
problematized the pursuit of happiness as a theological goal, while the third 
further problematized ‘the health paradigm of marriage’. These problems, 
however, do not vitiate efficacious interaction between particular religious 
beliefs about marriage and families, and particular desirable outcomes for 
parents, children and society. If societies in which Christians are present choose 
to formulate desirable social outcomes, including outcomes for families by 
means of an overarching term that is a ‘pseudo- concept’ or a ‘conceptual fiction’, 
it does not follow that theology should be absent from the party. There is a 
Christian vision regarding the thriving of children in the reign of God, and a 
vision for families in the life of God. These may be embraced because they are 
attractive. They constitute in part what Christian traditions teach about God and 
God’s reign. We should not be surprised, of course, if what God wills turns out 
to have happiness- producing consequences, since our happiness (insofar as we 
can agree what we are talking about) is what God wills. And that of course is to 
resolve the Euthyphro dilemma in a particular way. In fact it does not resolve it 
but rather, as Wittgenstein might have said, it ‘dissolves’ it. Yes, our happiness 
is what God wills. However, in seeking to discern what the will of God might 
be, any complacent identification of human flourishing with God’s will, or 
accommodation of the divine purpose to purely human and potentially selfish 
ends, is avoided. Rather, the promotion of the wellbeing of children, and so of 
the familial and social support they require, is a priority, and evidence, of God’s 
reign. God’s invitation to share in the divine love is extended also to families. 
The response to that invitation is able to be based on its sheer attractiveness, and 
not because someone authoritative can pronounce it to be a matter of prudent 
social policy.
Notes
 1 See also Almond (2006).
 2 Its authors are a team of eight male and five female American family scholars, chaired 
by Norval Glenn. There is a voluminous supporting literature detailing the research 
which must be consulted through the copious endnotes provided. It covers much of 
the ground already traversed in Waite and Gallagher (2000).
 3 Rebecca O’Neill, who prepared the text, acknowledges that the work is ‘inspired’ by 
Why Marriage Matters, and which has been used as a ‘model’ for its production. In 
fact long sections of text of the American version appear without further acknowl-
edgement in the British work.
 4 For a lengthy review of evidence about cohabitation see Thatcher (2002).
 5 Children of divorce have higher rates of psychological distress and mental illness, and 
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suicide. Divorce can contribute to crime and domestic violence: ‘Boys raised in 
single- parent homes are about twice as likely (and boys raised in stepfamilies are 
three times as likely) to have committed a crime that leads to incarceration by the time 
they reach their early thirties.’ They also associate marriage with ‘reduced rates of 
alcohol and substance abuse for both adults and teens’, and with ‘better health and 
lower rates of injury, illness, and disability for both men and women’. Married people 
live longer than single people. Families where parents stay married provide a safer 
environment for men, women and children. Adults are less likely to be ‘either perpe-
trators or victims of crime’, and ‘Married women appear to have a lower risk of expe-
riencing domestic violence than do cohabiting or dating women’. ‘A child who is not 
living with his or her own two married parents is at greater risk of child abuse’ (IAV 
2002: 16–17).
 6 On the problems of political correctness, and of ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ inter-
pretations of the data, see Thatcher (2007: 130–132).
 7 A sentence from Cicero’s lost Hortensius which stirred Augustine to philosophical 
endeavours. See O’Donovan (2008: 5).
 8 See Euthyphro, 10a, where Socrates asks: ‘The point which I should first wish to 
understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or 
holy because it is beloved of the gods.’
 9 See the arguments in e.g. Blankenhorn et al. (2004).
10 See Rowan Williams’ perceptive comment (2002: 315) about marital fidelity: ‘sexual 
faithfulness is not an avoidance of risk, but the creation of a context in which grace 
can abound because there is a commitment not to run away from the perception of 
another.’
11 Not according to Lk. 20: 34–36, strangely absent from most theological treatises on 
marriage!
12 For an analysis of the growing phenomenon of ‘chosen childlessness’ within mar-
riage, see Thatcher (2007: 217–230).
13 Summarized by Wuthnow (2005: 89).
14 For a fine exegesis of these sayings see Gundry- Volf (2001: 29–60). See also Thatcher 
(2007: 57–63).
15 An emphasis of David Matzko McCarthy (2001).
12 Mental health, spirituality and 
religion
Peter Gilbert
Introduction
We might expect that ‘the ascent of humankind’ would include rising material 
prosperity in most parts of the globe and a move away from mere survival 
 everywhere. Along with this would surely go a greater sense of mental wellbe-
ing and self- actualization, as we move up Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (Maslow 
1968). In fact, however, rates of mental illness have risen in the ‘developed’ 
world at a significant rate, and perhaps the most worrying aspects are the declin-
ing mental health and wellbeing of children (Alexander 2007; Layard and Dunn 
2009), and the effect of growing levels of inequality (Friedli 2009).
 In workshops run for service users and staff under the National Institute for 
Mental Health in England’s (NIMHE) Spirituality and Mental Health Project, 
conversations tend to return again and again to questions about what makes life 
worth living. Sometimes these are within a religious framework: ‘My spiritual-
ity, my whole life is Islam’ (participant in a Bradford Care Trust workshop, 
autumn 2007). At other times they may come from a religious or secular culture 
and a deeply personal spirituality: ‘My loss (the sudden death of her husband 
early in their marriage) has made me stronger, and this inner strength is my spirit 
and my whole way of being’ (Hulme in Gilbert 2008; Hay 2006).
 Governments have a duty to provide a framework for the security and develop-
ment of their citizens, but this will always be tempered by philosophical ideas (e.g. 
utilitarianism; threats from war or terrorism; and economic considerations). At the 
time of the Boer War the poor performance of city- dwelling troops in the South 
African countryside led to calls for greater attention to the physical capability of 
British citizens. Today it is the intellectual capacity and mental strength and well-
being of citizens in a competitive global knowledge economy that is crucial.
 The World Health Organization (WHO) puts it thus:
Mental- Health and mental well- being are fundamental to the quality of life 
and productivity of individuals, families, communities and nations, in ena-
bling people to experience life in a meaningful way and to be creative and 
active citizens.
(WHO Declaration 2005, in Friedli and Parsonage 2007: 1)
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We know that mental illness, or extreme sadness following trauma, can cause a 
marked withdrawal from society and a loss of societal and economic activity. At 
one end of the scale, Dr Lewis Wolpert, in his searing Malignant Sadness writes, 
‘if we had a soul – and as a hardline materialist I do not believe we do – a useful 
metaphor for depression could be “soul loss” due to extreme sadness’ (Wolpert 
2006: 3).
 In a complex national society, and at a time of extreme international eco-
nomic competition, the need to retain a mentally healthy workforce is 
paramount.
Mental ill- health and spoiled identity
Identity is one of the big issues of the twenty- first century (Bauman 2004; Spalek 
2007; Taylor 2007). In fact Zygmunt Bauman says that today ‘ “Identity” is the 
loudest talk in town’ (Bauman 2004: 17) and ‘our longing for identity comes 
from the desire for security, itself an ambiguous feeling’ (29). It was Erving 
Goffman who wrote about stigma being a form of ‘spoiled identity’. Goffman 
goes on to say that:
an individual who might have been received easily in ordinary social inter-
course possesses a trait that can obtrude itself upon attention and turn those 
of us whom he meets away from him, breaking the claim that his other 
attributes have on us. He possesses a stigma, an undecided differentness 
from what we had anticipated.
(Goffman 1963/1990: 15; Thorneycroft 2006)
I can identify personally with this, having experienced a depressive illness in 
2000/2001 which created a sense of disconnection with other people, the tran-
scendent, society and myself (Gilbert et al. 2008); it certainly felt like Wolpert’s 
description of ‘soul loss’. In a very consumerist society, with identity being con-
structed on a constant basis (Bauman 2007) I felt that I was ‘shop- soiled’ goods, 
and would have difficulty reconnecting with a number of worlds, including that 
of employment. Fortunately I was able to fall back on some support systems, 
which in a technical sense might be described as a bio- psycho-social- spiritual 
model, and, in more prosaic terms, as an excellent GP, who prescribed the right 
medication at the right time; a place of spiritual asylum (the Benedictine Abbey 
of Worth); friendships; the support of my running club Black Pear Joggers, who 
provided me with a sense of community (Coyte et al. 2007: ch. 10); and col-
leagues who valued me enough to invite me to come and work for them. Guard-
ian columnist and survivor, Clare Allan, neatly sets out the dilemmas of 
diagnosis and identity:
I’m not suggesting for a second that mental illness is not a reality. Anyone 
who scratched all night in a corner, voices rebounding off walls around 
them . . . will attest to the reality of their experience. What I’m saying is that 
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human experience – because that’s what it is, nothing more, nothing less – 
can never be filed under neat diagnostic labels. And while diagnoses may 
serve some sort of purpose in helping doctors to group symptoms together 
and decide on a course of treatment, they can all too easily become a 
replacement for genuine understanding”.
(Allan 2006)
In terms of mental health, then, a move from modern to postmodern forms of 
identity has both advantages and disadvantages. For a number of people their 
identity can be remade, sometimes strengthened following an episode of mental 
illness or mental distress. They are able to remake their identity around their 
experience and their inner spirit, but as Allan makes clear, this is a complex 
matter where labelling can be both validating and demeaning. As Bracken and 
Thomas point out in their Postpsychiatry (2005), modernity often produced sti-
fling metanarratives which drowned out the telling of a personal story. For many 
people, what Bauman calls Liquid Modernity leaves them as what he has 
described as ‘the floating and drifting self ’ (Bauman 1997: 21).
 Mental illness, madness, lunacy, however historical eras have described the 
phenomenon, has always been a sign of contradiction: from the medieval Chris-
tian monasteries and Muslim maristans; through the nineteenth- century asylums, 
which morphed into massive institutions; to the modern discourse about what 
kind of care and in what community (Gilbert 2003; NIMHE 2003; Rogers and 
Pilgrim 2005).
Recent mental health policy
The year 1998 saw the publication of a government White Paper, Modernising 
Mental Health Services, and the following year, in September 1999 witnessed 
the publication of the first government National Service Framework, that for 
mental health (DoH 1999).
 During the past nine years, mental health has been classed as one of the gov-
ernment’s three main health priorities: Professor Louis Appleby was appointed 
as the National Director for Mental Health; Professor Antony Sheehan set up the 
National Institute for Mental Health In England (NIMHE) in 2002; investment 
was increased by over £1.5 billion; and a new series of teams, to assist people in 
the community, were set up.
 The NIMHE’s role (NIMHE 2003) was to connect local implementation, 
regional strategy (including close links with local government and voluntary 
organizations) and national policy and strategy so as to create a unified develop-
mental approach.
 Work has been undertaken on a number of issues: the creation of new com-
munity teams to provide early intervention and support at home, especially in 
crisis situations (praised by the WHO in its 2008 overview of European Com-
munity services), social inclusion, workforce planning, stigma, acute care, user 
and carer initiatives, research, suicide, developing race equality and others.
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 With issues around spirituality and faith becoming ever more prevalent, a 
specific spirituality project was set up in September 2001.
The demography of mental health
Several works have recently brought together the demographics and the costs of 
mental ill- health. Some of the relevant texts are Rankin (2005), the Sainsbury 
Centre for Mental Health (2003), and the Mental Health Foundation (2007). In 
business there is usually an attempt to do a cost- benefit analysis of what are the 
pros and cons, the costs and the benefits of various business strategy options; in 
national policy, however, the picture is often opaque. It is perhaps significant 
that it is an economist, Lord Layard, who has questioned whether the country 
can afford to continue with rising levels of mental ill- health.
 Saba Moussavi et al.’s major survey for the World Health Organization 
(Moussavi et al. 2007) found that after adjustment for socio- economic factors 
and health conditions, depression had the largest effect on worsening mean 
health scores compared with other chronic conditions. Consistently across coun-
tries and different demographic characteristics, respondents with depression, 
comorbid with one or more chronic diseases, had the worst health scores of all 
the disease states.
 Depression produces the greatest decrement in health compared with the 
chronic diseases angina, arthritis, asthma and diabetes, and the comorbid state of 
depression incrementally worsens health compared with depression alone. The 
authors conclude that ‘these results indicate the urgency of addressing depres-
sion as a public- health priority to reduce disease burden and disability, and to 
improve the overall health of populations’.
 In 2002 it was estimated that around one- third of GPs’ time was taken up 
by mental health problems. As many as 1.5 million people were caring for rel-
atives with mental health problems. In 2003 the Sainsbury Centre for Mental 
Health set the annual cost of mental illness at £77.4 billion, while in 2006 over 
£600 million was spent on medication (£401 million on antidepressants and 
£209 million for psychosis and related disorders). It is estimated that about 10 
per cent of children have mental health problems at any one time (Mental 
Health Foundation 2006). In the prison service 70 per cent of the prison popu-
lation have two or more diagnosed mental illnesses (Edgar and Mickford 
2009). The recent WHO Europe survey (Friedli 2009) argues that current 
levels of economic inequality are damaging to the mental health of the popula-
tion. Inevitably more targeted research is required to consider the mental 
health of specific groups of people.
Drivers towards spiritual care in today’s health and social 
care environment
There are a number of strong drivers towards embedding a strong ethos of spirit-
ual care in today’s health and social care services.
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 The first driver is a desire by service users and carers to, in the words of the 
Somerset Spirituality Project, ‘be taken seriously’ (Mental Health Foundation 
2002) an impetus linked to the Recovery Movement; a dissatisfaction with a 
consumerist society, which we have seen in the first part of this chapter; and a 
greater complexity of belief systems in the UK. People who use services are 
making clear that they wish to be responded to as people. Interestingly, the 
National Census of In- Patients in Mental Health Hospitals, carried out by the 
Commission for Health Inspection, the NIMHE and the Mental Health Act Com-
mission (CHAI 2005), found a surprisingly high percentage of religious affili-
ation, even if this does not equate with religious belief. Professor Kamlesh Patel, 
as Chair of the Mental Health Act Commission, in launching the results of the 
survey, stated that:
If you don’t know who I am, how are you going to provide a package of 
care for me to deliver something? When you do not know how important 
my religion is to me, what language I speak, where I am coming from, how 
are you going to help me cope with my mental illness? And that is what I 
am trying to get over to people; the first step is about identity. It is abso-
lutely fundamental to the package of care we offer an individual.
(Mulholland 2005: 5, emphasis added)
The second main driver is legislation and policy. The 1998 Human Rights Act 
(introduced in 2000) defined the right of the individual to religious observance 
as:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practise and observance.
(Article 9: Freedom of thought, conscience or religion)
Subsequent legislation around the Employment Equality (religion and belief ) 
Regulations of 2003, and the Equality Act (2006), bring matters of religion and 
belief centre- stage in the legislative process, within the framework of a demo-
cratic, secular society.
 National policy, both generally and within the specific remit of mental health, 
also brings spirituality, in its widest sense, into prominence. The Patients 
Charter assures us that our religious, spiritual and cultural needs will be attended 
to by NHS staff.
 In a more general sense, the White Paper on health and social care, Our 
Health, Our Care, Our Say, set a new direction for community services (DoH 
2006a); the 2007 Commissioning Framework for Health and Well- Being (DoH 
2007), and the Commission on Integration and Cohesion’s Report Our Shared 
Future (CIC 2007), all point in the direction of increased choice and control for 
people who use services within a socially cohesive society. These drivers are 
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reinforced by the approach to service reviews by the Healthcare Commission 
who place a strong emphasis on ‘care appropriate to individual needs’ (HC 
2007: 5).
 A third driver is around the diversity of ethnicity and belief systems now 
evident in the United Kingdom. We have a number of spheres of identity: our 
ethnicity; belief systems; immediate and extended family; communities of 
meaning; profession and employment; friendship networks, and so on. These 
usually enhance rather than undermine civil society.
 Recent research carried out by the Mercia Group of researchers, based mainly 
at the University of Warwick (Beckford et al. 2006: 11) for the Department of 
Communities and Local Government, found that:
Over the last 50 years, the discourse in Britain about ‘racialised minorities’ 
has mutated from ‘colour’ in the 1950’s and 1960’s . . . to ‘race’ in the 
1960’s, 70’s and 80’s . . . to ‘ethnicity’ in the 90’s . . . and to ‘religion’ at the 
present time. This focus on religion has been driven both by major interna-
tional events which have highlighted the political demands associated with 
religious movements, and by an increasing recognition by academics, 
policy- makers and service providers, of the importance of religion in defin-
ing identity, particularly among minority communities.
Another driver is that of identity in general. As commentators such as Bauman 
(2004) have pointed out, identity becomes much more important when the 
essence of belonging is no longer taken for granted.
 It is possible that people of Asian ethnicity began to define their identity more 
by affiliation to a particular religious faith, rather than ethnicity, following the 
uproar over the publication of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses. Certainly, 
this has become far more evident since the global trauma of 9/11.
 Changes in professional approaches and understandings are another driver in 
force. Much of this is a strong moral approach from many practitioners to allow 
users as much choice and control of their lives as possible – putting people at the 
centre of services. This is all the more commendable, in that it is against the 
background of one of those pendulum swings in mental health, where public 
safety appears to be a major preoccupation in some sectors of government and 
media circles. The recent position paper on the recovery approach in mental 
health (CSIP/Royal College of Psychiatrists/SCIE 2007) stresses the ‘core belief 
that adopting recovery as a guiding purpose for mental health services favours 
hope and creativity over disillusionment and defeat’ (vi).
 All the professions are moving in the same direction, partly assisted by the 
Department of Health/NIMHE’s approach to New Ways of Working. The 
recent guidance by the Chief Nursing Officer in the Department of Health, on 
mental health nursing, From Values to Action, also recognizes the relevance of 
spirituality and/or religion in mental health care, and looks to nurses to recog-
nize and respond to the spiritual and religious needs of service users (DoH 
2006b).
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 The crisis over chaplaincy in acute hospitals has, ironically, in mental health and 
other more holistic services such as hospice care, highlighted the value of spiritual 
care in general and chaplaincy in particular (Swinton 2001; Eagger et al. 2009).
 In a wider organizational context, there has been increasing concern about the 
state of organizational culture in the NHS. Management thinkers across the 
world have raised the concern that short- term, macho- management (delivered by 
men or women!) may deliver very short- term, target- driven results, but actually 
cuts the heart and guts out of an organization in terms of its long- term effective-
ness (Aris and Gilbert 2007).
 Should cost be made more of as a driver? If services were able and willing to 
engage more with where individuals, groups and communities are at, perhaps 
rates of recovery would be better and more enduring in nature. Professionals 
have to connect with people’s deepest desires and motivations in a whole- 
persons and whole- systems approach, which is congruent with where the person 
is at, and where they wish to get to, in their pilgrimage.
Engaging the spirit: the NIMHE spirituality and mental 
health project
It was Professor Antony Sheehan, then Chief Executive of the nascent National 
Institute for Mental Health in England (NIMHE), who intuited the need for an 
approach to spirituality, as a response to the traumatic and iconic events of 9/11 
in America and the widespread effects on a huge range of people, especially, of 
course, Muslims in Western countries. There was also a groundswell of opinion 
from service users, carers and survivors that their spirituality was of vital impor-
tance in their recovery.
 The Project (from April 2008 under the auspices of the National Spirituality 
and Mental Health Forum) focuses on two main issues:
• Spirituality as an expression of an individual’s essential humanity, and the 
wellsprings of how they live their lives and deal with the crises which can 
leave us drowning, rather than waving! It is, therefore, an essential element 
in assessment, support and recovery, for users and carers in a whole- person 
and whole- systems approach. It is also vital in the approach to staff, in order 
to create genuine person- centred organizations.
• The establishment of positive relations with the major religions, at a time 
when a harmonious relationship between statutory agencies and faith com-
munities is essential; and when research studies are indicating the benefits to 
physical and mental health and longevity, for those who are members of 
inclusive and supportive faith communities.
This is aligned with the imperative for greater social cohesion and the positive 
role faith communities can play in family and community life (Cox et al. 2007).
 The aims and objectives of the Project (NIMHE/Mental Health Foundation 
2003) follow closely on the two main foci, in that the Project aims to:
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• Chart what is known about the role of spirituality in mental health; the role 
of religion; and the role of faith communities.
• Identify areas of good practice.
• Build coalitions of individuals and groups.
• Develop and create linkages with other NIMHE programmes.
• Set up Pilot Sites (with a broad framework, to allow for local issues), linked 
to the regional development centres, which would learn from, test, develop 
and promote positive practice.
• Bring together the growing body of research evidence on the importance of 
spirituality in mental health and stimulate further research.
• Influence curriculum formation for all professional groups and strengthen 
staff development at a front- line level.
• Support the role of chaplains (from all faiths), as part of the multi- 
disciplinary team.
Over the years, the Project has built constructive links with religious groups and 
foundations. It has been important to liaise with national umbrella organizations, 
such as the Inter- Faith Network and the Three Faiths Forum. Maintaining effect-
ive links with the Church of England’s Home Affairs Adviser has also been 
important, not least because of the national church’s links with other faiths. 
Relationships have been patiently built with the nine major faiths with which the 
government liaises: Bahā’i, Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jain, Jewish, Muslim, 
Sikh, Zoroastrian and also the Humanist Society. A multi- faith conference, Nur-
turing Heart and Spirit, was held at Staffordshire University in November 2006, 
which engaged all ten belief systems, with a strong user voice, to focus on the 
difficult issues around mental health and belief (e.g. suicide, possession); and 
also to consider the synergies between belief systems (Gilbert and Kalaga 2007). 
A second conference in January 2008, on end- of-life issues, From the Cradle – 
To Beyond the Grave?, was followed by a third in 2009 on The Flourishing City: 
The Role of Spirituality in Regeneration.
 Considerable work has been done on individual spirituality and engaging in 
faiths, through the National Spirituality and Mental Health Forum, which had its 
provenance back with the health promotion charity Mentality, and became a reg-
istered charity in 2006.
 The Project never forgets that many people will not be signed up to a spe-
cific belief system. They may, in fact, have a faith in The Divine, but no adher-
ence to a particular religious system. Many people move in and out of belief 
and different communities. One of the products of a diverse cultural society is 
that people will move from one faith to another, or from one denomination of 
a faith to another; or from faith to no faith and back again – especially at times 
of crisis! Some of the most desolate stories are from those who say that they 
have lost their faith and desperately want to believe, but belief is no longer 
with them.
 Work has been carried forward at government level in England, Scotland and 
Wales. In England work has been taken forward with the Department of Health 
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and the Department of Communities and Local Government; liaison is main-
tained with the Scottish Executive and the Welsh Assembly Government.
 A growing number of university centres interested in spirituality are now joining 
together to form the British Association for the Study of Spirituality (BASS). 
Research from America (Swinton 2001, 2007) indicates considerable benefits in 
terms of mental and physical health and longevity from being a member of a faith 
community. Recent research from the UK (King et al. 2006) is more equivocal, and 
raises issues for further study; one being whether a heightened sense of spirituality, 
with no affiliation to a community, either faith- based or secular, leaves an indi-
vidual prone to what Lewis Wolpert calls ‘malignant sadness’ (Wolpert 2006). The 
partnership work between NIMHE and the Mental Health Foundation produced a 
literature review in 2006 (Mental Health Foundation 2006).
 Support has been provided to professional groups wishing to bring the spiritual 
dimension into their curricula. The Royal College of Psychiatrists is moving on 
this, and spirituality formed a part of the Chief Nursing Officer’s review of mental 
health nursing in 2006 (DoH 2006b: par. 5.4.7, recommendation 10). Social 
work’s more decentralized arrangement for education and training has led to some 
detailed work by Professor Bernard Moss from Staffordshire University, Professor 
Margaret Holloway from Hull University and others (Moss 2005). Guidance on 
spirituality is being produced for staff in acute mental health services in 2008, in a 
collaboration between NIMHE/CSIP and Staffordshire University (NIMHE 2008).
Spirituality, faith and mental wellbeing
Professor John Swinton, in many respects the doyen of commentators on spiritu-
ality and mental health, recently considered the differences in research perspec-
tives between the USA and UK (Swinton in Coyte et al. 2007).
 Swinton considers that research in these countries is, with some exceptions, 
marked by a ‘structural behaviourist’ model in the USA and a ‘value guidance 
approach’ in the UK. Even a cursory consideration of American society demon-
strates a very high level of specifically religious (as opposed to a more general 
spiritual) commitment. But also American religious groupings are fairly homo-
geneous, with a clear, collective identity. In Britain the picture is often much 
more complicated than that. Black Pentecostal groups in urban areas are rela-
tively cohesive, but patterns of change, migration, secularization and so on make 
the picture quite clouded. Kwame Mckenzie’s work on African- Caribbean com-
munities (McKenzie 2007) shows a marked decline in the mental health of later 
generations over the first wave of immigrants, as the former feel ‘at home’ 
neither in the West Indies nor in their adopted country.
 The work by Koenig, Larson and others in the USA provides a clear demon-
stration of the health benefits of being religious in terms of:
• Extended life expectancy
• Reduced rates of blood pressure
• Lower rates of death from coronary heart disease
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• Reduction in myocardial infarction
• Increased success in heart transplants
• Reduced serum cholesterol levels
• Reduced levels of pain in cancer sufferers
• Reduced mortality amongst those who attend church and worship services
• Increased longevity amongst elderly people
• Reduced mortality after cardiac surgery.
(Koenig et al. 2001, quoted in Swinton 2007)
The 2006 EMPIRIC National survey in England (King et al. 2006), however, 
provides results that show no difference in the incidence of common mental dis-
orders (CMD) between people who are religious and those who are not. 
However, people who described themselves as spiritual, but without religious 
affiliation and practice, were more likely to have a common mental disorder.
 One of the aspects which is most difficult to reach is whether belief in a tran-
scendent deity or the cohesive group (social capital) aspects of religious affiliation 
and practice is the more efficacious, or whether it is a combination of the two ele-
ments. However, neuroscientists have identified that the recall of spiritual/religious 
experiences occurs in a different part of the frontal lobe than emotional experiences 
without a religious connotation (Beauregard and Paquette 2006). Some Christians 
who suffer severe mental distress say that they find it helpful to identify with Jesus’ 
suffering on the cross. The feeling that God actually empathized with humankind, 
through direct experience, is a comfort to them (conversations with the author; Rob-
inson 2008). In Islam, the concept of Zikr, remembrance of Allah, can be helpful:
Those who believe and whose hearts find satisfaction in the remembrance of 
God, for without doubt in the remembrance of God do hearts find 
satisfaction.
(Qu’ran: ch. 13, v 28, in Haroon- Iqbal et al. 2007)
David Hay in his Something There (Hay 2006) describes a variety of human 
beliefs in his research in Nottingham. A zoologist and Christian, Hay has enorm-
ous respect for those who have developed an individual spirituality, which does 
not necessarily provide the protective cover of organized religion.
 It may well be that spirituality without the cohesion of a religious community 
produces a sensitivity and vulnerability to the pressures of the current socio- 
economic climate described above, without the solidarity and peer support to 
combat the winds of change. It may be that we need to research new groupings 
such as sporting groups who produce what I term ‘communities of meaning’ 
around a common purpose, meaning, identity and solidarity.
 In terms of religious affiliation and practice Swinton (2007) postulates several 
protective and enhancing mechanisms:
• Regulation of individual lifestyles and health behaviours. Most religious 
systems have prohibitions on certain ways of behaving and living (e.g. the 
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prohibition on alcohol, smoking), all of which have health benefits for the 
participant.
• Provisions of social resources (e.g. social ties, formal and informal support). 
There is a recognized connection between mental health and wellbeing and 
effective social support structures. Social support can tie people into sup-
portive relational networks which are both protective against mental illness 
and healing of it when it develops.
• Promotion of positive self- perceptions. Religion can promote self- esteem by 
incorporating people into secure relational networks that are affirming and 
accepting. It can also engender feelings of personal mastery in ways that can 
be supportive and health promoting.
• Provision of specific coping resources (i.e. particular cognitive or behav-
ioural responses to stress). Adherence to a particular faith tradition realigns 
a person’s thinking and can enable them to cope constructively with trauma 
and illness. The signs, symbols, rituals and narratives of faith communities 
provide the resources for individuals to re- form their life- worlds in signific-
ant ways.
• Generation of other positive emotions (e.g. love, forgiveness). The growing 
body of literature within the area of forgiveness research, for example, indi-
cates that religion can generate particularly positive emotions which have 
the potential to be health- enhancing.
• Additional hypothesized mechanisms, such as the existence of a healing 
bioenergy. The growing literature within the area of prayer studies is indica-
tive of the possibility that there may be supra- empirical dimensions to reli-
gion and spirituality that are currently not understood but which may have 
healing capacities (Swinton 2007).
Pargament (2002:178) provides a succinct overview of the ‘bitter and sweet’ 
fruits of religion, with ‘the efficacy of religion’ depending largely on ‘the degree 
to which it (is) well integrated into people’s lives’. The ‘larger social context’ is 
also a vital part of the possible benefits, which may go some way to explain the 
issue highlighted by the EMPIRIC research that people who have an individual 
spirituality may not have enough safeguards against the vicissitudes of life.
 Questions and issues which require addressing might be:
• Is it faith in a divine entity or social solidarity which provides better mental 
health?
• What spiritual beliefs/practices keep people healthy and need retaining/
nourishing on admission to services?
• Are there differences between different religious traditions in these respects?
• What about religious traditions which are more individual and rely on prac-
tices like meditation?
• Does a spiritual ethos in a person predispose to vulnerability to depression?
• Is Paul Keedwell (2008) right in suggesting that mental ill- health can make 
us stronger?
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• What methods of assessment would be facilitative?
• What spiritual and religious practices might be helpful?
• What spiritual and religious practices/attitudes/relationships might be 
unhelpful?
• Research which links good spiritual care with service user satisfaction; 
shorter in- patient stays; longer remission times/reduced demands on 
services.
• Blocks to spiritual care among staff groups. Differentiation between staff 
groups.
• Faith communities’ attitudes to mental wellbeing and mental illness.
• The role of spiritual and pastoral care teams/chaplains.
Future research needs to take the EMPIRIC research and drill down into specific 
groups.
Conclusion
Mental health services and religious and spiritual organizations need to work 
closely together to build on what true spirituality and faith can provide in terms 
of hope, inspiration, connection and a framework for living. Modern life, and the 
particular pressure created by mental ill health, make this problematic, however. 
Perhaps we are like Graham Greene’s haunted and hunted Mexican priest:
What an impossible fellow I am, he thought and how useless. I have done 
nothing for anybody. I might just as well have never lived. . . . He felt only 
an immense disappointment because he had to go to God empty- handed . . . 
he felt like someone who has missed happiness by seconds at an appointed 
place. . . .
(Greene 1940/1962: 210)
13 The ‘one in the morning’ knock
Exploring the connections between 
faith, participation and wellbeing
Christopher Baker
Introduction
The illustration behind this cryptic title will hopefully become clear as this 
chapter unfolds. The broad aim of this contribution however is simple enough. It 
is to deepen and enhance some of the established rhetoric concerning the role of 
faith groups in relation to wellbeing and participation in public life.
 The increasingly intense speculation within political and academic circles 
(partly fed by post 9/11 and 7/7 anxieties) about finding a meaningful public role 
for religion has, according to Richard Farnell, created an un- nuanced set of dis-
courses concerning the relationship between faith groups and civil society 
(Farnell 2009). Some of these discourses uncritically overestimate the ability of 
faith groups to participate in civil society in respect of issues such as social cohe-
sion or volunteering. Farnell labels this a stakeholder/instrumental discourse, 
because it stresses the delivery that faith groups enable as instruments for achiev-
ing the government’s aims (Farnell 2009: 185).
 Other discourses, on the other hand, can express a more negative tone, espe-
cially from those public officials tasked with working with the ‘faith sector’. A 
2006 Joseph Rowntree report suggested that:
Among some professionals there is a scepticism concerning the motives of 
faith groups which reveals itself in the search for hidden agendas. For others 
there is the view that faith groups sometimes have unrealistic expectations, 
have undertaken insufficient investigation of their situation, and lack clarity 
about their basic aims.
(Furbey et al. 2006: 36)
Farnell adds further elements to this litany of anxieties regarding the public 
profile of faiths: ‘differing views on the nature of equal opportunities, worries 
about how the funding of faith groups will be used [i.e. for proselytizing pur-
poses] and issues of accountability’ (Farnell 2009: 185). There is also consider-
able evidence to suggest that the vertical structures of authority and control 
within some religious traditions prevent the proper participation into wider 
democratic and public processes of key groups, such as women and young 
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people (Farnell et al. 2003: 33–34). He points out however that some of the 
responsibility for this sceptical discourse lies at the feet of the public agencies 
themselves, who exhibit a lack of religious literacy and a failure to distinguish 
between ethnic and faith communities.
 This sceptical discourse is also partly driven by an increasingly polarized cri-
tique of religion by secular apologists who are perturbed by what they see as the 
re- emergence of faith within public life, especially within the categories of edu-
cation, science and political life. From this perspective, even mainstream faith 
traditions within the UK (including Christian ones) are either perceived as being 
on a par with fundamentalist religions (i.e. all religion is bad for your health) or 
seen as manqué humanist ideologies (see discussion of the work of Sam Harris 
and Christopher Hitchins in Furbey 2009: 22–27). Within this intellectual and 
policy- based landscape it is therefore quite difficult to reach a balanced view 
about the contributions and possibilities faiths create with respect to participa-
tion, and therefore by implication, human wellbeing.
 This chapter therefore seeks answers to a set of key questions and offers some 
emerging typologies in support of a more ‘realist’ perspective on this key area of 
research. First, what do we mean by participation, and does it make one happier? 
Second, a new typology of faith- based participation will be proposed, which will 
be referenced by some emerging qualitative research for the Leverhulme Trust 
into the link between participation and the motivation derived from religious and 
theological beliefs (described in terms of religious and spiritual capital). Third, 
different perceptions of participation between men and women of faith will be 
explored, as well as differences and overlaps between a Muslim and a Christian 
faith community in respect of the relationship between spiritual capital, partici-
pation and wellbeing. The material used to address these three areas of inquiry, I 
argue by way of conclusion, point us to a more nuanced, holistic and 360-degree 
view concerning the role of faiths in participation, and thus their contribution to 
human wellbeing and happiness.
But what do we mean by participation, and does it make one 
happier?
Participation is one of Layard’s Big Seven sources of happiness, and his influ-
ential list forms the structural backbone of this volume. Layard conceives of 
participation primarily in terms of the ability to have access to voting and other 
forms of public democratic participation. For example, he compares citizen 
happiness surveys based in former Soviet countries, such as Hungary, and 
those still under totalitarian rule, for example, Belarus (Layard 2005: 69–70). 
Key to happiness in this example, alongside obvious things like a rule of law, 
absence of corruption and the efficiency of regulatory systems, is the notion of 
having a voice which is not only heard, but is perceived to create accountabil-
ity. Thus Layard includes the comparative case study of Swiss cantons which 
showed that in those regions where citizens have more rights to referenda by 
which to decide regional policy, their happiness was as great as if they had 
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double the income over those regions which hold fewer referenda (Frey and 
Stutzer 2000).
 There are, of course, some strong connections between religion and political 
participation, especially from a US research perspective which Layard does not 
acknowledge. These include, for example, the increase in voting patterns from 
within church- based congregations, especially among black majority churches 
(Smidt 2003: 131), and the influential contribution made by faith groups to Saul 
Allinsky’s Industrial Areas Foundations in the 1930s and 1940s and which con-
tinues to this day to resource broad- based organizing in both the US and the UK 
(Putnam and Feldstein 2003; Bretherton 2006).
 However, a more broad and perhaps everyday area of participation which 
Layard doesn’t choose to dwell on is that of volunteering. If we focus on volun-
teering as an integral dimension of participation, then a firm link becomes estab-
lished between it and faith groups. A number of surveys correlating the linkages 
between membership of faith groups and formal volunteering appear to establish 
causality (Loveland et al. 2005; Schwadel 2005). However, a recent study by the 
Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion at the London School of Economics (LSE) 
of a 29,000 US- based dataset not only establishes a positive link between volun-
teering and membership of faith groups, but between these two variables and hap-
piness (Borgonovi 2008). In other words, not only do higher frequencies of 
volunteering correlate with higher self- reported levels of wellbeing and happiness, 
but if these frequencies are compared within religious and secular settings, levels 
of reported happiness are significantly different. For example, those who volunteer 
for religious groups and organizations are 6 per cent more likely to be in excellent 
health and 13 per cent are more likely to report being very happy than people not 
volunteering who have similar socio- economic characteristics. This increase in 
health and happiness, although still significant for those who volunteer for secular 
organizations, drops to 4 per cent and 9 per cent respectively (Borgonovi 2008).
 The LSE review also suggests an interesting new source of happiness con-
nected to volunteering. Currently, there are two well- established sources of hap-
piness associated with volunteering, namely social role (i.e. volunteering is an 
activity that is valued by society and therefore people engaging in volunteer 
labour feel useful) and social networking (i.e. volunteering increases the poten-
tial for social relationships which influences levels of happiness, depression, 
health status and mortality). A third source of happiness is now proposed. It is 
that unpaid work has intrinsic and non- monetary motives as its main reward 
through the stimulation of empathic emotions, rather than those of competition. 
By choosing to give away valuable resources such as time, we choose (so the 
theory goes) to change our normal perceptions and concerns over status. Instead 
of being unhappy with our relative wealth because we choose to identify our-
selves with others who have more material success than us (i.e. with those higher 
up the socio- economic or celebrity chain), we reinforce satisfaction for what we 
already have by choosing to identify with those less fortunate (or lower down 
the chain) than ourselves. Borgonovi summarizes what is currently a tentative 
hypothesis:
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The process of volunteering itself . . . might reinforce satisfaction for what 
one has rather than dissatisfaction for what she lacks and shift the salient 
group upon which people evaluate their circumstances from those who are 
above them in the income distribution, to those who are lower than them.
(Borgonovi 2008: 2330)
With this evidence in mind, we therefore need to expand our definition of partic-
ipation if it is to be useful in deciding the contribution and impact of religious 
groups to individual and community wellbeing.
Faith groups and bonding, bridging and linking participation
There could be what we might call (after Putnam 2000; see also Woolcock 1988) 
three types of participation engaged in by faith groups: bonding, bridging and 
linking.
 Bonding participation is that activity which is aimed primarily at ensuring the 
viability of the religious or faith group in question. This may have limited impact 
in wider civil society, but probably brings with it a large amount of happiness 
and wellbeing to those who find a sense of meaning, identity and purpose in 
undertaking these activities. I call this bonding participation because its main 
focus is the sustainability and wellbeing of the faith group (locally, nationally or 
globally) which might be at the expense of other sectors of community, but 
could equally produce more communitarian byproducts. For example, the confi-
dence and skills learned within faith communities may be deployed at a later 
stage by the individual concerned within other spheres of community activity. 
Putnam, for example, refers to the potential for churches and other faith groups 
to be ‘incubators’ for social capital (Putnam 2000: 66).
 Bridging participation is that activity generated by religious groups which 
makes a direct contribution to civil society and public life by means of a wide 
variety of activities available to the public at large, not only members of a par-
ticular faith community. For example, a survey for the Northwest Development 
Agency (NWDA) of faith- based contributions to civil society in 2003 identified 
the following areas of input: preschool provision, after- school care, youth clubs, 
families and parenting, counselling and bereavement services, care of the elderly, 
social activities, and working with excluded groups such as asylum seekers and 
refugees. A later report estimated the economic impact of this participation to 
the regional economy of England’s Northwest at £90–94 million (NWDA 2005). 
I call this bridging participation because it consciously aimed at providing goods 
and services across religious, ethnic and cultural divides. This form of participa-
tion operates within a moral and political recognition of the existence of the 
common good. It also ‘bridges’ in the sense that these services can be provided 
in partnership with organizations different to oneself.
 Linking participation I suggest is a rarer and more specialized form of faith- 
based participation that moves beyond service provision to a more sophisticated 
model of economic and political participation which develops new examples of 
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practice or analysis, or often acts as a reflective critique of mainstream policy. 
The purpose of this more ‘rights- based’ participation is to ensure a more struc-
tural and strategic redistribution of goods, knowledge and opportunity in favour 
of those most excluded within society. Religious participation of this kind func-
tions either in the form of modelling good and innovative practice, or acting as 
trusted powerbrokers between powerful and disempowered actors within civil 
society.
Religious and spiritual capital – the dynamic connection 
between faith and participation?
Underpinning this subtle redrawing of the widely used bonding, bridging, linking 
typology is another typology which also borrows from existing social capital 
theory, but again recalibrates its meaning to attain a more contemporary fit to the 
context under discussion, namely religious and spiritual capital. Definitions of 
religious and spiritual capital are not new (Bourdieu 1983; Iannaccone and Klick 
2003), but those devised by the William Temple Foundation in 2006 are becom-
ingly increasingly cited.1 These definitions emerged as a result of a three- year 
Church Urban Fund research project, reflecting on both the method and the lan-
guage deployed by nine churches working alone or in partnership with other 
organizations in socially excluded areas of Manchester undergoing rapid regen-
eration. Thus religious capital is defined as ‘the practical contribution to local 
and national life made by faith groups’ (Baker and Skinner 2006: 9). Spiritual 
capital
energises religious capital by providing a theological identity and worship-
ping tradition, but also a value system, moral vision and a basis of faith. 
Spiritual capital is often embedded locally within faith groups, but also 
expressed in the lives of individuals.
(Baker and Skinner 2006: 9)
The advantage of these distinct but interlinked concepts is that they raise the 
possibility of the significance of spiritual capital for participation. In other 
words, is it possible to show a connection between what people say about the 
importance of their faith (including theological worldview and how that is 
shaped by the practice of communal sharing, prayer, worship, meditation and so 
on) and the three levels of participation identified above – namely bonding, 
bridging and linking participation? We believe that it is – at least at the level of 
self- reporting backed up by some of the social science research cited above.
 What now follows is qualitative data from two case studies which will show 
some of the dynamic interaction between spiritual capital and participation and 
happiness. The first set of data emerges from focus groups conducted in an 
Islamic education centre in the Greater Manchester region. These data have been 
gathered for the Leverhulme Trust research project by the William Temple 
Foundation into religious and spiritual capital.2 It shows the interaction of 
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 spiritual capital with primarily bonding participation, but also with aspects that 
might be termed bridging participation. It also shows the interesting comparison 
between men’s and women’s understandings of how spiritual capital is expressed 
in participation.
 The second set of data is based on a Christian youth project, the Message 
Trust, which runs a variety of different projects, also located in Greater Man-
chester. These data have also been gathered for the Leverhulme Trust. It shows 
the interaction of spiritual capital with primarily bridging and linking forms of 
participation.
The Islamic study circle
The Leverhulme research undertaken by the William Temple Foundation seeks 
to test out with different faith and spirituality groups the valency and relevance 
of the concepts of religious and spiritual capital (see definitions above). As part 
of this discernment process, focus groups are invited to spend a considerable 
amount of time reflecting on what members perceive to be benefits of belonging 
to their particular religious or spiritual community. They are then invited to 
reflect on how these benefits are shared beyond the boundaries of their group, 
within the wider community. Both focus groups of this particular Islamic educa-
tion centre, one comprising men and one women, attended a midweek study 
circle, in which the Imam reflected on contemporary aspects of daily life in the 
UK from the perspective of the Qur’an and Sharia law, and invited questions and 
discussion on the issues raised.
 The men tended to focus on the external sources of spiritual capital. The 
Qur’an was perceived as a transcendent source of authority (a direct word from 
God) which laid out clearly the duties and responsibilities towards the rest of 
society. Thus one member of the focus group reported, ‘I feel Muslims generally 
see their pursuit of knowledge under the Islamic banner . . . understanding the 
Qur’an, understanding the life of the Prophet and how we should apply that to 
our daily lives.’ Another commented, ‘The Qur’an teaches us to implement eve-
rything in our lives . . . it runs through everything that we do; how to run our 
businesses, to how we run our families, to how we greet people in the street.’ 
This clear adherence to the ‘purity’ of Islamic teaching (and its guidance on what 
was referred to as the ‘straight’ path) is closely bound up with a firm sense of 
global identity. One focus group member remarked, ‘You can meet people from 
the other side of the world, we can communicate on the same level . . . it is 
through faith that you have with everybody, it is a brotherhood/sisterhood.’ This 
strong sense of a universal identity is in turn linked with a strong sense of com-
munity, in which norms about how to live one’s life are reinforced:
Islam has a lot of things in it about community based living . . . you would 
break fast together, you would pray together, it’s more of a blessing if you 
pray together . . . if you are on your own, you’re more susceptible to going 
astray, so you keep each other in a stronger link.
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There were a number of key words associated with this strong sense of direct 
guidance from the Qur’an and a clear understanding of identity within a global 
community of fellow Muslims. One was the idea of discipline, closely related to 
the five pillars of Islam, and in particular the discipline of prayer:
We pray five times a day at certain times, so it teaches us discipline. It 
makes me carry the discipline into my life [and] if I have that same discip-
line in my work I am sure everyone will be happy with me and all [my] jobs 
will be done very well.
Another concept was that of obligation, related to areas of life such as personal 
good manners and the importance of setting a good example to others, ‘so that 
everyone will take the message from you’ but also because ‘all our deeds are 
going to be recorded and we are all going to be judged as individuals’. This 
sense of obligation also extends to upbraiding a ‘brother’ who is not dealing with 
his neighbour properly, but there was a nuanced element to this concept of obli-
gation as the discussion unfolded in the focus group. ‘Sometimes it depends 
what the situation is, what the position that friend has put you in . . . it’s not black 
and white – we have to make sure we do by example, otherwise it is a tense life.’
 A third motif which continuously recurred was that of responsibility. One 
focus group member suggested two levels at which responsibility needed to be 
discharged. One was to put into practice the teaching from the study group:
When I listen to a talk by the Ustath, and he says you should do this and you 
shouldn’t do this, then it is my responsibility to apply the knowledge. The 
more knowledgeable I am, the more accountable I am.
A second level of responsibility (what he termed a ‘higher level’) is ‘to pass on’ 
this knowledge to others. He continues, ‘If I have a treasure . . .why should I keep 
it to myself. If I give it to others, I am not losing anything. On the contrary . . . I 
will be rewarded.’ These comments about ‘passing on a treasure’ appear to suggest 
a strong link between spiritual capital (the treasure comprising direct guidance and 
values for the Qur’an) and participation in some form (i.e. the direct living out of 
the principles and values understood to lie at the heart of Islam).
 These levels of obligation and responsibility appeared to be differentiated, 
beginning with the Muslim community (‘the Muslim ummah of the nation’) 
before being extended to ‘the non- believers and mankind in general’. In other 
words, there appears to be a strong priority on bonded participation with other 
Muslims (at the local level, via the mosque, and at the global level, via the sense 
of being a member of the universal ummah). This sense of bonding identity was 
reinforced by the extensive use of the word ‘non- Muslim’ to describe those 
beyond the scope and remit of Islamic teaching and law. Some of this bonded 
participation at the local level was clearly strengthened by a sense of mutual 
safety and ‘sanctuary’ in relation to a society that can feel unsympathetic, occa-
sionally hostile, or simply bewildering. As one participant reflected:
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When we come to this place [mosque], it’s like a way to escape, to keep you 
safe, to keep you guarding, then you can purify yourself and remember 
Allah again and then you feel safe . . . even when you leave and are in the 
middle of the dangerous area that is the city centre.
However, there were also indications of bridging forms of capital, most consist-
ently in relation to Islamic teaching about being fair and neighbourly to those 
around you in one’s local community and workplace. As one participant 
concluded:
You know you have to help them. You know you have to have good links 
with them. You have colleagues at work and you remember that it was 
taught that they were also a kind of neighbour to you, so you are good to 
them.
In conclusion, we might want to suggest that the kind of understanding of spirit-
ual capital as reflected in these remarks is a vertical model. It is vertical because 
this view of guidance coming directly from Allah via the Prophet could be 
termed figuratively as guidance ‘from above’. There is also a clear hierarchy of 
authority expressed in the way that the teaching of the Qu’ran and the Imam is 
filtered down in order to be implemented in one’s life – an implementation that 
is reinforced by a strong commitment to the discipline of daily prayer and the 
fulfilling of one’s obligations to one’s brothers and sisters and those beyond the 
Muslim faith. It is therefore a form of spiritual capital that relies to some extent 
on an externalized authority – namely the norms and sanctions applied by the 
community, and indeed recorded by Allah himself. There is also a strong sense 
within this understanding of spiritual capital of moralizing the self – of con-
stantly ‘submitting’ one’s will to ‘the will of Allah’ and following the straight 
path for one’s life.
 The cluster of images and ideas emerging from the women’s focus group had 
a somewhat different emphasis. Asked what they got out of attending the 
Tuesday night study circle, the first member to answer said, ‘Basically you learn 
a lot about your religion, but also it’s more of a social thing, because I meet all 
my friends here.’Another member warms to the theme: ‘It’s Facebook, but face 
to face.’ Another said, ‘We make an effort to come along on a Tuesday night to 
see everybody, and even if we don’t really know each other that well, we have a 
bond . . . It’s like a big sisterhood.’
 It also becomes evident that this emphasis on socializing, as well as the 
opportunity for ‘general chat’, has a significant supportive and pastoral role cov-
ering a wide range of issues; ‘a space to chill and wind down’, child- minding, 
counselling and support for those suffering ‘depression’, a space to reflect as part 
of the daily routine of childcare, shopping, visiting and so on. A significant word 
that the women used to describe the mosque was ‘it’s a place where you just feel 
at home’. ‘Home’ connotes a feeling of security and a space for family rites of 
passage which one focus group member amplifies in another striking image:
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I call it a big Muslim hippy thing because there are that many types of 
people. Whether they are ill, whether they have problems . . . you can just 
come down and celebrate as well. There are weddings, people coming into 
Islam, the birth of a baby – it’s all going on here.
 One significant element of spiritual capital that came across with more inte-
rior force than the men’s focus group was the practice of prayer. The men 
described prayer simply as an important point of connection with God: ‘It’s like 
petrol in your car or topping up a mobile phone.’ The women expand in more 
detail the experience and impact of prayer. One reflected:
When you are praying you are thanking God for everything that you do 
have. You are thanking Him for living, for breathing, for other people 
around the world, who are suffering and you are asking Him to help you in 
your daily life – to be more patient, to be more nice to people.
Prayer is thus an activity that encompasses concern for personal wellbeing and 
moral behaviour, as well as empathic concern for the global suffering of others. 
Another woman focused more on the psycho- therapeutic dimension of prayer:
It’s [prayer] like my little moment with God and its more like counselling – 
you sit there and talk to Him and say everything that is going through life 
and in a way it’s a relief. Because a lot of people are going through depres-
sion and stuff like that.
When compared to the men’s focus group, we can see that the notions of spirit-
ual capital are more horizontally- linked, and feelings of happiness and wellbeing 
are more located within a sense of interior feelings of peace and emotional solid-
arity, linked closely to practical support mechanisms such as childcare, advice, 
training and home visiting. Indeed, one of the forms of participation instigated 
by the women of this group was called the Serenity Project. This was described 
as a:
mother and toddler group, just to give [them] some time out of the house 
and put the kids in an Islamic environment . . . the mother is also given time 
to connect with other mothers over the same issues. They may have come 
for advice, or just time out.
When asked what other forms of beneficial participation emerge from the 
Tuesday Study Circle, the list is impressively wide, ranging from personal bene-
fits through to practical support of global projects. They include:
• ‘You meet people you would not normally meet’.
• Hear news of events – e.g. news of announcements to help the wider 
Muslim community.
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• Training in the use of computers and the Internet.
• Serenity Project (see above).
• A Bosnia project.
• Raising money for earthquake victims in Kashmir.
• Visits to Egypt to support an orphanage and other projects helping the visu-
ally impaired.
• Providing care support for an old lady who recently came out of hospital.
• A space for those who are ‘shaky about Islam’ or ‘going through a bad time 
– a secure environment to sit and unload their head’.
• A safe place for women away from ‘critical’ or ‘prying’ eyes – ‘that whole 
kind of nasty girl thing’.
Because the main thrust of this participation is focused on the Muslim commun-
ity, it primarily constitutes what we are proposing to call bonding participation. 
However, it would be probably fair to assume that the sense of peace, safety and 
security generated by this study circle generally would support and empower 
these Muslim women to play a fuller part as neighbours within the wider com-
munity. Indeed, one woman remarked: ‘My neighbours are non- Muslims, I don’t 
see a difference really. They are all God’s people, they are all from Adam, and 
that’s how I see it.’ In other words, the potential to create informal forms of 
bridging capital with neighbours and work colleagues is also formed by this 
sense of inner peace and wellbeing.
The Christian youth project
The following case study emerges from a Manchester- based Christian charity 
called the Message Trust, whose innovative community development work 
(called Eden projects) with disadvantaged young people has already been cited 
in William Temple Foundation- based research (Baker and Skinner 2005). In this 
research, we focused on the ability of faith- based groups such as the Message 
Trust to construct what I called ‘Local Political Economies’ (Baker 2007b) in 
neighbourhoods of chronic, but also acute, social and economic exclusion. By 
this concept, I refer to the ability of faith groups like the Message Trust to create 
alternative structures of economic and political participation that have a struc-
tural as well as a personal impact beyond ethnic or religious bonds.
 Thus, for example, the Message Trust had developed two innovatory pieces 
of community development and social enterprise in North- east Manchester. The 
first, highlighted in an impact report commissioned from the University of 
Leicester (Centre for Citizenship Studies in Education 2005), was referred to as 
a Matrix Mentoring system. This provided a multiple number of mentoring 
points for young people seeking pastoral care or advice to complement the usual 
statutory opportunities provided at school or youth club outlets. These multiple 
points of contact were provided by a network of adults and projects which were 
available at all hours and at a number of other venues, e.g. Eden project com-
munity houses. Because of the commitment of the Eden projects’ paid youth 
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workers and volunteers to live as a ‘community- within-the community’, they 
were able to provide a constant low- key presence which was open- access, infor-
mal and non- judgemental, but also well connected to statutory agencies who can 
provide further support and advice (for example, on issues such as dyslexia or 
self- harm).
 The second innovative project is called the Entry to Enterprise Programme. It 
helps young people aged 14 to 19 who access Eden’s mentoring schemes to 
develop enterprise skills to set up their own micro- enterprise ventures. This 
project includes mentoring and placement schemes with local businesses, and 
addresses related issues that can often impede employment opportunities, for 
example, CV writing, improving communication and presentation skills, and 
enhancing emotional intelligence. Through these initiatives, the Message Trust 
creates opportunities for young people to stay in North- east Manchester and 
invest their human capital at the local level. This is therefore an example of what 
I have defined earlier as linking participation; namely ‘to ensure a more struc-
tural and strategic redistribution of goods, knowledge and opportunity in favour 
of those most excluded within society’.
 In order to understand better some of the links between spiritual capital, par-
ticipation and the happiness and wellbeing generated by these projects, I will 
briefly explore some of the reflections offered by young Message Trust volun-
teers who participated in WTF ’s Leverhulme research. These young people, 
aged between 18 and 24, have enrolled on an intensive gap- year programme to 
learn more about their Christian faith within the context of faith- based praxis. 
This allows them to be proactively involved in a number of Message Trust- run 
projects or those that are run by partner organizations; for example, detached 
youth work and drop- in centres for those involved in prostitution or sleeping 
rough on the streets. These volunteers live in special community houses, where 
much time is spent learning and sharing aspects of Christian discipleship and 
identity, and being mentored by older and more experienced Message Trust 
workers. Many of these gap- year students or volunteers continue to help in 
various youth projects once they leave the programme, or indeed go on to 
become trained youth workers. The volunteering work done while on this pro-
gramme is also recognized for accreditation by secular and educational agencies.
 Some members of the Message focus groups spoke about a sense of being 
directly guided or sent by God to participate in this programme. For example, 
one focus group participant recalled, ‘I heard about this course because God told 
me about the course . . . God told me to email him [programme leader] and said I 
will help you.’ Another simply said, ‘I believe that God has a plan for every-
one’s life.’ Another contributor, unsure about whether or not to come on the 
programme, was advised by a friend:
We will pray for it, and if it is God’s way, He will open the door . . . He just 
opened every door and when I went to my boss and told him what I wanted 
to do [i.e. take four months out to participate in the programme] he said, 
‘Sure, don’t worry’.
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Several members of the focus groups had a strong expectation that they were 
going to discover a truer form of identity or authentic personhood. ‘Coming here 
has helped me to build who I am as a person’ is a simple phrase that summed up 
the feelings of many.
 From this strong sense of God- guided direction comes an expectation that 
personal transformation will occur, not only in themselves but in the lives of 
those whom they encounter in local projects and communities. Whereas within 
the Muslim focus groups there was a strong sense of the importance of obliga-
tion, responsibility and discipline (including five times’ daily prayer, and chari-
table giving) as a way of obeying God’s will, among these young Christian 
people there was perhaps more emphasis on the support and discipline of the 
community (what might be called a form of peer pressure, reinforced by mentor-
ing from the programme leaders). There was also perhaps a more personalized 
sense of calling (or vocation) which required making key choices and decisions 
at significant moments of life. ‘You want to live your own dream and be who 
you are.’
 The combination of these decisive psycho- dynamic feelings generated many 
references to peace and wellbeing among the Message focus group members. 
Here are just four examples. ‘Being surrounded by people and others who 
support you all the time is just fantastic.’ ‘It makes your life much better, not 
just living for going out at weekends . . . here you enjoy everyday . . . here just 
gives you more peace.’
Being a Christian and seeing older people [i.e. programme directors/
mentors] who have that [faith] . . . you see that they have that long term kind 
of satisfaction, that long- term peace . . . I think one thing that kids don’t 
grasp is (until they get told) the short term yeah it might be good but it is 
short term whereas Christianity – this is everlasting and long term . . . a long-
 term peace which is better than anything short term.
‘Sometimes when you are in hard situations it is really hard but sometimes you 
can just feel peaceful.’
 The above references to securing a long- term peace at the expense of the 
short term show, for example, the happiness that can be secured from delayed 
gratification over and against the hedonic.
 This sense of peace, fulfilment, support and happiness thus reinforces partici-
pation – especially with respect to role modelling the benefits of good behaviour 
and change. As one young focus group member said, ‘The inspirational work 
kind of breaks your heart and makes you want to do more.’ The importance of 
role modelling a more positive and value- driven lifestyle is a particularly insist-
ent theme with this group of young people. One ex- drug user said, ‘I want to be 
a good role model to other people – I am from what they are going through – 
I’ve seen that all my life.’ Another pointed out the importance of constant 
contact and care, recognizing that for many of the youngsters Eden projects work 
with, the sense of constancy and trustworthiness is what can be missing most 
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from their family life. The comment, ‘If you have constant contact with them 
that can stop [their destructive behaviour]’ is a sincere expression in the expecta-
tion of personal change and transformation through engagement of this kind. 
This form of participation is deeply committed and potentially unboundaried, as 
represented by the ‘one in the morning’ knock at the door from young people 
seeking support or just company at the Eden community houses. It also tran-
scends the tendency towards utilitarian analysis of faith- based contributions 
from within government and social policy literatures identified earlier in this 
chapter. The motivation for this type of participation lies more within the 
complex language of gift and immaterial benefit, rather than in the more simplis-
tic level of choice and happiness.
 The type of spiritual capital exemplified within this project might be charac-
terized as both vertical and horizontal. Some of the sources of spiritual capital 
are quite externalized and hierarchical. For example, the Bible is perceived in 
not dissimilar ways to which the Qur’an was described within the Muslim focus 
groups. The Bible is seen as a practical and infallible guide to human behaviour, 
and reflects the strong theological belief that it is guidance from God that shapes 
the life path of the volunteer according to strict principles. This can often estab-
lish a satisfying sense of counter- cultural participation in the world. However, 
alongside this appeal to vertical sources of spiritual capital are strong dimensions 
of horizontal spiritual capital – mediated in strong support networks and com-
munity sharing and mentoring, perhaps best expressed in the concept of the 
family. The belief that replicating the experience of a supportive, loving family 
is one of the most effective ways of meeting the needs of marginalized and 
excluded young people is often expressed. The unconditional form of participa-
tion reflected in this concept of the family shows that while there is a desire to 
bring awareness and thus ‘conversion’ of young people to the Christian faith, 
this is a secondary desire in respect of the main motivation for Christian partici-
pation of this kind – namely to serve the needs of others out of a sense of happi-
ness and gratitude for what these volunteers perceive as a life- changing 
transformation for themselves through an ongoing encounter with God.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have attempted to describe a more complex and nuanced rela-
tionship between faith, participation and wellbeing. Using the concepts of reli-
gious and spiritual capital (but primarily the latter), I have attempted to describe 
a close relationship between beliefs and other communal aspects of religious life 
(such as prayer, scripture study and communal living) and participation. I have 
also attempted to show different levels of participation using the typology of 
bonding, bridging and linking participation, and the different ways in which men 
and women from the same religious tradition and community (in this case Islam) 
participate as a result of their faith. The issue of how women of faith participate 
in UK settings is still relatively under- researched, although it is more researched 
in North American contexts (O’Neill 2009). Neither should it be forgotten that 
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several faith groups, especially those working within the most marginalized 
communities, often have resources only sufficient for their own survival with 
little else apparently to spare. There can also be a suspicion aimed at over- 
bureaucratic initiatives from central or local government that seek to profession-
alize or homogenize the very low- tech but culturally- specific ways in which 
several religious groups operate (Lukka et al. 2003).
 What is clear, however, is that most narratives of how faith groups participate 
in civil society focus on external outputs and public activities such as leadership 
and community development. This by definition tends to reinforce an instrumen-
tal understanding of participation (see Farnell above) which perhaps finds it hard 
to appreciate and value that which is not highly visible or ordinary (in the best 
sense of the word).
 Further research is needed into the extent to which patterns of participation 
by Muslim women in particular allow them to function as bridgers in the wider 
community, and what that bridging might look like. What is also required is the 
development of more qualitative measurement systems that might give a rounded 
and holistic understanding of the impact of faith- based engagement on the lives 
of both individuals and communities. These measurement systems need to 
engage with the immaterial as well as the material levels of happiness, and to 
take account of the strongly expressed sentiments expressed in both the Muslim 
and Christian focus groups: to practise delayed gratification (i.e. practise long- 
term peace over short- term satisfaction); to voluntarily give up some degree of 
personal autonomy to the discipline of either a community or external source of 
authority like the Bible or the Qur’an; to practise charity and/or commit uncon-
ditionally to both others of one’s faith group and one’s neighbours – all these 
values bring a significant degree of wellbeing that other disciplines are now 
beginning to recognize the value of.
 Thus much of what has been expressed in these focus groups aligns closely to 
the third happiness factor associated with volunteering identified by the LSE 
research mentioned above and to which I want to aim my concluding remarks. If 
we recall, the first wellbeing factor was associated with meeting new people and 
extending social networks, namely the social networking hypothesis and what 
we might term loosely as ‘community’. The second factor was associated with 
being recognized for what one does, namely the social role hypothesis or ‘being 
valued’. The third wellbeing factor, it is suggested, is generated by deliberately 
choosing to give up something in order to identify empathically with others who 
are different from or less fortunate than yourself. This we might call the ethic of 
‘altruism’, or ‘unconditional regard’, and, as already intimated, it lies at the heart 
of much religious motivation for participation. Could it be that this wellbeing 
factor, if researched carefully but more purposefully, might give us a more 
nuanced and holistic tool by which to understand the relationship between par-
ticipation and wellbeing? And could it be that faith groups have a distinctive role 
in modelling and refining this tool for the benefit of society as a whole?
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14 Crime, wellbeing and society
Reflections on social, ‘antisocial’ and 
‘restorative’ capital
Christopher Jones
Crime in the affluent society
The literature on happiness and wellbeing airs the paradox of increased levels of 
material affluence in modern societies without a comparable increase in general 
happiness or wellbeing. The paradox may be explained by a more differentiated 
account of the goals that human beings pursue. Thus Robert Lane in his 
acclaimed study The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies argues that hap-
piness and income have a curvilinear relationship. In poor societies, he contends, 
there is a strong relationship between increases in income and individual happi-
ness, but beyond a certain level of affluence diminishing returns set in and com-
panionship is valued more highly than money (Lane 2000: chs 4 and 5). 
Similarly, Avner Offer in The Challenge of Affluence highlights the importance 
of ‘the economy of regard’ in which many forms of non- market exchange 
operate in the context of incentives influenced by personal relations (Offer 2006: 
ch. 5). For both authors, market economies not merely leave out of account, but 
actively undermine, major elements in human wellbeing.
 The paradox may also be explained by positing that people are not necessarily 
accurate judges of the causes of their own wellbeing – as Lane goes on to argue 
– and that they make inconsistent choices over time as a result of what Offer 
terms ‘myopic bias’ towards short- term hedonic reward. Both Lane and Offer 
contend that market economies provide an institutional and cultural environment 
which tends to encourage mistaken beliefs about the sources of happiness and to 
reward self- defeating behaviour in pursuit of it. For Lane, this is seen in the 
choice of money over companionship, and for Offer, in the pervasive erosion of 
self- control and commitment to long- term objectives.
 Both sets of observations might seem to offer some help in explaining the 
conjunction between the increase in affluence and the steady increase in crime 
in most economically developed societies between 1960 and the present. It can 
be suggested that a market economy, by prioritizing the pursuit of material 
gain at the expense of social cooperation, leaves those who are unable to 
compete effectively in the market with a sense of relative deprivation which 
can only be assuaged by illegal forms of acquisition and weakens the social 
inhibitions that would otherwise restrain them. This is effectively a restatement 
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of the theory of ‘anomie’ advanced decades ago by the sociologist Robert 
Merton (1938).
 However, differing prescriptions may be derived from this scenario. It is fre-
quently used to justify a conservative and individualistic policy whose aim is 
simply to induce the criminally inclined among the deprived to desist from crime 
through a combination of incapacitation and deterrence. Alternatively, an 
approach more sensitive to social inequality would advocate tackling the dis-
advantages which create the conditions for offending (Gorringe 2004). In recent 
years, the role of interlocking forms of deprivation in generating crime has been 
recognized by government, notably in the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) report 
Reducing re- offending by ex- prisoners (Social Exclusion Unit 2002). The eco-
nomic, social and political mechanisms which produce affluence for the majority 
systematically disadvantage certain types of people, not only making them more 
liable to offend in the first place, but also making it more difficult for them to 
desist.
 The SEU report showed in detail what practitioners in the criminal justice 
system have long known: that prisoners are much more likely than the general 
population to have been brought up in care or in highly dysfunctional families; 
that they tend to have experienced disruption to their education, leading to lower 
levels of skills and qualifications and high incidence of unemployment; that 
around 70 per cent of them suffer from two or more diagnosable mental disor-
ders; that a high proportion of them are dependent on drugs or alcohol and their 
physical health is relatively poor; and that they tend to have a history of home-
lessness and debt. It states bluntly, ‘The failure of mainstream agencies to deal 
with these aspects of social exclusion means that the Prison Service and Proba-
tion Service are being asked to put right a lifetime of service failure’ (Social 
Exclusion Unit 2002: 18).
The relevance of social capital
Explanations of crime based on highly generalized factors, whether inclining 
towards right- or left- wing interpretations, achieve both too much and too little. 
On the one hand, not all people who are acquisitive and economically deprived, 
or those who are acquisitive and economically powerful, turn to crime; on the 
other, there are many aspects of crime, such as the use of violence, on which this 
sheds little light. The broad socio- cultural environment is influential in setting 
the context of criminal behaviour. However, any attempt to trace the social roots 
of crime must engage more closely with social structures and interactions at dif-
ferent levels, particularly in local communities where positive and negative 
forms of socialization bear upon individuals and groups. The analyses of Lane 
and Offer point in this direction. The outworking of choices between compan-
ionship and income and the operation of the ‘economy of regard’ takes place in 
families, organizations and communities subject to particular sets of opportun-
ities and constraints. Companionship as a human good is understood by Lane to 
embrace families and friends, and to meet a variety of needs including the desire 
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for reciprocal help, intimacy and affiliation. The ‘economy of regard’, according 
to Offer, builds up relationships through gift exchanges which both establish an 
expectation of reciprocity and communicate approval.
 These considerations may be set alongside the widespread view among crimi-
nologists that policy makers tend to overestimate the influence of the criminal 
justice system at the expense of the norms and sanctions of everyday life that 
underpin the operation of the law. While the criminal law tends to be reactive 
and adaptive – and in any case appears to deal with only about 3 per cent of 
actual offences committed – informal social controls are preventative and form-
ative (Garland 2001).
 Awareness of the significance for social policy of the associations and organi-
zations of civil society has crystallized in recent years in the formulation and use 
of the concept of ‘social capital’. This is defined by one of its leading British 
exponents, David Halpern, in terms of three elements: a social network, the 
cluster of norms, values and expectations shared by those who belong to it, and 
the norms and sanctions that help to maintain the network (Halpern 2005: 10). 
The concept highlights key features of human interaction that facilitate indi-
vidual and collective action across many areas of social life. The terminology of 
‘capital’ reflects the judgement that these features of interaction constitute 
resources that are accumulated and invested in purposeful activity over time, and 
may be augmented or depleted in the process.
 ‘Social capital’ is best seen as an organizing concept uniting a variety of phe-
nomena at a high level of generality. In view of this, its critics question the pos-
sibility of producing a consistent and useable definition, not least on account of 
the difficulty of devising satisfactory methods of measurement. At best, they say, 
its insights rest on what we know by means of more specific and verifiable con-
cepts, and at worst it may lead to flights of generalization which obscure the dif-
ferences between particular historical and social situations (for a strong statement 
of this view, see Fine 2001). There is also a question of whether social capital is 
defined by its effects, leading to an impressive but uninformative tautology: 
social capital is what facilitates certain social outcomes; what facilitates those 
outcomes is social capital. If Halpern’s definition is applied in a disciplined 
manner this circularity may be avoided, but the warning is salutary.
 What follows is an exploration of the light thrown by social capital thinking 
on crime and society’s attempts to deal with it. The contribution of religion to 
restoring social capital is discussed, and in the final section the challenge of 
broader social intervention to prevent offending is posed.
Deviance and social capital
Sociological approaches to crime have tended to proceed under the rubric of 
‘deviance’, investigating how it is that offenders against the law, individually 
and collectively, come to manifest patterns of belief and behaviour at odds with 
dominant social values. One tradition, stemming from Durkheim, sees this as 
resulting from a failure of social regulation and integration, tending to cast 
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offenders as the casualties of weakened norms and other unintended con-
sequences of social change. Other traditions have rejected the notion of societies 
as (more or less effective) self- regulating systems, emphasizing instead the pro-
cesses whereby deviant identities and meanings are constructed and maintained, 
both by social institutions and by offenders themselves.
 Within this second approach, subcultural explanations have sought to show 
how the deviant values and behaviour of particular groups can be traced to 
shared experiences, as in the so- called ‘delinquent subculture’ of adolescent men 
facing economic and other forms of deprivation (Cohen 1957). This restores 
some intelligibility and agency to deviant behaviour, and implies the possibility 
that in different situations, ‘delinquents’ might decide to change their attitudes 
and behaviour.
 The relevance of these considerations to the subject of wellbeing is that sub-
cultural influences on offending behaviour help make sense of the fact that 
offenders persist in a pattern of life that may seem to the outsider to be harmful 
to others and to themselves, but which appear to them legitimate and conducive 
to their wellbeing. Current anxiety about gang- related violence in cities in the 
UK risks failing to understand the role of gangs in creating and sustaining the 
identity of their members in the face of negative and threatening experiences, 
thereby producing a simplistic and ineffective response to violence among young 
people (Aldred et al. 2008; Alexander 2008). The impulse to condemn rather 
than to understand fails to deal with the anxiety behind the impulse, because 
accurate understanding is a condition of appropriate remedial action.
 Subcultural perspectives also take us directly into the territory of social 
capital. The Chicago School of criminology, with its grounding in urban geo-
graphy, advanced theories of ‘differential association’ linking professional crim-
inals and impressionable young men living in particular urban areas through the 
transmission of shared ‘traditions of delinquency’ (Shaw and McKay 1942). 
This is confirmed by more recent studies: Hagan and McCarthy found that 
youths on the street in Toronto and Vancouver formed groups in which deviant 
knowledge and skills (‘criminal capital’) were passed on (Hagan and McCarthy 
1997). This supplies the three elements in our definition of social capital (net-
works, norms and sanctions) but suggests that in some contexts the effects of 
social capital may be detrimental rather than beneficial. This insight is a recur-
rent theme in the literature of social capital, sometimes treated under the heading 
of ‘the dark side’ (Putnam 2000: ch. 22).
 We therefore arrive at what may playfully be termed ‘antisocial capital’ (Rubio 
(1996) speaks of ‘capital social perverso’) which is a redescription of the phe-
nomenon of deviancy from which this section began. The effects of particular 
examples of social capital need to be distinguished and evaluated. The example 
of juvenile crime suggests that these issues cannot be resolved within a purely 
functional framework, but require the application of determinative norms of per-
sonal and social good. We may note that Lane maintains that happiness cannot be 
the sole end of life, but that subjective wellbeing must be complemented by two 
other ultimate goods: human development, including virtue, and the quest for 
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justice (Lane 2000: 6). Christian belief generates moral norms based on a vision 
of human development tempered by knowledge of human fallibility, to which the 
quest for justice is central. In assessing the social values surrounding deviance 
and crime, discernment is needed to detect self- interested and ideologically 
motivated arguments on the part of both dominant and deviant groups.
Loss and restoration of social capital
The experience of young offenders demonstrates the effects of social capital, 
because the rate of offending peaks in this age range: between 15 and 18 in self- 
reported data, and between 17 and 21 in arrests (Farrington 1986; Smith 1995). 
Social capital contributes to a developmental explanation in highlighting both 
inadequate or negative endowments in childhood (e.g. absence of stable and con-
sistent parenting, experience of abuse or violence, associated educational failure) 
and the loss in the transitions of adolescence of whatever positive connections 
there may have been. This is likely to produce an inability to form strong and 
cooperative intimate relationships and/or the tendency to associate with deviant 
peer groups, as already noted. Thus the early deficits in social capital increase 
the difficulty of adding to it at a later stage.
 Lane talks of personality as itself a ‘capital stock’ (Lane 2000: 45–47), 
reminding us of the interaction between human and social capital or, as it might 
more traditionally be put, between psychological and environmental factors in 
development. This raises the methodological problem of distinguishing the 
direction of causality: do a person’s psychological flaws bring about social 
exclusion, or vice versa? The only sensible answer would seem to be ‘both’, but 
the proportions elude precise determination.
 This developmental account is supported by the clear finding that the majority 
of young offenders desist from crime in their early twenties, most of them after 
relatively few offences, while a small minority continue to offend repeatedly. A 
large part of this may be explained by the formation of new social bonds. In their 
study Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning Points Through Life, 
Sampson and Laub re- examined the life history of 500 offenders and 500 non- 
delinquents from the late 1940s and 1950s, finding that job stability, commit-
ment to education and marriage were strong predictors of desistance from 
offending (Sampson and Laub 1993).
 Similarly, the survey of young people in Toronto and Vancouver which 
showed the effects of parental rejection, family disruption and educational 
failure in pushing them on to the streets also showed the benefits of employment 
in securing release from a criminal lifestyle and preventing a return to homeless-
ness (Hagan and McCarthy 1997). There is strong evidence, both statistical and 
anecdotal, that ‘social ties . . . create interdependent systems of obligation and 
restraint that impose significant costs for translating criminal propensities into 
action’ (Sampson and Laub 1993: 141).
 These findings are crucial to the efforts made by government and other agen-
cies to promote the rehabilitation of offenders. Historically, commitment to reha-
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bilitation in Britain came about through a mixture of religious and secular 
influence. The religious approach, pioneered by John Howard and Elizabeth Fry, 
sought the conversion of the individual in response to the divine offer of forgive-
ness. The secular, expounded in its purest form by Jeremy Bentham, held that 
the prospect of the infliction of pain would deter future offending. However, 
both approaches tended to overestimate the power of the individual will and to 
neglect the need for social support.
 The twentieth century saw a conscious effort to balance punishment and 
welfare (Garland 1985) through officially supported resettlement of prisoners. In 
1907 the Probation Service was formed, building on the activities of the police 
court missionaries and charged with the duty to ‘assist, advise and befriend’ dis-
charged prisoners, with particular attention to avoiding drunkenness. Before 
long, the religious ethos of the Service was transmuted into social casework 
based on a therapeutic model of offenders’ needs and motivation, and reinforced 
by attention to education and employment.
 These attempts at rehabilitation, often more ambitious than evidence- based, 
were undermined by two developments. First, therapy- based rehabilitation was 
rejected by many practitioners and by government as ineffective and intrusive, 
because it subjected offenders to open- ended ‘treatment’ on a morally question-
able basis. Second, the role of probation officers moved increasingly away from 
care towards control, enforcing the decisions of the courts and reporting 
breaches, until probation was seen as another form of punishment rather than an 
alternative to it. From the early 1970s to the mid- 1990s this left a policy vacuum, 
which was filled successively by the depressing slogans ‘Nothing Works’, 
‘Humane Containment’ and ‘Prison Works’. Rehabilitation seemed to have lost 
its bearings.
The brave new world of ‘offender management’
The past 15 years have seen a major shift in policy. First, international research 
appeared to show the effectiveness, in some circumstances, of offending behavi-
our programmes based on cognitive behavioural therapy, seeking to change 
negative patterns of thinking and action. Second, following the election of the 
Labour government in 1997, there was renewed awareness of the social needs of 
offenders and a commitment to more integrated forms of the resettlement of ex- 
offenders in the community.
 Through the work of the Social Exclusion Unit and the interest of the Prime 
Minister’s Strategy Unit (advised by David Halpern, among others), the chal-
lenge of rebuilding social capital began to assume new prominence in policy 
making. A leap forward came with the first Carter Report of 2003 (Carter 2003). 
This recommended the merger of the prison and probation services to promote 
continuity in care and management; a more sparing use of imprisonment with 
increased use of community sentences; and the provision of integrated services 
to offenders through prison and on discharge, commissioned from public, private 
and voluntary sector organizations.
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 Of these recommendations it may be said that the objectives were right but 
the means chosen to pursue them were flawed. The merger of prison and proba-
tion was not self- evidently the best or only method of promoting better 
coordination between them; and the competitive commissioning model has led 
to considerable difficulties and delays in implementation. It is probably true that 
traditional methods of probation work were over- individualistic. However, the 
great strength of the system, at its best, was the element of sympathetic personal 
interaction. The strategy now emerging under the label of ‘offender manage-
ment’ attempts to combine a degree of personal supervision with the provision 
of services to build up – directly and indirectly – offenders’ social capital in 
order to prevent their re- offending.
 These measures are grouped under seven ‘pathways to resettlement’ (National 
Offender Management Service 2005: chs 4–10). The direct measures include 
support in education, training and employment, and strengthening relationships 
with families and children. The indirect measures increase the potential to build up 
offenders’ social capital by augmenting their human capital. They include assist-
ance with finding accommodation, treatment of physical and mental health prob-
lems including drug and alcohol dependence, and help with finance, debts and 
benefits. The seventh pathway is significant: ‘attitudes, thinking and behaviour’, 
recognizing that offenders themselves need to take responsibility for changing. 
The title reflects the current popularity of cognitive behavioural therapy. Unfortu-
nately, there are doubts as to the appropriateness of such programmes, originally 
developed for use with white male offenders, for women (Shaw and Hannah- 
Moffatt 2004) and members of minority ethnic groups (Lewis et al. 2006b).
 Although the resettlement strategy is welcome in its broad scope and positive 
aims, there are major concerns about its likely effectiveness in restoring or build-
ing up the social capital of offenders. First, the organizational problems in pro-
viding individual and integrated programmes (whether by statutory, voluntary or 
private bodies) are enormous, and it is not clear that the demarcation of path-
ways will help in that direction. Second, the prospect of adequate resourcing for 
these programmes, which was always doubtful, has been rendered highly 
improbable by the financial crisis. Third, there is little point in building up the 
social capital of ex- offenders if the resources for doing so are diverted from 
mainstream health, education and social services, as appears to have happened in 
the youth justice system since 1997 (Solomon and Garside 2008: ch. 2). Fourth, 
the very term ‘offender management’ betrays the preoccupation with risk aver-
sion and control in modern criminal justice policy (Hudson 2003), which stands 
in tension with the growth of trust and reciprocity at the heart of social capital. 
Finally, the strategy depended on a significant reduction in the use of prison 
which has proved politically and operationally impossible to achieve.
Religion and restorative capital
The discussion so far has implicitly been informed by the Christian paradigm of 
creation, sin and redemption. Social capital has been understood as a feature of 
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the created order, part of God’s good provision for human fulfilment but subject 
to corruption and misuse by human beings. Christian theology does not find the 
reality of ‘antisocial’ capital surprising: it exemplifies the pervasive ambiguity of 
human action and social interaction. The third element in the theological pattern, 
that of redemption, refers to the overcoming of what has gone wrong and the ful-
filment of God’s purposes for humanity and the created order. I have deliberately 
referred to the ‘restoration’ of social capital, as reflecting the divine purpose and 
echoing the concept of restorative justice, which is congruent with Christianity 
and many other religious and non- religious belief systems (for a general survey, 
see Tickell and Akester 2004).
 It remains to ask what role the Christian churches, and other faith communit-
ies, might have in building up social capital in relation to crime and offenders. I 
suggest that this contribution naturally lies in the provision of what may be 
called ‘restorative’ social capital – that is, the repair of the networks, norms and 
sanctions, and the patterns of trust and reciprocity, that have been damaged by 
crime. This would properly include engagement with victims as well as offend-
ers, but space precludes treatment of that topic.
 The topics at the heart of this discussion resonate with the characteristic con-
cerns of religion. The priority of companionship over material satisfaction, the 
indispensability of gift exchange, and the nurturing of trust and reciprocity 
would be affirmed by most religious traditions. The Christian religion has par-
ticular reason to engage with the criminal justice system, since its central narra-
tive recounts the condemnation and execution of its acknowledged Saviour 
alongside criminals, as the climax of a public ministry marked by restoration of 
those who had transgressed moral and religious laws. Although Christianity has 
too frequently regressed to punitive attitudes and behaviour, its normative teach-
ings, stories and paradigms witness that showing mercy, offering forgiveness 
and seeking restoration are divine acts which humans are called to emulate. 
Churches are committed to embodying and making available creative and restor-
ative social capital, to offenders and victims of crime as to everyone else.
 The recognition that churches are themselves social networks with distinctive 
norms and sanctions prompts the question whether there is anything distinctive 
about their mobilization of social capital. Economists and social scientists have 
occasionally used the term ‘religious capital’ as a subset of social capital, but the 
debate has been advanced by the work of the William Temple Foundation on 
regenerating communities. Their 2006 report Faith in Action distinguishes 
between ‘spiritual capital’ as the motivating and energizing basis of faith, belief 
and values that shapes the life of faith communities, and ‘religious capital’ as the 
practical contribution to the life of society made by faith communities (Baker 
and Skinner 2006: 4–5). In criminal justice work, the spiritual capital of the 
churches is the redemptive narrative and vision outlined above, while their reli-
gious capital is the outworking of that vision in restorative action and 
relationships.
 Here we must also distinguish between ideal and reality. The ambiguity 
between social and ‘antisocial’ capital applies as much to churches and faith 
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communities as to any other social network. The literature routinely distin-
guishes three types, or uses, of social capital: ‘bonding’, which has the result of 
reinforcing similar identities (e.g. family, class, ethnicity or religion); ‘bridging’, 
by which relationships are forged with groups of different social, economic or 
cultural status; and ‘linking’, as a result of which individuals and groups are able 
to access other networks of power and resources. This means that spiritual and 
religious capital may be used by individuals and groups for their own wellbeing, 
or may be ‘donated’ to the wider community (Baker and Skinner 2006: 11).
 Recent years have seen the setting up of (approaching) 20 community chap-
laincies in England and Wales as support networks for prisoners resettling in the 
community. The emphasis is upon helping with practical needs, but also on per-
sonal support, advice and mentoring, usually by trained volunteers. Community 
chaplaincies are ecumenical, and in some places interfaith, and routinely involve 
partnership with statutory and secular agencies – bridging and linking. In this 
enterprise the restorative vision at the heart of Christianity, converging at points 
with the vision of other faiths, finds practical expression in reciprocal and 
empowering relationships.
 It is clear both that the ethos of the New Testament and authentic Christianity 
is about costly self- giving in order to find life, and that churches often prefer to 
defend their own identity and security. The presence of ex- offenders in church 
congregations reveals how far their social capital is ‘bonding’ rather than ‘bridg-
ing’, as members find it difficult to sympathize with alien experiences and iden-
tities. It is also true that church members may engage in work with offenders 
from a position of non- reciprocity, seeking only to conform others to their own 
religious identity, teaching without learning and giving without receiving.
 The point of drawing on spiritual capital is to become free to take risks and to 
meet failure with honesty, resilience and hope. It is commonly found that net-
works of Christians who do this find the ability to go out to people with disturb-
ingly different life histories and embark on a journey of transformation. 
Typically this transformation affects not only those whom they seek to help, but 
themselves as they are challenged and blessed by the needs of strangers and by 
the moral and political implications that their encounters uncover.
From cure to prevention: crucial choices
Prominent among those moral and political implications is that close engage-
ment with offenders points up the urgent need to build up social capital so as to 
prevent offending in the first place. Another way of making the point would be 
to ask whether the focus on restoring the social capital of individuals diverts 
attention from the systemic dynamics of social exclusion traced by the SEU 
report. Insofar as it fails to deal with the causes and consequences of this, the 
criminal justice system re- victimizes offenders with multiple needs and makes 
their situation still more intractable. Offenders easily become scapegoats for fail-
ings for which society, and the dominant groups within it, bear a broader 
responsibility.
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 From this perspective, official policy displays a profound incoherence result-
ing from failure to face the implications of what is known about the social roots 
of crime, and to learn from decades of relatively ineffective response. Govern-
ments have attempted to combine the rhetoric of punitive populism with a degree 
of informed commitment to rehabilitation and prevention. It is clear that in 
recent years the punitive agenda has won out and the possibility of adequately 
redirecting policy has been compromised (Tonry 2004).
 Expanding prison capacity, which is the policy of both major political parties, 
exemplifies this incoherence. If offending results partly from a failure to connect 
with mainstream social networks, and desistance from offending is helped by 
connecting or reconnecting with them, prison tends to aggravate the loss of 
social capital (family, education, employment) and threatens to undermine the 
movement towards restoration. In addition, ‘prison may reinforce the indi-
vidual’s connections to alternative or criminal forms of social capital’ (Halpern 
2005: 119). It is of course true that prison may also give potential for an increase 
in social capital through educational and other opportunities, such as drug treat-
ment, but the detrimental effects seem likely to outweigh the possible gains.
 The situation is now complicated by the involvement of the private sector in 
building and managing prisons. This began in the 1990s and is now planned to 
increase as a means of achieving the expansion in capacity which is deemed 
necessary to deal with prison overcrowding – a course memorably compared by 
a former Bishop to Prisons to the expedient of widening the M25 motorway as a 
means of relieving traffic congestion (Selby 2007: 321). Although there is a case 
for competition as a means of raising standards, there are many reasons for 
concern about the growth in private prisons, not least the creation of a commer-
cial complex with a vested interest in incarceration. By removing financial and 
practical barriers to expansion, privatization may encourage governments to 
evade the pressure to search for a better way.
 One way of conceptualizing the necessary reorientation of policy is the 
increasingly influential idea of ‘justice reinvestment’, recently commended by 
the Howard League’s Commission on English Prisons Today (2009) and the 
subject of a forthcoming report from the House of Commons Justice Committee. 
The term was coined in the United States as a result of dawning recognition that 
the massive resources now devoted to criminal justice processes and an outland-
ish rate of imprisonment (1 per cent of the population) would be better devoted 
to remedial social, health and educational programmes. Justice reinvestment 
seeks to restore the social capital of local communities and not simply of indi-
viduals, and does so by devolving power to determine spending priorities from 
national to local level.
 For example, from 2002 the State of Connecticut launched a programme 
halting prison building and setting up local resettlement projects backed by 
increased resources for probation supervision and treatment services. Although 
difficulties were encountered in community planning, the prison population was 
reduced substantially and crime rates declined (Allen and Stern 2007: 12–14). 
Similarly, New York State has cut the prison population and reduced crime by 
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coordinating investment in mental health and drug treatment, housing and social 
support, and by instituting specialist drug and community courts with an empha-
sis on problem solving and diversion from custody (Commission on English 
Prisons Today 2009: 24). In the United Kingdom a Justice Reinvestment pilot 
project has been pursued in the Metropolitan District of Gateshead (Allen and 
Stern 2007: ch. 2), and since 2004 an innovative Community Justice Court with 
multi- agency support has operated in North Liverpool (Fletcher 2007).
 These straws in the wind raise formidable challenges, particularly in over-
coming the public mood of punitiveness, finding the necessary resources in a 
harsh economic climate and tackling the dilemmas of local responsibility. 
However, they demonstrate promising alternatives to the costly and self- 
defeating spiral of imprisonment. They also suggest that once the spiral has been 
countered and broken, the benefits will become apparent and the assumption that 
the status quo constitutes hard- headed realism can be turned on its head. What-
ever may ensue, the case for change is powerful, and increasingly urgent for our 
individual and communal wellbeing.
15 Supporting offenders
A faith- based initiative
Charlotte Lorimer
This is the story of how a new faith- based project, known as the Greater Man-
chester Community Chaplaincy (GMCC), was established in Greater Manches-
ter. It was a response to a need highlighted by prison chaplains working in 
Manchester Prison. GMCC seeks to support offenders who choose to live crime- 
free lives. Volunteers are at the heart of what is offered and, like the offenders, 
may be people of faith or no faith.
	 This	account	also	tells	of	the	long	and	sometimes	difficult	journey	from	vision	
to	reality.	Significant	to	the	development	of	this	project	was	establishing	partner-
ships	with	other	agencies	who	work	with	offenders.	The	most	 significant	part-
nership is with Greater Manchester Probation. The initiative was taken in 2000 
by	Christine	Knott,	 then	Chief	Officer	 for	Greater	Manchester	Probation,	who	
had heard about the success of Community Chaplaincy in Canada, where it was 
started by the Mennonite Church. Christine invited representatives from Greater 
Manchester Churches Together to a meeting to discuss the possibility of working 
together to create a Community Chaplaincy for Greater Manchester. At this time 
I was a Prison Chaplain at Manchester Prison and Methodist Minister to the city 
centre of Manchester. My work in these two places involved pastoral care for 
offenders and their families while offenders were in prison and on release. I had 
heard the Revd Dr Pierre Allard, Assistant Commissioner Correctional Services 
of Canada, speak at a Prison Service Chaplains’ conference in 1999 about the 
response made by the Mennonites to the needs of offenders, and I had already 
begun to talk to other chaplains, local churches and the Manchester Prison Fel-
lowship about how feasible it would be to set up a support network based on the 
Canadian model. The timing was right to make the vision a reality.
 The process from vision to reality has included the joy of working alongside 
and learning from other agencies, being amazed by the passion and commitment 
of volunteers, and disappointment over the often slow progress, sometimes the 
result of suspicion and fears on the part of the professionals towards people of 
faith. I write this empirical account as a practitioner who was instrumental in 
establishing and then coordinating GMCC until September 2007. I make little 
claim to being a theologian but having said that, my own understanding is that 
all people who believe in God should be prepared to give an account of what 
they believe and what they do in relation to their knowledge of the nature of God 
196  C. Lorimer
(Graham et al. 2005). GMCC is based on a belief in the worth of each person 
who having been made in the image of God has the capacity to grow more into 
the likeness of God. In The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius (Rickaby 1936) 
we are told that human desire and choice should be for what is ‘more conducive 
to the end for which we are created’, and to achieve this we should choose such 
things as will take us nearer to that end.
 GMCC has recruited and trained a diverse group of people. The commitment, 
enthusiasm and richness of the skills our volunteers offer has contributed to 
making GMCC the success that it is. There are many people in our communities 
who	have	time	to	spare	and	are	themselves	feeling	unfulfilled.	Volunteer-	based	
projects offer an opportunity for a rich seam of talent to be exposed and used. 
There	 is	 double	 benefit	 in	 that	 those	 in	 need	of	 help	 receive	 it	 and	 those	who	
need to give have an outlet for their care and compassion. This brings a real 
sense of reciprocity and one which is acknowledged by the GMCC volunteers. 
We	are	inclusive	and	try	to	find	a	place	for	everyone	who	volunteers.	We	had	a	
man with learning disabilities who was not suitable to support offenders on a 
one- to-one basis, but who with supervision turned into a real asset in our Cafe 
Central (see below). It is right that volunteers get something out of volunteering 
as well as giving. People have various motives for volunteering: the need to 
experience contact with offenders prior to working with them in a professional 
capacity, either in probation or the prison service, as a response to crime in their 
area, their faith and/or the desire to show love and concern in a practical way. 
One volunteer who was in his last year at university came ‘just for the experi-
ence, it will look good on my CV when I apply for jobs’. He was so moved by 
the life situations and especially the mental health issues of some of the offend-
ers that instead of continuing in his chosen career he decided to train to become 
a psychiatric nurse. GMCC aims to contribute to the process of integration of 
offenders back into society and of supporting those who have made the decision 
not to re- offend; volunteers are crucial to this aim. Offenders often ask the ques-
tion; ‘Why would someone bother with people like us?’, and are surprised by the 
answer: ‘We care about you and want to help you improve your life.’ The idea 
of people doing anything without expecting something in return can be a new 
and hard to understand concept for some offenders. GMCC believes that what 
we get is reduction in crime and positive growth in individuals, and is worth all 
the hard work.
	 It	can	be	really	difficult	for	any	offender	to	begin	a	new	life	on	release.	Their	
old supports and social networks, friends and family may well involve criminal 
activity, and they can easily be drawn back into a life involving crime, or 
become isolated and lonely if they reject criminal activity. If what they once 
thought of as a good way of life is shown for what it really is, and even if they 
then	reject	it,	there	will	be	a	void	to	be	filled.	Somehow	each	person	has	to	come	
to realize for themselves what brings joy and happiness, but some people need to 
hear what alternatives are available. The opening scene from A.A. Milne’s 
Winnie- the-Pooh has a picture of Edward Bear being dragged downstairs behind 
Christopher Robin, and his head is being bumped on each stair. ‘It is, as far as he 
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knows, the only way of coming downstairs, but sometimes he feels that there 
really is another way, if only he could stop bumping for a moment and think of 
it’ (Milne 1976: 1). People caught up in criminality are often so overwhelmed by 
their situation that they can’t even begin to think of an alternative. Offering 
alternative lifestyles and challenging offending behaviour are part of what should 
happen to people in prison and among the ways of doing this is hearing the 
words of wisdom found in spiritual writings, and in particular but not exclusively 
the words of Jesus as found in the Christian tradition. Contact with prison chap-
lains	will	often	help	people	to	talk	about	how	they	live,	identifying	the	selfish-
ness and greed that drives their behaviour. Rowan Williams described one of the 
functions of a prison chaplain as ‘the truth teller’ (Williams 1994). In prison it is 
often in conversations with a chaplain that people become aware of the effect 
their behaviour has had on themselves and other people, and experience a real 
sense of regret and remorse for what they have done, creating a genuine desire 
not to re- offend. This may well last, or it may dissipate on release.
 Each offender who is referred to the GMCC is assessed and must consent to 
the probation service passing on relevant information about his or her criminal 
activity and behaviour. This information helps in matching a suitable volunteer 
but also serves to see the person for who they really are and, as Jesus did, to see 
beyond to what that person could become. The GMCC aims to help individuals 
make choices that will enhance rather than diminish themselves and those 
around them. This is done by one- to-one support and through enabling people to 
become part of a community.
 It should be obvious to the participants in and the observers of the GMCC 
what effect contact with the GMCC has on the individuals involved, but the 
GMCC does have the task of giving an account of the work it does, as descrip-
tion, explanation and evaluation. A quantitative evaluation of the work is often 
required to satisfy funders, although a subjective qualitative evaluation also has 
relevance to proving the value of our work. Yet the latter can be problematic 
insofar	as	it	is	more	difficult	to	present	to	and/or	be	accepted	by	those	who	prefer	
to measure tangible outcomes. Any assessment or evaluation of happiness and 
wellbeing is also confronted with this quandary. If the GMCC has had a positive 
effect on a person then that person will not have re- offended, will be contribut-
ing to his or her community in a positive way, will be able to say that they are 
living a better quality of life, and that they feel more positive about themselves 
and their life situation than when they were involved in crime.
 One volunteer had been visiting a man prior to release. While in prison this 
man had stopped being dependent on various non- prescription drugs and was 
attending a weekly Bible study group led by volunteers. He said he really wanted 
a different kind of life when he got out. The GMCC had made arrangements for 
accommodation and his volunteer was to meet him at the prison gate on the 
morning of his release. His volunteer was waiting for him as arranged, but as he 
was walking towards her he saw two men, stopped and looked both ways before 
he went off with his ‘friends’. It was not long before he was back in prison and 
asked to speak to the chaplain. He was full of regrets and apologies for not going 
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with his GMCC volunteer, for using non- prescription drugs and stealing to fund 
his drug addiction. The volunteer began visiting him again and he attended the 
Bible study group. Arrangements were made for accommodation and his volun-
teer was at the main gate on the morning of his release, but so too were his 
‘friends’. He looked both ways and chose to go with them. When he was once 
again arrested and sent to prison he was visited by the chaplain. He was very 
surprised when the chaplain told him that his volunteer was willing to come and 
see him again and that the GMCC was still prepared to support him. He was a 
classic example of the recidivist offender who is in and out of prison, serving 
short sentences and never out of prison long enough to establish a settled life-
style and who costs the taxpayer a lot of money. Prison is not an inexpensive 
option. This man is now a volunteer, but he had to make the decision of which 
way to go. He has been drug- free for over two years and his story is a real 
encouragement to others who think that they will never be able to change or that 
they have ‘messed up’ so many times that the GMCC will give up on them. 
GMCC volunteers show a great deal of patience and graciousness, accepting that 
the offenders with whom they are matched may well not turn up for appoint-
ments and that any progress may be slow and hard won. So when a matching is 
successful it brings great joy and makes the hard work worthwhile. Even if a 
person re- offends, for example, it can be rated as a kind of success if the period 
of time during which they have stayed crime- free has increased or if they commit 
a less serious offence.
	 ‘Dave’	 made	 slow	 progress	 at	 first.	 His	 self-	confidence	 and	 sense	 of	 self-	
worth were both very low and he needed his volunteer to encourage him and 
help	him	find	the	inner	strength	just	to	begin	what	most	of	us	do	on	a	daily	basis	
without much thought. His volunteer would call him on the telephone or send 
him a text message to remind him to get out of bed and keep an appointment, go 
with him to help in the communication process between him and the profession-
als with whom he needed to engage, or go shopping or for a coffee. Dave also 
had a real struggle with issues involving his sexuality and sense of identity. 
Behaviour that was not illegal and which in the past had seemed to bring happi-
ness now seemed shallow and empty to him. The GMCC did not condemn his 
behaviour	but	encouraged	him	to	find	alternative	activities	 that	would	 increase	
rather than diminish his self- esteem and make him feel happy. One afternoon he 
was asked to help in Cafe Central. When the afternoon was over, he said that he 
felt really good, and that washing dishes and clearing tables had given him a 
buzz! A purposeful activity, being needed, working alongside other people, 
being thanked for what he had done gave him a sense of personal satisfaction, 
increased	his	 self-	worth	 and	made	him	happy.	A	 small	 but	 significant	 step	 on	
one man’s journey from feeling worthless and thinking that he had nothing to 
contribute,	 to	 an	 increased	 confidence	 and	 a	 belief	 in	 his	 ability	 to	 learn	 new	
skills. He has also learned to love himself and believe that he can love and be 
loved.
 I have permission from ‘Danny’ to tell his story and I include it not to excuse 
his criminal behaviour but to illustrate how his changed life situation contributed 
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to his behaviour, and how the GMCC was able to help when he was released 
from prison. Married with two children, a mortgage, two cars and a job, ‘Danny’ 
was living a fairly typical life of a man in his early thirties. He was shocked 
when his wife told him she had begun a relationship with another man and 
wanted a divorce. They discussed what would be best for the children and he 
agreed	to	move	out	of	the	family	home	and	rent	a	flat.	This	arrangement	worked	
until ‘Danny’ became increasingly lonely, missing the ordinary things that 
family life brings with it. His abuse of alcohol resulted in verbal and written 
warnings from work. His self- esteem was very low and he resented seeing his 
children enjoying themselves with their new family. He felt isolated, excluded, 
and as his alcohol abuse increased his physical and mental health deteriorated to 
such a degree that his ex- wife asked him not to visit the children because he was 
having	an	adverse	effect	on	them.	He	lost	his	job	and	his	flat.	‘Danny’	said	the	
first	night	he	slept	on	the	streets	of	the	city	centre	life	became	so	much	simpler,	
he didn’t care what happened to him because no one else cared what happened 
to him, no one needed or wanted him any more. There is a way of existing in the 
city centre: people slip out of the system, and begging, casual work for cash, 
prostitution and crime provide the wherewithal to survive. ‘Danny’, while drunk, 
was	involved	in	a	fight	with	another	man	who	was	also	drunk.	The	fight	resulted	
in the other man falling to the ground, sustaining head injuries and dying. 
‘Danny’ was arrested, charged and convicted of manslaughter. While in prison 
he didn’t drink alcohol, learned a new trade, attended church, a Bible study 
group, learned to live with the bereavement of divorce and separation from his 
children and was optimistic about life after prison. A volunteer was matched 
with ‘Danny’ and visited him prior to release. When he was released from prison 
‘Danny’ became depressed by the smallness of his life and after six months he 
found it hard to sustain his optimism. He had moved home twice, had only a few 
job interviews and no offers of employment. Contact with his children had been 
re- established but at quite a minimal level. The focus of his week was visiting 
Cafe Central. ‘Danny’ said that his GMCC volunteer was the rock that kept him 
grounded and gave him a sense of hope, and without her he would have ‘gone 
under’. Eighteen months later ‘Danny’ feels good about his life and is beginning 
to feel happy. He is now in paid employment, his circle of activities is growing, 
he has increasing amounts of contact time with his children and he sees less of 
his GMCC volunteer.
 ‘Danny’s’ story is an example of how the GMCC seeks to support offenders. 
If we are to be true to our aims and objectives as a faith- based activity, then part 
of the very nature of God should be evident in the activity. The daily routine and 
behaviour required by life in an institution such as prison can help people to 
survive but can inhibit social relatedness or personal autonomy. The GMCC is 
informed and motivated by an incarnational understanding of the nature of God 
and a Trinitarian dynamic of relatedness expressed in creating and sustaining a 
healthy	community	in	which	individuals	can	flourish.	Social	capital	is	increased	
when people take an active part in promoting good, and diminished when people 
absent themselves from social engagement. The Christian tradition is grounded 
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in the person of Jesus who came to live among people and by his words and 
actions enhance their lives. Jesus helped them to discover joy and happiness and 
challenged them to go and help others. Healthy community is about response 
and commitment to one another where there is creativity and social cohesion. 
Who we are is affected both positively and negatively by those with whom we 
have contact, which is important in the formation of identity and personhood. 
The GMCC can make a contribution to the rehabilitation of offenders by its 
praxis,	and	I	suggest	that	the	GMCC	is	both	mission	and	ministry	firmly	based	
on the principles set out by Jesus and, therefore, a valid activity for the institu-
tional church to support. The GMCC does not set out to convert or proselytize 
but	as	people	of	faith	we	have	something	important	to	offer	in	the	affirmation	of	
repentance, forgiveness, reconciliation and fullness of life as positive factors in 
the rehabilitation of offenders. Challenging offending behaviour, promoting 
ways of working for justice and peace, and creating inclusive and life- enhancing 
communities is what the criminal justice system is about, but it is also the 
Shalom or peace or wellbeing associated with the Kingdom of God. If people are 
accompanied and supported in their chosen crime- free life the negative effects 
on the victims of crime will decrease and ex- offenders will contribute in a posit-
ive way. A great advocate and supporter of the GMCC, Terrence Brain, Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Salford, says this about the GMCC:
Everyone in prison comes from a community; on release everyone in prison 
returns	to	a	community.	Those	communities	can	be	an	influence	both	good	
and bad on the people who live in them. If local communities can be a good 
influence,	less	will	leave	to	go	to	prison.	If	local	communities	can	welcome	
home	former	prisoners	and	influence	them	for	good,	there	is	a	good	chance	
they will not re- offend. This is what community chaplaincy is all about. It is 
worth a try!
Cafe	Central	plays	a	significant	part	in	the	life	of	the	GMCC.	It	is	based	in	Meth-
odist Central Hall, which is situated opposite the main bus station in the city 
centre and provides an easily accessible place where volunteers can meet the 
people whom they support. Cafe Central is open to the public, has a warm, 
friendly and welcoming atmosphere, and serves good food. Sitting in the café, it 
is never easy to work out who people are. It is not obvious who are ex- offenders, 
volunteers or indeed professional people having a meeting, or just regular cus-
tomers. The pleasant surroundings create a good setting in which people can talk 
and be listened to. The relaxed atmosphere has a calming effect on people who 
perhaps have never sat down at a table and had someone listen to them or indeed 
talk to them in an interested and sensitive way. The people who staff the café are 
pleasant,	efficient,	caring,	and	take	a	real	interest	in	the	people	whom	they	serve.	
A 26-year- old man cried on his birthday when he was given a cake; he had never 
had a birthday cake before. It is also a place where convicted offenders who are 
not serving a custodial sentence can be placed by the Greater Manchester Proba-
tion to work, in order to complete the hours needed to comply with a Commun-
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ity Service Order (CSO). This is a scheme aimed to give the offender the 
opportunity to gain skills and make a positive contribution to the community. In 
Cafe Central people can learn how to prepare snacks, serve customers, handle 
money and cook simple dishes. One young woman was so grateful for being 
taught how to make scones that now when she visits the café, having completed 
her CSO, she brings her own homemade scones as a gift for the person who 
taught her.
 When Community Chaplaincy was initiated over 25 years ago in Canada, it 
provided a professional model that enabled faith communities to engage in the 
support of offenders and their families. In Britain there has been a long history 
of involvement by people of faith with offenders, both in prison and on release. 
The excellent work begun in the nineteenth century by penal reformers including 
Elizabeth Fry, a Quaker, is being continued by Quaker Peace and Social Witness 
(QPSW). In 1999 Helen Drewery, Assistant General Secretary QPSW, read an 
article written by a Quaker in Canada who had volunteered for Community 
Chaplaincy and in particular something called Circles of Support and Accounta-
bility (COSA). Through QPSW, ‘Circles’ were introduced into Britain. In Man-
chester the Methodist Church in the city centre has a long association with 
offenders. There is a picture, taken in 1897, showing The Sisters of the People 
who worked from Methodist Central Hall, waiting outside the main gate of 
Strangeways Prison, just up the road, to meet the men and women on their 
release from gaol and offer them practical help. Today GMCC volunteers offer a 
similar service. Prison Chaplaincy also has a well- deserved and often hard- won 
reputation for the valuable work it undertakes on behalf of the faith communities 
inside Her Majesty’s Prisons. The Prison Service expects chaplains to work to a 
high standard, to deliver statutory requirements and appropriate activities, and to 
achieve set targets. In order to work in this professional way, chaplains need to 
be part of and accountable to the institutional structures.
 It would be wrong if I did not also mention that there is a certain level of sus-
picion and mistrust of people of faith who work with offenders. One probation 
officer	 initially	 dismissed	 GMCC	 as	 sandal-	wearing,	 lentil-	eating	 do-	gooders,	
until he met the volunteers and attended a training day run by the Thames Valley 
Circles of Support and Accountability (TVCOSA) team headed up by Chris 
Wilson and Dominic Williams. (The GMCC is indebted to and extremely grate-
ful for the help and support given to us by TVCOSA.) The main cause of 
concern is that well- meaning, possibly naive people will not work in an 
informed, professional way and will either breach security, or even be the cause 
of harm to the offenders who themselves may be vulnerable people. Community 
Chaplaincy (CC) seeks to offer a recognizable and accountable structure that sets 
down standards of good practice and promotes codes of conduct which enable 
the expertise offered by CC to stand alongside other agencies in the support of 
offenders and their families. We also have a responsibility for the safety of the 
volunteers and this we believe is achieved by our policies, procedures and the 
quality of the training we give. Over the past 10 years CC projects have been 
established across England, Wales and Scotland, and the high standards to which 
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they work give them credibility with the statutory providers for the resettlement 
of offenders. The GMCC has shared knowledge, policies and procedures with, 
and encouraged, other projects as they have established themselves. Common to 
every project is the belief that local people can play a part in reducing crime, 
enhancing the safety of their community and rehabilitating offenders. A scheme 
that trains, supports and supervises volunteers is a good way of doing this.
	 It	is	difficult	enough	for	‘ordinary’	offenders	to	resettle	into	society.	Finding	
somewhere to live and a job can be really hard. This is especially problematic 
for people who have been convicted of sexual offences against children. The 
offender’s family may be so shocked or ashamed by the behaviour that they are 
unable to offer the offender a home. If the abuse was within the family it will not 
be possible for the offender to return home even if the family want him or her 
back. ‘Circles’ was the response the Canadians made to this particular situation. 
In	1994	a	notorious	and	prolific	offender	was	due	for	release	into	the	community	
after having served a long sentence for serious sexual offences against children. 
He was to be housed in Ontario and there was an outcry among local people. 
The school published posters showing a picture of the man. Teachers handed out 
the posters to the children with a warning about how dangerous the man was and 
told them to tell an adult whom they knew and trusted if they saw him. One boy 
put his hand up and said that he had met the man when he came to their house 
for dinner. The boy was the son of the Mennonite pastor Harry Neigh who had 
started Community Chaplaincy. When Pastor Neigh heard about the release of 
this particular man he wanted to offer support to him but realized that it would 
involve something more than the ordinary one- to-one volunteer support that 
Community Chaplaincy offered. He put in place a group of people who would 
share	the	care	and	support	one	another	in	the	difficult	task	of	caring	for	this	man.	
The man was called Charlie and the group were nicknamed ‘Charlie’s Angels’; 
Circles of Support and Accountability was born. Pastor Neigh believed that with 
good supervision and support even someone like Charlie could on release from 
prison live as a member of a community.
 In Manchester one woman had been so shocked by the behaviour of a hostile, 
angry mob of neighbours towards a released sex offender that she wanted to do 
something positive to help the offender and protect the children in the area. She 
attended a GMCC Road Show, where she heard about ‘Circles’ and applied to 
be a volunteer. The daughter of a convicted sex offender expressed her gratitude 
for the help the ‘Circle’ volunteers were giving her father. She was the victim of 
his sexual abuse and cannot forgive him, but she said, ‘he is still my father and I 
am grateful that someone is supporting him’.
 ‘Circles’ aim to do three things: to support the offender to not re- offend, 
thereby to reduce the number of people adversely affected by crime, and to 
protect the offender from angry members of the community. Not all GMCC vol-
unteers will want, or be suitable, to work with sex offenders. Most GMCC vol-
unteers give one- to-one support to ‘ordinary’ offenders and those who become 
‘Circle’ volunteers receive additional training to help them understand the 
complex issues, behaviour and attitudes associated with those who abuse chil-
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dren. ‘Circles’ are intended for people who have been assessed by the public 
protection	agencies	and	classified	as	high	risk	of	re-	offending	and	in	high	need	
of social and emotional support. A ‘Circle’ is in addition to any statutory provi-
sion and is effective because there is shared knowledge and responsibility for the 
offender who is known as the core member. When a ‘Circle’ is set up the core 
member gives consent to probation so that information can be given to the vol-
unteers. The core member knows that information will also be passed back to the 
professionals. The success of Thames Valley Circles of Support and Accounta-
bility is that not one of the core members they supported has re- offended. In par-
ticular incidences core members have disclosed to their ‘Circle’ details of 
thoughts which could have led to actual behaviour and those core members were 
recalled to prison before an offence was committed. HTV Circles: Six Years of 
Safer Communities (Quaker Peace and Social Witness 2008) gives statistics and 
anecdotal evidence of the success of their work.
	 Two	 people	 who	 have	 influenced	 the	 thinking	 that	 underpins	 GMCC	 are	
Edwina Gateley and Jean Vanier.
We can all walk together in hope. Celebrating that we are loved in our bro-
kenness, helping each other, growing in trust, living in thanksgiving, learn-
ing to forgive. Opening up to each other welcoming them and striving to 
bring peace and hope to our world.
(Vanier 1997)
It is in this spirit of mutuality that GMCC encourages all people who are 
involved in the project to contribute and receive, recognizing that all have needs 
and something to offer. The GMCC endeavours to nurture both volunteers and 
offenders	 carefully,	 allowing	 them	 to	 grow	and	develop	 and	find	 fulfilment	 in	
the giving of their skills and talents. The opportunity to be useful has contributed 
to increasing their sense of personal happiness, wellbeing and self- worth, and 
enhances those with whom they have contact. I think this might be what is called 
a ‘win- win situation’.

Part III
Reflections on foundations

16 Human happiness as a common 
good
Clarifying the issues
Patrick Riordan
Richard Layard suggests that happiness can provide a clear concept of the 
common good that all can accept and work towards (Layard 2005: 108). Happi-
ness can be the social good, the ‘one ultimate goal that enables us to judge other 
goals by how they contribute to it’ (Layard 2005: 113). Is he correct? Is happi-
ness the common good?
 It will depend on what is meant by happiness. Is it to be explained in terms of 
‘left- brain activity’, or in terms of moral excellence? There are different styles 
of rhetoric available for talking about human happiness. One typical style says 
of something that it is ‘nothing other than. . . ’. Some y is said to be nothing other 
than some x in another form. So, for instance, Marx says that natural rights to 
property are nothing other than the property interests of the bourgeoisie asserted 
in a language which deceives the victims of those interests. Ludwig Feuerbach 
says that God is nothing other than human nature projected out of itself into 
another who appears to dominate humanity. This rhetorical style doesn’t have to 
be reductionist, but it lends itself to such use. It is linked to reductionism in con-
temporary human sciences, as when, for example, human community and coop-
eration are explained exclusively in terms of the survival and reproduction of the 
genes. Is happiness nothing other than activity in the left side of the brain?
 There is another style of rhetoric associated with Aristotle, which attempts to 
explain something by saying it is always more than something else. So, for 
instance, in comparing constitutions, he claims that the best constitution articu-
lates an accurate account of human good, the good life, and the deficient cases 
reflect a limitation in their grasp of this good. Aristotle’s discussion is a classic 
case of the rhetorical style of ‘always more than’. The best constitution is more 
than a non- aggression pact, and more than a mutual guarantee of rights, and 
more than the contract for the exchange of goods and services. What is it then? 
Aristotle’s further reflections cannot get away completely from this way of 
thinking about that which is sought, which is always more than what is already 
known.
 Which of these rhetorical styles is appropriate for discussing human wellbe-
ing and happiness? Are we considering some reality which can be accounted for 
as ‘nothing other than . . .’ or are we exploring a reality which is ‘always more 
than . . .’ what we have already managed to articulate?
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 How we identify the notion of happiness will condition what may be said 
about it. It is important that the language and categories we use do not exclude in 
advance one of the relevant perspectives which might contribute essential 
insights. There is always a danger that avenues of exploration are closed off by 
means of a linguistic regulation specifying which terms may or may not be used. 
For instance, if the political is only to be understood in purely secularist terms, 
then it can follow that only secularist language may be relied upon in determin-
ing the role of religion in public life. John Rawls recognized this problem in his 
later writings, and admitted that secularism is as much a comprehensive doctrine 
as a religion and fails to ensure neutrality of the public space (Rawls 1999: 148). 
Instead of confining faith- based arguments to the private domain Rawls accepted 
that religious reason had a place in the public forum, on the condition that faith- 
based arguments be supplemented with narrowly construed public reasons acces-
sible to fellow citizens without faith (Riordan 2004: 183).
 The exploration of human wellbeing requires a language which is capable of 
serving the distinctive methodological purposes of the relevant disciplines, from 
economics to theology, while at the same time being open to the considerations 
raised from other perspectives. Without a language which is capable of ranging 
across the spectrum of disciplines the discussion can only reveal a discontinuity 
of goods which have nothing in common. Consider the notion of desire. Rele-
vant phenomena are identified and spoken of using this term in different disci-
plines, such as psychology, economics, philosophy, aesthetics, spirituality and 
theology. Since each discipline has its own concerns and theoretical interests, its 
‘formal object’, it will invest the term ‘desire’ with its own relevant content. The 
expectation that the definition of the term generated in one field would have to 
be normative for the other disciplines would be an unwarranted imposition on 
those sciences. But if each science generates its own concept independently of 
the others, they would seem not to be talking about the same thing, ‘the material 
object’, even if using the same term. This would be a clear example of equivoca-
tion, when the same word is given two or more incompatible meanings. Discon-
tinuity emerges. By contrast, continuity across the perspectives is made possible 
when the language of desire can cope with a range of meanings. The meanings 
in the range would have to be compatible, while different. A valuable example is 
provided by Leslie Francis’ application of the Oxford Happiness Inventory and 
the Francis Scale of Attitude towards Christianity (Chapter 8, this volume). To 
be of use for quantitative studies these two instruments have to be reliable in 
consistent application generating measurements. This purpose specifies the func-
tion which the relevant conceptualizations of happiness and religion will have to 
fulfil. They do not have to exhaust the meaning of the concepts of happiness or 
religion, and as long as they are not incompatible with other more extensive and 
valid meanings, the information they make possible can be very useful.
 When theology engages as a partner in interdisciplinary conversation, is there 
not a danger that its all- encompassing perspective would dominate other, more 
restricted positions? It is not unusual for this anxiety to be expressed in relation 
to the Catholic Church. Does the Church acknowledge the autonomy of the polit-
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ical realm? A significant breakthrough in the Catholic theological tradition was 
achieved in the Second Vatican Council’s Pastoral Constitution on the Church 
Today, Gaudium et spes (1965). In this document the complexity of the relation-
ship between the Church and the political community is acknowledged. Not only 
are the differences recognized, but their mutual independence and autonomy are 
proclaimed (GS §76). Given their differences and independence of each other, 
the possibility of cooperation appears limited. But a real possibility of coopera-
tion is located in the fact that both are concerned with facilitating people in 
achieving their personal and social fulfilment. ‘Man is not confined to the tem-
poral order: living in human history he keeps his eternal vocation intact’ (GS 
§76).
 Following this example of perspectives which both distinguish and integrate, 
it may be seen how an adequate discussion of political economy, religion and 
wellbeing would have to fulfil several requirements. There would have to be a 
recognition of the distinctive perspectives of the economic and the religious, 
without collapsing one into the other. At the same time, the different visions as 
appropriate to these two perspectives must be capable of being related to one 
another, so that the same human reality is considered in each. It will be neces-
sary to outline a notion of human wellbeing which is capable of both a political 
(economic) and a theological reading. The twin dangers of reducing the tran-
scendent and subsuming the political in a theological project must be avoided. 
The language available for speaking of human wellbeing will have to allow for 
this kind of flexibility.
 There are five dimensions of the topic in which the basic tension may be 
encountered. First, any discussion of human wellbeing will presuppose some 
account of human nature and the positions taken will reflect the spectrum 
between ‘nothing other than . . .’ and ‘always more than . . .’. Second, wellbeing 
will entail an account of community, or relationship, along with an account of 
the common goods of cooperation. Third, the discussion of wellbeing will 
require an account of morality and the explanation of obligation to and for 
others. Fourth, the concepts of happiness, human flourishing or wellbeing will 
require elaboration. Finally, the role of the state and public authorities in relation 
to human happiness and wellbeing is controversial, and will have to be 
addressed. It is not possible to deal with these questions independently of each 
other. A discussion of happiness entails issues of human nature, human relation-
ships and morality.
Following Aristotle’s suggestions
Aristotle remarks that eudaimonia is what all ultimately seek in their action. 
Eudaimonia is usually translated as ‘happiness’, but more recently, following the 
suggestion of Elizabeth Anscombe, it is commonly rendered as ‘flourishing’ 
(Anscombe 1958: 1). John Cooper contributes a fresh reading of Aristotle fol-
lowing this suggestion. He understands Aristotle to identify human flourishing, 
eudaimonia, ‘with a lifetime of morally virtuous action’ (Cooper 1975: 88). In a 
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similar vein the German philosopher, Robert Spaemann offers a new account of 
eudaimonia as the end of a good life. His translator J. Alberg renders the German 
original das Gelingen des Lebens as ‘a life which turns out well’ (Spaemann 
2000: 7). In both cases, it is the lifetime, the living of the life as a whole narra-
tive that is stressed, not some end- product.
 Spaemann is one of several recent authors whose work restores the good life, 
the life which turns out well, as the main object of ethical reflection. Some of 
these claim the tradition of ‘natural law’ reflection. For instance, John Finnis and 
those working with him have coined the phrase ‘integral human fulfilment’ in 
order to render an account of eudaimonia as the highest goal of life (Finnis 1984: 
23). In the discussion of this account their critics have accused them of incoher-
ence, since although they maintain that fundamental values (such as life, know-
ledge, friendship) are incommensurable, they seem to require that moral agents 
choose between values in their pursuit of integral human fulfilment. Such choice, 
it is argued, requires the commensurability of values. Finnis et al. have defended 
their position against this challenge and have clarified the sense in which they 
hold values to be incommensurable. In doing so, they have emphasized the crea-
tive role of human freedom. When obliged to choose between alternative 
projects (do I marry or remain celibate, do I study medicine or philosophy, do I 
give priority to my research or to my teaching), the human agent can seldom rely 
on some calculus of costs and benefits: the exercise of freedom selects one from 
a set of morally possible options and so is both creative of history and constitu-
tive of the human subject. Spaemann seems to have a similar understanding of 
the end of life when he writes: ‘To be sure, the turning out well of a life is not a 
particular goal, in relation to which other contents of volition are degraded to 
mere means’ (Spaemann 2000: 14). We are left wondering about life’s goals, 
which are not to be degraded to mere means but can be evaluated none the less 
as contributing to the comprehensive goal (Spaemann 2000: 19). Even for those 
who wish to speak of a life as a whole as the principal focus of ethical reflection 
there is a real difficulty in finding the appropriate way to integrate the elements 
into that whole.
 In advocating the greatest happiness as the highest goal, both of individual 
decision making and public policy, Layard skates over such debates as have 
challenged the Aristotelian tradition (Layard 2005: 115). The problems of com-
mensurability are not so easily dismissed once one recognizes the complexity of 
the human good and the creative function of human freedom in determining 
which goods will be realized. The issue of freedom arises also in the reflection 
on the state’s role in pursuing wellbeing. This is the critical point in Nozick’s 
use of the hypothetical ‘experience machine’ which Layard interestingly glosses 
as the ‘happiness machine’ (Layard 2005: 114). Nozick uses this ploy to discuss 
the importance of freedom in life, and the extent to which the exercise of one’s 
own freedom in setting goals and pursuing them is integral to any satisfaction 
which may arise from success (Nozick 1974: 42–45). In other words, it is not 
primarily a state of affairs (call it ‘happiness’) however it may be attained, which 
people want, but they want to be active in the living of their lives. This same 
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insight is integral to Amartya Sen’s argument about the centrality of freedom in 
development (Sen 1999: 24–27). The policy conclusions he derives from this are 
that governments and development agencies should aim at facilitating freedoms, 
so that people can get on with the business of pursuing their life goals, rather 
than directly attempting to provide the desired goals of people’s lives. Martha 
Nussbaum’s reworking of the notion of human nature in terms of human capaci-
ties for good functioning is related to this project (Nussbaum 2000: 87).
 The field of ethics is controverted. Familiar positions are labelled deontology, 
consequentialism and virtue ethics. Each offers an approach which gives priority 
to one aspect, and allows the other aspects to be considered from the chosen per-
spective. One strand begins with the problems of determining which rules to 
guide action are to qualify as moral rules, with the binding force of the moral 
law (typically Kant). Another considers the consequences of action as crucial 
and discusses how action might be directed such that the optimal outcomes are 
achieved (typically Bentham). John Rawls has sided with the former against the 
latter, wanting to give priority to the right over the good. The sterility of the 
stand- off between proponents of right action and good consequences has pro-
voked many moral philosophers to revisit the classical emphasis on the character 
of the moral agent in recovering virtue ethics. Considering ethics in terms of a 
life which turns out well avoids the exclusive concentration on rules to guide 
action, or on the outcome of action, or on the characteristics of agents that con-
dition action. It can provide an integrating context in which the traditional dis-
cussions of rules or outcomes or virtues can continue without the ideological 
commitment to a position which sidelines other important discussions.
 However valuable the perspective of the good life, the life which turns out 
well, may prove to be, it is questionable whether this perspective is attainable in 
practice through philosophical reflection alone. Since no moral agent ever comes 
to regard her completed life as a whole, our primary experience for this perspec-
tive is given through our membership of some community in which we learn to 
consider and evaluate the completed lives of others. This learning is mediated by 
the community and especially by those who are parents and teachers. But biog-
raphers, artists, dramatists and novelists play their part in enabling us to consider 
life as a whole. Because of this shared cultural wealth, individual actors can 
enter imaginatively into a consideration of their own lives as wholes. Faith com-
munities which rely on a sacred narrative for their consideration of human life 
are particularly important in this regard.
 Our society does not share a single account of a life which turns out well. 
There are several accounts among the various cultures which make up the fabric 
of society. The standard liberal reaction to this plurality in visions of the good 
life is to resort to some minimum to be expected of all. Mill’s ‘prevention of 
harm to others’, or Rawls’ two principles prescribing liberty and specifying the 
conditions under which inequality may be tolerated, or the set of basic human 
rights, are variously proposed to meet the need for a common ground in the 
context of potential conflict. The minimization of harm or securing of the 
minimum conditions is at the other end of the spectrum from the goal of human 
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flourishing. The minimum conditions facilitate the pursuit of that wellbeing, but 
are not to be identified with it.
 Kant has posed a challenge to any teleological ethics including a eudaimonis-
tic one. Put simply, that is the doubt that anyone who acts for the good of others 
(benevolence) out of hope of reward (happiness) does not truly act morally, since 
what she really seeks is not the good of the other but her own interest. This is 
one version of the problem of altruism. If the questions of ethics are burdened 
with individualistic assumptions, then there is always a difficulty in moving from 
the assumed interests of the agent (self- interest) to the good of others who are 
beneficiaries. J.S. Mill encountered his own version of this difficulty: Why 
would the happiness of others be significant for someone who pursues his own 
happiness? This is a relevant challenge for the topic of wellbeing, and it can best 
be handled through the notion of common good.
Common good as the wellbeing of a community
Aristotle’s discussion moves from the small- scale familiar forms of cooperation 
to the large- scale systems of social order which we are constantly constructing. 
Just as any cooperation between persons presupposes some good which the part-
ners attempt to achieve, so acting together in a political community has a good 
in common. Aristotle goes further and asserts that the highest form of coopera-
tion has the highest good of all. It is clear: people doing business, playing sport, 
engaging in projects, share some goods as conditions, or means, or goals of their 
action, or some combination of these. But does the political community have a 
good in common? And is the common good of a political community the highest 
common good, as Aristotle asserted?
 Christians found this philosophical language congenial because the common 
good provided a set of terms open to an infusion of theological meaning. Augustine 
could speak of the vision of God as the beatitude of the community united in love of 
God. The Christian perspective on the common good of humankind is not widely 
accepted – some Christians would balk at this use of philosophical language to 
mediate a biblical vision – so that on its own it cannot communicate a content which 
might be a shared ground of public deliberation. It is not easy to pin down a philo-
sophical usage of the common good of political cooperation, beyond the ‘always 
more than . . .’ style of rhetoric. I suggest that we can recover a usable conception in 
terms of heuristic concepts (Riordan 2008: 27). That is, we need terms which allow 
us to speak about realities we do not yet know, but are in the process of exploring 
and discovering. We already know enough about what would satisfy our questions 
so that we have some operative criteria which allow us to factor out the false candid-
ates and flawed answers. So, the common good could be understood to name that 
which we in our political conversations are attempting to identify as warranting the 
willing cooperation of all. It will be always more than mere security, or satisfaction 
of basic needs, or purely formal liberty without effective freedoms, or legal equality.
 What could be the common good of the UK or the EU, since they are pluralist 
in religious affiliation, in ethnic background, in political allegiance, in morali-
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ties, in interests, in professions and skills, in prosperity, in experience, in hopes 
and aspirations? If there is such a common good, how is it to be achieved? Can it 
be the business of legislators to bring about this good? Does happiness constitute 
the common good of our society as Layard proposes? (Layard 2005: 124–125). 
The insistence on liberty and on people’s freedoms to determine their own good 
makes many suspicious of any talk of a good which is properly theirs, but which 
they have not chosen. I have suggested above that a care for liberty and the role 
of freedom in the construction of a life as a whole entails that public policy is 
best directed at facilitating freedom and its responsible exercise rather than in 
attempting to bring about a state of affairs. There is another line of challenge 
which queries the competency of the public authorities in relation to human 
wellbeing.
 Aquinas distinguishes between the divine and the human lawgiver. Only the 
divine lawgiver can require and monitor a change of heart. The human lawgiver 
must be content with outward conformity to the requirements of the law (Finnis 
1998: 177). Punishment provides a motivation for those who are not spontane-
ously inclined to conform in their behaviour towards the law. But such coercive 
instruments are inconsistent with the free response which the divine command 
invites. Of course, Aquinas concedes that those who at first conform out of fear 
of punishment can be habituated to love the good and so come to do willingly 
what formerly had been done only reluctantly. The point is that the difference is 
not always observable, and so is not relevant to the human lawmaker.
 There is a limit to what social policy can achieve. For instance, in family 
policy, we can put arrangements in place that allow people to form families and 
raise children. But that they will be happy, and will flourish in their relationships 
is not accessible to intervention. The most that can be done is that the conditions 
which tend to foster wellbeing can be maintained. But of themselves they do not 
guarantee the outcome. This reflects a distinction between the common good 
which is unrestricted and open- ended, and a more restricted category of common 
good. The latter is that which can be measured and observed and which func-
tions in an instrumental role for the achievement of the unrestricted common 
good of fulfilment or flourishing. So, for instance, the Vatican Council’s 
Gaudium et spes speaks of ‘the common good as the set of conditions which will 
allow humans as individuals and as groups to achieve their fulfilment’ (§ 26). 
The tension between the conditions for fulfilment and the fulfilment which is 
ambitioned is relevant to the task of generating an appropriate language for 
speaking of wellbeing. The concentration in politics on providing the agreed 
conditions for human flourishing brings with it the danger of losing sight of the 
ultimate fulfilment, which we may only be able to speak of in heuristic terms 
(Riordan 2006: 36–37). When means and conditions are no longer relativized to 
some further purpose, the danger arises that they are promoted into the category 
of ends.
 This reflection provokes the following questions. What limits are there to the 
effectiveness of public agencies in working for people’s wellbeing? What are the 
boundaries which public authorities should not overstep in caring for wellbeing? 
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Reducing crime, maintaining public security and absence of anxiety merely 
establish the conditions for living a decent human life. What a decent human life 
is to consist of and how it might be realized and shared cannot be the business of 
the public authorities. It is a matter for the freedom of each one and each group. 
But this is not to relegate the question to a supposedly private sphere. It is very 
definitely a matter of public concern, and what is required for its pursuit are 
public spaces in which the questions of the human good and the common goods 
of our social cooperation may be aired and explored, without the fear that some 
body or group will be able to hijack the power of the state so as to impose its 
preferred answer on others.
 J.S. Mill desired experimentation in human living so as to clarify what 
might contribute to flourishing. The more examples there are available to 
people, as models of human living, the more likely they are to find their own 
way. But it is not a matter of having a range of products on a supermarket shelf 
from which to choose. The ability to recognize the value of something, to 
appreciate the good at stake, requires a prior history of socialization. Some 
tastes are acquired tastes., and capacities to appreciate some human goods 
must also be developed. Alasdair MacIntyre makes this point very strongly in 
comparing the needs of young dolphins and young humans who require a pro-
longed period of socialization so as to be capable of entering into the life of 
the species (MacIntyre 1999). In the case of human children this includes 
acquiring the skills which enable them to enter into the conversation in which 
the human good is explored. This conviction that some tastes are not simply 
given but must be acquired is often dismissed as elitist. The point is anything 
but elitist, and is well established in our ordinary experience. For instance, 
aggressive young males have to learn to value the skills of negotiation and 
conciliation; it doesn’t come automatically to them. Similarly, the goodness of 
fidelity, a sustained love over a lifetime despite hardships, is normally not 
apparent to an observer who does not share the relevant values. Accordingly, 
education is not only about becoming aware of the range of one’s possibilities 
and options, but about becoming a person capable of commitment to what is 
truly worthwhile and conducive to wellbeing.
 Aristotle had noted the complexity in the notion of friendship and in the cor-
responding visions of political community. He was aware of constitutions which 
were based on non- aggression pacts and on the mutual guarantee of rights. He 
understood also the notion of a bargain to ensure the exchange of goods and 
services. These forms of constitution are meaningful because they do correspond 
to aspects of the human good. The aspiration to guarantee security to ensure that 
rights are respected is rooted in an awareness of human fragility. Regulating 
relationships between people so that the threat of violence is minimized and the 
possibility of vindicating one’s rights ensured makes sense to people who are all 
too aware of their vulnerability (Riordan 2007: 40). However, this way of con-
ceiving political community reinforces the view of the other as a threat, and as a 
limit to one’s own possibilities. This had been the core of Marx’s criticisms of 
the liberal achievement in creating bourgeois society. It institutionalized selfish, 
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self- centred man, concerned about the fences to secure his freedom and his prop-
erty from the neighbour (Marx 1977: 53–57).
 Aristotle had anticipated Marx’s rejection of the narrow view of political rela-
tionships, for the similar reason that it constrained the breadth of the human 
good. Political relationships for Aristotle are forms of friendship. Friendship is 
always a partnership in the pursuit and enjoyment of some good. Constitutions 
which take the form of non- aggression pacts and mutual guarantee of rights are 
based on a kind of friendship which can recognize a shared vulnerability. The 
good which is pursued and achieved in those constitutions is a basic aspect of 
human wellbeing, in securing survival in an objective sense and a sense of secur-
ity in a subjective sense. Aristotle objects if this basic aspect is taken to represent 
the whole of human wellbeing. That people are secure from attack, that their sur-
vival is secured, does not mean that they do well. For Aristotle much more is at 
stake, which he would classify as the achievement of excellence in the perform-
ance of characteristically human activities. The kind of political constitution 
which would incorporate this more expansive account of the human good would 
correlate with a form of friendship in which each would be concerned about the 
wellbeing of the other for their own sake.
 For Aristotle the distinctive factor of political community is that citizens are 
bonded by genuine concern for the quality of the life they share which enables 
each one to flourish (Aristotle 1972: 119). This is friendship in a full sense, 
beyond what is useful and what is pleasant. Beyond mutual material benefit and 
pleasure there can be concern for the other as living well, precisely for their own 
sake. The bonds of friendship would not simply be by- products of their involve-
ment in the tasks of ruling and being ruled, but would be the essential dynamic 
of their citizenship. The friendship of good people for one another, wanting each 
other and all together to enjoy a good life, and taking the steps to achieve it as 
far as they can, is the core of Aristotle’s conception of politics. If this eudaimo-
nia is rendered as happiness, then it is always more than what is already grasped 
and understood, because it is always striving for a greater excellence. Such a 
rhetoric of happiness is open to theological perspectives. Theological narratives 
for a life which turns out well can allow for dimensions of friendship with the 
creator, with all of creation and with all of humankind, so that the happiness 
pursued in a corresponding pursuit of the good life is always more than what we 
can hope or imagine, based on previous experience. Then the common good 
transcends the instrumental goods which are conditions for fulfilment, and it 
does not rule out the unrestricted common good known by faith. If the appropri-
ate rhetoric for happiness is that it is ‘always more than . . .’, then Layard’s intui-
tion is correct that happiness in this sense is our common good.
17 Being well in creation
John Rodwell
The closing vision in the biblical book of Job (Job 38, 1–42, 6) suggests that the 
proper context for pondering the human predicament is the realm of other crea-
tures and the cosmos beyond: alongside Leviathan and the hippopotamus, where 
winds are born and snow is stored, among the circling planets. I want to explore 
here the notion that this creation provides more than a scenic backdrop for the 
kinds of questions about the human condition that have been raised by Haidt 
(2006) – ‘Why are we here?’, ‘What kind of life should we lead?’ and ‘What 
paths lead to happiness?’ – to review the part that the environment and nature 
play in definitions and understanding of both human wellbeing and religious 
capital; and to show that a wider perspective might give us a more radical vision 
of the difference religious belief can make to our humanity and whether or not 
we might be happy.
The wellbeing of the environment
With increasing urgency these days, the future wellbeing of humankind is seen 
as threatened by a deteriorating environment. Its own wellbeing, the ‘state of the 
environment’ as it is often called, is expressed by a welter of measures of quality 
applied to what are very diverse sectors – air, water, biodiversity and so on. The 
structure of any index of wellbeing, how its various constituents are organized 
and combined, strongly influences its usefulness and measurement of its per-
formance (Prescott- Allen 2001). With the environment, the condition and quality 
of the different sectors vary in their susceptibility to quantification, and the 
measures devised for one sector are rarely equivalent to those proposed for 
others. Moreover, different environmental interests – state agencies, non- 
governmental organizations, businesses and so on – rarely share a common 
metric for such measurements, or for reckoning overall environmental costs, 
benefits and quality.
 Environmental quality indices (EQIs) make a more balanced attempt to 
provide algorithms for calculating combined scores in a variety of environmental 
measures (Inhaber (1974) in Canada, Hope and Parker (1995) in France, Italy 
and the UK, Puolamaa et al. (1996) in The Netherlands, Sang et al. (2002) in 
Korea). In the UK, for example, the South- West Observatory EQI for govern-
Being well in creation  217
ment and local stakeholders in that region of the country includes measures of 
pollution, derelict land, flood risk, river quality, green space, street cleanliness, 
poor housing, fly- tipping and biodiversity (South West Observatory 2007). Such 
an EQI has been designed explicitly to measure improvements in the quality of 
life for a community of customers and allows them to weight the various contri-
butions themselves, according to their own needs and preferences. An EQI 
devised for measuring environmental wellbeing in industrial areas in Greece also 
attempted to integrate such public perceptions of the comparative seriousness of 
environmental problems in their area, though the methodology worked from a 
long list of just six rather obvious factors and gave environmental ‘experts’ the 
task of ultimately vetting and totalling the scores (Vatalis and Kaliampakos 
2006).
 In practice, the generation of official statistics on the state of the environment 
is much driven by the need for comparable information to facilitate free trade at 
a variety of scales (El- Shaarawi and Piegorsch 2002) and initiatives to develop 
common standards often aim at a currency- based metric to enable environmental 
accounting to measure the attainment of performance and environmental trends 
(Markandya and Constanza 1993). More generally, although it has become com-
monplace in the policy and practice of sustainability to include environmental 
capital along with economic and social capital as one of three pillars for ‘secur-
ing the future’ (the present government’s byline for sustainable development: 
Defra 2005), it is widely recognized that social and economic goals take prece-
dence in the sustainability process. A robust non- anthropocentric ethic is evident 
among the staff of environmental agencies and wildlife charities, and a duty- 
based commitment is sometimes explicit in the public statements of these organ-
izations (RSPB 2007), but many players have an obviously instrumental 
environmental ethic and use a fundamentally utilitarian calculus in weighing 
environmental benefits against social and economic ones (Rodwell 2008a). Thus 
the wellbeing of birds, butterflies, habitats and landscapes is promoted because 
they can, for example, raise property values, promote tourism and generate jobs 
and business. Effectively, the sustainability agenda lends credibility to a whole 
variety of goals through a kind of pragmatic convergence (Sterba 1994; Norton 
1997).
Human wellbeing in the environment
As the sustainability process finds expression in the regeneration of regions and 
their communities, there is an overwhelming stress on demonstrating perform-
ance and a need for measurable targets and indicators that makes the notion of 
non- material goals, aspirations and benefits deeply problematic. Even recent 
modifications of Gross Domestic Product such as the Index of Sustainable Eco-
nomic Welfare (Daly and Cobb 1989) or the headline UN indicator, the Human 
Poverty Index, do not incorporate subjective measures of how people feel about 
the quality of their lives. One attempt to integrate environmental wellbeing in 
this stricter sense with estimates of life satisfaction is the Happy Planet Index 
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(Marks et al. 2006), which aims to avoid more strictly economic measures of 
quality of life and to use environmental mediators to show that certain forms of 
economic development are detrimental to human wellbeing. The HPI aims to do 
this by multiplying such an index of Life Satisfaction by Life Expectancy to cal-
culate Happy Life Years (in the sense of Veenhoven 1996) and then it divides 
this sum by the Ecological Footprint, the area of land required to sustain a given 
population at current levels of consumption, technological development and 
resource efficiency, expressed in global- average hectares.
 In the UK, the ‘Quality of Life’ agenda and particularly the notion of ‘well-
being’ which is a relatively recent addition to the government’s list of keynote 
indicators, admit the possibility of acknowledging those less obvious aspects of 
personal or community life that might matter for securing the future alongside 
socio- economic sustainability. In a study of the regenerating post- industrial land-
scape of the Dearne Valley in Yorkshire, Rodwell (2008a) found that ‘wellbe-
ing’ meant such ill- defined things as a ‘feel- good factor’ or an unqualified ‘being 
happy’ but, for other interviewees, there were more palpable environmental 
benefits which touched the human condition. Such experiences of delight some-
times focused on encounters with particular animals or plants or on contact with 
habitats such as heath or woodland, sometimes on situations where, for example, 
at a memorable coincidence of time and place, huge flocks of golden plover 
twisted and turned over a marshland in winter sunshine. For many who work in 
the environmental realm, such experiences clearly play a crucial role in their per-
sonal life histories and career trajectories, and in forming perceptions of what 
human wellbeing is more generally. This then can make a crucial connection 
between the wellbeing of individuals and communities, and the wellbeing of the 
environment in which they live and work or which they visit for one reason or 
another.
 Wonder, of course, the term we might use to describe such responses, is not a 
Christian prerogative, nor a more generally religious one, though those among 
Rodwell’s (2008a) interviewees who, unprompted, declared some commitment 
to belief gave wonder a religious resonance, saying, for example, that it informed 
their worship. Fisher (1998; see also Gomez and Fisher 2003; Francis and 
Robbins 2005) sees such experiences as part of an environmental strand in spir-
itual wellbeing. Moreover, such moments of wonder – unbidden, trusting, disin-
terested, unpossessed – are one quiet protest against what Robin Grove- White 
has called the ‘mean and inadequate conceptualisations of ourselves’ (Grove- 
White 1992: 11) which have become embedded in the frameworks of social and 
economic discourse and the sustainability process. Such orthodoxies are, for 
him, an inadequate reflection of the full range of felt experience, of the open- 
endedness and ambiguity of the human condition and of our experience of 
nature. Naive attempts to consider them simply as a form of capital, religious or 
otherwise, might be thought to be likewise impoverished.
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Religious capital and its place in creation
The term ‘religious capital’ has been defined in its broader sense as the distinc-
tive contribution which faith communities can make to the sustainable social and 
economic fabric, especially within the regeneration of communities and the 
urban renaissance (Baker and Skinner 2005; Reader 2005b), yet the particularity 
of this contribution is all too readily subverted by the sustainability process 
whose pragmatic discourse is essentially instrumental and utilitarian, and 
devoted to the delivery of material targets that are externally determined. Faith 
communities have been generally regarded as clients or partners in delivering a 
sustainable future (Rodwell 2008a), a role they have often conspired in by their 
own successes in the welfare and education programmes that are all too neces-
sary in many regeneration initiatives (Community Environment Associates 2004; 
WWF- UK and Sustainable Development Commission 2005).
 In particular, it is commonplace for two of the contributions recognized in the 
Home Office report on faith group involvement in civic renewal (Lowndes and 
Chapman 2005) – the physical and human resources of faith communities and 
their leadership and networking roles – to be understood primarily as practical 
contributions to regeneration that can be delivered through tangible assets that 
are put at the disposal of the wider community. Few Christians would deny that 
such service was an essential part of their apostolate, though they might mourn 
the way in which the prevailing discourse can transform a church mother and 
toddler group into an ‘enclave of interim intimacy’ (Reader 2005b: 45). Lukka et 
al. (2003) also found that much of the volunteering of faith group skills was 
actually so informal and localized as to have little purchase on the performance- 
based targets demanded by government funding.
 Using the term ‘spiritual capital’ to describe the core identity and values of 
faith communities and their celebration in worship (the normative rationale of 
Lowndes and Chapman 2005) has been proposed as a way of safeguarding those 
less tangible and irreducible aspects of religious belief and practice so that they 
might exert some critical freedom in relation to social and economic develop-
ment and the political process (Baker and Skinner 2005). Thus they might foster 
stories which gain no recognition or respect in the official discourse: ‘letting 
people tell their own story’ was one of the ways in which Rodwell (2008a: 279) 
found that less material benefits might be explored in the sustainability process. 
Yet these are readily discounted in regeneration initiatives as being anecdotal or 
they can accumulate when unheard into obstructive resentments among com-
munities (Reader 2005b). That such voices might sometimes gather confidence 
so as to discern and challenge false meanings within the regeneration rhetoric 
was one of the causes for celebration which Robinson (2005) detected in his 
study of Newcastle initiatives.
 For Reader, such engagement would necessarily have to risk compromise 
with the prevailing culture, making life in the faith communities an uncomfort-
able and ambiguous affair, the dissonance between religious values and visions 
and the reductionist language of the secular agencies always being under threat. 
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This is what would give it the capacity to release the ‘subversive other’ (Reader 
2005b: 45). And, in fact, it is not as if mainstream Judaeo- Christian belief is 
meanly equipped to challenge some of the more fundamental elements of the 
sustainability process (Rodwell 2008a, 2008b). For example, in the conventional 
regeneration discourse, land is usually treated as a tradable commodity, yet for 
these faith communities it is an inalienable inheritance, intended to be managed 
not as if by owners of property, but by people seeing themselves as tenants and 
heirs to gift. For Brueggemann (2002), land is a central theme of the biblical 
heritage, a reassertion of the importance of place as well as history in the sense 
of identity and the salvation of God’s people. In such a view, land is freighted 
with symbolic meaning derived from shared spiritual experience but it is also 
undeniably real, the actual earthly turf where people have lived and worked and 
have now to find themselves amid a rapidly changing scene. Land is thus neither 
a deserved inheritance, nor an anticipated reward, nor the result of prudent plan-
ning. It would be hard to find a more devastating and ready criticism of regener-
ation, yet, lacking confidence or opportunity, this prophetic voice may not be 
found among the faith communities, or, if voiced, never heard.
 For Brueggemann (2002), the emphasis on land is a reassertion of the impor-
tance of place and the geography of salvation and an expression of disillusion-
ment with the power of anonymity and mobility to save, so prominent in, for 
example, the early vision of Harvey Cox (1965) and still so much a guiding prin-
ciple in the regenerated landscapes of today (Rodwell 2008a, 2008b). A renewed 
interest in the theology of place (Sheldrake 2001; Gorringe 2002; Inge 2003) is 
taking us away from narrower preoccupations of sacred space to a wider engage-
ment with how people of faith belong in the world and negotiate mutual entan-
glements of necessity and freedom in place (Scott 2003, 2008; Rodwell 2008a). 
Meanwhile, in the more specifically medical realm, a return to an early definition 
of human health as including physical, mental and social wellbeing and not 
merely an absence of disease or infirmity (WHO 1946) has for some focused on 
the shift from ill- defined space or particular locations for the delivery of health 
care and wellbeing to notions of healing in place (Kearns 1993; Kearns and 
Gesler 1998; Gesler and Kearns 2002). For such practitioners, place is ‘the 
centre of social activity and nexus of personal and shared meaning’ (Kearns and 
Gesler 1998: 10), and wellbeing is a process of interactive negotiation. The 
observation of these workers that, nevertheless, place seems to matter little to 
political decision-making in the delivery of health care is paralleled by the very 
partial and impoverished understandings of place that are to be seen in the sus-
tainability process (Rodwell 2008a, 2008b). In planning guidelines it is difficult 
to incorporate multifunctional notions of place that integrate social and eco-
nomic concerns with environment, let alone more elusive feelings of belonging 
(Handley 2003; Ling et al. 2007). For the Canadian planner Leonine Sandercock 
(1998, 2006), the planning process she learned as a professional failed to match 
the local desires and needs of those people in communities she worked with to 
appropriate space and create place. Despite the now frequent use of slogans such 
as ‘pride of place’, ‘doing justice to place’, making somewhere or other ‘a great 
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place’ in regeneration programmes, richer understandings of the relationships 
between society on the one hand and environment on the other are noticeably 
scarce.
Social capital and the gift of creation
The freedom for such deeper engagement challenges the whole notion that the 
language of ‘capital’, even religious and spiritual capital, is at all adequate to 
describe the quality of life built entirely on divine gift. For Christians, the end of 
religious belief and practice is not simply to build social capital, rather it is to 
foster the Kingdom of God and to discern and mend the difference between this 
and the societies and cultures in which we find ourselves. Certainly, we would 
not wish to subscribe to the stability of the habitus that Bourdieu (1992) sees as 
reinforcing hierarchies and the status quo, but neither to commit ourselves 
simply to promoting the common good and associational life among humankind 
(Smidt 2003). Religion should function as something more than a social system 
in the world, engaging with civil society and public life (Baker and Miles- 
Watson 2008), rather as a radical challenge to enable us to find ourselves at 
home in creation. ‘Belonging’ as a religious question is about much more than 
the relationships of individual believers to institutions (Davie 2000, 2001), and a 
religious understanding of how we belong in creation can make a crucial contri-
bution to our wellbeing – as individuals, in community and as a species. Seeing 
beyond our own situation in the immediate environment thus reveals that our 
primary loyalty is not to the polis at all but to a wider realm, wherein may be 
seen the entirety of God’s gift of life and being. Made as humans in his image, 
fleshly but rational, we are the only one of his creatures able to discern and artic-
ulate this shared dependency of all that is upon his creative desire (Rodwell 
1999).
 A fundamental shift from the elitism of Bourdieu would thus extend Cole-
man’s (1990) concern for the marginalized to include those non- human creatures 
that are generally treated as instrumental to our own socio- economic benefits. It 
would also foster the networks and relationships not just outwith the narrow 
realm of the family but quite beyond our own societies to the oikos or household 
of nature on which we all ultimately depend. These other creatures would then 
also be seen as actors, and between us and them we would recognize expecta-
tions and obligations that would build up the trustworthiness of stewardship. 
That secure self- identity which Coleman (1988) saw as essential to maturity 
would thus be acquired by negotiation with an altogether bigger and richer 
realm.
 In fact, in creation we humankind have bowled alone, as Putman (2000) puts 
it, for centuries, favouring a hierarchical model of autocratic dominion over our 
fellow creatures rather than the horizontal partnerships which he saw as the 
proper basis of relationship between individuals and among communities and 
societies. It may seem fanciful to consider what he called ‘bonding’ – that dense 
layering of trusts within homogeneous groups – and ‘bridging’ – developing 
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links between different groups – as extending beyond our immediate human 
relationships, but these processes do have equivalents within ecological under-
standings of species- dependencies, food chains and predator–prey relationships. 
And the kind of ‘linking’ which for Woolcock (2001) addressed damaging 
power differentials is reflected in the altruistic care that many people want to 
express towards wildlife and habitats through a commitment to nature conserva-
tion. In short, such a critical perspective helps us see that human societies do not 
work out their economic and political life and the accumulation of capital against 
the backdrop of an instrumental environment. Rather they discover themselves 
blessed along with other creatures as part of the whole of creation.
Becoming well in creation
It has been suggested that the Happiness Hypothesis (Haidt 2006) might provide 
a new and more profitable entry into the complex debate between religion and 
capitalism because, while incomes and economic growth have been shown inca-
pable of themselves of generating increased happiness, belief and the practice of 
religion may promise humanity more (Atherton 2007b). However, the Big Seven 
factors which Layard (2005) considered must be addressed for economic growth 
and incomes to generate happiness – the financial situation, work and fulfilment, 
family relationships, community and friends, health, personal freedom and per-
sonal values and the philosophy of life – these do not explicitly involve the sorts 
of interdependencies between society, economics and the environment that we 
have considered above. Nor does Layard’s argument suggest ways in which 
human self- understanding might be enriched – and maybe the prospect of greater 
happiness revealed – by seeing ourselves as part of a wider realm of nature that 
surrounds us. From among the ‘Other Big Seven’ which are considered in the 
argument on the implications of Layard’s and Haidt’s work that has been 
pursued by Atherton (2007b), the influence on our religious belief of this richer 
perspective on the origin and context of human life is barely visible.
 While we might concede Layard’s complaint that ‘happiness’ is altogether 
too vague a concept, yet the kinds of quantification offered – ‘not perfect, yet . . . 
in many ways as good as the measures economists use’ (Diener 2006) – do not 
exactly reassure us that we are in the hands of rich and creative minds. Certainly, 
an equation for happiness like that of Seligman (2004) which reduces the com-
plexities of our human nature to a genetical set point (worth about 50 per cent) 
and our situation in life to ‘circumstances’ (amounting to 8 to 15 per cent) cheats 
us of the understanding that might accrue from deeper reflection on our 
predicament.
 In fact, where such reflection finds expression within the Judaeo- Christian 
tradition, notions of happiness of this kind do not provide the currency to express 
what it is to ‘enjoy God for ever’ (as the 1647 Westminster Catechism puts it: 
Williamson 2003: 1). Such enjoyment is contingent upon an appreciation of the 
cost of God’s creating all that there is – which Job is challenged to acknowledge 
in the vision with which we began – and the cost of making all things new in 
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Jesus Christ. Such revelations of divine love throw into sharp relief the ways in 
which our humility and responsiveness fall short of God’s own desire and show 
that only this acknowledgement can be the starting point for our ultimate wellbe-
ing. Yet, reflecting on ecstatic revelations received 20 years earlier in 1373, 
Julian, a woman of Norwich, refuted the heresy that our human condition is due 
to our being prey to some independent force of evil, but rather because we suffer 
from a privation of goodness. Julian’s concern is not to emphasize our wilfulness 
but to stress the comfort that comes from realizing that our unhappy predicament 
is for the purpose of learning. Sin is ‘behovely’, she says, that is, sin is unavoid-
able, a necessary part of what it is to be human, and its purpose is not to induce 
guilt but to challenge us to learn (Colledge and Walsh 1978; Baker 1994). Being 
well is thus a process of being drawn on by the promise that ‘All shall be well, 
and all shall be well, and all manner of thing shall be well’ (Julian of Norwich, 
trans. Wolters 1966: 103). Such an assurance of her own ultimate being well is 
made to Julian by the sight of all creation shrunk to the size of a hazelnut on the 
palm of her hand – everything that there is and she a part of it, made and sus-
tained there, she was told, through the love of God alone.
 The woundedness of the human condition, which Julian prayed to know more 
fully in her revelations, the contrition for what we are, our compassion for the 
others who share this state, our longing to be made whole with the rest of crea-
tion – these themselves offer the prospect of healing of our unhappiness. God 
certainly desires that humankind should be happy, so the cultivation of delight in 
his longing is indeed a proper religious pursuit (Jantzen 1987). Our deliverance 
from incompleteness is thus more fulfilling even than the happiness of some kind 
of original innocence or that which comes from capitalizing on any naive 
worldly dream.
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18 The ‘virtuous circle’
Religion and the practices of 
happiness1
Elaine Graham
Growing prosperity since 1945 in developed economies is now being shared 
increasingly by developing economies. Yet experience and research widely 
recognize that above certain income levels, greater prosperity is not matched by 
greater happiness, but is accompanied instead by greater social and individual 
distress, manifested, for example, in increasing crime and ill- health, such as 
depression. Much evidence now also suggests that such trends are exacerbated 
by high levels of inequality in society. This so- called ‘Happiness Hypothesis’ is 
explored across a range of disciplines in a field of ‘overlapping literatures’ from 
the 1990s onwards (Atherton, 2008). They all confirm that increasing economic 
prosperity in Western economies is not matched by greater levels of recorded 
happiness. These literatures serve as a multidisciplinary ‘entry- point’ for the 
excavation of further layers of debate about the relationship between global eco-
nomic change, social capital, human behaviour and political institutions, as well 
as their ethical and religious aspects. It is notable that the various literatures on 
wellbeing are mindful of these latter dimensions, and increasingly are focusing 
on the importance of values and beliefs in human satisfaction or quality of life.
 Alongside these developments has been the re- emergence of religion globally, 
including into public life, and more recently matched by the growing interest, 
especially in the West, in the religious contribution to ‘social capital’, or the 
capacity to build social networks within and across various parts of civil society. 
It is the potential link between this latter development and the growing concern 
over the paradox of prosperity and human wellbeing that forms the basis of this 
chapter, which will focus on interacting this so- called ‘happiness hypothesis’ 
with a consideration of the potential role and contribution of religious values and 
organizations. It has further resonances with emerging interest in faith- based 
economics and ethical aspects of development, debt relief and poverty reduction: 
with the morality of the market, if you will, and the question of values, not just 
in terms of informing the ‘moral compass’ (Brown 2007; see also Davis et al. 
2008: 13) of individuals as they chart their course through life, but raising ques-
tions about the very purposes and ends to which political economy as a whole 
should be directed.
 If the question of happiness and wellbeing (especially in relation to economic 
prosperity) is multidisciplinary and multidimensional, then the question of reli-
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gion emerges as one, not insignificant element of that. Given that such a broad- 
based debate raises questions of meaning and value, this opens new doors for 
theological input, and there are significant overlaps between philosophical think-
ing about the good life, particularly around virtue ethics, and moral theology. 
My intention here is to trace these convergences and offer some ways forward.
Religion and the pursuit of happiness
What the literature on wellbeing acknowledges time after time is the significance 
for individuals of what Richard Layard terms a strong philosophy of life. This is 
not identical with organized religion, even though Layard at one point does 
indeed declare that ‘people who believe in God are happier’ (Layard 2005: 72). 
Nevertheless, some kind of correlation does seem to be evident. For example, 
the Center for Spirituality, Theology and Health at Duke University publishes 
digests of research in this area, and reports on a series of clinical studies which 
suggest, among other things, that rates of recovery of cancer patients may be 
better among those who report involvement in faith communities, as well as 
better longevity among those who attend synagogue, slower rates of cognitive 
decline in those experiencing the onset of dementia, and some, marginal, impact 
on aspects of coping strategies in relation to recovery from serious illness 
(Center for Spirituality, Theology and Health 2007). The evidence is varied but 
rich, therefore, although clearly such research raises important questions of 
method and interpretation. For example, is the incidence of better mental health 
among religious people due to divine influence or human solidarity? Do differ-
ent religious traditions deliver different degrees of wellbeing? What about reli-
gious traditions that stress individual practices, such as meditation, in comparison 
to more corporate ones? What is the relationship between ‘religion’ and ‘spiritu-
ality’ – organizational, formal dimensions of observance, say, as opposed to a 
more subtle appreciation of existential or transcendent dimensions to life?
 In terms of explaining the correlation between religion and wellbeing, the 
consensus seems to be that there is powerful ‘added value’ in religion (Coyte et 
al. 2007; Eckersley 2007). It appears to be down to a combination of factors, 
among which social support and membership of a faith community is pre- 
eminent, but which extends to other forms of religious practice, such as prayer, 
reading one’s sacred Scriptures, a sense of meaning and existential belief system 
and a well- articulated moral code. While other (secular) activities might provide 
some of these elements, commentators such as Richard Eckersley argue that reli-
gion ‘packages’ these components effectively and accessibly (Eckersley 2007).
 More specifically, John Swinton (2001: 64–92) postulates various tangible 
mechanisms by which religious affiliation might contribute to greater mental and 
emotional wellbeing:
• Regulation of lifestyle and behaviour – such as restriction of intake of 
alcohol.
• Provision of resources, such as social support and networks.
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• Promotion of positive self- esteem.
• Acquisition of specific life skills and coping resources – such as a frame-
work of understanding illness, stress or loss.
• Generation of positive emotions – cultivation of disposition towards for-
giveness, hope, transformation.
All in all, wellbeing comes from being connected and engaged, from being sus-
pended in a web of relationships and interests. This gives meaning to people’s 
lives (Eckersley 2007: S54).
Social capital, religion and wellbeing
What is interesting is how much of the social capital literature intersects with the 
literature on happiness, in terms of offering insights into the devices by which 
individuals are able to feel a greater connection to the wider community – in 
other words, the very kinds of networks which seem to engender a better quality 
of life. So, one policy document identifies some of the positive benefits of strong 
social capital: high GDP; higher educational attainment; lower levels of crime 
(as a result of strong social norms and levels of trust); better health; and more 
effective institutions of democratic participation in terms of linking citizens with 
government. If we look at those alongside Layard’s Big Seven, considered else-
where in this volume, we see an interesting degree of correlation.
 But a further dimension to this is the significance of religion for engendering 
forms of social capital. Robert Putnam has probably led the way in charting how 
religious values and organizations serve as rich sources of social capital which 
foster precisely those networks and relationships that seem to contribute most 
decisively to healthy social networks, and thus to our quality of life. As Putnam 
reports, churchgoers were ‘substantially more likely to be involved in secular 
organizations, to vote and participate politically in other ways and to have deeper 
informal social connections’ (Putnam 2000: 6). The distinctiveness of churchgo-
ers’ values and attitudes – the theological wellspring of their motivations – has 
variously been described as ‘faithful’ or ‘spiritual’ capital (Commission on 
Urban Life and Faith 2006).2 The Commission on Urban Life and Faith used this 
term to describe the effect of churches on the life of their neighbourhoods: quan-
titative but also qualitative. It is intended to link the sense of strong values that 
guided and informed the activism – and that the two are indivisible.
 If religion is one of the most potent sources of strong values and principles 
that appear to make the difference as people steer their way through the world, 
then this is precisely because it represents a powerful synthesis of beliefs and 
action. We might term this ‘performative’ faithful capital: where belief and prac-
tice are indivisible, something also encapsulated well in understandings of 
praxis, as value- driven, value- directed action, or of phronesis, or practical 
wisdom. This only serves, however, to highlight the question of the relationship 
between values and practices: the literature on religious/social capital, or faithful 
capital, is increasingly converging on the impossibility of separating the two. It 
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resists, therefore, a straightforwardly functionalist reading of the contribution of 
religion to wider society, that faith merely ‘delivers’ social goods and should be 
evaluated on its efficiency or effectiveness in so doing, as any other 
organization.
‘Virtuous capital’
As John Atherton argues, this establishes a strong continuity between ethics and 
religion, or between market economics and welfare economics (Atherton 2008: 
131). It also resonates powerfully with other literatures on the foundations of 
healthy social capital, and especially the role of religion in nurturing bonding, 
bridging and linking the social relationships and networks that appear to be so 
crucial in fostering wellbeing. This then takes us further still into the territory of 
virtue ethics and teleology, because they form part of the realization within the 
happiness and wellbeing literature of the centrality of people’s goals and values. 
It is about being able to establish some basic criteria of human flourishing – of 
what actually constitutes a life well lived – in order to be able to make some 
judgements about what is good for us. Insofar as virtue ethics represents differ-
ent accounts of the ‘good life’ and especially in theologically derived virtue 
ethics, the idea that the good is related to the ends for which humans are believed 
to have been created, it occupies a prominent position.
 In Aristotle’s thought, the good life was defined in terms of the pursuit of 
happiness, or eudaimonia. This entailed the achievement of one’s ultimate goal, 
or telos, which was essentially about shaping one’s life according to the virtues 
of excellence, learning and pleasure. Christian theologians such as Augustine 
and Aquinas put that in a Christian framework, in which virtue was about con-
forming to God’s purposes, a goal that could only be fully fulfilled in the after-
life. This became adapted in later medieval times to a conformity to the precepts 
of natural law. So there is an ontological as well as a moral dimension to the 
normative basis of happiness and wellbeing: we are most fulfilled when becom-
ing and attaining our highest calling and our most authentic being, which in tra-
ditional Christian theology is to become what God has created us to be, by 
practising the virtues of faith, hope, love and charity with the assistance of divine 
grace.
 Eudaimonia is traditionally translated as happiness, although the philosopher 
Elizabeth Anscombe has preferred the term ‘flourishing’, a concept that has also 
recently re- entered moral discourse with the work of Grace Jantzen, who explic-
itly contrasts it and the worldview it embodies with the language and terminol-
ogy of ‘salvation’ (Jantzen 1996). The aim of the ‘good life’ in virtue terms for 
Jantzen is not to seek rescue from a fallen and corrupt world, but to promote the 
values of new life, creativity and justice in ways that propel us towards ‘becom-
ing divine’ (Jantzen 1998). Other philosophers and theologians have emphasized 
the importance of moral agency and choice: the good is something that has to be 
chosen, there has to be an element of freedom, it is not about simply following a 
predestined life- course, or following prescribed rules. Arguably, what makes any 
228  E. Graham
action moral is the necessity of choosing between conflicting goods, or even 
lesser evils. In that respect we return to a useful strand in virtue ethics, which is 
about how one cultivates the gifts of moral discernment: seeking and attaining 
the good and our own wellbeing and that of the planet is not only about follow-
ing a path, but acquiring the map- reading skills by which one ‘navigates’ one’s 
course through life.
 The life which cultivates virtue is preferable for many to alternative traditions 
of moral reasoning, such as Kantian ethics (rule- governed), or utilitarianism or 
consequentialism. The alternative of ‘right action’ versus ‘good consequences’ 
may be resolved by an emphasis on the qualities of the moral agent – but we 
cannot escape the question of what nurtures and sustains the practical wisdom of 
that moral individual; nor the need to consider whether in fact it is not about 
individual virtue but an ecology of virtue in which the individual’s participation 
in a community’s shared ethos is what cultivates the practical wisdom of 
discernment.
 The revival of virtue ethics in theology could usefully connect with this liter-
ature on wellbeing therefore, since it offers a way of reconciling the potential 
conflict between law and grace, while indicating such a framework in the public 
domain: a ‘more dialogic approach to Christian ethics [which] attempts to main-
tain the integrity of religious traditions, while drawing out the potential for 
mutual understanding between them – both within Christianity and between 
Christianity and other faith or non- faith-based groups’ (Garnett et al. 2006: 201). 
This takes us into debate about how questions of value and how notions of the 
good can be negotiated in pluralist societies, and what role is afforded to any 
religious traditions. Can religion be taken seriously as a wellspring of public 
values, or is it to be seen purely as a sectional, fiduciary language only for the 
faithful?
 The point is that religious people do have a long history of thinking about 
values, many of which they share across traditions and many of which have actu-
ally informed the cultural worldviews in which secular people find themselves. 
So it is that dialectic, that sense that Christian identity, like that of other religious 
and cultural traditions, has always developed in particular contexts and through 
constant processes of change and revision, interacting with other worldviews, 
religious and secular, that needs to be affirmed: a convergence of theologically- 
grounded notions of virtue with those of others.
 Yet equally, it may be asked whether Christians should be more wary of 
having anything to do with a concept as banal and self- seeking as ‘happiness’. 
The strong counter- cultural and eschatological nature of early Christianity would 
suggest that new life in Christ and the task of entering the Kingdom have little or 
nothing to do with living happily ever after, with contentment with one’s lot or 
settling for social conformity. The Church’s memory of Jesus is of one who 
preached no cheap grace, but rather warned of the hatred, persecution and abuse 
they would encounter (Matt 10: 24–39). If this is the corporate memory of a per-
secuted community, then it also reflects the shared conviction that Christian dis-
cipleship is a process of constant struggle towards the parousia that speaks of 
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God’s radical intervention in human affairs, rather than the ameliorative gradual-
ism of history, as the ultimate goal to which the faithful should aspire.
 This idea is that happiness is to be found in a struggle within a world which is 
governed by the dynamics of tragedy rather than comedy, of suffering in the face 
of overwhelming moral complexity rather than the restoration of order and 
stability. It is also present in the Aristotelian teleology in which a life virtuously 
lived is constantly tested against notions of the good and excellent which involve 
ends and values that transcend mere self- interest or subsistence. Yet ‘being 
good’ is not necessarily synonymous with ‘being happy’: admittedly, the Aristo-
telian tradition, later taken up by natural law theory, teaches that virtue and 
goodness are all about orientating ourselves towards that which will authenti-
cally fulfil our true natures. Surely, then, we should be happy if we are becoming 
truly ourselves; but Christian theology would also teach that if we live in a fallen 
world in which the limitations and flaws of sin are an ever- present reality, then 
we can never be complacent about simply following our own desires.
 It also propels us towards some of the more communitarian traditions, repre-
sented by theologians such as Stanley Hauerwas, in which the emphasis is on 
inhabiting the habitus of a community which tells the stories by which the good 
life is to be guided: this again is about cultivating habits of discernment in the 
context of particular practices of virtue (Hauerwas 1981). It is through participa-
tion in community that we learn to consider and evaluate the lives of others; in 
communities of faith, there is the (perhaps unique) opportunity to connect with 
the lives of those in other cultures (by virtue of the global nature of many faiths) 
as well as across many generations and historical epochs. This constitutes a 
unique brand of ‘cultural capital’. We need communities as schools of virtue, as 
the places that nurture us. This is not only characteristic of Hauerwas and other 
forms of post- liberal Christian ethics, but is reminiscent of Alasdair Macintyre’s 
famous evocation of ‘practice’ as inherent to moral action (Macintyre 1985). 
Practices and virtue are mutually reinforcing, in that seeking the good may only 
be attained by participating in the specific practices that enable us to achieve 
excellence or virtue in that very pursuit. If certain traditions or communities are 
the bearers of standards of excellence or virtue, then cultivation of the goods 
which they embody may only be reached by means of participation:
After all, if being trained in virtue is like learning the skills for practising a 
craft, or for making and appreciating good music or art, or becoming aware 
of how to eat healthily, then Christianity can provide teaching, practices and 
disciplines, mentors and communities in which to be so trained.
(Harris 2006: 210)
This makes the link between this tradition of virtue and communitarian ethics, 
since it is essentially arguing that people cannot be schooled in virtue in abstract. 
These values have to be embodied and located, because essentially virtue, good-
ness and wellbeing are what might be called ‘performative’ values. It is therefore 
the respect to which virtue ethics is not only about a vision of the good, but about 
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the practice – cultivating and embodying – of particular ways of life by which 
the good may be realized. In that respect, it does not need to be heavily prescrip-
tive or abstract but quite concrete. It is about how practices shape our moral 
selves and build lives well lived, whether that is framed in terms of a telos or life 
goal. Yet it also suggests that this needs to be quite a reflective task, in which the 
twin elements of the vision of the good and the enactment of the life well lived 
need to be brought into active correlation. It suggests that virtue and cultivation 
of virtue also rest on the cultivation of what we might call ‘practical wisdom’ – 
as a form of theological reflection, or moral discernment.
Towards practical wisdom
‘Practical wisdom’, or practical reasoning, has tended to be regarded as inferior 
to more lofty forms of knowledge, which perhaps reflects a split in the Western 
intellectual tradition between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’. If the former is about gen-
eralizable, universalizable knowledge, which models an ideal type or representa-
tion of the world, then the latter is the field of action which may certainly be 
used to test out theories or hypotheses, or develop them, or find exceptions, or 
even disseminate knowledge; but it is rarely seen as the place which prompts 
research or generates theory. There is a sense that practice is the place of ‘appli-
cation’ of theoretical constructs formulated elsewhere; it is secondary, inert. 
However, this division or configuration of ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ itself has a 
history (Gumbrecht 2004).
 So there has been a return to Aristotle’s definitions in the Nicomachean Ethics in 
which he places phronesis (or practical wisdom) alongside Sophia (wisdom). If 
Sophia is the ability to speculate on universal truths, then phronesis is more stra-
tegic, as the form of knowledge geared towards achieving specific goods. But this 
is, for Aristotle, a reflective and deliberative skill, and not just simple technique. 
More recently, with the revival of ideas of practical wisdom, not least in the training 
of many professionals, this is strongly linked with notions of virtue and the good, 
insofar as practical wisdom is concerned with producing right action, ‘bringing 
about a good end for humans in general and for each unique individual’ (Lauder 
1994: 93). As some voices in professional education have argued, such practical 
wisdom may not necessarily involve rule- based or Kantian behaviour, but a complex 
interrelation of thinking and doing – or even being – by which implicit values guide 
discernment in relation to specific contexts, networks or relationships. ‘The goal is 
not some pre- determined end but is instead a result of affirming oneself in spite of 
the events and circumstances which might prevent an individual achieving their 
potential or finding some meaning in life- health experience’ (Lauder 1994: 95).
 As Harriet Harris argues, virtue theory always has to transform itself into 
practice, since it is concerned not with virtue in abstract but with particular 
virtues (Harris 2006: 212). Similarly, paralleling the literature on happiness and 
wellbeing, it is in the context of relationships, ways of life and institutions – in 
the corporate traditions we inhabit and help to form, reflexively, as they are 
shaping us – that the virtues are forged and demonstrated:
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Virtuous living is learned by being practised. It is nurtured . . . in the com-
munities and institutions that shape our lives, especially families, schools, 
churches, and other religious institutions, colleges, places of work, com-
munity groups, and political and charitable organizations.
(Harris 2006: 210)
The concept of theology as ‘practical wisdom’ has achieved prominence in 
recent years, especially in liberation (Gutierrez 1973) practical (Graham 1996) 
and systematic theology (Charry 1997). In their various ways, such sources 
claim that theology has what Ellen Charry terms an ‘aretegenic’ function, as dis-
course aimed towards the formation of Christian character or identity. Know-
ledge of, or talk about, God is intended to cultivate virtue; but – echoing 
Macintyre’s model of moral reasoning – it is more than scientia, or dispassionate 
knowledge, and is better characterized as sapentia, or the wisdom that comes 
from relationship. In more postmodern versions of practical theology (Graham 
1996), practice itself is the primary medium of truth, but this is not simply to 
reduce the nature of God or God- talk to human action. Instead, it is to argue that 
by fixing their attention on the goodness of God, Christians shape their perform-
ances and ‘practise what they preach’ as words are enacted in faithful action. It 
is essentially a ‘virtuous circle’ from practice to theology to practice. From the 
practical, everyday dilemmas of faith comes the need to articulate guiding prin-
ciples, stories, images and values which can constitute the practical wisdom – 
the grammar – of discipleship. In turn, practical activities of healing, nurturing, 
sustaining and transforming are normatively shaped by the tradition. Amidst the 
necessarily unsystematic character of human action and relationships, Christians 
uphold the essentially theological nature of human practical wisdom, informing 
faithful and transformative practice. The primary language of theology is articu-
lated in the practical wisdom of human care; only as a second stage does it find 
expression in systematic doctrinal propositions. This is not to reduce all 
 theology- in/as- practice to human pastoral care, however. Without the horizon of 
divine wisdom, such practice becomes self- referential or reducible to ethics. This 
understanding of theology as practised, however, refuses such a division between 
theory and practice, and insists that God is both immanent and transcendent: 
apprehended in, but never reducible to, human experience.
 This is not unfamiliar within public theology. Heinrich Bedford- Strohm 
(2007) speaks of ‘bilingualism’, capable of giving an account of its own roots 
and sources, but capable of addressing a wider audience too.3 Yet my point is 
that such dialogue is not propositional but performative. This notion of the con-
tribution of theology is essentially a form of wisdom that is enacted and commu-
nicated in the life of its practitioners, yet is accessible to a wider public not by 
virtue of its ability to understand the finer points of doctrine but by its ability to 
‘read’ and witness the lived reality of that community: ‘By their fruits shall ye 
know them.’ Such a performative theology, enacted in the practical wisdom of 
the community, is weighty in terms of its value- ladenness, but tangible in the 
public nature of its demonstration.
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 I have been asking to what extent should Christians be called to a self- 
contained life of virtue that rests exclusively on the narratives of faith and mores 
of the internal community, and to what extent can their inherited values overlap 
with those of other worldviews? Would we agree with ethicists such as Hauer-
was that ‘Christian social insights cannot be shared with others except with those 
who participate in the faith from which they come’ (Atherton 2008: 7)? This is 
to some extent what underlies a principal fault- line in contemporary public theo-
logy today, namely between the communitarian or holiness traditions repre-
sented by thinkers such as Stanley Hauerwas or John Milbank, versus the liberal 
perspectives of Reinhold Niebuhr, Duncan Forrester or Charles Taylor. The 
reality is that people draw their concepts of the good life from a variety of 
sources, Christians being no exception; the point of contention is what aspects of 
such influences – Scripture, the corporate narrative of tradition, secular reason, 
experience – should prove ultimately binding. Understandings of happiness are 
lived out and formed in a variety of settings – and the complexity of modern life 
is such that any mature adult will inevitably encounter a plethora of such mes-
sages in the course of a single day, just by watching a television soap opera, 
passing advertising billboards, reading a bedtime story to their children, listening 
to politicians, let alone reading the sacred texts of their tradition (which are not 
in themselves monolithic in their visions). These are the raw materials out of 
which practical wisdom is negotiated; but ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ are to be held in 
tension, and neither collapsed nor assimilated in the process.
 William Cavanaugh provides a helpful metaphor for this when he returns to 
Augustine’s idea of the ‘city of God’ to examine how Christians are to manage 
the balance between religious faith and public reason, the tensions of disciple-
ship and citizenship. He describes the two realms not as separate self- contained 
worlds, as almost virtual spaces, overlapping each other; but they are primarily 
performative spaces, in which different narratives (in our case of wellbeing and 
human fulfilment) are lived out:
Envisioning the two cities as performances helps us to avoid some serious 
problems with the way the church is imagined. The church as God sees it – 
the Body of Christ – is not a human institution with well- defined bounda-
ries, clearly distinguishable from the secular body politic. The church is not 
a polis, but a set of practices or performances that participate in the history 
of salvation that God is unfolding on earth . . . The church is not a separate 
enclave, but . . . it joins with others to perform the city of God.
(Cavanaugh 2006: 318, emphasis added)
The Church is not preaching to the world or delivering generic moral principles; 
it is, primarily, demonstrating its distinctive ethic within the world, creating a 
shared space in which some views of the good life are mutually discovered and 
celebrated, but also able to create an alternative oikumene, or household or polit-
ical economy, in which different models of human flourishing and unconditional 
regard – an economy of grace rather than reward – may also be practised. But 
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prompted by Cavanaugh’s terminology of space, performance and boundaries, I 
am inclined to characterize public theology as a liminal discipline, which locates 
itself at the threshold, which encourages traffic from the sanctuary into the street, 
fostering the secular vocation of those who need to be articulate in the vernacu-
lars of production, consumption and citizenship as well as the dramas of grace, 
redemption and sacrifice.
 To conclude: the happiness literature stresses the importance of values and 
plentiful, rich social capital such as networks of friends, intimacy, meaningful 
and rewarding (in all sense of the word) pursuits. It is also pointing to evidence 
which suggests that religion and participation in organized religion is effective at 
fostering that kind of social capital. While I have been arguing, however, that 
Christianity may have some distinctive insights to offer in terms of a particular 
practical wisdom of human flourishing, this still needs to be accountable and 
accessible to a wider world. The Christian theological contribution is drawn to 
some kind of bilingualism, or mediation between the many sources and visions 
of happiness and goodness on offer. It is a balance of faith and reason, engage-
ment in the world and immersion in tradition, but then, as Kathryn Tanner says, 
theology has always been dependent on ‘borrowed materials’ (Tanner 1997: 
61–92). A high theology of creation and incarnation requires that it is within this 
world, and in the vernacular of human affairs, that effective discipleship is 
undertaken. There is a tension, but no ultimate contradiction, between the imper-
atives of ‘citizenship’ and ‘discipleship’. In the words of the Sri Lankan theolo-
gian Wesley Ariarajah, ‘At the global level, there is an increasing recognition 
that the world’s problems are not Christian problems requiring Christian 
answers, but human problems that must be addressed together by all human 
beings’ (Ariarajah 1998: 327).
 Similarly, it is a question of ‘happiness’ being both of this world and beyond 
this world, which is a perfectly theologically orthodox perspective, given the 
Christian dispensation which acknowledges both the promise of the Kingdom in 
the light of the resurrection and the gifts of the Spirit at the same time as knowing 
that such promises remain to be fully inaugurated this side of the eschaton. This 
reflects a perennial tradition of living at the threshold between sacred and secular; 
the ‘now’ and the ‘not yet’, and between the Gospel of ‘common grace’ and meta-
noia. This may permit us to conceive of overlap, if not convergence, of many 
worldviews and value commitments, in order that Christians can occupy the same 
space as others without compromising a theologically robust vision. If Christian 
faith and practice has anything to teach the world about happiness and the life well 
lived, such wealth and wisdom must be offered in the name of a common human-
ity and a shared concern for its ultimate flourishing.
Notes
1 This chapter is a revised version of an article (Graham 2009a) which first appeared in a 
special edition of the International Journal of Public Theology entitled ‘Faith, Welfare 
and Well- being: New Directions’, edited by Francis Davis and Andrew Bradstock.
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2 I would defend the term ‘faithful capital’ against its critics because of its ability to hold 
together in synthesis the dimensions of religious (as in practice- based outcomes) and 
spiritual (as in values or beliefs). ‘Faithful’ is performative, praxis- oriented, in terms of 
values enacted and embodied in their outworking, where the actions themselves point 
toward their point of transcendent origin.
3 Elsewhere, I have spoken of this process as one of ‘mediation’ (Graham 2009b: 146).
19 Wellbeing or resilience?
Blurred encounters between theory and 
practice
John Reader
Theories of wellbeing and the Happiness Hypothesis to be found in the recent 
work of Richard Layard and represented in the theological world through the 
work of John Atherton suggest that the application of purely economic criteria to 
various, if not all aspects of human society, has severe limitations. Beyond a 
certain level of financial remuneration, for instance, people look for satisfaction 
and motivation from other, non- financial factors. One question for those of faith 
is how the values that underpin a faith commitment contribute to a ‘thicker’ or 
deeper understanding of human social action than that found in theories of hap-
piness and wellbeing. The particular argument addressed in this chapter is that 
those who are engaged in both scientific research and community development 
activity may be seen, in some cases, to use these alternative ideas as the basis for 
a critique of contemporary culture as and when it relies upon purely financial 
considerations. I will focus on a number of examples in order to support the 
view that not only do non- economic factors play a crucial role for some within 
this field of action, but the dominance of economic criteria in how scientific 
research is translated into practice can be damaging to human wellbeing. 
Beneath these practical considerations lie some more theoretical questions about 
the nature of truth in both religion and science, and the need to develop a more 
open understanding of how truth processes work – one that allows questions of 
value and commitment to be taken into account. This takes the argument in a 
more theoretical direction that can only be hinted at. I will state at the outset that 
I do not believe that happiness and wellbeing can or should be direct outcomes 
of the life of faith, although I do believe that there are occasions when they are 
indirect consequences of following this vocation. The limitations of the concept 
of wellbeing in providing a critique of activity based exclusively upon economic 
considerations may be supplemented by the notion of resilience as used now in 
the environmental movements.
 My first example comes from the work of a colleague who was Professor of 
Materials Engineering and Engineering Education at Queens University, King-
ston, Ontario, Dr Caroline Baillie, who has given me permission to use the 
website account of this project. During the second half of 2007 she and some 
colleagues spent six months in Argentina working with a number of local groups 
and cooperatives, helping them to set up for themselves a recycling enterprise 
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using waste materials. The title of the project is waste- for-life (http://wastefor-
life.org). Without going into the full details, the essential task was to develop 
means of processing and recycling waste material, particularly plastic, in order 
to produce something that can be resold and reused. The scientific and technolo-
gical expertise of the academic team was to be put to practical use for the benefit 
of people in the poorer parts of the country in ways that would be both environ-
mentally friendly and income- generating. The project contained a number of dif-
ferent elements including adult education and community development. A 
quotation from the website will offer a better sense of this:
The cooperative is the epitome of do- it-yourselfism. It was very evident that 
the members of the cooperative had an extensive knowledge of the types of 
materials that they were working with, but this is knowledge attained 
through trial and error and collectivizing the knowledge learned from suc-
cesses and failures. They’ve managed to build a few major and complicated 
machines to process – cut into small bits, wash, and dry – the recycled 
plastic that they collect. This is important because the more capacity 
the cooperatives have to process recycled materials, the less they are at the 
mercy of intermediaries and the more value they can extract from the 
material.
What emerged from the engagement between the incoming scientists and the 
cooperatives was that more efficient and effective means of processing the 
materials would be of considerable benefit to the local projects. As a result of 
this the researchers began to develop a hotpress. At the time of writing and after 
a number of technical teething problems, this is close to being put into operation. 
Of equal significance for the argument of this chapter is the comment from 
members of the team on what they believed themselves to be doing:
We have spent most of our time in Buenos Aires working with cartonero 
recycling cooperatives. They have the structures in place to successfully 
incorporate a small manufacturing channel to their mostly collection, 
sorting, processing and distribution operations. But equally important to us 
is a common political and social outlook that stresses equity and human 
interdependence, and we have been the privileged witnesses to these ideas 
in motion, particularly their commitment to wage equality, non- hierarchical 
participatory decision making practices, and to ‘socializing’ their 
knowledge.
Here is an example of professional scientists working alongside local coopera-
tives, both contributing their technical expertise to the recycling process, and 
also sharing in and learning from values that differ from and even conflict with 
the dominant economic model. Both parties, one might argue, gained in terms of 
their own wellbeing from this venture, but were also contributing to a critique of 
the surrounding culture through the actual project. Science and technology, 
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embedded in certain explicit social and political values, which, incidentally, 
those of faith might share, is making a real and practical difference in a difficult 
economic context.
 Unfortunately however, there are many counter- examples of ways in which 
scientific developments are not put to the benefit of those who need them most. 
One of the starkest of these is the differences in the treatment of AIDS across the 
globe. A comment from the French philosopher Badiou points this out (Badiou 
2007: 27–28):
Today there are more or less 500,000 people infected with AIDS in Europe. 
With the implementation of tritherapy, mortality rates are decreasing 
rapidly. The great majority of these 500,000 will live, albeit paying the costs 
of a burdensome and chronic treatment. In Africa there are 22 million 
people infected with AIDS. Pharmaceuticals are practically absent. A stag-
gering majority of these people will die; in some countries, this will mean 
one child in four, or even one in three.
Badiou’s point is that there is the technical capacity to address the AIDS prob-
lems in Africa but clearly not the political will or interest to do so. This is 
because there is no economic motivation to act. The pharmaceutical companies, 
in the main, do not see Africa as a prime market for their products nor do the 
politicians see dealing with this massive internal problem as a priority in their 
attempts to assert or retain power. One could continue to argue the case, but the 
picture that Badiou presents is perfectly clear: how scientific and technological 
advances are put into practice depends all too often upon values that conflict 
with what is in the interests of the wellbeing of the majorities in developing 
countries. Where purely economic criteria in the narrow sense of a positivist 
economics are the determining factor, human wellbeing will come a poor second 
on the list of priorities.
 What is not often brought out into the public domain is the influence and 
impact of the current regime of Intellectual Property Rights which operates 
across the globe and determines who has access to scientific developments and 
under what conditions. Here one sees political and economic factors shaping the 
way in which scientific advances are rolled out – or not – into the wider com-
munity. In 1994, the Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS) introduced a new era that extended the global reach of 
intellectual property regulation, based on concepts of protection and exclusion 
rather than dissemination and competition. Up until that date, nations had 
enjoyed considerable discretion in the adoption and implementation of domestic 
intellectual property regulation (Sell in Held and McGrew 2003: 170–188).
 Unlike earlier agreements, the TRIPS agreement requires states to take posit-
ive action to protect intellectual property rights. Sell argues that this is a signific-
ant instance of global rule- making by a small handful of well- connected 
corporate players and their governments. This led to protests about the power 
being exercised and this has made the operating environment for large  companies 
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somewhat more sensitive. Nevertheless, the basic argument stands, which is that 
the political and economic power of the few is allowed to determine how scient-
ific advances are made available to those who might benefit from them.
 As one might suspect, much of the impetus behind what became the TRIPS 
agreement came initially from US- based multinational companies aiming to 
protect their market share. The US has been the most aggressive country in terms 
of legal actions and challenges based on the new governance model. The most 
glaring examples of TRIPS in action, and the protests that have developed as a 
result, come from the worlds of agriculture and the pharmaceutical industries. 
So, for instance, grass- roots activists, farmers’ groups, environmental groups, 
human rights and consumer groups have mobilized in recent years in order to 
oppose global biotechnological, pharmaceutical, agricultural chemical and seed 
industries and their aggressive approach to intellectual property. A major issue 
has been the rights of farmers themselves to save, reproduce and modify seeds. 
Biopiracy is the charge often mounted against the multinationals as they attempt 
to appropriate and protect their own control over both genetic resources and tra-
ditional knowledge. Although TRIPS permits the exclusion of plant and animals 
from patentability, Article 27.3(b) requires that members provide protection for 
plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system. The 
problem is that there is no consensus on what qualifies as such a system.
 As we have already noted following Badiou’s comments, the other glaringly 
obvious area for concern is that of the HIV/AIDS crisis in developing countries. 
Both South Africa and Thailand sought to employ compulsory licensing to man-
ufacture AIDS drugs more cheaply in the late 1990s and this led to conflict with 
the US- based industry interests. In May 2000 the Clinton administration did take 
action to relieve this situation, which has led to some relaxation of the multina-
tionals’ stranglehold, but the scale of the problems remaining is still of global 
concern.
Making connections – what has faith engagement to learn 
from this?
The argument is that these particular engagements between scientific research 
and application and the general concept of wellbeing have lessons for possible 
encounters between faith and the developing wellbeing discourses. In order to 
understand this we need first to highlight the differences between the two 
approaches as evidenced so far.
 In the first example the following themes emerged. Scientific methods and 
knowledge were of benefit to a particular local community and contributed to the 
wellbeing both of that community and to the scientists involved, but also to a 
form of political critique. These included: a commitment to adult education as a 
means of learning; a community development approach which based itself on 
local knowledge and needs; a willingness to progress through trial and error; and 
a cooperative endeavour founded on a democratic rather than hierarchical under-
standing of the collective process. These factors in turn were based on certain 
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values: the commitment to equity, human interdependence, and a non- 
hierarchical process of decision- making. It is clear that all of these factors con-
stitute an explicit critique of the dominant models of both research and 
application. One might also want to point out that a particular notion of truth, 
and indeed integrity and human value, underpins all that happened in this 
project. One could also add that happiness and wellbeing, although possible indi-
rect consequences of this activity, are not really the primary objectives.
 This is in contrast to the other examples of how science is used – or misused 
– to promote and contribute to issues of human wellbeing. What emerges is that 
the determining and driving factors are essentially economic and political. Large 
multinational pharmaceutical companies are not prepared to invest ideas and 
resources into countries where there appear to be no obvious economic benefits 
from doing so. Rather than the sharing of resources and expertise characteristic 
of the first approach, the tenor of the second is one of protection and exclusion. 
Those who possess the knowledge prefer to keep it to themselves in order to 
retain their control through market share. If the local contributes in any way to 
knowledge and research then it is only likely to be appropriated and annexed by 
global business for its own internal benefit. The existing economic and political 
order is used as a means of excluding those whose wellbeing might improve but 
who do not form a lucrative market so that resources may be directed to areas 
where the greatest profit is to be made. Wellbeing then is subservient to the profit 
motive and scientific research is simply the handmaid of economic and politi-
cally motivated external forces.
 One can argue therefore that any discussion of wellbeing must first unearth 
the values and understandings which underpin particular examples and be pre-
pared to face up to the conflictual and contested nature of what will be discov-
ered. Whose wellbeing is actually being served in specific instances and is there 
a danger that the term is being employed to disguise certain economic and polit-
ical interests? Claims to neutrality made by those engaged in science and techno-
logy must be handled with care and a degree of scepticism, and similarly with 
those who might suggest that wellbeing is a neutral term that has no connection 
with issues of power. As I have suggested elsewhere (Reader 2008:http://wtf.
org.uk), one of the dangers in the encounters between faith and public life is that 
of ‘cheap grace’ where the realities of distorted or imperialistic relationships are 
hidden beneath the rhetoric of an open and democratic relationship. Without a 
close analysis of particular situations and an awareness of how such relation-
ships and encounters work in practice there is a risk that one side can too readily 
be drawn into engagement without realizing who is really in control. In terms of 
the examples shared earlier, where might those of faith stand on the question of 
a non- hierarchical approach to decision making, let alone on the democratization 
of knowledge which gives greater weight to the local rather than relying heavily 
on outside experts? Is truth the possession of those in positions of power and 
authority who then impose their interpretations on the rest, or is it more like a 
process of ‘circulating references’ as I have suggested elsewhere using the work 
of Bruno Latour (Reader 2009b:ch. 13)? Where then does the knowledge and 
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research carried out by academics (in any field) play a legitimate part in the 
search for human progress and greater wellbeing? These are profound questions 
that must be addressed in this debate.
The Cowley churchyard project
It is time to offer some practical examples of ways in which faith involvement 
can add value to individual and community wellbeing. The first example is the 
churchyard project at St Mary and St John church in Cowley which is on the 
outskirts of the City of Oxford (www.ssmjchurchyard.org.uk). The aim of the 
project is to transform a derelict two- acre Victorian cemetery into a welcoming, 
quiet, safe green space for the local community, as well as to create a pocket 
habitat to link with and enhance the various park and garden habitats across the 
city. So this is essentially an environmental project but with clear social and 
community benefits.
 By the close of the 1990s this space had become overgrown and was a hide- out 
for those sleeping rough and wanting a safe place for drug trafficking. Concerns of 
both parishioners and police led to a group of soldiers being brought in to cut back 
the ‘jungle’ in 2000. This began a process of consultation with the local community 
which led to a partnership with East Oxford Action (Single Regeneration Budget 
funded), as a result of which old paths were resurfaced, entrances reopened and 
lighting installed. It was also agreed that the churchyard should be managed as a 
wildlife conservation area. Further funding was obtained from the Oxford Preserva-
tion Trust and the Conservation Foundation, enabling a tree survey to be carried out 
and a five- year management plan to be commissioned. Other local environmental 
groups and experts were drawn in, plus the involvement of local agencies keen to 
see the project become a focus for social and personal regeneration.
 In 2003 the Lord Lieutenant of Oxfordshire designated the churchyard as a 
Jubilee Wildlife Space and the project also won the Green Church Awards in 
2007.
 Without going into further details, it is clear that the project provides an 
important example of how a local faith group, through the application of scient-
ific insights emerging from environmental studies, can add to the wellbeing of 
an area. The critical factor is the number and variety of people who have so far 
been part of the volunteer workforce. This includes members of local ethnic 
minority groups and also people suffering from mental illness, and the homeless. 
Welfare agencies have recognized that engagement in this type of activity is of 
value for people with deep personal problems. Whether this means working by 
oneself out in the open air or being part of a team, there is no doubt that the 
experience of contributing to this enterprise has a therapeutic value. Being able 
to spend time in this large open space which is in the heart of a built- up area of 
East Oxford also has an attraction for those who live locally, and is a link both 
with the natural world and with the history of the community. Silence, space, 
time for reflection and a period of respite are some of the obvious benefits for 
those who walk through and take time out in this churchyard.
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 So in what ways does this project put into practice the methods identified 
earlier? Scientific knowledge and insights are being applied for the benefit of 
the local community in a very practical and down- to-earth manner. The site 
itself and the work it entails are seen as an educational process both in terms of 
personal and community development. The whole approach is one of partner-
ship and full local engagement, so there is no hint of a ‘top- down’ or imposed 
plan of any sort. The project is open and therefore subject to risks and ambigui-
ties. Much depends on the skill and commitment of key individuals, and their 
capacity to motivate and involve others in the work and the sharing of the 
vision. One might ask what has happened to those who used the space previ-
ously, as their problems may have been simply shifted elsewhere rather than 
directly addressed, but the project leaders are fully aware of this and continue 
to liaise with local agencies in trying to help those who cross the threshold of 
the churchyard. The values underpinning the work are those of commitment to 
the wellbeing of others and to that of the natural world, and the profit motive 
does not figure in the process. Like all such projects it is both of value in itself 
and sets an example of what can be done standing as a beacon within the area 
and further afield, given its growing national profile. Here is faith adding value 
to personal and community wellbeing using the community development 
approach similar to that in evidence in scientifically motivated projects. Yet to 
say that this is only about happiness and wellbeing is surely to miss the most 
important dimension of the project which can be more adequately captured 
under the heading of resilience. How can this locality adapt itself to the forces 
of change shaping its wider context while holding on to the values and beliefs 
which have shaped its history, let alone the hopes for a different future which 
emerge out of its environmental principles? Resilience is the capacity to hold 
this tension between theory and practice while engaging in a lived critique of 
the surrounding culture.
Wellbeing and landscape capital
It is perhaps not surprising that many of the practical projects one encounters 
which employ scientific insights and which aim to further greater human well-
being are broadly environmental, as this is an obvious arena within which they 
contribute to a different and better future. I now want to describe another devel-
oping piece of work in which I am directly involved and which follows a similar 
pattern to the Cowley project. I am linking this to the concept of landscape 
capital which is one of the growing family of ‘capitals’ that are now familiar in 
the discourse – others being of course social capital, religious capital and spirit-
ual capital. The idea behind this is that direct engagement with the landscape as 
a source of both refreshment and stimulation is a means whereby people can 
revive a sense of their relationship with the natural world and also achieve a new 
perspective on human identity. Once again it may well challenge the dominant 
discourse of a positivist economics where profit- driven motives are seen as the 
determining factor. Landscape does not exist purely as an asset to be exploited, 
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even as a tourist attraction, but in its own right and as an unfamiliar and untapped 
source of new experiences.
 This particular project took place in autumn 2008 in the village of Chelford in 
Cheshire, just southwest of Manchester and close to the Peak District. It began 
with three people in the village wondering how they could encourage others to 
think about how and why the community has developed as it has. The local 
terrain and then the trails and communication networks, both road and rail, have 
determined where the village was built and how it has subsequently grown and 
developed. But in order to see that more clearly one needs to stand apart from 
the immediate locality by walking along the edge of the Peak District and 
looking back towards the area. Hence the idea was born that the project would 
encourage people to go up to the Peaks and walk all or part of the trail from 
which one can look down and still see Chelford.
 A number of further ideas have grown from this original concept which turn 
this into a local community development project. It builds upon recent experi-
ence of the organizers that, amidst the busy lives people lead and their unwill-
ingness to engage in any sustained community activity, one thing that many are 
prepared to do is to come out into the countryside and walk. As long as some-
body else does the organizing and sets out the trail clearly, all that is required is 
a couple of hours’ time and some good walking boots at best. The question then 
becomes whether it is possible to use this shared experience as a means of ena-
bling people to engage not only with each other, but also with the landscape, in a 
different and challenging manner. The project therefore encourages people to 
take note of their varied experiences as they walk and to do such things as take 
photographs, record sounds, write poems or short comments, to draw or sculpt 
either at the time or subsequently. At the end of the project an exhibition of what 
emerged from this activity was held in the village school.
 Events that were planned around the project included the community artists 
working on site up in the Peaks with a class from the local school, sculpting 
small figures that then become part of the trail – similar ideas have been success-
fully tried in other parts of the country such as the Anthony Gormley figures 
along the Merseyside coastline. A village picnic took place on one part of the 
trail at the end of August 2008 which included a gentle walk (in thick fog as it 
happens) to the top of one of the ridges. This was on a Sunday, so all church 
services were cancelled and the walk and picnic became ‘it’ for that day. Over 
50 people of all ages took part. At the end of October there was a pilgrimage 
which began further up at the boundary of the County Palatine of Cheshire and 
Yorkshire but ended six days later at Chelford itself. Then the exhibition in the 
school took place in late November and drew events to a close.
 All of this is highly experimental and may or may not work in the sense of 
engaging people in their local community, let alone helping them to experience 
the landscape in a different way. It is risky but may result in unexpected insights 
and reactions. It is not being run by experts, but by local people for local people 
who nevertheless share certain values and commitments. I would argue, as the 
local parish priest now heavily involved and a member of the planning team, that 
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there was a faith element to this, even though it was a community arts develop-
ment project, a way of helping people work together in new ways, to create a 
greater sense of community and to engage with the world around them in a new 
and creative way. Thus it was very much about enhancing wellbeing but also 
increasing resilience, and adding value by engaging people beyond the everyday 
and mundane. One can never anticipate what will evolve as a result of such 
projects but they do tend to be a practical way of setting processes going and 
constructing new relationships and possibilities.
Spiritual resilience
In the final part of this chapter I will turn my attention to some of the theoretical 
issues and resources that are required in order to further this debate. In order to 
do this in a focused manner I will use the concept of spiritual resilience. As we 
have seen, the term ‘resilience’ has recently entered environmental discourse and 
refers to the capacity of individuals or systems to respond effectively to distur-
bance and change while still retaining its/their essential functions or values 
(Hopkins 2008: 54). It seems to possess a greater capacity to support activity and 
thought that challenges any financially or power- based structures within a wider 
culture. Happiness and wellbeing are not, in themselves, robust enough to 
provide a basis for political critique.
 What I will argue is that a faith contribution to human wellbeing cannot 
remain within the confines of an economically constructed framework but must 
engage with issues of appropriate change and adaptation. As we have seen in the 
practical examples, there is more fluidity and uncertainty built into the processes 
that appear to yield a greater sense of wellbeing, and it is those that need to be 
developed and investigated further. There is both the resilience that is required 
by individuals in adapting to change through their own personal development, 
and that of a more collective dimension which is facilitated by community devel-
opment work and adult education. The projects outlined earlier are essentially 
fragile and complex, and cannot be guaranteed to yield clear and coherent 
results. In the context of learning and personal development it has been sug-
gested that a key component of this is to ‘hang out in the fog’ (Claxton 2001: 
16). Outcomes are still unclear and uncertain. We have to be able to tolerate con-
fusion, to dare to wait in a state of incomprehension as we deal with unknowns 
and the unpredictability of setting up a process that none of us have experienced 
before. Such is the cost – and the excitement – of creativity.
 This refers back to the ideas about truth as circulating reference as identified 
by Bruno Latour and what he calls Science Studies (Reader 2009b: 199). What 
this talks about is the process by which new ideas and hypotheses circulate 
through a range and entanglement of human relationships and structures. Sooner 
or later much of this does come to rest in a particular location, and people reach 
the conclusion that such and such is the case and becomes the accepted interpre-
tation – at least for the moment. But there are always dangers in this that truth is 
reduced to a particular position or set of propositions which then becomes 
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 stabilized in a manner that undermines further critical investigation. Such a 
process can also be identified in matters of faith. Once one particular party 
begins to claim that they possess the truth, this becomes a means of exercising 
power over others and of preventing deeper questioning and research. I am also 
reminded of one of the requirements of intercultural communicative competence 
as developed by other colleagues from the educational world, one of which is the 
capacity to live with ambiguities. One might suggest that both real learning and 
spiritual resilience require an openness and flexibility to hang around in the fog 
and not to search for quick fixes and easy resolutions of issues.
 The final idea that I find particularly powerful and revealing is that of liminal-
ity. ‘Limen’ is the Latin term which translates as threshold. At what point and in 
what context do ‘blurred encounters’ which may occur out in the fog become 
turning points or thresholds to a new understanding or insight? There are those 
from within spiritual traditions who perceive the liminal space to be the location 
for growth and change, the space betwixt and between where God is often 
leading but where we feel uncomfortable and insecure. The tried and tested has 
to be left behind and we have to be willing to live with the not knowing and not 
being in control – the desert is another symbol of this location within spiritual 
traditions. The temptation is always to return from this scary place too quickly, 
to retreat from this ‘cloud of unknowing’ and from the homely and familiar by 
resorting to quick- fix solutions and interpretations. Few of us know how to stay 
on the thresholds or to remain in the liminal spaces – though this could be part of 
the concept of spiritual resilience – the capacity to remain ‘out in the fog’!
 So here then are some hints and suggestions as to how a notion of spiritual 
resilience might be the real contribution of faith which take us beyond the some-
times limiting concepts of human wellbeing. This may not be the comfortable 
conclusion that many had anticipated but it might well provide a basis for cri-
tique of some of the more obvious ideas that are around at the moment. It does 
not reduce wellbeing to being financially or economically better off, or simply to 
a notion of mental or physical health which presupposes such levels of affluence 
or access to public care services. It raises questions about our self- understanding 
and thus about our relationships with each other and the natural world which 
tend to emerge through current environmental issues and the contribution of a 
critical scientific process to both areas. It does require a willingness to engage in 
deeper exploration that perhaps those attempting to secure the future of institu-
tional Christianity may prefer to ignore, but perhaps our calling is to step out 
into the fog, to go out into the desert and to let go of much that we think we 
know and believe in order to be present in a place where truth may once again 
begin to emerge.
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